• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.15-26
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• 2018

This study examines the effects of failure experience, re-startup's motivation, government support business and education for re-startup on the performance of re-startup firms after failure. In addition, we analyzed how the above factors affect the performance of re-startup firms by the condition of debt and credit problems. As a result of the analysis, the failure experience had no significant effect on the re-startup performance regardless of the credit problem, while re-startup's motivation, government support business and education for re-startup had a significant effect on re-startup firms' performance. In the re-startup group with the credit problem, the re-startup's motivation and the failure experience had a significant influence on the re-startup firms' performance. On the other hand, in the group that did not solve the credit problem, the re-startup's motivation and the failure experience had no significant effect on the re-startup performance, but the government support business and education for re-startup had a significant effect on re-startup performance. The results of this study are as follows: First, it shows that the characteristics of re-startups and the determinants of re-startups are different according to credit problems. Second, this study shows that it takes 56 months on average from the close of business to the re-start, and it may take more than 7 years due to the credit problems and bankruptcy. This suggests the necessity to consider re-startup in the concept of obsolete in consideration of time, when studying the direct/indirect influence of failure experience and re-startup, and establishing policy.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.1-31
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• 2008

Various opinions have been suggested to explain the slump in equipment investment, such as increased government regulations, shareholder-oriented management by expanded foreign equity investment, response against M&A threats, conservative investment trends seen after a series of bankruptcy of large conglomerates (amidst crumbling myth of "Too Big to Fail"), and financial restructuring. Some also argued that the increased uncertainty in business environment is mainly responsible for conservative management, though there are few domestic studies made regarding the situation. But, in other countries, including the U.S., studies have shown that more volatility is seen now surrounding stock prices, profitability, and sales growth rate reflecting business performance. Also, there are other studies showing such expanded volatility have led to conservative management by businesses. In this regard, this study reviews the volatility conditions of business performance of Korean companies based on profitability, and then attempts to analyze the impact on investment brought on by increased volatility. Each company's profitability volatility used here is from the standard deviation of companies for the past five years. As a profitability indicator, the ROA (= operating profit/total asset) is used. According to the analysis, profitability volatility has remarkably increased from the mid 3% in 1994 to low 5% in 2005. Profitability volatility of the Korean companies has expanded to a great extent since the financial crisis. The crisis might have served to raise the volatility in the macroeconomic conditions. If increased volatility observed during the economic crisis had gradually declined after the crisis, the situation could be interpreted as a temporary phenomenon, not to be too concerned over. But, this was not the case for Korea. The volatility level, after the crisis, has not dropped back to its pre-crisis level. Hence, in the Korea's case, high volatility cannot be explained by the impact of financial crisis. Not only that, the fact that such expansion is seen in every industrial sector indicates that this phenomenon cannot be explained by the composition change of industries alone. An undergoing study shows that with a rapid spread of globalization, industries fiercely competing with China experience more volatility. Such increased volatility tends to contract investment, and since the crisis the impact of volatility on investment has slightly increased. It is noteworthy that this study only includes a part of 'uncertainty' that could be measured statistically. For instance, the profitability volatility indicator used in this study is unable to reflect all the effects that the tacit reduction of protection by the government or regulations might have made. So, the result here also indicates that other 'uncertain' factors not mentioned in this study may have served to contract investment sentiment. It would be impossible for policies to completely remove uncertainties measured by profitability volatility, but at least it is necessary to put effort to reduce the macroeconomic volatility in the future economic management. Stabilized macroeconomic management may not be enough to diminish all volatility that occurs within each company, but it would make a meaningful contribution in encouraging investment.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.9
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• pp.69-98
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• 2005

The security industry for civilians (Private Security), was first introduced to Korea via the US army's security system in the early 1960's. Shortly after then, official police laws were enforced in 1973, and private security finally started to develop with the passing of the 'service security industry' law in 1976. Korea's Private Security industry grew rapidly in the 1980's with the support of foreign funds and products, and now there are thought to be approximately 2000 private security enterprises currently running in Korea. However, nowadays the majority of these enterprises are experiencing difficulties such as lack of funds, insufficient management, and lack of control over employees, as a result, it seems difficult for some enterprises to avoid the low production output and bankruptcy. As a result of this these enterprises often settle these matters illegally, such as excessive dumping or avoiding problems by hiring inappropriate employees who don't have the right skills or qualifications for the jobs. The main problem with the establishment of this kind of security service is that it is so easy to make inroads into this private service market. All these hindering factors inhibit the market growth and impede qualitative development. Based on these main reasons, I researched this area, and will analyze and criticize the present condition of Korea's private security. I will present a possible development plan for the private security of Korea by referring to cases from the US and Japan. My method of researching was to investigate any related documentary records and articles and to interview people for necessary evidence. The theoretical study, involves investigation books and dissertations which are published from inside and outside of the country, and studying the complete collection of laws and regulations, internet data, various study reports, and the documentary records and the statistical data of many institutions such as the National Police Office, judicial training institute, and the enterprises of private security. Also, in addition, the contents of professionals who are in charge of practical affairs on the spot in order to overcomes the critical points of documentary records when investigating dissertation. I tried to get a firm grasp of the problems and difficulties which people in these work enterprises experience, this I thought would be most effective by interviewing the workers, for example: how they feel in the work places and what are the elements which inpede development? And I also interviewed policemen who are in charge of supervising the private escort enterprises, in an effort to figure out the problems and differences in opinion between domestic private security service and the police. From this investigation and research I will try to pin point the major problems of the private security and present a developmental plan. Firstly-Companies should unify the private police law and private security service law. Secondly-It is essential to introduce the 'specialty certificate' system for the quality improvement of private security service. Thirdly-must open up a new private security market by improving old system. Fourth-must build up the competitive power of the security service enterprises which is based on an efficient management. Fifth-needs special marketing strategy to hold customers Sixth-needs positive research based on theoretical studies. Seventh-needs the consistent and even training according to effective market demand. Eighth-Must maintain interrelationship with the police department. Ninth-must reinforce the system of Korean private security service association. Tenth-must establish private security laboratory. Based on these suggestions there should be improvement of private security service.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.13 no.4
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• pp.91-116
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• 1991

Market liberalization progressing simultaneously with high and rapidly rising domestic wages has created an adverse business environment for domestic firms. Korean firms are losing their international competitiveness in comparison to firms from LDC(Less Developed Countries) in low-tech industries. In high-tech industries, domestic firms without government protection (which is impossible due to the liberalization policy and the current international status of the Korean economy) are in a disadvantaged position relative to firms from advanced countries. This paper examines the division of roles between the private sector and the government in order to achieve a successful structural adjustment, which has become the impending industrial policy issue caused by high domestic wages, on the one hand, and the opening of domestic markets, on the other. The micro foundation of the economy-wide structural adjustment is actually the restructuring of business portfolios at the firm level. The firm-level business restructuring means that firms in low-value-added businesses or with declining market niches establish new major businesses in higher value-added segments or growing market niches. The adjustment of the business structure at the firm level can only be accomplished by accumulating firm-specific managerial assets necessary to establish a new business structure. This can be done through learning-by-doing in the whole system of management, including research and development, manufacturing, and marketing. Therefore, the voluntary cooperation among the people in the company is essential for making the cost of the learning process lower than that at the competing companies. Hence, firms that attempt to restructure their major businesses need to induce corporate-wide participation through innovations in organization and management, encourage innovative corporate culture, and maintain cooperative labor unions. Policy discussions on structural adjustments usually regard firms as a black box behind a few macro variables. But in reality, firm activities are not flows of materials but relationships among human resources. The growth potential of companies are embodied in the human resources of the firm; the balance of interest among stockholders, managers, and workers of the company' brings the accumulation of the company's core competencies. Therefore, policymakers and economists shoud change their old concept of the firm as a technological black box which produces a marketable commodities. Firms should be regarded as coalitions of interest groups such as stockholders, managers, and workers. Consequently the discussion on the structural adjustment both at the macroeconomic level and the firm level should be based on this new paradigm of understanding firms. The government's role in reducing the cost of structural adjustment and supporting should the creation of new industries emphasize the following: First, government must promote the competition in domestic markets by revising laws related to antitrust policy, bankruptcy, and the promotion of small and medium-sized companies. General consensus on the limitations of government intervention and the merit of deregulation should be sought among policymakers and people in the business world. In the age of internationalization, nation-specific competitive advantages cannot be exclusively in favor of domestic firms. The international competitiveness of a domestic firm derives from the firm-specific core competencies which can be accumulated by internal investment and organization of the firm. Second, government must build up a solid infrastructure of production factors including capital, technology, manpower, and information. Structural adjustment often entails bankruptcies and partial waste of resources. However, it is desirable for the government not to try to sustain marginal businesses, but to support the diversification or restructuring of businesses by assisting in factor creation. Institutional support for venture businesses needs to be improved, especially in the financing system since many investment projects in venture businesses are highly risky, even though they are very promising. The proportion of low-value added production processes and declining industries should be reduced by promoting foreign direct investment and factory automation. Moreover, one cannot over-emphasize the importance of future-oriented labor policies to be based on the new paradigm of understanding firm activities. The old laws and instititutions related to labor unions need to be reformed. Third, government must improve the regimes related to money, banking, and the tax system to change business practices dependent on government protection or undesirable in view of the evolution of the Korean economy as a whole. To prevent rational business decisions from contradicting to the interest of the economy as a whole, government should influence the business environment, not the business itself.