• Journal of the Institute of Electronics Engineers of Korea TC
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• v.43 no.7 s.349
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• pp.1-13
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• 2006

In this paper, we introduce a novel key management scheme that is based on the key pre-distribution but provides the key re-distribution method, in order to manage keys for message encryption and authentication of lower-layer sensor nodes on hierarchical mobile sensor networks. The characteristics of our key management are as follows: First, the role of key management is distributed to aggregator nodes as well as a sink node, to overcome the weakness of centralized management. Second, a sink node generates keys using regression model, thus it stores only the information for calculating the keys using the key information received from nodes, but does not store the relationship between a node and a key, and the keys themselves. As the disadvantage of existing key pre-distributions, they do not support the key re-distribution after the deployment of nodes, and it is hard to extend the key information in the case that sensor nodes in the network enlarge. Thirdly, our mechanism provides the resilience to node capture(${\lambda}$-security), also provided by the existing key pre-distributions, and fourth offers the key freshness through key re-distribution, key distribution to mobile nodes, and scalability to make up for the weak points in the existing key pre-distributions. Fifth, our mechanism does not fix the relationship between a node and a key, thus supports the anonymity and untraceability of mobile nodes. Lastly, we compare ours with existing mechanisms, and verify our performance through the overhead analysis of communication, computation, and memory.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.30 no.3
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• pp.377-386
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• 2003

In this paper, we present an application layer protocol to support secure wireless Internet services, called Application Layer Security(ALS). The drawbacks of the two traditional approaches to secure wireless applications motivated the development of ALS. One is that in the conventional application-specific security protocol such as Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol(S-HTTP), security mechanism is included in the application itself. This gives a disadvantage that the security services are available only to that particular application. The other is that a separate protocol layer is inserted between the application and transport layers, as in the Secure Sockets Layer(SSL)/Transport Layer Security(TLS). In this case, all channel data are encrypted regardless of the specific application's requirements, resulting in much waste of network resources. To overcome these problems, ALS is proposed to be implemented on top of HTTP so that it is independent of the various transport layer protocols, and provides a common security interface with security applications so that it greatly improves the portability of security applications. In addition, since ALS takes advantages of well-known TLS mechanism, it eliminates the danger of malicious attack and provides applications with various security services such as authentication, confidentiality integrity and digital signature, and partial encryption. We conclude this paper with an example of applying ALS to the solution of end-to-end security in a present commercial wireless protocol stack, Wireless Application Protocol.

• The Journal of Society for e-Business Studies
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.169-185
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• 2017

Juliano Rizzo and Thai Duong, the authors of the BEAST attack [11, 12] on SSL, have proposed a new attack named CRIME [13] which is Compression Ratio Info-leak Made Easy. The CRIME exploits how data compression and encryption interact to discover secret information about the underlying encrypted data. Repeating this method allows an attacker to eventually decrypt the data and recover HTTP session cookies. This security weakness targets in SPDY and SSL/TLS compression. The attack becomes effective because the attacker is enable to choose different input data and observe the length of the encrypted data that comes out. Since Transport Layer Security (TLS) ensures integrity of data transmitted between two parties (server and client) and provides strong authentication for both parties, in the last few years, it has a wide range of attacks on SSL/TLS which have exploited various features in the TLS mechanism. In this paper, we will discuss about the CRIME and other versions of SSL/TLS attacks along with countermeasures, implementations. We also present direction for SSL/TLS attacks resistance in practice.