• International Journal of Advanced Culture Technology
• /
• v.7 no.4
• /
• pp.63-68
• /
• 2019

Recently, the United States and China have declared a 25% retaliatory tariff for the partner country products of 50 billion dollar scale. "Trade war" is getting full swing. Such conflicts between economic powers may spread to Japan like the domino phenomenon following the EU (European Union) and become bigger in the global trade war. As a result, Korea has an economic system with a high degree of external dependence, and there is an expert's analysis that it will become the largest victim of the global trade war. If the WTO Dispute Settlement Authority approves this US 301 retaliation measure in the same way as the past case (US-EU hormone-treated beef imports), the United States will not import any Chinese imported products Chinese products) can be imposed. If the US launches a special 301 or super 301, which is stronger than the regular 301, then China is very likely to enforce US retaliation against it, and the trade war between the two countries could become a reality. This phenomenon is likely to have a negative impact on Korean companies. In particular, Korea, which is highly reliant on intermediate goods exports to China, is expected to suffer a great deal of damage. Therefore, Korea needs flexible response at home and abroad, it is necessary to enhance the autonomy of companies and protect export industries. Adjusting corporate tax rate as well as domestic industry height will be one way. The long-term (21 months) trade war between the United States and China has resulted in economic uncertainty. The resulting damage must be compensated. It is necessary to prepare the compensation through the economic council between countries. In the future, the punitive damage compensation system should be introduced.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
• /
• v.22
• /
• pp.255-285
• /
• 2004

After more than 15 years of negotiations, China was finally able to achieve the WTO membership, opening up new trade opportunities for China as well as existing WTO members. China accepted a special safeguard mechanism as one of its WTO- plus commitments. And in response, Korea has since introduced China special safeguard rules, which in simple terms, allows an invocation of safeguard measures against Chinese product imports under more lapse conditions than would normally be allowed under the existing general safeguard rules. China also introduced new safeguard rules in November 2001 in an effort to increase transparency in its operation of safeguard measures. However, the current article contends that the new rules pose a serious threat to free trade in the form of the retaliation provision, which enables China to take unilateral retaliatory actions against safeguard measures on Chinese product imports, It indicates that the provision could be operated in an arbitrary manner as the US Super 301, and lead to infringements of WTO disciplines. This paper indicates that the foregoing elements could lead to mort trade disputes between Korea China regarding safeguard measures and subsequent retaliations on the hills of the so called the Garlic War. The current article goes on to offer policy recommendations toward deterring such disputes. First, it recommends a more active invocation of Korea's own retaliatory provision against China's unilateral actions at least to gain negotiating leverage. Second, it sites problems involving China's still conspicuous state-trading practices, and proposes to raise issues again China to induce more faithful implementation of WTO disciplines Final, it stresses the importance of preventing disputes before they arise, and suggests several specific preventive measures.