• 국제지역연구
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• 제15권1호
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• pp.109-134
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• 2011

미국의 지원 하에 추진된 우리베 정권(Alvaro Uribe:2002-2010)의 마약퇴치 및 불법무장조직에 대한 강경책은 가시적 성과에도 불구하고 마약과 관련된 범죄는 증가했으며, 마약재배와 거래량의 변화를 동반하지 않았다. 오히려 불법작물 재배권을 둘러싼 좌.우익 불법무장단체들의 무력분쟁은 심화되었고, 강제실향민으로 인한 난민은 급증했다. 2005년 실향민등록위원회 RUPD(el Registro Único de Población Desplazada)는 콜롬비아 전체인구의 7.3%에 해당하는 3,316,862명이 난민상태라고 보고했다. 특히 2002년 강제실향민으로 인한 난민 수는 전년대비 624%의 대폭적인 증가율을 나타냈다. 강제실향민 주요 배출지역은 마약범죄와 불법무장조직의 활동과 관련을 맺고 있는 곳으로 불법무장단체와 민병대의 점령지 확장과정에서 무력분쟁이 지속적으로 증가했다. 불법무장조직과 민병대가 불법작물경작지를 차지하는 과정에서 농민에 대한 무차별적인 공격을 감행하여 강제실향민이 급증하였고, 이들은 상주지를 떠나 국경을 넘어 접경지역으로 이동했다. 2002년 우리베 정권이 등장하기 이전 강제실향민문제는 일부 특정지역에 국한되었지만, 국가안보정책 추진이후 강제실향민은 양적인 팽창뿐만 아니라, 전국적으로 확산되는 경향을 나타냈다. 마약거래의 주요 루트였던 아마존 지역이 폐쇄되자 불법무장조직의 활동거점이 태평양 역으로 이동되었고, 특히 파나마 접경지역은 이전에 존재하지 않았던 강제실향민으로 인한 콜롬비아 난민이 증가했다. 본 연구는 2002년 우리베 정권등장 이후 증가한 국경지역 강제실향민을 대상으로 콜롬비아 난민증가 원인에 대해 고찰해 보고자 한다. 역사적으로 콜롬비아의 강제실향민이 가장 많이 분포되어 있는 베네수엘라와 1990년대 말 이후 강제실향민의 새로운 정착지로 변모한 파나마 그리고 2000년 들어 다른 인접국보다도 급격하게 증가한 에콰도르 접경지역의 강제실향민을 중심으로 강제실향민 증가원인을 고찰하고 이를 바탕으로 난민문제 해결을 위한 콜롬비아 정부의 노력을 살펴볼 것이다.

• 국제학술발표논문집
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• The 1th International Conference on Construction Engineering and Project Management
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• pp.693-698
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• 2005

Evaluation of construction claims history can provide insights to improvement opportunities in a capital project portfolio. This study analyzed construction litigation claims extracted from the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (COFC) history involving the U.S. Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) from 1995-2004. Twenty-four total cases were examined over this period. Both "primary" causes and "root" causes were identified and compared to 666 litigation cases reviewed by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA). Based on the analysis, strategies for resolving future disputes are recommend using a 'hybrid' process prior to litigation.

• Strategy21
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• 통권33호
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.

• Strategy21
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• 통권44호
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• pp.28-53
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• 2018

The U.S. has recently developed Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and Distributed Lethality strategy based on a common perception that they are responding to China's threats. In the future, it is anticipated the following. Strengthen cooperation of the U.S.-India-Vietnam navy, Maximizing the combined combat power between the U.S. and regional navies, Improving its ability to restore damage control, Economic cooperation between the Pacific and Indian countries. The meanings given to the Korean navy are as follows. First, South Korea should pursue cooperation with the Indian Navy, which will grow into a regional balance on China's growth. The growth of the Indian navy is expected to increase cooperation with other Pacific countries. The government should seek ways to promote cooperation with india navy in various fields. Secondly, it is a joint drill between the U.S. Navy and the Korean Navy. Recently, the Korea-U.S. joint drill has not been conducted and many changes are expected to be made regarding the implementation of the joint drill in the future. Therefore, it is necessary to respond to possible changes in the naval relationship between Korea navy and the U.S. navy Also, due to distributed lethality strategy, preparations for operations and training with U.S.navy will be necessary. Lastly, it should contribute to cooperation among regional countries in preparation for maritime territorial disputes. The growth of the Chinese navy and the territorial disputes in the East and South China sea has raised the possibility of accidental military clashes at sea. Therefore, the government should make efforts to create multilateral security cooperation systems that can continue to promote the prevention of armed conflict.

• Strategy21
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• 통권38호
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• pp.287-320
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• 2015

On October 27, 2015, USS Lassen(DDG82), a 9,200 ton class Aegis destroyer of the United States Navy, began its operations within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef, one of the seven artificial islands that China has built and claimed sovereignty over. The maneuver was joined by anti-submarine patrol airplanes such as P-8A and P-3. The White House press secretary mentioned that the President of the United States approved the operation. In response, China announced that it warned the US Navy ship about the 'illegal violation' by sending two destroyers(PLAN Lanzhou and Taizhou). This event represents a close call case where tension between the United States and China in the South China Sea might have been elevated to a conflict between the two navies. Moreover, considering that this happened only one month after Chinese president Xi's state visit to the United States, the event shows that the positions of the two countries have become starkly different to the extent that they are so hard to be reconciled. The United States' position is different from those of Vietnam and the Philippines. Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines have been directly involved in disputes with regard to sovereignty claims across the waters in the South China sea. As for the United States, being a third party in the disputes, it still cannot be a by-stander watching the whole waters in the region fall under the influence of China. Accordingly, the United States maintains that all countries bear the rights of innocent passage and military operations in the Exclusive Economic Zones(EEZ) as stipulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS). In contrast, China claims that, historically, the South China sea has been part of China's territorial waters, and that foreign countries are not allowed to conduct military operations within the waters. It strongly accuses that such military operations are illegal. Against this background, this paper tracks the different positions of the United States and China on the issues regarding the South China sea. It also carefully looks at the possibility that, in the process of dealing with the issues, the two countries may get into an armed conflict as the phrase 'Thucydides Trap' predicts.

• 해양안보
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• 제3권1호
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• pp.211-235
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• 2021

1982년 4월 2일부터 6월 14일까지 지속한 포클랜드제도 분쟁 결과, 영국은 전쟁 승리를 통해 극심한 경제불황의 위기를 넘어 과거 화려한 대영제국의 영광을 되찾을 수 있었다. 반면 아르헨티나는 군사독재 정권의 몰락과 민주정권의 탄생에 지대한 영향을 받는다. 본 연구는 포클랜드분쟁에 관해 "DIME on PMESII"를 적용함으로써, 미래 독도에서 발생 가능한 해양분쟁 대응전략을 제시하고자 작성되었다. 특히 분쟁지역을 실효적으로 지배하고 있는 국가가 가진 총체적 국력의 수단으로서 외교·정보·군사·경제, 즉 DIME 능력이 어떤 영향을 미치는지 분석하였다. 동시에 반대 시야에서 해당지역을 실효적으로 지배하지 못하는 국가의 정치·군사·경제·사회·정보 및 기반시설, 즉 PMESII 체계를 적용해 분석하였다. 연구 결과, 독도 해양분쟁 관련 대응전략으로 첫째, 영국과 같이 분쟁영토에 대한 실효적 지배를 효과적으로 지속하고 강화해나가야 한다. 이를 통해, 국민에 대한 애국심 고취 및 전시정부에 대한 지지, 정당한 전쟁명분의 확보, 국제적인 지지를 얻을 수 있다. 둘째, 현대 전쟁을 분석할 때 자국의 DIME 능력을 상대국의 PMESII 체계 약점에 집중하는 'DIME on PMESII'가 효과적임을 증명할 수 있었다. 이제는 전쟁을 수행하는 데 있어 군사력만으로 상호 충돌하는 형태가 아니라 국가의 총체적인 국력인 외교·정보·경제분야 능력을 즉각적으로 투입해야 한다. 셋째, 미래 독도 해양분쟁에 대한 철저한 대비가 필요하므로, 해양에서의 제한된 국지전 가능성을 극복하기 위해 주변국에 대한 적절한 전략이 필요하다.

• Strategy21
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• 통권30호
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• pp.99-142
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• 2012

Withe increased North Korea's security threats, the South Korean navy has been faced with deteriorating security environment. While North Korea has increased asymmetric forces in the maritime and underwater with the development of nuclear weapons, and China and Japan have made a large investment in the buildup of naval forces, the power of the Pacific fleet of the US, a key ally is expected to be weakened. The biggest threat comes from China's intervention in case of full-scale war with North Korea, but low-density conflict issues are also serious problems. North Korea has violated the Armistice Agreement 2,660 times since the end of Korean War, among which the number of marine provocations reaches 1,430 times, and the tension over the NLL issue has been intensifying. With tension mounting between Korea and Japan over the Dokdo issue and conflict escalating with China over Ieo do Islet, the US Navy has confronted situation where it cannot fully concentrate on the security of the Korean peninsula, which leads to need for strengthening of South Korea's naval forces. Let's look at naval forces of neighboring countries. North Korea is threatening South Korean navy with its increased asymmetric forces, including submarines. China has achieved the remarkable development of naval forces since the promotion of 3-step plan to strengthen naval power from 1989, and it now retains highly modernized naval forces. Japan makes an investment in the construction of stat of the art warship every year. Since Japan's warship boasts of its advanced performance, Japan's Maritime Self Defense Force is evaluated the second most powerful behind the US Navy on the assumption that submarine power is not included in the naval forces. In this situation, naval power construction of South Korean navy should be done in phases, focusing on the followings; First, military strength to repel the energy warship quickly without any damage in case of battle with North Korea needs to be secured. Second, it is necessary to develop abilities to discourage the use of nuclear weapons of North Korea and attack its nuclear facilities in case of emergency. Third, construction of military power to suppress armed provocations from China and Japan is required. Based on the above naval power construction methods, the direction of power construction is suggested as follows. The sea fleet needs to build up its war potential to defeat the naval forces of North Korea quickly and participate in anti-submarine operations in response to North Korea's provocations. The task fleet should be composed of 3 task flotilla and retain the power to support the sea fleet and suppress the occurrence of maritime disputes with neighboring countries. In addition, it is necessary to expand submarine power, a high value power asset in preparation for establishment of submarine headquarters in 2015, develop anti-submarine helicopter and load SLAM-ER missile onto P-3C patrol aircraft. In case of maine corps, division class military force should be able to conduct landing operations. It takes more than 10 years to construct a new warship. Accordingly, it is necessary to establish plans for naval power construction carefully in consideration of reality and future. For the naval forces to safeguard maritime sovereignty and contribute to national security, the acquisition of a huge budget and buildup of military power is required. In this regard, enhancement of naval power can be achieved only through national, political and military understanding and agreement. It is necessary to let the nation know that modern naval forces with improved weapon system can serve as comprehensive armed forces to secure the command of the sea, perform defense of territory and territorial sky and attack the enemy's strategic facilities and budget inputted in the naval forces is the essential source for early end of the war and minimization of damage to the people. If the naval power construction is not realized, we can be faced with a national disgrace of usurpation of national sovereignty of 100 years ago. Accordingly, the strengthening of naval forces must be realized.

• 안보군사학연구
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• 통권13호
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• 해양안보
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• 제5권1호
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

중러 관계 강화는 강대국 경쟁이 재개되고 있음을 보여주는 한 가지 징후라고 볼 수 있다. 공식적인 방위동맹을 체결하지 않았음에도 불구하고 양국의 군사관계가 강화되고 있다는 사실을 눈여겨 볼 필요가 있다. 특히, 중국과 러시아가 세계 최강의 해군력을 보유하고 있다는 점에 비추어 본다면, 양국간 해양안보협력 강화는 최근 수년 간 나타난 국제안보 전개상황 중 가장 중요한 양상으로 꼽을 수 있다. 여러 플랫폼과 장소에서 펼쳐진 중러 해상합동훈련은 고위급 인사교류와 중국의 대규모 러시아 무기 구매, 중러 우호조약 체결 및 다양한 협력형태로 수년간 지속되었다. 양국간 해상합동훈련은 냉전기의 대치국면이 종식된 직후 시작되었으나, 그 중요성은 최근 십년의 기간 동안 더욱 부각되고 있다고 볼 수 있다. 해상합동훈련이 양국 국방동맹의 핵심으로 부상하고 있기 때문이다. 양국은 그 어느 때보다도 다양한 장소에서 다양한 무기체계를 활용해 해상훈련에 임하고 있다. 앞으로 양국의 합동군사훈련은 북극, 초음속 운반수단, 아프리카, 아시아, 중동의 신규 파트너를 비롯해 새로운 위치와 전력을 동원해 펼쳐질 가능성이 크다. 또한, 경비함정 및 제병 연합부대를 동원한 해상합동 훈련을 수행하는 등 최근에 보여준 획기적인 전개를 지속할 것으로 보인다. 중국과 러시아는 양자간 해군협력을 토대로 일련의 목표를 추구하고 있다. 중화인민공화국과 러시아 연방 사이에 체결된 선린우호협력조약 (Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation)은 공동방어 조항을 포함하고 있지는 않지만, 공동의 위협에 대해 상호 논의하도록 언급하고 있다. 전통적/비전통적 군사작전 (예: 대해적 작전, 인도적 구호 및 최고수준의 전투수행)을 모의하는 해상훈련은 합동군사활동을 통해 공동의 도전과제에 대한 양국의 대응력을 강화하는 수단이 된다. 이러한 합동훈련이 전투력 측면에서 높은 수준의 상호운용성을 구현하지 못하더라도, 이를 통해 중러 양국이 단합된 해군력을 동원할 수 있는 역량을 갖추고 있다는 사실을 국제사회에 알릴 수 있다. 양국의 해상무역의존도나 영해를 둘러싼 국가간 갈등을 감안하면 이는 중요한 메시지라고 할 수 있다. 한편으로는 해상합동훈련을 통해 자국의 전투력을 향상시키고, 동시에 서로의 전략, 전술, 전투기술 및 절차에 대한 이해를 강화할 수 있다. 점차 부상하고 있는 중국 해군은 특히 러시아군으로 부터 많은 혜택을 얻을 수 있다. 러시아군은 복수의 제병협동작전을 중심으로 중국인민해방군 (People's Liberation Army, PLA) 보다 훨씬 많은 해상임무수행 경험을 보유하고 있기 때문이다. 그러나 한편으로는 전투력 강화를 통해 양국 정치지도자들이 군사력을 동원하거나 다른 국가와 대치할 경우, 긴장을 더 고조시키는 방향을 선택할 가능성이 더욱 커졌다는 부정적인 측면이 지적된다. 이러한 모든 영향은 양국 해군이 대부분의 해상합동훈련을 수행하는 동북아시아 지역에 더욱 큰 파급력을 미친다. 동북아시아 지역은 중국과 러시아가 미국 및 일본과 벌이는 그리고 불편한 상태로 한국을 사이에 둔 해상에서의 대치상황이 펼쳐지는 격전지가 되고 있다. 중러 해군 협력 강화가 공고해지면서 한미 군사계획이 더욱 복잡해지고, 북한에 집중되어야 할 자원이 전환되어 결국 지역 안보환경을 악화시키는 결과로 이어지고 있다. 한미일 해군 실무자의 입장에서는 중러 해군이 모두 포함된 시나리오를 수립해야 할 필요성이 더욱 커지고 있다. 가령, 한미 정책 결정가들은 중러 군사력의 공동 무력대응에 대비하기 위해 미 국방부가 과도한 지출을 하게 만들고, 한반도에서 한미안보 부재가 발생하지 않도록 대한민국 해군을 신속하게 보충해야 하는 상황이 발생하게 되었다. 북한이 한국 및 동맹국과 해상에서 대치할 경우 이를 중러 해군이 지원할 수 있다는 가능성은 또다른 심각한 도전을 제기한다. 이 같은 긴급사태 발생 가능성을 고려해 안보결속을 강화하겠다는 한일 간의 약속을 토대로, 한미일 3국 공동군사훈련을 더욱 확대할 필요가 있다.