• Journal of Korean Society of Water and Wastewater
• /
• v.10 no.3
• /
• pp.100-114
• /
• 1996

Besides insufficient water, water contamination confronts us with 'water crises' of both quantity and quality. However, the daily water consumption per capita of Korea is greater than that of other developed countries. Because of the current low water price, which is lower than a half of production cost, not only does it become difficult to cope promptly with rapidly increasing water demand and water contamination, but it also causes waste of water. We should, therefore, switch over from supply side management-oriented policy to demand side management-oriented policy through a raise of the water rate. This study carries out a cost analysis based on fair return method which is the principle of water pricing in Korea, and it estimates, through equilibrium analysis, long run marginal cost(LRMC), which satisfies allocative efficiency and reflects true social cost to additional one-unit water supply. Based on the results, this study proposes that the estimated LRMC is the optimal price level in water pricing, which is the most important of the demand side management policies. In the end, water conservation effect, price pervasive effect, and social welfare effect are analyzed.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
• /
• v.13 no.10
• /
• pp.2030-2038
• /
• 2009

We analyze the economic effects of mobile termination rate asymmetry by simulation model. The asymmetry allows the mobile operator to get access profits at the expense of the incumbent and induces negative effects such as the entry of inefficient operator and allocative efficiency as well as productive efficiency. We use simulation model to investigate the effect on social welfare of asymmetric regulation. If the brand loyalty is high, social welfare increase as the termination charge of entrant increases. The extension of the basic model shows that the degree of social welfare increase becomes higher as the brand loyalty increases when the cost of entrant is smaller than that of incumbent. But, the degree of social welfare decrease becomes lower as the substitution effects increase.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
• /
• v.2 no.1
• /
• pp.55-75
• /
• 1986

This article is to analyse the economic efficiency of capital market, which plays a role of resource allocation in terms of financial claims such as stock and bond. It provides various contributions to the welfare theoretical aspects of modern capital market theory. The key feature that distinguishes the theory described here from traditional welfare theory is the presence of uncertainty. Securities has time dimensions and the state and outcome of the future are really uncertain. This problem resulting from this uncertainty can be solved by complete market, but it has a weak power to explain real stock market. Capital Market is faced with the uncertainity because it is a kind of incomplete market. Individuals and firms in capital market made their consumption-investment decision by their own criteria, i. e. the maximization of expected utility form intertemporal consumption and the maximization of the market value of firm. We noted that allocative decisions that had to be made in the economy could be naturally subdivided into two groups. One set of decisions concerned the allocation of first-period resources among consumption $C_i$, investment in risky firms $I_j$, and riskless investment M. The other decisions concern the distribution among individuals of income available in the second period $Y_i(\theta)$. Corresponing to this grouping, the theoretical analysis of efficiency has also been dichotomized. The optimality of the distribution of output in the second period is distributive efficiency" and the optimality of the allocation of first-period resources is 'the efficiency of investment'. We have found in the distributive efficiency that the conditions for attainability is the same as the conditions for market optimality. The necessary and sufficient conditions for attainability or market optimality is that (1) all utility functions are such that -$\frac{{U_i}^'(Y_i)}{{U_i}^"(Y_i)}={\mu}_i+{\lambda}Y_i$-linear risk tolerance function where the coefficients ${\mu}_i$ and $\lambda$ are independent of $Y_i$, and (2) there are homogeneous expectations, i. e. ${\Large f}_i(\theta)={\Large f}(\theta)$ for every i. On the other hand, the efficiency of investment has disagreement about optimal investment level. The investment level for market rule will not generally lead to Pareto-optimal allocation of investment. This suboptimality is caused by (1)the difference of Diamond's decomposable production function and mean-variance valuation model and (2) the selection of exelusive investment or competitive investment. In conclusion, this article has made an analysis of conditions and processes of Pareto-optimal allocation of resources in capital marker and tried to connect with significant issues in modern finance.

• Korean Journal of Agricultural Science
• /
• v.12 no.2
• /
• pp.333-340
• /
• 1985

In this paper, we discuss the role of allocative efficiency and X-efficiency in determining resource allocation under the share tenency. Economic efficiency of resource allocation is related to land reform. Classical and neoclassical schools insist that land reform must be achieved for agricultural development by more efficient use of inputs. According to them, there is no incentive for tenants to use inputs until $MVP{\ell}=wage$ under the share tenancy. But "equal efficiency" school's conclusions are different. They conclude that there is no productivity differences between owner cultivation and share tenancy, owing to monopoly power of landlords and/or landlords's transaction costs. Considering X-efficiency, the share tenancy is not as efficient as the owner cultivation. On the other hand, the productivity differences may be reverse, in which landlords cultivate their lands by wage contracts. Land reform--reduction of land rent or redistribution of land--will be benefitable not only for agricultural development, but also for resource allocation in farm management.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.12 no.2
• /
• pp.51-79
• /
• 1990

Research on technical efficiency, an important dimension of market performance, had received little attention until recently by most industrial organization empiricists, the reason being that traditional microeconomic theory simply assumed away any form of inefficiency in production. Recently, however, an increasing number of research efforts have been conducted to answer questions such as: To what extent do technical ineffciencies exist in the production activities of firms and plants? What are the factors accounting for the level of inefficiency found and those explaining the interindustry difference in technical inefficiency? Are there any significant international differences in the levels of technical efficiency and, if so, how can we reconcile these results with the observed pattern of international trade, etc? As the first in a series of studies on the technical efficiency of Korea's manufacturing industries, this paper attempts to answer some of these questions. Since the estimation of technical efficiency requires the use of plant-level data for each of the five-digit KSIC industries available from the Census of Manufactures, one may consture the findings of this paper as empirical evidence of technical efficiency in Korea's manufacturing industries at the most disaggregated level. We start by clarifying the relationship among the various concepts of efficiency-allocative effciency, factor-price efficiency, technical efficiency, Leibenstein's X-efficiency, and scale efficiency. It then becomes clear that unless certain ceteris paribus assumptions are satisfied, our estimates of technical inefficiency are in fact related to factor price inefficiency as well. The empirical model employed is, what is called, a stochastic frontier production function which divides the stochastic term into two different components-one with a symmetric distribution for pure white noise and the other for technical inefficiency with an asymmetric distribution. A translog production function is assumed for the functional relationship between inputs and output, and was estimated by the corrected ordinary least squares method. The second and third sample moments of the regression residuals are then used to yield estimates of four different types of measures for technical (in) efficiency. The entire range of manufacturing industries can be divided into two groups, depending on whether or not the distribution of estimated regression residuals allows a successful estimation of technical efficiency. The regression equation employing value added as the dependent variable gives a greater number of "successful" industries than the one using gross output. The correlation among estimates of the different measures of efficiency appears to be high, while the estimates of efficiency based on different regression equations seem almost uncorrelated. Thus, in the subsequent analysis of the determinants of interindustry variations in technical efficiency, the choice of the regression equation in the previous stage will affect the outcome significantly.

• Information Systems Review
• /
• v.24 no.4
• /
• pp.41-54
• /
• 2022

Despite the recent rapid advancement of science and technology, we have been experiencing the decline in productivity since the 2000s. This study aims to investigate the decline at both industry and firm levels, by looking at the emergence and growth of large firms such as Amazon, Alphabet, and Apple and M&A trends. Following the results of previous studies, our results show that productivity at industry level has decreased since the 2000s. Particularly, in the period after 2011, the deterioration of allocative efficiency due to the large firms and the decline in the growth rate of surviving firms in the industry with low ratio of large firms contributed to the productivity decline. On the other hand, our analysis at firm level demonstrates that the productivity of firms that acquired IT firms improved over the entire period. While M&As have a positive impact on productivity, M&As with a demand-side motive such as market penetration and expansion of channels have a relatively larger impact than the ones for production or operation efficiency. Our results also suggest that the higher the proportion of large firms in a specific industry, the lower the productivity of individual firms in the same industry. Overall, given that the industry's structural changes for digital transformation tends to strengthen the growth of large firms, our findings have significant implications by empirically identifying the relationships of the emergence of large firms, the acquisition of IT/Non-IT firms, and motivations for M&As to firm/industry productivity.

• Journal of Society of Preventive Korean Medicine
• /
• v.6 no.1
• /
• pp.1-14
• /
• 2002

The proportion and role of public sector in health care industry is very small in Korea. Asymmetric distribution of health care resources is one of the major health care concerns. This issue is so important that it raises a question of accessibility, availability, continuity of care and equity of rural area people's health care utilization. To solve these problems and to satisfy the basic demand of oriental medical service in rural areas, the oriental public health doctors were placed in rural health centers since 1998. The main objectives of this study are twofold: to measure the cognition and attitude of health center directors on the strategies for utilizing oriental public health doctors and to provide basic data for improving the health manpower management program. Data have been collected by way of the self-administrative questionnaires. Developing the questionnaire, the literature review on the previous studies and delphi method were carried out. The response rate was 38.7%. The results of this study are summarized as follows; 1. community people respond positively on the oriental medical service activity in health center. 2. In regard to workloads of oriental public health doctor, 'appropriate' was 81.1% and 'burdensome' was 18.2%, respectively. 3. The 94.0% of respondents thought that the oriental medical service will be continued. 4. To activate oriental medical service in health center, the sufficient budget and provision of aid workers is a necessity. 5. The 75.5% of health center directors respond positively on the allocation of oriental public health doctor to health sub-centers. 6. Health center directors agreed that oriental public health doctor should perform the clinical service as well as prevention and health promotion activity. These results recommend that oriental medical service in health center should be continued gradually, and oriental public health doctors working at health center perform their work efficiently. Undoubtedly, their activity should be more focused on health promotion and disease prevention than daily patient care. For achieving this objective, more support of governmental policy is essential for utilizing oriental public health doctor and better health of the rural area community people.

• Health Policy and Management
• /
• v.5 no.1
• /
• pp.31-58
• /
• 1995

The Korean government achieved the universal coverage of health insurance in July 1989, and concomitantly introduced a new measure of regulated health care delivery system in using medical care. There are three reasons why the government took the new health care delivery system. Firstly, there was ample room for improving the allocative efficiency in the use of medical facilities. And the second one was to constrain the dramatic increase of medical demand under health insurance. Thirdly, and the most important reason was to alleviate the patient crowdedness in big general hospitals, particularly tertiary hospitals. There are essentially two different ways to control the use of health care : one is to cut the demand for health care, and the other to regulate behaviors of providers through the use of incentives/disincentives, demand-side approach or supply-side approach. The objective of this study is to examine whether or not medical care utilization behaviors under health insurance scheme have been changed among medical facilities such as clinic, hospital, general hospital and tertiary hospital in comparison with those before and after the introduction, particularly whether the patient crowdedness in tertiary hospitals has been alleviated or not. In order to conduct this study, the insurance claim data during the period of January 1989 and July 1992 were analyzed by focusing on diagnosis of both inpatients and outpatients, and especially the fifteen most frequent diseases in ambulatory care and the seven most frequent diseases in hospitalizatio. In addition, the same analyses were made on the changes in medical care utilization by specialty department. This was because the five departments, such as family medicine, ENT, eye, dermatology and rehabilitation, were exempted from applying the regulated health care delivery system in tertiary hospitals. The study revealed that a remarkable alleviation effect in the crowdness was noted for tertiary hospitals. This effect was most conspicuous for the most frequent mild diseases of both inpatient and outpatient care. For example, the fifteen most frequent OPD care at tertiary facilities have decreased as much as by 40%, of which 34% belonged to the cut in initial visits. Meanwhile, the proportion of those who used general hospitals and private practitioner's clinics have increased due to the shift of patients. The cases from the five special departments were also decreased, but not so much as other departments. A problem was noted that, as time passed by, the decreasing tendencies of crowdness at tertiary hospitals due to the regulated system became slightly smaller. Therefore, through complementary remedies are needed for the future implementation.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.12 no.2
• /
• pp.135-149
• /
• 1990

Housing owners in Korea have a variety of tax advantages such as income tax exemption for the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing, exemption from the capital gains tax and deduction of the estate tax for one-house households. These tax reliefs for housing owners not only conflict with the principle of horizontal and vertical equity, but also lead to resource misallocation by distorting the housing market, and thus bring about regressive distribution effects. Particularly in the case of Korea with its imperfect capital market, these measures exacerbate the inter-class inequality of housing ownership as well as inequalities in wealth, by causing the affluent to demand needlessly large housing, while the poor and young experience difficulties in purchasing residential properties. Therefore, the Korean tax system must be altered as follows in order to disadvantage owner-occupiers, especially those owners of luxury housing. These alterations will promote housing-ownership, tax burden equity, efficiency of resource allocation, as well as the desirable distribution of income. First, income tax deductions for the rent payments of tenants are recommended. Ideally, the way of recovering the fiscal equivalence between the owner-occupiers and tenants is to levy an income tax on the former's imputed rents, and if necessary to give them tax credits. This, however, would be very difficult from a practical viewpoint, because the general public may perceive the concept of "imputed rent" as cumbersome. Computing the imputed rent also entails administrative costs, rendering quite reasonable, the continued exemption of imputed rent from taxation with the simultaneous deduction in the income tax for tenants. This would further enhance the administrative efficiency of income tax collection by easing assessment of the landlord's income. Second, a capital gains tax should be levied on the one-house household, except with the postponement of payments in the case that the seller purchases higher priced property. Exemption of the capital gains tax for the one-house household favors those who have more expensive housing, providing an incentive to the rich to hold even larger residences, and to the constructors to build more luxurious housing to meet the demand. So it is not desirable to sustain the current one-house household exemption while merely supplementing it with fastidious measures. Rather, the rule must be abolished completely with the concurrent reform of the deduction system and lowering of the tax rate, measures which the author believes will help optimize the capital gains tax incidence. Finally, discontinuation of the housing exemption for the heir is suggested. Consequent increases in the tax burden of the middle class could be mitigated by a reduction in the rate. This applies to the following specific exemptions as well, namely, for farm lands, meadows, woods, business fields-to foster horizontal equity, while denying speculation on land that leads to a loss in allocative efficiency. Moreover, imperfections in the Korean capital market have disallowed the provision of long term credit for housing seekers. Remedying these problems is essential to the promotion of greater housing ownership by the low and middle income classes. It is also certain that a government subsidy be focused on the poorest of the poor who cannot afford even to think of owning a housing.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.12 no.1
• /
• pp.31-68
• /
• 1990

The concentration of economic power takes the form of one or a few firms controlling a substantial portion of the economic resources and means in a certain economic area. At the same time, to the extent that these firms are owned by a few individuals, resource allocation can be manipulated by them rather than by the impersonal market mechanism. This will impair allocative efficiency, run counter to a decentralized market system and hamper the equitable distribution of wealth. Viewed from the historical evolution of Western capitalism in general, the concentration of economic power is a paradox in that it is a product of the free market system itself. The economic principle of natural discrimination works so that a few big firms preempt scarce resources and market opportunities. Prominent historical examples include trusts in America, Konzern in Germany and Zaibatsu in Japan in the early twentieth century. In other words, the concentration of economic power is the outcome as well as the antithesis of free competition. As long as judgment of the economic system at large depends upon the value systems of individuals, therefore, the issue of how to evaluate the concentration of economic power will inevitably be tinged with ideology. We have witnessed several different approaches to this problem such as communism, fascism and revised capitalism, and the last one seems to be the only surviving alternative. The concentration of economic power in Korea can be summarily represented by the "jaebol," namely, the conglomerate business group, the majority of whose member firms are monopolistic or oligopolistic in their respective markets and are owned by particular individuals. The jaebol has many dimensions in its size, but to sketch its magnitude, the share of the jaebol in the manufacturing sector reached 37.3% in shipment and 17.6% in employment as of 1989. The concentration of economic power can be ascribed to a number of causes. In the early stages of economic development, when the market system is immature, entrepreneurship must fill the gap inherent in the market in addition to performing its customary managerial function. Entrepreneurship of this sort is a scarce resource and becomes even more valuable as the target rate of economic growth gets higher. Entrepreneurship can neither be readily obtained in the market nor exhausted despite repeated use. Because of these peculiarities, economic power is bound to be concentrated in the hands of a few entrepreneurs and their business groups. It goes without saying, however, that the issue of whether the full exercise of money-making entrepreneurship is compatible with social mores is a different matter entirely. The rapidity of the concentration of economic power can also be traced to the diversification of business groups. The transplantation of advanced technology oriented toward mass production tends to saturate the small domestic market quite early and allows a firm to expand into new markets by making use of excess capacity and of monopoly profits. One of the reasons why the jaebol issue has become so acute in Korea lies in the nature of the government-business relationship. The Korean government has set economic development as its foremost national goal and, since then, has intervened profoundly in the private sector. Since most strategic industries promoted by the government required a huge capacity in technology, capital and manpower, big firms were favored over smaller firms, and the benefits of industrial policy naturally accrued to large business groups. The concentration of economic power which occured along the way was, therefore, not necessarily a product of the market system. At the same time, the concentration of ownership in business groups has been left largely intact as they have customarily met capital requirements by means of debt. The real advantage enjoyed by large business groups lies in synergy due to multiplant and multiproduct production. Even these effects, however, cannot always be considered socially optimal, as they offer disadvantages to other independent firms-for example, by foreclosing their markets. Moreover their fictitious or artificial advantages only aggravate the popular perception that most business groups have accumulated their wealth at the expense of the general public and under the behest of the government. Since Korea stands now at the threshold of establishing a full-fledged market economy along with political democracy, the phenomenon called the concentration of economic power must be correctly understood and the roles of business groups must be accordingly redefined. In doing so, we would do better to take a closer look at Japan which has experienced a demise of family-controlled Zaibatsu and a success with business groups(Kigyoshudan) whose ownership is dispersed among many firms and ultimately among the general public. The Japanese case cannot be an ideal model, but at least it gives us a good point of departure in that the issue of ownership is at the heart of the matter. In setting the basic direction of public policy aimed at controlling the concentration of economic power, one must harmonize efficiency and equity. Firm size in itself is not a problem, if it is dictated by efficiency considerations and if the firm behaves competitively in the market. As long as entrepreneurship is required for continuous economic growth and there is a discrepancy in entrepreneurial capacity among individuals, a concentration of economic power is bound to take place to some degree. Hence, the most effective way of reducing the inefficiency of business groups may be to impose competitive pressure on their activities. Concurrently, unless the concentration of ownership in business groups is scaled down, the seed of social discontent will still remain. Nevertheless, the dispersion of ownership requires a number of preconditions and, consequently, we must make consistent, long-term efforts on many fronts. We can suggest a long list of policy measures specifically designed to control the concentration of economic power. Whatever the policy may be, however, its intended effects will not be fully realized unless business groups abide by the moral code expected of socially responsible entrepreneurs. This is especially true, since the root of the problem of the excessive concentration of economic power lies outside the issue of efficiency, in problems concerning distribution, equity, and social justice.