• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.44-51
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• 2014

This thesis analyzes the latest operating concept and status for Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) researching overseas ADIZ CONOPS, international legal basis for ADIZ, the intention & background of proclamation for China Air Defense Identification Zone(CADIZ). Firstly, ADIZ is lawful concerning international connivance for ADIZ where around 20 countries have operated, Article 56 "Rights, jurisdiction & duties of the coastal State" and Article 301 "Peaceful uses of the seas" on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea(UNCLS). Secondly, ADIZ has been regarded as a support means for national interest & policy as well as military air defense one. Thirdly, Based on legal re-interpretation for UNCLS relating to ADIZ, China proclaimed CADIZ where can ensure national maritime policy and strategy including A2/AD(Anti-Access & Area Defence), inroad into the ocean, claim for Senkaku Islands possession, etc..

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.148-177
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• 2014

The regional security and stability in Northeast Asia has become more complicated because of a sudden establishment of China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on 23 November 2013. One dimensional conflicts on the territorial sovereignty over the islands between the regional States has developed into the two dimensional conflicts like maritime delimitations among the States concerned since they have all ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which adopts the 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone regime. Moreover, due to the notion of the outer limit of the continental shelf, the conflicts have developed into three dimensional ones in order to acquire more natural resources even in the seabed. To make matters worse, such three dimensional conflicts have expanded to the airspace as well. The paper will analyze what implications the sudden declaration of China's ADIZ have for the regional security in Northeast Asia from the perspectives of public international law. To this end, the paper 1) starts with the debates on the legal nature of the ADIZ, 2) identifies the Chinese government's political motives for the establishment of the ADIZ over the East China Sea, 3) assesses the responses of the regional States and the USA to the China's establishment of the ADIZ, and then 4) discuss what implications the overlapped ADIZ of the three key States in the region have for the regional security and stability.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.10 no.1
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• pp.127-132
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• 2016

Recently, China & Japan have expanded their responding ADIZ(Air Defence Identification Zone) to implement each Government's maritime policy and to project their Air Power in preparation for maritime provocation & contingency, especially over the piled area where East Asia countries have claimed to have maritime jurisdiction one another. So this is to guide the Development Option for Korea Air Defence Identification Zone to cope with the maritime intentions of the neighboring countries, considering the international law for ADIZ, the maritime policy and the maritime sovereign & jurisdiction area of the Republic of Korea, etc.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.189-217
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• 2017

Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.201-224
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• 2017

The main subject of this article focused on the legal status of the military aircraft in the high seas. For this the legal status of the military aircraft, the freedom of overflight, the right of hot pursuit, the right of visit and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) were dealt. The 1944 Chicago Convention neither explicitly nor implicitly negated the customary norms affecting the legal status of military aircraft as initially codified within the 1919 Paris Convention. So the status of military aircraft was not redefined with the Chicago Convention and remains, as stated in the 1919 Paris Convention, as a norm of customary international law. The analyses on the legal status of the military aircraft in the high seas are found as follows; According to the Article 95 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. We can suppose that the military aircraft in the high seas have also complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. According to the Article 111 (5) of the UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. We can conclude that the right of hot pursuit may be exercised by military aircraft. According to the Article 110 of the UNCLOS a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy, (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade, (c) the ship is engaged in an unauthorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109, (d) the ship is without nationality, or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. As for Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) it is established and declared unilaterally by the air force of a state for the national security. However, there are no articles dealing with it in the 1944 Chicago Convention and there are no international standards to recognize or prohibit the establishment of ADIZs. ADIZ is not interpreted as the expansion of territorial airspace.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.1
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• pp.287-325
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• 2017

Considering the development of aerospace, military science and technology since the 20th century, the sky is very important for the nation's existence and prosperity. The proverb "Whosoever commands the space commands the world itself!" emphasizes the need for the command of the air. This essay is the first study on the status of airspace after reunification. First, the territorial airspace is over the territory and territorial sea, and its horizontal extent is determined by the territorial boundary lines. Acceptance of the present order is most reasonable, rather than attempting to reconfigure through historical truths about border issues, and it could be supported by neighboring countries in the reunification period. For peace in Northeast Asia, the reunified Korea needs to respect the existing border agreement between North Korea and China or Russia. However, the North Korean straight baselines established in the East Sea and the Yellow Sea should be discarded because they are not available under United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. It is desirable for the reunified Korea to redefine the straight baselines that comply with international law and determine the territorial waters up to and including the 12-nautical mile outside it. Second, the Flight Information Region (hereinafter "FIR") is a region defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization (hereinafter "ICAO") in order to provide information necessary for the safe and efficient flight of aircraft and the search and rescue of aircraft. At present, Korea is divided into Incheon FIR which is under the jurisdiction of South Korea and Pyongyang FIR which is under the jurisdiction of North Korea. If North Korea can not temporarily exercise control of Pyongyang FIR due to a sudden change of circumstances, it is desirable for South Korea to exercise control of Pyongyang FIR, and if it is unavoidable, ICAO should temporarily exercise it. In reunified Korea, it is desirable to abolish Pyongyang FIR and integrate it into Incheon FIR with the approval of ICAO, considering systematic management and control of FIR, establishment of route, and efficiency of management. Third, the Air Defense Identification Zone (hereinafter "ADIZ") is a zone that requires easy identification, positioning, and control of aircraft for national security purposes, and is set up unilaterally by the country concerned. The US unilaterally established the Korea Air Defense Identification Area (KADIZ) by the Declaration of Commitment on March 22, 1951. The Ministry of Defense proclaimed a new KADIZ which extended to the area including IEODO on December 13, 2013. At present, North Korea's military warning zone is set only at maritime boundaries such as the East Sea and the Yellow Sea. But in view of its lack of function as ADIZ in relations with China and Russia, the reunified Korea has no obligation to succeed it. Since the depth of the Korean peninsula is short, it is necessary to set ADIZ boundary on the outskirts of the territorial airspace to achieve the original purpose of ADIZ. Therefore, KADIZ of the reunified Korea should be newly established by the boundary line that coincides with the Incheon FIR of the reunified Korea. However, if there is no buffer zone overlapping with or adjacent to the ADIZs of neighboring countries, military tensions may rise. Therefore, through bilateral negotiations for peace in Northeast Asia, a buffer zone is established between adjacent ADIZs.

• Journal of the Korean Society for Aviation and Aeronautics
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.43-53
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• 2011

It is well known some Foreign aircraft used to fly INCHEON FIR(Flight Information Region), especially the island of IEODO without a flight plan, even though foreign aircraft is subject to submitting a flight plan to Flight Information Center(FIC) before its flight. IEODO is a sunken rock 4.6m beneath the sea level, 149km away from Marado. Facing the Yangtze river's sea entrance horizontally and military zones of Korea and China vertically, IEODO is a very important place for national security of North East Asia because it is located at the boundary between China East Sea and Yellow Sea of South Korea. Moreover, JDZ(the 7th mine lot) is just 77NM from IEODO, which possesses natural gas eight times bigger than the gulf region and oil 4.5 times bigger than that of the U.S. In addition, INCHEON FIR, managed by MLTM(Air Traffic Control Center) and Japanese Self-Defense Force's JADIZ(Japanese Air Defense Identification Zone) are overlapping on IEODO whose air space is very complex. This paper focuses on air space, FIR, ADIZ(Air Defense Identification Zone) and related airspace system and suggests strategic implications of how to prevent foreign aircraft from invading INCHEON FIR without permission and of how to utilize the airspace efficiently.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.11 no.2
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• pp.35-42
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• 2017

This paper analyzes the intention of the PRC (People's Republic of China) to establish and operate CADIZ to implement the government's maritime policy and strategy and to project its air power in preparation for maritime provocation and contingency, especially over the area where East Asia countries have claimed to have maritime jurisdiction over one another. This paper is also intended to guide the Republic of Korea's response measures for coping with the maritime intention and threat of China by such measures as reinforcing military power, constructing the strategic air base in Jeju, and expanding the present KADIZ.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.1
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• pp.3-30
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• 2011

According to the Article 86 of the United Nations on the Law of the Sea(UNCLOS) the provisions of high seas apply to all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. Article 87 also stipulates the freedom of the high seas. International laws on the flight over the high seas are found as follows; Firstly, as far as the nationality of the aircraft is concerned, its legal status is quite different from the ship where the flags of convenience can be applied practically. There is no flags of convenience of the aircraft. Secondly, according to the Article 95 of UNCLOS warships on the high seas have complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. We can suppose that the military(or state) aircraft over the high seas have also complete immunity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag State. Thirdly, according to the Article 101 of UNCLOS piracy consists of any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft. We can conclude that piracy can de done by a pirate aircraft as well as a pirate ship. Fourthly, according to the Article 111 (5) of UNCLOS the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only by warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. We can conclude that the right of hot pursuit may be exercised only military aircraft, or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect. Fifthly, according to the Article 110 of UNCLOS a warship which encounters on the high seas a foreign ship, is not justified in boarding it unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that: (a) the ship is engaged in piracy, (b) the ship is engaged in the slave trade, (c) the ship is engaged in an authorized broadcasting and the flag State of the warship has jurisdiction under article 109, (d) the ship is without nationality, or (e) though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship. These provisions apply mutatis mutandis to military aircraft. Sixthly, according to the Article 1 (5)(dumping), 212(pollution from or through the atmosphere), 222(enforcement with respect to pollution from or through the atmosphere) of UNCLOS aircraft as well as ship is very much related to marine pollution. Seventhly, as far as the crime on board aircraft over the high seas is concerned 1963 Convention on the Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft(Tokyo Convention) will be applied, and as for the hijacking over the high seas 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft(Hague Convention) and as for the sabotage over the high seas 1971 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation(Montreal Convention) will be applied respectively. These three conventions recognize the flag state jurisdiction over the crimes on board aircraft over the high seas. Eightly, as far as reconnaissance by foreign aircraft in the high seas toward the coastal States is concerned it is not illegal in terms of international law because its act is done in the high seas. Ninthly as for Air Defence Identification Zone(ADIZ) there are no articles dealing with it in the 1944 Chicago Convention. The legal status of the foreign aircraft over this sea zone might be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states whether this zone is legitimate or illegal. Lastly, the Arctic Sea is the frozen ocean. So the flight over that ocean is the same over the high seas. Because of the climate change the Arctic Sea is getting melted. If the coastal states of the Arctic Sea will proclaim the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) as the ocean is getting melted, the freedom of flight over that ocean will also be restricted to the regulations of the coastal states.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.113-147
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• 2014

While China's military rise is an issue of growing importance to regional security, it is worthwhile to note that it is not China's military modernization per se, but its capacity to project and sustain power along and beyond its borders--in particular, the possibility to resolve forcefully its outstanding maritime disputes and various contingencies. This essay argues that China's "anti-access capability"--a U.S.-coined term originally developed for a Taiwan contingency--is equally applicable to other major regional cases such as the Spratly disputes and a North Korean contingency. Furthermore, notwithstanding China's continuos efforts to develop and deploy various types and classes of weapons/platforms, it is the Russian systems and technologies that are most capable and thus likely assigned to the highest mission-critical areas. In assessing China's current and likely future military capability as well as their implications for the region, it is necessary to take note of the following: • There exists asymmetry of military capability between China and its weaker neighbors. While the PLAN is weak in several important aspects, for instance, many of its neighbors' navies are weaker still. • Some have argued that China's foreign policy behavior apparently became more "assertive" in 2009-2013, but it is wiser to keep in mind that China has almost always been assertive and aggressive when it comes to what China defines as "sovereignty and territorial issues" as well as its newest "core interests." • On the South China Sea disputes it is the function of U.S. presence in the theater--in the form of overseas bases and the freedom of navigation--and the PLA's own limitations to project and sustain power for an extended period of time that have largely prevented armed. • While Taiwan remains the idee fixe of China's diplomacy and military, it is and will be a tough nut to crack. China's recent creeping attempts for economic integration with Taiwan should be seen in this context. • China and Japan, the two regional heavyweights and traditional rivals, will likely have a bilateral relationship that is replete with difficulties and tension. China's unilateral announcement of its ADIZ in November 2013 as well as the occasional yet persistent disputes with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyudao/Diaoyutai islands are only the latest manifestation of this deeper and difficult relationship. • For Korean security it is imperative to take into account the geostrategic and historical factors. On top of the existing military threats from North Korea, the ROK should be able to employ a) hedging strategy, b) "limited defense sufficiency" strategy, and c) rock-solid relations with the United States.