• Food Industry
• /
• s.111
• /
• pp.59-64
• /
• 1991

건강의 유지증진에 필요한 정보를 포함시킨 $\ulcorner$특정보건용식품$\lrcorner$의 제도가 발족되었다. 후생성은 7월 11일, 영양개선법의 시행규칙의 일부를 개정, 특정보건용식품 시장도입을 위한 (1) 허가 (2) 지도 (3) 취급등에 대해서의 규칙을 명확하게 했다. 이것에 의하면 (1) 허가제도 (2) 허가요건 (3) 신청 등에 대해서는 대부분 1990년의 기능성식품 검토회의 보고를 답습한 내용이지만, 성분을 약사법에 따라 한정하는 한편, vitamin 등 통상의 영양소에도 범위를 확장시키는 것도 새롭게 덧붙이고 있다. 이 식품의 심사를 담당하는 검토회의 발족은 8월 중순으로 예상되어 9월 1일부터 신청접수를 시작할 예정이다. 유력한 후보로는 allergy용 식품, oligo당, heme철, 식물섬유 등의 식품이 알려지고 있고, 빠르면 연내에도 허가상품 제 1호가 탄생하게 될듯하다.

• 방재와보험
• /
• s.109
• /
• pp.30-33
• /
• 2005

최근 수도권에서는 지방공단 등으로 이전한 노후 공장 건축물을 철거한 자리에 '테크노타운', '벤처타운', 'IT타워', '디지털밸리', '테크노밸리' 등의 이름으로 아파트형 공장을 설립하고 있다. 아파트형 공장은 서울을 중심으로 수도권역에서 토지이용을 극대화가기 위한 집합 공장건물로서 중소기업체의 입지 해결 및 쾌적한 작업환경을 제공하고 도시근로자의 풍부한 노동력을 적극적으로 활용하고 있다. 또한 공동 부대시설을 확보하여 공간효율의 극대화와 종업원의 복리후생이 개선되는 등의 중소기업 지원효과를 거두고 있다. 고층화, 집단화, 공동화를 주요 특징으로 하는 아파트형 공장에서 부속시설의 화재보험요율 적용에 관하여 생각해보고자 한다.

• Journal of the korean veterinary medical association
• /
• v.30 no.3
• /
• pp.187-194
• /
• 1994

이 자료는 사단법인 미국 수의공중보건협회(N.A.S.P.H.V.; National Association of State Public Health Veterinarians, Inc.)에서 제정한 동물 관견병 관리대책 컴펜디움 1993(Compendium of Animal Rabies Control, 1993)을 미합중국 연방정부(U.S. Federal Government), 보건후생성 공중보건국 전염병관리센타(US Department of Heal and Human Services, Public Health Service, Center for Disease Control and Prevention(CDC) Atlanta, Georgia 30333)에서 발행되는 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT Volume 42, No RR-3(March 26, 1993)에 수록한 것인데, 우리나라의 광견병 방역대책 수립을 위한 참고자료로 활용하기 위하여 그 내용을 번역 소개한 것이다.

• Proceedings of the Korea Information Processing Society Conference
• /
• 2021.11a
• /
• pp.1257-1260
• /
• 2021

1인 가구 수의 증가로 시장에서 1인 가구를 위한 서비스와 재화가 제공되고 있고, 시장에서 소비자로서 입지를 다지고 있음에도 합리적인 가격에 소비하지 못하고 있다. 사용자들이 스스로 주최하는 공동구매를 통해서 합리적이고, 친환경적이고, 소비자 후생적인 소비를 도모하고, 나아가 1인 가구 웹 커뮤니티 형태로 발전하길 기대한다.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Intelligent Systems
• /
• v.24 no.4
• /
• pp.379-384
• /
• 2014

This paper proposes a Cournot model that can be used to analyze the strategic behaviors of generation companies which try to maximize their profits in an imperfectly competitive electricity and carbon markets. The proposed model consists of two parts. First, the strategic behaviors of generation companies are modeled based on the Cournot theory. Second, the market operation is modeled based on the assumption that the market operator tries to maximize the total social welfare in consideration of environmental welfare. To find the Nash equilibrium of the proposed model, the two-level optimization technique is used. The proposed method has been applied to an illustrative example of oligopolistic markets. We found that the proposed method has strong potential to analyze the influence of the strategic biddings of the generation companies and the impact of renewable generator on markets where the competitiveness of the markets is not fully developed.

• Microbiology and Biotechnology Letters
• /
• v.31 no.3
• /
• pp.264-270
• /
• 2003

A quantitative survey of the protozoa microfauna at bioreactor of advanced sewage treatment plant was carried out during a period of 11 months. In this study, 32 genera were identified, including 17 ciliates. The abundance of the important protozoa were compared with the operating parameters and water quality of the effluent of the plant using statistical procedure. Statistical analysis revealed a relationship between the abundance of some genera and removal rate. In particular, correlation analysis on the quality of effluent and protozoa indicated that Lepadella may be used as the bioindicator of TP removal and Trochilia, Entosiphon, Colepus may be used as the bioindicator of TN removal when water temperature was below $20^{\circ}C$.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
• /
• v.19 no.3
• /
• pp.493-499
• /
• 2015

In Korea mobile phone subscribers exceeded 1 million people in 1995, and ten million people in 1998. Prevalence of the mobile phone increased dramatically over 110% compared to the population. Almost every family members including children uses more than one mobile terminal. Mobile phone is obviously more necessary good than washer, vacuum cleaner and passenger car. Our daily life are conveniently positioned with mobile communication, but communication related costs including the price of the device and service charges become a big burden on the household. But the government does not seem to do the right role at the right time to prevent the market failure to maximize consumer welfare and social welfare through supporting fair competition. This principal-agent problem issues of mobile communication policies will be understood in perspective of public choice against joint use of the mobile communication network, number portability, separation of phone distribution and phone service, network neutrality, mobile phone subsidy since the early 1990s when mobile phone service was introduced in Korea.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
• /
• v.12 no.7
• /
• pp.11-20
• /
• 2014

This paper finds that the ultimate source of problems facing Korean mobile telecommunications such as excessive subsidies of handsets, waste of resources, and a vicious circle of expensive handsets and high prices for services, is bundling of handset and subscription. The analysis suggests that bundling causes consumers to confuse about prices of handsets and services, and firms focus on handset subsidy competition rather than on upgrading service qualities and lowering prices due to anti-competitive effects of bundling. Because most of the cost of bundling is passed on to consumers, the welfare of consumers decline. In particular, equality among consumers worsens due to price discriminations. To resolve these problems, unbundling of handset and subscription is a necessity. Mixed bundling allowing separate selling of handsets under bundling does not seem to work as a cure because bundling tends to be a dominant strategy. The best regulatory policy is a complete separation of handset and subscription.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.37 no.sup
• /
• pp.1-32
• /
• 2015

Korea witnesses continued debate over the policy that mandates the use of the public authentication certificate (electronic certificate) in electronic financing. The debate mainly centers on the rationale of the government compelling, as a standard, a public electronic certificate based on a specific technology, among several user authentication technologies. This paper looks into the impacts of both adoption and abolition of this mandatory policy and thereby analyzes the effects of government intervention in technology standardization. To that end, two main questions are presented: what conditions would enable a single technology to serve as a standard in the market without government intervention; and what conditions would make the standard determined in the market contribute to maximizing social welfare. This paper demonstrates that the attitude and preference of market participants towards each technology determine the level of market equilibria and social welfare caused by the adoption and abolition of the mandatory policy on electronic certificate.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
• /
• v.19 no.8
• /
• pp.1893-1900
• /
• 2015

The government has the responsibility to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. The government should address the asymmetry in the information as much as possible and ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it actually distorts the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by neglecting their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy is part of excess profit and could be transferred to down the price of mobile phone and charges and it would become a benefit to consumers. Separate announcement of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a little developed policy but it was not actually realized. The market price close to that from perfect competition structure is plausible, ultimately.