• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.10 no.3
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• pp.299-304
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• 2024

Beyond the first nuclear age, which pitted the United States and the Soviet Union against each other, we are now in the second nuclear age, in which the decision-makers of nuclear weapons are diversified among countries large and small. India and Pakistan, two such countries, are antagonistic toward each other and possess nuclear weapons, but their nuclear posture and nuclear strategies are different. The examples of these two countries can provide clues to the future nuclear posture of North Korea, which faces South Korea. In particular, Pakistan's chosen posture of pre-emptive deterrence is a highly offensive nuclear posture that threatens to use nuclear weapons against an adversary to deter aggression. This is an option that can be accomplished even with a small nuclear arsenal that can be used as a first strike, so it seems to be the optimal posture for a nuclear-powered Pakistan to choose in response to an Indian threat. North Korea, which is outgunned by the United States and South Korea, is likely to continue to threaten to use nuclear weapons preemptively like Pakistan. However, it is expected to be defensive and quite conservative, like India, until it actually uses them to maintain its regime.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.53
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• pp.255-279
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• 2017

The development of North Korea's nuclear weapons has worsened to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and despite the sanctions of the international community including our government, we have not been able to offer clear solutions and alternatives, and the current measures are not enough in case of North Korea is using nuclear weapons. This study suggests how we should be prepared against the use of nuclear weapons under the premise that North Korea will never give up development of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. The first chapter outlines the current status of our preparedness if North Korea makes a nuclear attack. The second chapter analyzes and evaluates the power of nuclear weapons and North Korea's nuclear weapons threat. In the third chapter, we analyze North Korea nuclear attack and analyze the wartime emergency situation and civil defense posture. Finally, in order to implement the solutions presented in the text, we will identify priorities and summarize further developments.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.42
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• pp.205-227
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• 2015

The Korean Peninsula is put in a position to carry out a highly strategic game vis-a-vis nK, which is asserting itself as a nuclear power amongst Northeast Asia's complex dynamics. While the international community recognizes nK's possession of nuclear weapons as released secret based on nK's three nuclear tests, shrewd strategic thinking is needed by ROK to secure itself as a non-nuclear nation in order to assume a responsible role to the international community, while simultaneously being ready to respond at all times for nK's military provocations. ROK must continue with its twofold strategy, by firm response to military confrontation with nK and maintaining flexible policy of tolerance in the areas of economy and ethnicity. Various strategic options to overcome nK's nuclear threats have been presented to ROK, whose possession of nuclear weapons have been difficult, and nK's nuclear capability is a real threat to ROK's national security. We must be able to respond to nK's nuclear threats strictly from ROK's national security perspective. This thesis aims to propose a response policy for nK's nuclear capability and nK's nuclear attack based on analysis of such nuclear damage, ROK Government's response posture against nK's nuclear threats, centered around ROK Government's non-military response posture.

• Defense and Technology
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• no.5 s.123
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• pp.28-37
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• 1989

프랑스는 자주적 방위태세 유지를 중요시하며, 해군에 있어 이 정책은 핵추진 항공모함 사업과 차기세대 SSBN사업등으로 구현되고 있다. 1988년 Le Bourget에서 열렸던 제11차 해군 장비 전시회는 프랑스 방산업계가 추구하는 2가지 방향을 명확하게 나타냈다. 프랑스와 이탈리아간에 체결된 Milas 대잠 유도탄 사업과 함정 탑재 대유도탄체계 사업이 이 방향으로 이루어진 2개의 주요한 조치였다. 또한 프랑스 방산업체들은 점차 유럽과 북아메리카로 사업대상을 넓혀가고 있다

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.

• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.69-96
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• 2019

This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.26
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• pp.29-58
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• 2011

Since 11 September 2001, warnings of risk in the nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons and materials which poses one of the gravest threats to the international community have continued. The purpose of this study is to analyze the aim, principles, characteristics, activities, impediments to progress and developmental recommendation of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism(GICNT). In addition, it suggests implications of the GICNT for the ROK policy. International community will need a comprehensive strategy with four key elements to accomplish the GICNT: (1) securing and reducing nuclear stockpiles around the world, (2) countering terrorist nuclear plots, (3) preventing and deterring state transfers of nuclear weapons or materials to terrorists, (4) interdicting nuclear smuggling. Moreover, other steps should be taken to build the needed sense of urgency, including: (1) analysis and assessment through joint threat briefing for real nuclear threat possibility, (2) nuclear terrorism exercises, (3) fast-paced nuclear security reviews, (4) realistic testing of nuclear security performance to defeat insider or outsider threats, (5) preparing shared database of threats and incidents. As for the ROK, main concerns are transfer of North Korea's nuclear weapons, materials and technology to international terror groups and attacks on nuclear facilities and uses of nuclear devices. As the 5th nuclear country, the ROK has strengthened systems of physical protection and nuclear counterterrorism based on the international conventions. In order to comprehensive and effective prevention of nuclear terrorism, the ROK has to strengthen nuclear detection instruments and mobile radiation monitoring system in airports, ports, road networks, and national critical infrastructures. Furthermore, it has to draw up effective crisis management manual and prepare nuclear counterterrorism exercises and operational postures. The fundamental key to the prevention, detection and response to nuclear terrorism which leads to catastrophic impacts is to establish not only domestic law, institution and systems, but also strengthen international cooperation.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• Korean Security Journal
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• no.29
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• pp.193-222
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• 2011

Our country successfully hosted the G20 summit in Seoul in November, 2010. Afterwards, however, the Yeonpyungdo shelling incident took place by the North, and the North Korean nuclear issue have strained interKorean relations. Our country is going to host the nuclear security summit, which is of great significance at this point of time. The nuclear security summit is to be attended by 47 countries. The participant countries of this summit is larger in number than those of the ASEM, APEC and the G20 summit that our country has ever hosted. That is a large-scale international conference that invites the UN, the IAEA and the EU, which are three major nuclear-related international organizations. A successful hosting of the nuclear security summit will serve as an opportunity to boost our country's national prestige, and is likely be beneficial to the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue. Like other international submits in foreign countries, however, violent anti-globalization demonstrations are expected to occur when the nuclear security summit is held in April next year. The purpose of this study was to make a case analysis of demonstrations during multilateral international conferences hosted by foreign countries over ten years between 1999 and 2009, to examine the controversial points over the demonstrations, and ultimately to seek ways of ensuring safety against possible assemblies and demonstrations during the forthcoming nuclear security summit, which is scheduled to be held in April next year. The findings of the study on feasible security measures are as follows: First, information and intelligence gathering should be reinforced, and the inspection should be stepped up. Second, pacification among domestic NGOs and the supplementation of the existing legal devices are required. Third, publicity should be strengthened. Fourth, riot police officers should be selected as early as possible to bolster their education and training, and more reinforced emergency measures should be taken. It's needed to seek assistance from the military as one of emergency measures, and national defense readiness should be bolstered across the nation in collaboration with the Ministry of National Defense when the summit is near at hand. Finally, CBR countermeasures should be taken in preparation for CBR terrorism.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.109-115
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• 2019

The North's short-range projectiles and missiles are the Iskander-class missiles of the S-300 series, with a range of 270-420 kilometers and an altitude of 40-50 kilometers, making it very difficult to respond with South Korea's detection radar or striking weapons. The North's handling of the Seoul sea of fire also makes it very urgent for the South to deploy the weapons to power or introduce them as soon as possible, as it can identify its intention to strike the Seoul metropolitan area by equipping such short-range rockets and missiles with nuclear or chemical weapons. We will be prepared to prep are for reckless provocations by securing our own technology by continuously developing the Korean missile defense system and striking system, Kill Chain, which is designed to defend short-range missiles in the long-term, and securing our own technology.