• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.148-187
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• 2019

This paper is to analyse the necessity and development direction of the ROK's maritime security strategy white paper. To this end the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the necessity of the ROK's maritime security strategy white paper; the ROK's actual situation in relation to maritime security strategy and cases of major advanced oceanic countries; the vision, goals, strategic tasks, and implementation system of the ROK's 'national maritime security strategy'; and conclusion. The achievement of the national marine strategic vision, such as the 'Ocean G5,' is of course possible when Korea can maintain and strengthen the maritime safety and maritime security of the people. The Sewol Ferry incident reminds us that we need a 'national maritime security strategy white paper' like the advanced marine countries. In order for the national maritime security strategy to be carried our efficiently, as in advanced oceanic countries, mere should be a dedicated department with sufficient authority and status to mobilize the cooperation of related organizations including naval-coastal cooperation. It would be good to set up a tentatively named Maritime Security Council, an organization of minister-level officials involved under the National Security Council, and an executive body composed of working-level officials from related ministries. In order to successfully carry out the national maritime security strategy for the maritime safety and maritime security of the people like the United States and the United Kingdom, we need to further strengthen our domestic cooperation and cooperation system, international cooperation, and maritime security. We have to promote the establishment and promotion of maritime security strategies by the Navy; strengthening the operational link between the Navy and the Coast Guard; strengthening the maritime surveillance capability at the national level, and promoting sharing with the private sector, etc.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.33-59
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• 2019

There have many research papers to see China's evolution of maritime strategy and naval modernization in terms of its naval mind-set. However, this article focuses on assessing how China uses its all sorts of maritime strength to achieve 'a building maritime great power.' The aim of the article is to introduce a new perspective to this debate by analysing China's diversified ma maritime capabilities and a new way of implementation in maritime security strategy. In recent years, China has been developing not only unpredictable maritime military capabilities but also maritime supporting forces - Coast Guard and Maritime Militia. And recently China adopted up-to-date operational concept aimed at gaining military superiority in Asia-Pacific waters. By taking salami slicing strategy, gray zone strategy and cabbage strategy, China has been trying to exercise surpassing influences in regional maritime area, also in western Pacific region. This article provides a stepping stone to comprehend the aspect of China's recent maritime strategic actions, especially in Yellow Sea. In conclusion, this article suggests some policy recommendations for countering China's coercive maritime strategy. First, Korea should make sure a strategic concept of maritime security, instead of land warfare focused strategic concept. Second, it is needed to set up suitable naval forces for actively responding to neighbor nation's offensive actions.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.119-148
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• 2020

The purpose of this study is to examine the perceptions of neighboring countries on the gray zone and to explore Korea's maritime strategy. The concept of gray zones appears in various ways from country to country. In international relations, the gray zone is a comprehensive space between war and peace. The gray zone in the ocean is an unstable space in which competition between the US and China is represented and proxy wars are possible, and the gray zone needs strategic management. This study summarizes the concept of gray zones in the maritime security field, examines the gray zone strategies of neighboring countries, and suggests Korea's gray zone strategies. In particular, the recognition of the gray zone itself is the core of the problem, and it is necessary to strengthen information sharing to clarify the problem about the gray zone and accurately recognize the gray zone situation. The CMG(Complex Maritime Geostrategy) framework attempted in this study is expected to be helpful in understanding the nature of various gray zone issues around Korea and preparing for a geostrategy based on the analysis.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.61-92
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• 2020

This paper attempts to examine the changes in China's naval strategy and to analyze the goal, range, and method of each strategy during the Xi Jinping's era. Since the founding of New China, the People's Liberation of Army Navy(PLAN) has made four changes in the naval strategy. Under Xi Jinping's administration, China's naval strategy is far seas operation combined with near seas active defense. Now, China's naval strateg y is shifting from a defensive to an aggressive one, increasing the proportion of offensive weapon systems and the number of state-of-the-art warships, and the scope of the naval strategy has been specified in the second island chain including the Indian Ocean. With the changes of naval strategy, the PLAN will set a new strategic goal to secure maritime dominance and implement an assertive strategy to actively respond to the intervention and intrusion of external forces. Moreover, the PLAN will also improve its sea-based deterrence force and the maneuver force to block other countries in the long-distance maritime conflict zones. The operation method of China's future naval strateg y will gradually shift from 'interdiction' to 'rapid-response.'

• Strategy21
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• s.30
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• pp.286-311
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• 2012

한국은 세계 유일의 분단국가로서 대륙으로는 북한과 대치 중에 있으며, 해양으로는 세계 강대국인 중국, 일본, 러시아 등에 의해서 둘러 쌓여 있다. 이러한 안보환경에서 최근 북한은 김정은 후계세습을 위해 천안함 피격사건과 연평도 포격도발 사건을 감행하였으며, 이러한 북한의 도발위협은 김정일 사후 지속되고 있다. 그러나 한국은 북한이라는 현존 위협에 대비함과 동시에 주변국으로 상정할 수 있는 잠재적 위협에도 대비해야 한다. 특히 잠재적 위협의 경우 해상에서 한국과 국가이익이 상충되고 있으며, 이들 모두 한국보다 강한 해군력을 보유하고 있을 뿐만 아니라 최근 들어 해군력을 강화하고 있다. 따라서 최근의 안보정세는 한국해군이 향후 어떠한 해양전략을 추구해야 하는지에 대한 재정립을 요구하고 있다고 할 수 있다. 본 논문은 한국의 잠재적 위협인 러시아와 일본 간에 발생한 러일전쟁을 통해 미래 위협에 대비한 최정예해군(Post modern navy)으로 도약하기 위한 한국해군의 발전방향을 도출하고, 이를 달성하기 위한 4가지 핵심개념을 제시하였다. 구체적으로 이는 최정예해군으로서 해양통제와 거부를 균형적으로 갖추고, 원정작전 수행능력을 보유하며, 해양경찰과 결속력이 있는 유대관계를 형성 및 북한의 비대칭전력에 대한 대응능력을 갖춘 해군이라고 설명할 수 있다. 결국 한국해군은 대륙세력인 북한의 위협에 대비하고 동시에 미래 잠재적 위협에 대비함과 동시에 해양에서의 국가이익을 보호해야 한다고 할 수 있다. 한국은 해양국가이다. 한국은 결코 바다를 포기할 수 없으며, 한국해군이 추구하는 해양전략은 국가의 운명을 결정짓는다고 해도 과언이 아닐 것이다. 이러한 측면에서 본 논문은 향후 한국해군이 어떠한 해양전략을 추구해야 하는지에 대해 하나의 방향을 제시하고 있다.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.241-271
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• 2020

The military technology currently receiving the most attention is the hypersonic missile. hypersonic is faster than the speed of sound or Mach 5+. The vast majority of the ballistic missiles that it inspired achieved hypersonic speeds as they fell from the sky. Rather than speed, today's renewed attention to hypersonic weapons owes to developments that enable controlled flight. These new systems have two sub-varieties: hypersonic glide vehicles and hypersonic cruise missiles. Hypersonic weapons could challenge detection and defense due to their speed, maneuverability, and low altitude of flight. The fundamental question of this study is: 'What effect will the hypersonic missile have on the maritime strategy?' It is quite prudent to analyze and predict the impact of technology in the development stage on strategy in advance. However, strategy is essential because it affect future force construction. hypersonic missiles act as a limiting factor in securing sea control. The high speed and powerful destructive power of the hypersonic missile are not only difficult to intercept, but it also causes massive ship damage at a single shot. As a result, it is analyzed that the Securing sea control will be as difficult as the capacity of sea denial will be improved geographically and qualitatively. In addition, the concept of Fortress Fleet, which was criticized for its passive strategy in the past, could be reborn in a modern era. There are maritime power projection/defence, SLOC attack/defence in exploiting sea control. The effects of hypersonic missiles on exploiting sea control could be seen as both limiting and opportunity factors.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Navigation and Port Research Conference
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• 2019.11a
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• pp.104-106
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• 2019

IMO, IALA는 e-Navigation 전략과 해사 서비스를 개발하고, 해상자원에 대한 유일 번호체계 도입을 위한 해상자원명 지침을 개발하고 있으며, 항로표지 등의 해양정보를 해사안전 국제 공통 표준(S-100)에 기반한 정보 표준 및 관련 서비스 표준을 개발 중에 있다. 해상교통시설을 기반으로 항로표지, 해양기상 정보 등 다양한 정보를 수집/관리 하고 있으므로, 항로표지 관련정보를 효율적으로 관리하고 육상 및 해상 사용자로의 활용 증대를 위해 항로표지 정보의 스마트화 전략이 요구 된다. 본 연구에서는 항로표지 스마트화 전략의 핵심 요소인 항로표지 정보 표준에 기반한 체계 구축, 유일번호 부여 및 활용을 위한 해상자원명 적용 방안을 소개하고, 이러한 핵심 기술을 활용한 항로표지 정보의 스마트화 전략을 제시 하고자 한다.

• Strategy21
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• s.32
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• pp.271-297
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• 2013

2010년 초반 이래 지역 해양안보는 보다 개선된 신뢰증진을 위한 안보구도와 메커니즘을 요구하고 있다. 특히 2011년 이래 전문가들은 지역 내 어려운 해양안보 문제들을 주요 현안으로 식별하고 있으며, 아울러 다양한 다루기 힘든 개념 위주의 지역 해양신뢰구축방안들을 제시하고 있었다. 최근 동북아는 다양한 해양분쟁과 갈등으로 점철되고 있으며, 대부분 국가들은 더욱 위험한 상황을 선택하기에 주저하지 않는 위험한 현상을 보이고 있다. 이러한 문제들은 첫째, 기본적으로 기존의 개념적 목적의 해양신뢰구축방안 이행에 대한 실패, 둘째, 개념적 해양신뢰구축방안을 넘어선 기능적이며 실질적 해양신뢰구축으로 변화에 어려움 그리고 셋째, 이를 동북아에서 어떻게 적용30)해야 하는가" 하는 문제로 귀결되고 있다. 대체적으로 전문가들은 개념적 방안 보다 효과적이며 기능적 해양신뢰구축방안을 적용하고 이해하는 것이 바른 "정답"이라고 보고 있다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 기존의 개념적 논쟁에 빠졌던 개념적 해양신뢰구축방안에 대한 과거 미련을 버리고 점차 진화된 복합적 문제로 대두되는 동북아 해양에서의 해양분쟁과 갈등을 기능적이며 실질적 해양 신뢰구축방안에 의해 해결하는 방법을 식별하여 제시하고자 한다. 이에 본 논문에서 제시하는 기술적이며 제도적 해양신뢰구축방안이 인정되면, 지금까지의 작용-반작용의 악순환적 주기를 넘어설 수 있는효과적 해양신뢰 각론, 레짐 또는 거버런스가 될 수 있을 것이다. 궁극적으로 본 논문의 목적은 고질적이고 새로운 해양갈등을 해소할 수 있는 신뢰 구축 전략을 제시하여 지역 해양안전과 평화를 유지하는 것이다.

• Maritime Security
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.1-42
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• 2021

Controversy continues over the offensive nature of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of China's naval strategy to become a maritime power by using the three elements of strategy and predict China's military actions in the future. For this purpose, research was conducted by considering the three elements of strategy and the distinct characteristics of naval strategy, and it was found that China's naval strategy was overall aggressive, but there was an imbalance in the pursuit of aggression between each strategic element. Offensive nature was prominent in terms of the methods, but there were limitations in the goals and means, such as the need to cooperate with neighboring countries to become a maritime power and the lack of military technology and operational continuity. The prospects for China's future military actions derived from the imbalance between these strategic elements are as follows. ① The risk of all-out military conflict with the US is low for now. ② China may use its naval power to force or cause limited military clashes against neighboring countries within the first island chain. ③ Accidental military conflicts with the US and neighboring countries may occur over naval confrontation over territorial disputes.

• Strategy21
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• s.45
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• pp.116-147
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• 2019

Despite the fact that South Korea, one of peninsula countries, has been already a middle power in an international arena, it still tends to get stuck in continental-driven inertia and be reluctant to become a consolidated maritime power. In its efforts to deal with the parable of South Korea, designing a tailored-made strategy needs to be initiated in detail. Its design is centered around two variables: classification of waters and prestige. First of all, the domain of waters confronted to South Korea ranges from the greatest threat to scattered national interest. Second, South Korea is prestigiously regarded as the middle power which is equipped with the capability to see beyond its sovereign waters. The Maritime Access Strategy(MAS) can be more clearly explained by three-axis factors: ends, ways, and means. Ends need to be oriented to achieving three types of classified objectives-Deterrence, Engagement around the world to maximize remotely-scattered interest and Check of neighboring countries' seapower expansion, called DEC. Ways is mainly driven by the closer access to three different types of waters: waters of security, check, and interest. The active access and closer approach to the domain of waters need to be maintained with a high degree of willingness and capability. Means is attainable by guiding naval forces to be armed with multiple platforms and functionally-balanced assets. These platforms and assets will allow the naval forces to attain and maintain cost effective means, leading to making MAS feasible. This strategy allows the middle-power Korea to make the best of its maritime assets at various seas, contributing to international stability as well as national security and interest.