

From the Sea to Post-Modern Navy as a Future Korean Maritime Strategy based on the Russo-Japanese War case study

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I . Introduction

North Korea was supposed to launch a missile test in mid-April, 2012, yet adjacent countries forced them to cancel the test including the United States, China, and Japan, etc. It showed the Korean peninsula was the most significant threatened area under the armistice. Before that, there were several sea disputes between North Korea and South Korea along the north limit line which affected the Korean maritime strategy calling for a blue water navy, specifically, the PCC Cheonan sinking and the Yeonpyong-do artillery attack in 2010.

The Korean navy strategy up to that time relied on a blue navy for operating on the oceans by its own fleet with self-protection and mobility including several Aegis ships, and amphibious landing ships as command and control ships similar to the United States. However, Korea reconsidered the strategy because North Korea attacked using an asymmetric force including a submarine, and indirect artillery which highlighted the true threat from North Korean.

There are several reasons to choose the Russo-Japanese War as the case study for analysis. First, the Russo-Japanese War occurred where Northeast Asia adjacent countries fought in their region including the Korean peninsula. The security threats of South Korea might potentially be neighboring countries such as China, Japan, and Russia. The case study will reveal significant lessons learned that may shed light on how to respond to future security threats of South Korea. Second, the pattern of Russo-Japanese War operations is similar to that expected of South Korea in the future. The possibility of all out war between nations becomes lower since the Post Cold War and in case of an all-out war, causes serious damage among disputed countries. Because of that, patterns of future wars are expected to be limited wars and/or local wars based on sea power at sea instead of a ground war on land excepting that a ground war could be a local war ashore. In this

respect, Russo–Japanese War lessons learned shed insight for South Korea in development of its future maritime. It provides a case study which Mahan and Corbett, both critical maritime strategists, analyzed the navy's ability regarding maritime strategy to conduct sea control, sea denial, and fleet concentrations. From this lesson learned, the author applies the construct of a post modern naval strategy for the future maritime strategy for the Korean navy. Dr. Till categorized three navy styles in terms of national development such as pre–modern navy, modern navy, and post modern navy. As South Korea was the 13th largest economic country in the world, and needed a proper role for the navy to support to this economy.

As a future maritime strategy, South Korean navy should focus on a balanced navy between sea control and sea denial, expeditionary capabilities, cooperative security, and increasing coast guard cooperation. It should not be solely focused on overwhelming the North Korean threat, but should also contribute to maintaining stability of Korean sea lines of communication and by protecting commercial shipping and commerce.

II. Background

There were recently two terrible sea engagements along the North Limit Line(NLL) in the Korean western coastal area in 2010. One of these was the Republic of Korea(ROK) patrol ship PCC Cheonan sunk by a North Korean submarine torpedo, the other was Yeonpyong–do artillery attack by North Korea. Why did this happen and why is there still tension along the NLL in Korean peninsula?

The reasons revert back to the Korean War. The U,N and North Korea met agreement on the Korean armistice after 3 years of the

Korean War. It divided the peninsula into two separate countries along the Military Demarcation Line(MDL) which identified the land border. It is the basis for conflict with North Korea today and is still disputed near the NLL, specifically, the issue of the definition of a sea border. The armistice states “all the islands lying to the north and west of the provincial boundary line shall be under the military control of the Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army and the Commander of the Chinese People's volunteers, except the island groups of Baengnyeong-do, Taechong-do, Sochong-do, Yeonpyong-do and U-do, which shall remain under the military control of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. All the islands on the west coast of Korea lying south of the above mentioned boundary line shall remain under the military control of the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(UNC).¹⁾” But there is no mention of maritime boundaries in the armistice.²⁾ As a result of this, two the Koreas each declared its own territorial sea after armistice.

It became a more serious territorial dispute after the sea clash in 1999 which occurred between small patrol boats along the NLL. Sea clashes in 2002, 2009 along the line, also occurred but North Korea lost the clashes because of a lack of ship modernization. Finally, North Korea provoked South Korea using a submarine and an artillery round which North Korea may use to retaliate against South Korea as an asymmetric weapon. There is significant security and economic interest between the two countries. The main reasons of the dispute over the NLL are resources, access to the West Sea, security, and sovereignty.³⁾ At this

1) Korean Armistice agreement, Article 2, 13 (b)
<http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html> (accessed 5 March 2012).

2) Terence Roehrig, *Korean dispute over the northern limit line: Security, Economics, or international law* School of Law university of Maryland, no. 3, 2008, 6.

3) _____, “The Northern Limit Line and North Korean Provocations”, In *The Survival of North Korea : essays on strategy, economics and international relations* edited by Suk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig, and Bernhard Seliger: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011, p. 203.

point, South Korean maritime strategy was forced to focus on the North Korean threat and had to reconsider the strategy of a blue water navy.

III. Future Korean war

Security challenge in South Korea

South Korea is the only divided country in the world not only facing a border with North Korea under armistice, but also confronting potential threats from maritime nations possessing a strong navy at sea. These security environments have forced the South Korean military to prepare for ground war opposing the North's million man army and to array ground forces with overlap in order to defend the capital area located 40km away from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) after the Korean War. Furthermore, U.S. forces, mainly navy, and air force forces supports the South Korean forces and covers ground war under a current ROK-U.S combined defense system. It was underlying factor that caused the South Korean military to build the army centric military structure.⁴⁾ As a result, the South Korean military focused on building a strong army in order to defend the North's million army even though there were two threats on land, at sea.

Nonetheless, South Korea should prepare for future wars or conflicts with adjacent countries such as China, and Japan, since their national interests conflict in area concerning island disputes, delimitation of maritime boundaries and others maritime issues. The patterns of future warfare under potential challenges require naval power in order to meet the new strategic environment regarding as a

4) MND, Republic of Korea, "military reform basic plan: C2 reform" 2011, p. 22.

highly possible occurrence with limited war and/or a local war based at sea. Recently, common threads of these countries have focused on naval forces including aircraft, surface ship, and submarines, to include new U.S. Defense Strategy in January, 2012.

Patterns of future war: North Korea

The North's maritime strategy could be executed achieve the North's military objective, primarily through surprise attack, short term lighting war, and asymmetric activity not countered by South Korea's current strategy. For this reason, patterns of future war between the two Koreas will be a local war under armistice, and furthermore the North's provocation will be more likely to be executed at sea. There is a lower possibility of occurrence of all out war on the Korean peninsula, but it can't completely be ruled out. As a result, South Korea should also prepare contingency plans that address all out war as well. Figure.1 shows expected patterns of future war with North Korea.

Figure. 1 Expected Patterns of future war with North Korea.

	Local War	All out War
Battlefield range	Small, the front/the rear	Large, the front/the rear
Major battlefield (primary/secondary)	Maritime(ashore) / Ground	Ground / Maritime(ashore)
Military strategy	surprise attack strategy, short term lighting war strategy, asymmetric strategy, Mixed strategy, Consume/ Annihilation strategy	
Weapon Systems	artillery, submarine, flag ship of convenience, LCPA, torpedo, mine, anti-surface missile, GPS confusion, cyber terror	reserve forces, artillery, surface ship, tank, submarine, LCPA, torpedo, mine, CBR weapons, ballistic missile, GPS confusion, cyber terror
Possibilities of occurrence	High	Low
response forces	Navy, Air-force asset	Military

Patterns of future war: Potential threats(or adjacent threats)

South Korea is linked with China, Japan, and Russia by sea, each have reinforced their military structure based on a strong navy. If war breaks out between these nations, major conflicts might be at sea with naval forces and air-forces. South Korea has a potential source of conflict with adjacent countries concerning island disputes, delimitation of maritime boundaries as well as other maritime issues and it cannot exclude the possibility of military conflict.

Military conflict between South Korea and adjacent countries could be a local war and/or a limited war that does not necessarily involve all out war, then United States Involvement in the war would depend on the level of involvement of the principal combatant countries.

China has achieved phenomenal economic growth since reform and opening up policy in 1978, now, building military power focused on naval power and air power. Even though Japan has a powerful navy in the world, Japan is still continuing reinforce her naval power and air power in order to secure national interest at sea. Russia is recently increasing naval power to meet its strategic objectives, and the U.S. officially declared that military power would be increased in East Asia as part of the new defense strategy. Finally, the Korean peninsula neighbors are building navy centric military in order to protect national interest at sea. It means that can't completely rule out the possibility of military collision. Figure.2 shows expected patterns of future war with potential threats between adjacent countries.

Figure. 2 Expected Patterns of future war with potential threats between adjacent countries.

	China	Japan	Russia
Cause of war	Maritime dispute	Maritime dispute	Protection for national interest at sea
Major battlefield	Maritime(open sea) / restraint ground war		
Patterns of war	A limited war or a local war		
Major forces	Naval force, Air-force force		
U,S involvement			
(Relative evaluation)	High	Low	Medium
Weapon systems	Aircraft carrier, submarine, steles bomber, new missile, space/cyber attack capabilities	Submarine, aegis ship, frigate with helo, bomber, space/cyber attack capabilities	Aircraft carrier, submarine, bomber, ballistic missile, space/cyber attack capabilities
Possibility of occurrence	High	Medium	Low
Possibility of occurrence for All-out war	Low	Low	Low
Response force	Naval force (Air-force)	Naval force (Air-force)	Naval force (Air-force)

IV. Response priority for security challenge

Security challenges for the Korean navy are analyzed North Korean threats from the North, potential threats at sea, and from threats

adjacent countries. In other words, the most security challenge for Korea is the North Korean threat since the North's military strategy for unification policy remains under the new leader Kim Jong Un succession. The New dictator's leadership and challenge for the system leads to the possibility of more provocation in the local region as well as the possibility of an all out war. What is worse, potential threats have reinforced their naval power recently. Additionally, the Korean peninsula tensions have risen following the new U.S. Defense Strategy release. South Korea should be well prepared to defend national interests in order to overcome this situation. For the conclusion, South Korean navy should build sufficient sea power to protect South Korea national interests.

Response priority for security challenges of the South Korean navy is to prepare for a North Korean threat, potential threat, and non-military threat. But, the South Korean navy need not only build military power to offset the North Korean threat, but also to reinforce naval assets against a potential threat. In other words, the South Korean navy should prepare sea power for both threats simultaneously with advanced weapon systems and naval assets.

South Korean navy's strategy for potential challenge would require a future structure change for the navy. Future wars would most likely be a limited war or a local war at sea with sea power as substantiated by previous analysis. What is a limited war or a local war at sea means that major conflicts to counter these threats would not on be land but at sea without supporting combat on land. Because an unlimited war would extend onto the mainland, it means most of countries might try to restrain military involvement to only response forces in an attempt to keep it a limited war. The South Korean navy should operate its own naval forces with three dimensional warfare assets. However, South Korean naval assets are lacking air power even though operating a maritime airplane, and antisubmarines helicopter with submarines, aegis surface ships, and LPDs, etc. North Korean threats are limited in

the Korean peninsula and generally fall within an operational range of the South Korean air force, but potential challenges still require the South Korean navy operate carrier borne aircraft. China now is testing an aircraft carrier and developing carrier borne aircraft by herself. China's aircraft carrier would make not only her strategic objectives achievable, but also may force adjacent countries to accelerate in an arms race at sea. For example, Japan would purchase 42 F-35 from the U.S. which ROC is required for vertical launching system. Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces already possesses platforms for vertical launching aircraft carrier, and then Japan could operate immediately the platform as an aircraft carrier with vertical launching F-35.

Finally, the South Korean navy needs to develop a maritime strategy to address potential challenges and include vertical launching aircraft and attack helicopters. Furthermore, the South Korean Navy needs to address potential challenges in obtaining adequate defense against underwater to surface missile/underwater to ground missile/surface to ground missile, and torpedo attacks in order to operate continually using advanced assets for potential threats.

Russo-Japanese War case study

The Russo-Japanese War showed how a maritime strategy adopted for the Navy of Japan to win the war against a western developed country in 1904-1905. Japan had undergone modernization in economy and military preparations for war for the last 10 years. This victory resulted from two distinctly different battles which employed different methods. The first was an eleven-month war of attrition against the Russian Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur, the other was a two day battle of annihilation of the Russian Baltic Fleet in the Tsushima Strait.⁵⁾

Strategic thinking: Japan

Is the position in itself one good for Russia to keep, or for Japan to capture?

Alfred Thayer Mahan⁶⁾

The Sino-Japanese war made Japan, Asia's new power country with the treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan gained Port Arthur, the Liaotung Peninsula, and the island of Taiwan from China, to realize its ambitions on the northeast Asian continent without interference. However Russia itself demanded and received from China a twenty five year lease on Port Arthur and the commercial Port of Ta-lien(Dalny, Dairen).⁷⁾ It brought Japan to a turning point to reconsider national strategy regarding a Western power, its military power. As a result, Japan decided relentlessly to build strategic strength. There were clearly two facts to retaliate to Russia from the lost Port Arthur. Japan not only reinforced sufficient military power to fight Russia as a continental power in northeast Asia, including enough naval force to beat or defeat whatever armed forces Russia might come with, which came from Great Britain; but also sought the support of some Western power in order not go it alone by itself in the world. Japan tried to assure freedom of action without interfering other maritime powers and encouraged the Japanese navy to think of domination of East Asian waters through the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902.⁸⁾

At the beginning of the war at Port Arthur, Corbett stated that "It wasn't Japanese success of having command of the sea, but that they were able to prevent the Russians from obtaining it."⁹⁾ It was use of

5) Ronald Andidora, "Admiral Togo: An Adaptable Strategist," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 44, no. 2(Spring 1991), p. 52.

6) Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia," in *Naval Administration and Warfare*. Boston: Little Brown, 1918, p. 143.

7) David C Evans, and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997, p. 52.

8) *Ibid.*, p. 53.

the fleet in Japanese Admiral Togo's strategy as command of the sea, first used in England in the 16th century. The Russian Admiral Makarov sustained the fleet in Port Arthur with fortification. When many maritime theorists said what was command of the sea, Vego strictly defined it as “ensuring one's free use of sea communications and full denial of it to the adversary...in practical terms, was obtained when one side possessed superiority over its adversary in a given theater of parts of the theater, but aftermath of World War I, it was replaced by the term sea control.”¹⁰⁾ However, how could the weaker nation possess a superior navy against the Russia Empire in the war? It could be achieved using a fleet in being, understood as a fleet strategically large, not itself in command of the sea, but strong enough to deny that command to the adversary by strategic and tactical dispositions adapted to the circumstances of the case, as like an example of Port Arthur.¹¹⁾

Corbett defined object of command of the sea a goal that “must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.”¹²⁾ Corbett viewed Admiral Togo's strategic thinking that “with the army lies the offensive part of the war plan, and his part is to provide the defensive support by confining the enemy's main fleet to an area from which it cannot interfere with the army's progress.”¹³⁾ The author argues that if Admiral Togo obtained command of the sea without the Japanese army's landing in the Korean peninsula, we would not know how the

9) Julian S. Corbett, *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*, Vol. 2, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994, p. 394.

10) Milan Vego, *On Naval Warfare*, Newport, RI: U. S. Naval War College, September 2008, p. 10.

11) _____, op. cit., 75.

12) Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992, p. 91.

13) _____, *Maritime Operations in the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905*, Vol. 2, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press and Newport: Naval War College Press, 1994, p. 383.

Russo-Japanese war would end up? It might be success for Russia to keep Port Arthur with the Baltic Fleet joined. However, Japan combined its army and navy together to achieve a strategic objective using a recent term: “expeditionary operations”.

Strategic thinking: Russia

The Russian Empire had an unprecedented economic boom between 1888 and 1904, but of importance was Russia's dependence on Europe which required Russia to devote more resources to Europe than Asia when Kuropatkin was War Minister in 1898 as well.¹⁴⁾ Even though increasing the danger of war with Japan in every year, Russia neglected to preserve peace or to prepare sufficiently to wage war and also convinced themselves that they would have an easy victory in defeating Japan.¹⁵⁾ As a result of the situation such as economy and military development, Russia was forced to take a defensive strategy within fortifications. In other words, Russia took a fortress fleet instead of securing command of sea for Port Arthur. It is a good example of Russian thinking pitting General Kuropatkin's idea against Japan. The commander of Russia's far eastern armies, was to avoid decisive engagements in order to gain the time needed to bring tens of thousands of additional troops from Europe to Russia.¹⁶⁾

General Kuropatkin would have made the right decision with a sufficient Trans Siberian railway perfectly timed if Japan didn't adopt a joint operation such as landing in Korea and Russia confronted not only Japan but had to contend with European countries. Considering the European theater's internal situation, it not only met their assumption,

14) William C., Jr. Fuller, *Strategy and Power in Russia, 1600-1914*, New York: Free Press, 1992, p. 362, pp. 365-366.

15) Ibid., pp. 374-375.

16) William C. Fuller, op. cit., p. 400.

but also the Anglo–Japanese treaty was forced on to the Baltic Fleet to delay the arrival. In the end, losing command of the sea caused Russia to lose Port Arthur.

In a sense of fleet in being, Russia adopted a passive fleet in being which exists when a weaker force not only holds back but also inflicts little if any damage on the stronger fleet. It was securing the squadron in Port Arthur at the beginning, but it gave Japan the opportunity to retain their entire heavy force in the area to be able to support the landing at Chemulpo. Russia was responsible for the disaster in Manchuria due to the passive fleet in being theory.¹⁷⁾ If Russia adopted active fleet in being like Japan, Russia might take command of the sea. It would have changed the result of the Russo–Japanese War with decisive battle between two navies and deny the Japanese army a landing in the Korean peninsula.

Moreover, Russia's fleet was separated by geographic location which was major Baltic Fleet, Pacific Fleet and Pacific Fleet also divided two bases Port Arthur, Vladivostok. Mahan said that “Concentration may be correctly defined as being itself a choice of position”¹⁸⁾ but, an interior navy as Japan had significant advantage from separated forces during the war. It showed that how important of maritime strategy affected the result of war.

17) Milan Vego, op. cit., p. 78.

18) Alfred Thayer Mahan, “Retrospect upon the War between Japan and Russia,” in *Naval Administration and Warfare*, Boston: Little Brown, 1918, p. 169.

V. Future Korean maritime strategy

Strategic thinking: South Korea vs North Korea

Both Korea developed its own strategy and military capabilities after the Korean war in 1953. There wasn't enough naval power even with North Korea supported by Russia with just 16 patrol craft, several coastal steamers in North Korea, and small vessels in South Korea during Korean war. Therefore, the United States could maintain sea control for the war, and it showed Operation CHORMITE.

South Koreans increased their economic development prior to military power reinforcement, because South Korea was a mostly poor country due to the devastation of the Korean War. After that, South Korea had focused its conventional military capabilities on deterring and defending against the military threats posed by North Korea.¹⁹⁾ South Korea tried to modernize the armed forces after their major role changed, which was a transfer of peacetime operational control from Combined Forces Command. The other was a plan to transfer wartime operational control by 2015. As a result, the Republic of Korean Navy(ROKN) adopted a modernized combat ship force which took them from a brown water navy to a blue water navy including a strategic mobile fleet. The catchphrase for the navy was “to the sea, to the World”.

North Korea, unlike South Korea, was focused on military power first under the dictator Kim Il Sung after the Korean War because he wanted to sustain his regime under communist power with a focus on conventional military power. But having observed the ineffectiveness of

19) Yong Sup Han, “South Korean’s Military Capabilities and Strategy”, In *The Survival of North Korea : essays on strategy, economics and international relations* edited by Suk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig, and Bernhard Seliger: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011, p. 215.

America's high-tech war in Vietnam, Pyongyang drastically increased its military in 1970 and greatly improved its conventional and asymmetric capabilities.²⁰⁾ After the second nuclear crisis in 2002, North Korean efforts posed a superior military force against South Korea, enabling "surprise attack, short term blitz tactics, and integration of conventional and asymmetric warfare to obtain rapid defeat of the southern half of the peninsula."²¹⁾

Several western sea disputes occurred causing issues with security and sovereignty along the NLL from 1999 to 2009. Finally North Korea recognized a superior South Korean modern naval power compared to the North. To use political and internal bondage for the new leader, Kim Jung Un, North Korea attacked a South Korean patrol ship Cheonan, by midget submarine on March 26, 2010, and also attacked Yeonpyong-do by land based artillery on November 23, 2010 asymmetric weapons. It forced the ROKN strategy to reconsider its blue water navy strategy. In order words, the ROKN was focused on Anti-Submarine Warfare capabilities for a present threat prior to future reinforcement of naval power after the Cheonan sinking.

Strategic thinking: Adjacent countries(China, Japan)

The People's Republic of China(PRC) was unified after the civil war by the communist, leaving only Taiwan governed by a democratic party led by Chaing Kai-shek. The PRC increased military power in Asia and supported the Korean War. Recent China economic development and security considerations established vital sea lines of communication

20) Duk-Ki Kim, "The Republic of Korea's Counter-asymmetric Strategy" *Naval War College Review*, vol 65(Winter 2012), p. 57.

21) Seung Joo Baek, "North Korea's Military Buildup and Strategic Outlook", In *The Survival of North Korea : essays on strategy, economics and international relations* edited by Suk Hi Kim, Terence Roehrig, and Bernhard Seliger: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2011, pp. 199-200.

(SLOC) and offshore assets. Even though China did not have all the classic elements of sea power stated by Alfred T. Mahan, PRC leadership had agreed to raise a blue water navy by 2050.²²⁾ As a result, Wen Jiabao, Chinese prime minister, commented that “We will enhance the armed forces' capability to accomplish a wide range of military tasks, increasing its defense budget by 11.2% to some 670 billion yuan (\$106.4 billion) this year similar previous years, and a renewed strategic push by the United States in the region.”²³⁾ It showed PRC's ambition to possess modern expeditionary forces for a navy which would obtain offshore sea denial and control missions beyond the East China Sea. In accordance with his comment, the first Chinese aircraft carrier will go into service this year.²⁴⁾

Not only increasing military power but also raising geometrical disputing issues where PRC was interested in mainland China. There were several disputed sea areas where Asian countries were mostly interested and concerned with territorial and boundary issues for several decades such as, Ieodo between China–Korea, Senkaku Island between China–Japan, the Gulf of Tonkin between China–Vietnam. Specially a major issue concerning Ieodo, which had a ROK ocean research center built on it and raised in accordance with the Korean Jeju port building plan, it pushed ROKN into a joint armed race.

After the Sino–Japanese war, the Russo–Japanese War brought Japan to a blue water navy strategy adopted mainly from Alfred T. Mahan's thinking. The Imperial Japanese Navy(IJN) was a concept of an eight by eight fleet to build up a formation of eight battleships and eight battle cruisers as a core of the Combined Fleet. But the plan was

22) Duk–Ki Kim, “The Republic of Korea's Counter–asymmetric Strategy”, *Naval War College Review*, vol 65(Winter 2012), p. 157.

23) Chi–Chi Zhang and Jethro Mullen, “Chinese premier touches on military, economy”, *CNN.COM*, 5 March 2012 <http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/05/world/asia/china-wen-speech/index.html>(accessed 18 March 2012).

24) Michael Wines, “China: New Aircraft Carrier Is a Vintage Soviet Model”, *NYTIMES.com*, 14 March 2012 <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/world/asia/china-new-aircraft-carrier-is-a-vintage-soviet-model.html> (accessed 18 March 2012).

abandoned under the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 between the United States and Japan.²⁵⁾ Japanese defeat in WWII revealed a lot of mistakes by senior leadership, skilled sailors, and assets but, they could keep facilities in the main land of Japan because of the unconditional surrender after atomic bombardment in Japan during World War II. After that, Japan established a basic policy to address the homeland defense mission by giving full priority to the warfare capabilities, especially ASW, required for the SLOC protection mission.²⁶⁾ Now, as Japan kept a security relationship with the United States, it modernized its fleet and had the most advanced Maritime Self-Defense Forces even though the Japanese Constitution restricted the number of assets with the North Korean Ballistic missile threat. Therefore, the Japanese navy built a concept of eight destroyers with eight shipboard ASW helicopters, finally had a Hyuga class DDH platform for carrier like 8 ASW helicopters onboard which caused lot of issues in Asia for armed raising.

Japan also had several territorial and boundary disputes with adjacent countries such as Southern Kuril islands/Northern territories with Russia, Senkaku Island with China, Dokdo(island) with Korea, which were considered to have a huge economic value for resources.

Post-modern navy strategy

Geoffrey Till stated Seapower in his book SEAPOWERS A Guide for The Twenty First Century that “Seapower is at the heart of the globalization process in a way in which landpower and airpower are not.”²⁷⁾ That meaning of Seapower gives Korea the need to increase

25) Yoji Koda, “A New Carrier Race?: Strategy, Force Planning, and JS Hyuga”, *War College Review*, vol 64(Summer 2011), p. 56.

26) _____, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

27) Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. 2nd ed. London

naval power as the vital forces as operated to army centric forces in Korea even though the North Korean threat exists. Because the country's major imports come by sea, about 99.8%. The globalization process could divide states into pre modern states, modern states, post modern states which were determined by economic development as to pre modern navy, modern navy and post modern navy.²⁸⁾ In retrospect, the Korean maritime strategy was more focused on a blue water navy, in order words increasing capabilities to overwhelm North Korea. As a result, South Korea struggled to prevent North Korean provocation. Since the 2010 provocation, the movement for maritime strategy was more concentrated on the North Korean threat. But, the effect of globalization forced South Korea to keep increasing its naval power as a post modern navy. An essential element of a post modern navy is the ability to conduct sea control, expeditionary operations, maintain good order at sea, maintenance of a maritime consensus. The author would argue that the Korean maritime strategy should be transforming to a post modern navy based on the lessoned learn from the previous case study.²⁹⁾

First of all, Korea needs to increase capabilities to balance maintaining sea control and sea denial. The Russo-Japanese war showed that sea control played a vital role in wartime for both countries. As the Korean Navy needs equivalent naval power for control of sea compared to adjacent countries naval power, enabling to deter and maintain sea flow from major sea line of communications. But budget constraints will not allow a significant increase in naval power, so South Korea needs not only to adapt active and passive fleet in being strategies depending on specific situations as a method for sea control or sea denial, but also to focus on the asymmetric power such as submarines, and special operation forces in the Navy. In order to be

and New York: Routledge,

28) *Ibid.*, pp. 1-2.

29) Geoffrey Till, *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

successful with a fleet in being, the Korean Navy must possess at least two movement fleets for dealing with two internal and external major sea disputes against adjacent threat countries vying for sea control. Furthermore, South Korea has to reinforce submarine fleets, aircraft fleets to maintain sea denial capability.

Second, expeditionary operations are a key factor for a post modern navy. A major reason for Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War was the conduct of joint operations between the navy and army. Without the Japanese army attack on Port Arthur, Japan couldn't win the first phase of the war. The Korean Navy launched an the amphibious landing ship in 2008, named LPH Dokdo, but this effort was still too weak to increase its capability compared to Japan or China. In addition to sea dispute, South Korea required the ability to conduct expeditionary operations to include humanitarian assistance/disaster relief(HA/DR). For example, The Korean Air-Force capability to operate off the disputed island, Dokdo, lasted for 15minutes with KF-15s, it meant if fighting the Japanese air force, the Korean Air Force had to come back before meeting Japanese air force. A method to compensate for this is with expeditionary forces with aircraft carriers.

Third, the Korean Navy had to increase efforts to support the coast guard for good order at sea. The Korean coast guard increased their capabilities including big cutters, and a major role at sea such as migrant interdiction, drug interdiction, and Chinese fishing boat issues in the Korean exclusive economic zone(EEZ). Effects of the economic situations was forced by military budget cuts by Congress even though the North Korean threat is rising. What we call zero sum game for national budget. To get more maritime power including good order at sea, there was no difference between the navy and coast guard. The coast guard was supposed to be controlled by the navy during wartime. It meant that coast guard power could help the navy if the navy needed to control coastal areas for contingency or wartime national interests.

Lastly, the Navy needed to focus on self deterrence capabilities

based on cooperative security for maintenance of maritime consensus. Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of alliances and that “the best time is to disrupt his alliances after attacking the enemy's strategy.”³⁰⁾ ROK would transfer wartime operational control from the United States in the year of 2015. But the U.S. military would stay in Korea under United Nation Command based on the North Korean threat situation and the Korean armistice even though operational control was handed over and our alliance between the two countries would agree on a common strategy to protect democracy against the North Korean threat. However, adjacent countries such as China and Japan allowed South Korea to reinforce its Korean military power even though manpower was shrinking, it would do so by innovation using the state of the art weaponry.

VI. Count-Argument

Even though the South Korean navy transformed to a post modern navy, the situation faced against North Korea would be changed significantly under armistice nation. In fact, the most effective factors for South Korea against North Korea, would not change, the environment forced South Korea to modernize its navy instead to a post modern navy in order to keep eyes on North Korea. This threat based on an army centric force was under budgeted. Dr. Till said that, “Modernists exhibit a preference for the maintenance of the traditional naval fighting disciplines.”³¹⁾ Self deterrence forced a change to increase the traditional naval power fight against North Korea and

30) Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*. Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 77-78.

31) Geoffrey Till, *Op. cit.*, p. 17.

reinforces the need to increase the number of ships with cutting edge weapons adjacent countries where potential armed conflict is possible. Further more, the Army also needed to modernize future defense to maintain capabilities to fight North Korea. Because the Army still struggled to keep readiness for about 550,000 personnel with old fashioned weapons, the push should be a priority for the armed forces.

Is balanced sea control and denial it really necessary for the Korean Peninsula to have to operate as a Joint Force? The Navy needed to be focused on sea denial with conventional sea power along coast line without increasing fleet building considering the budget issues regarding recent economic recessions. If the Navy would give up to its obtain Aegis destroyers then, the Navy could afford to buy at least 5 Frigates or more including a maintenance and logistic support after acquirement or to build new equipment for at least 5 army corps. In order words, the South Korean military was army centric armed forces based on North Korean threat for maintaining deterrence and keeping peace over 50 years after foundation of military. Which one would be more valuable for the country under the armistice regarding these threat?

VII. Conclusion

Even though army centric forces in Korea under North Korean threat, Korean economic situation through sea line of communication would be forced to increase its vital role to sustain the Korean economy while adjacent countries brought an issue of territorial and sea dispute. Present Korean armed forces was able to maintain deterrence to North Korean threat in order to keep peace under armistice state compared to North Korean conventional troop. However, China's ambitious maritime

capabilities and Japanese military power pushed South Korea to need a post modern navy in accordance with economic recession.

What if sea dispute occurred between China and Japan in the Senkaku area, what would happen to the South Korean sea lines of communication for import and export? There is no doubt Korea needs a fleet to protect commercial shipments through that vital area. Without naval capabilities, South Korea would have a heavy struggle for economic stability to import resources and, export materials. The counter piracy operations, which saved 21 hostages from Somalia pirates in early 2011, showed how important naval capabilities and cooperative security for national interest are.

A post modern navy is a huge effort to cooperate other countries with their own national interest, however, it was not navy capabilities but also maritime capabilities for nations including coast guards, Minister of Land, Transportation and Maritime Affairs. South Korea through integration of these maritime efforts should overcome not only the North Korean asymmetric threat, but also adjacent countries' dispute along Korean peninsula.

South Korea, therefore, is like an island because of its boundary to the North and isolation with North Korea. It was really important period for South Korean maritime strategy development after the North Korean attack forcing South Korea to rethink its future maritime strategy to make a more effective and affordable navy for the nation.

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요 약

러일전쟁에서 본 한국해군의 발전방향

임종수*(주저자) · 백병선**(교신저자)

한국은 세계 유일의 분단국가로서 대륙으로는 북한과 대치 중에 있으며, 해양으로는 세계 강대국인 중국, 일본, 러시아 등에 의해서 둘러 쌓여 있다. 이러한 안보환경에서 최근 북한은 김정은 후계세습을 위해 천안함 피격사건과 연평도 포격도발 사건을 감행하였으며, 이러한 북한의 도발위협은 김정일 사후 지속되고 있다. 그러나 한국은 북한이라는 현존 위협에 대비함과 동시에 주변국으로 상정할 수 있는 잠재적 위협에도 대비해야 한다. 특히 잠재적 위협의 경우 해상에서 한국과 국가이익이 상충되고 있으며, 이들 모두 한국보다 강한 해군력을 보유하고 있을 뿐만 아니라 최근 들어 해군력을 강화하고 있다. 따라서 최근의 안보정세는 한국해군이 향후 어떠한 해양전략을 추구해야 하는지에 대한 재정립을 요구하고 있다고 할 수 있다.

본 논문은 한국의 잠재적 위협인 러시아와 일본 간에 발생한 러일전쟁을 통해 미래 위협에 대비한 최정예해군(Post modern navy)으로 도약하기 위한 한국해군의 발전방향을 도출하고, 이를 달성하기 위한 4가지 핵심개념을 제시하였다. 구체적으로 이는 최정예해군으로서 해양통제와 거부를 균형적으로 갖추고, 원정작전 수행능력을 보유하며, 해양경찰과 결속력이 있는 유대관계를 형성 및 북한의 비대칭전력에 대한 대응능력을 갖춘 해군이라고 설명할 수 있다. 결국 한국해군은 대륙세력인 북한의 위협에 대비하고 동시에 미래 잠재적 위협에 대비함과 동시에 해양에서의 국가이익을 보호해야 한다고 할 수 있다. 한국은 해양국가이다. 한국은 결코 바다를 포기할 수 없으며, 한국해군이 추구하는 해양전략은 국가의 운명을 결정짓는다고 해도 과언이 아닐 것이다. 이러한 측면에서 본 논문은 향후 한국해군이 어떠한 해양전략을 추구해야 하는지에 대해 하나의 방향을 제시하고 있다.

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