• Defense and Technology
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• no.1 s.275
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• pp.22-31
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• 2002

한국의 해군력 건설 방향은 미래 해양 안보환경과 국가경제력에 상응함은 물론 주변국 해군에 대해 균형자적 역할을 담당할 수 있는 정예 해군력으로 건설해야 할 것이다. 이런 의미에서 수상 전투함은 높은 안정성, 고감도 탐지 장비와 함정 전투체계에 의한 성분작전 수행 능력 및 전역 탄도미사일 방어를 위한 탐지, 추적, 요격 및 실시간 지휘통제를 위한 함정 전투체계의 능력완비 등을 목표로 개발해 나가야 할 것이다.

• Defense and Technology
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• no.1 s.227
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• pp.68-77
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• 1998

주변국의 해양세력을 억제하고 견제하기 위해서는 해군력이 필수적이며, 미래의 해상전은 컴퓨터 기술을 무기체계 제어기술에 접목시킨 4차원 교전개념이 될 것이다. 해군의 역할 증대와 군사과학 기술의 변화 그리고 미래 전쟁 양상에 비추어 양보다도 정확성이 요구되는 무기체계의 개발이 요구된다.

• Defense and Technology
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• no.10 s.200
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• pp.74-87
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• 1995

지난 8월 세종연구소에서 열린 제4회 국제 해양력 심포지엄에서 발표된 내용을 각 주제별로 요약 정리했다. 21세기 태평양 시대를 대비해 바다를 지키는 해군의 역할이 증대됨에 따라 해군력을 길러야 안보와 함께 국가발전에 기여할 수 있음이 심도 깊게 논의되었다.

• Strategy21
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• s.46
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• pp.5-28
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• 2020

In 2019, the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State issued two reports to announce their plan to fulfill "free and open Indo-Pacific". Two reports commonly insisted on the support and participation from allies and partners to maintain security and stability in the Indo-Pacific. In response to this, neighboring states in the Indo-Pacific, including Japan, Australia, India, ASEAN, and Taiwan have different perspectives and stances based on their national interests. South Korea, too, has not clearly announced its position because they need to consider the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea as well as relationships between South Korea and China. This report focuses on the stances of neighboring states to the Indo-Pacific strategy and expected pros and cons of the participation of the strategy. In addition, when considering the name of strategy, the Indo-Pacific, naval power will be a main instrument to implement the strategy. Thus, this study also investigates the role of naval power in the Indo-Pacific strategy.

• Maritime Security
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• v.6 no.1
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• pp.83-107
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• 2023

To Republic of Korea in the Indo-Pacific region, the stability and prosperity of the area are directly coupled with national survival, interest. Currently, on account of strategic competition between U.S.A, and China in this area as well as supranational·non-conventional threats, the security environment is unstable, required joint/allied responses. So, lots of states inside(U.S.A., Japan, ASEAN, etc.), also, out of this Indo-Pacific area like EU-NATO, open their own strategy related in Indo-Pacific issues to be involved. R.O.K. government took its own line with publishing self strategy following this international trend, it can be shown korean government's strong intend to join in the pending security issues in this region with 'strategic clarity'. Now, R.O.K. Navy has to back up governments, policy. First, R.O.K. Navy should strengthen the relationship inside and take part in the multilateral cooperation of security. Second, to convey this deterrence message to potential threats, Navy is required to show of forces and have combined exercises. Also, as naval forces of advanced countries, Korea, Navy should be taken action in non-traditional threats, and help developing states improve their sea power. To fulfill this tasks in the wide ocean area, Navy need five inherent characteristics(mobility, flexibility, sustainability, capability of presence and projection). In the end, this paper propose the development plan following operational environment (SWOT) analysis as well.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.85-112
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• 2022

The maritime blockade has long been used as a means of war in that it serves as a bridge for economic warfare by paralyzing enemy maritime transport, although it is not a decisive battle, and in the Korean War, U.N. forces have achieved significant results in the war with limited maritime blockade through the Clark Line. However, with China emerging as a maritime powers based on its strong naval power, there is a lack of consideration on how to set up a blockade to block maritime activities and how to respond neutral ships or carrying wartime contraband products if war breaks out again on the Korean Peninsula, In addition, since maritime blockade should be used as a sensitive and flexible naval force projection in that it has interests with neutral countries, it should be carefully reviewed in that it can be used only through careful and reasonable judgment considering the principle of ensuring the legality of maritime blockade Therefore, in this study, Reexamine the process of change in the application of the International Law of Blockade, and through this, Derive the basic principle of ensuring the legitimacy of maritime blockade. In addition, by reviewing the application of these basic principles in the waters off the Korean Peninsula at wartime, we presented answers to research questions by reviewing what needs to be done to neutral ships and ships carrying wartime contraband products, and considered the implications for us

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.311-343
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• 2020

Because of the global warming, the Arctic Ocean is expected to be ice-free by the year 2035. When the Arctic Ocean will be opened, a number of national interests will become more salient as experiencing a shortened sailing distance and decreasing navigation expense, possibility of natural resources transport by sea from Arctic Circle, and indirect-profit making by building a herb port in Asia. To secure the national interests and support the free activities of people in this region, R.O.K government is trying to make advanced policies. In order to carry out the naval tasks in the Arctic Ocean, using the operational characteristics(mobility, flexibility, sustainability, presence of capabilities, projection) is necessary. To this end, ROK Navy should analyze the operational environment (O.E.) by its capability(weakness and strength), opportunity, and threat. R.O.K. Navy should make an effort over the following issues to implement the tasks in the Arctic Ocean: first, Navy needs to map out her own plan (Roadmap) under the direction of government policies and makes crews participate in the education·training programs in home and abroad for future polar experts. Third, to develop the forces and materials for the tasks in cold, far operations area, Navy should use domestic well-experienced shipbuilding skills and techniques of the fourth industrial revolution. Next, improving the combined operations capabilities and military trust with other countries in the Arctic region to cover the large area with lack of forces' number and to resolve the ports of call issues. Lastly, preparation in advance to execute a variety of missions against military and non-traditional threats such as epidemics, HA/DR, SOLAS, in the future operation area is required.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.108-152
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• 2017

This paper aims to analyze hegemonic competition and the role of naval power. To this end the paper is composed of four chapters titled introduction, the role of naval power in the hegemonic competition, the role of naval power in the East Asia, and the lessons and implications for the Korean Peninsula. Since the modern era, the hegemonic competition in the East Asian region has been the intrusion and struggle process between the world system and the East Asian regional system, and the ocean between these two systems has become the goal and means of supremacy(hegemony). Currently, the hegemonic competition between the US and China consists of systemic competition at the global level and marine competition at the regional level. When South Korea is forced to make strategic choices in the course of the US-China hegemonic competition, naval power will be the first factor to be considered. The ROK is asymmetrically maintaining a deep dependency relationship with the United States in terms of security and China in relation to the economy. And while the ROK's national economic power is acquired from the ocean, the ROK's military power is imbalanced because it is centered on the ground forces. These international relations and asymmetric-unbalanced resources distribution will not be able to effectively cope with the hegemonic competition between the US and China in the future, and will limit Korea's strategic choice. Since naval power and forces are the prerequisites for the hegemonic competition or the maintenance of supremacy we must construct balanced naval forces(naval power) that are not subordinate to the ground forces at the national strategic level for the future of the country.

• Journal of the Korea Society of Computer and Information
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• v.28 no.4
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• pp.93-104
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• 2023

Recently, the technology of drones is developing remarkably. The role of military drones is so great that they can cause serious damage to the enemy's important strategic assets without any damage to our allies in all battlefield environments (land, sea, air). However, the battleship combat management system currently operated by the Korean Navy is vulnerable to defense because there is no customized defense system against drones. As drones continue to develop, they are bound to pose a major threat to navy in the future. This paper proposes a way for the warfare software of naval combat management system sets a combat mode suitable for anti-drone battle, evaluates the threat priority in order to preemptively respond to drone threats and eliminate drone threats through automatic allocation of self-ship-mounted weapons and sensors, and through a test of the improved warfare software in a simulated environment, it was proved that the time to respond to the drone was improved by 62%.

• Strategy21
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• s.34
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• pp.236-261
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• 2014

The future role of nuclear extended deterrence in the security alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is currently a central concern. The gradually lessening role of reliance on nuclear weapons in US security policies broadly, combined with increasing North Korean nuclear capabilities and belligerence, raise fresh questions about the sufficiency of the "nuclear umbrella" as a pillar of the US-ROK defense posture. This article addresses the current and future role of nuclear extended deterrence in Korea in this dynamic context. The article reviews the longstanding trend toward reducing the overall size of the US nuclear arsenal, and assesses developments in US-ROK outlooks toward extended deterrence in response to the Obama administration's nuclear policies and North Korea's recent smaller-scale aggressions. The analysis finds that the challenges of deterrence credibility and allied reassurance are difficult and long-term. The analysis explains how these challenges emerge less from a shrinking US numerical arsenal size than from the sufficiency of specific nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities to meet emerging smaller-scale threats. The analysis also highlights the importance of broader strategic and political interaction in sustaining allied confidence in any joint security posture. The evaluation concludes that a strong US-ROK alliance relationship can be maintained while the size of the US nuclear arsenal continues to decline, in part because nuclear weapons in any deployment configuration are relatively ineffective means for deterring smaller-scale aggression. Nevertheless, continuing adjustment of the US-ROK extended deterrence posture to the evolving, complex and uncertain Korean peninsula security environment will remain an ongoing challenge. Finally, the article encourages further examination of the potential specific role ROK maritime forces might serve in enhancing deterrence of smaller-scale threats while minimizing risks of conflict escalation.