• Journal of Fisheries and Marine Sciences Education
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.53-73
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• 2007

There exists historically intimate relationship between the fisheries of the three countries of Northeast Asia in terms of the same fishing ground and similar resources. This means that if one of the countries fail to manage their fisheries properly, it will harm the others. Especially, if the EEZ straddling and Trans-Boundary Fish Stocks aren't managed by the cooperation of the three countries, the exhaustion of resources will be more likely to be accelerated. Considering the aspects mentioned, this paper refers to the necessity of fisheries cooperation between Korea, China, and Japan. Next, it analyzed the joint control cases of Norway/Russia Management of Shared Fish Stocks in the Barents Sea, Management of South Tasman Rise in Orange roughy, Agreement on Fisheries between the European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway, Conservation and management of pollack resources in the central Bering Sea, and drew a conclusion for ourselves. Last of all, it suggests a step-by-step strategy of promoting joint control between three countries, and the plan of the establishing and managing the organization of joint fisheries control. About the joint control, "The Joint Statement of promoting collaboration between Korea, China, and Japan" has been announced at ASEAN in October 7th, 2003 and the summit talk of the three countries. In the joint statement, the three countries came to an agreement which says, "Cooperation in Fishery Resource Conservation : The three countries will cooperate, bilaterally or trilaterally, to promote the sustainable use and conservation of fishery resource through the effective fishery management". Not only the consistent collaboration between the government is necessary, but also continuous exchange and related study on a Non-governmental level is also needed for the viable outcome in the near future. When deducting the result for the joint fisheries control, this writer hopes the contents of this study will be helpful.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.454-462
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• 2021

The purpose of this paper is to compare and analyze the status of ship departures by major ports in Korea. To this end, we collected necessary data from the National Statistical Office (National Statistical Portal), "Transportation·Logistics ⇨ Ship Departure Status by Port". The analysis period is 141 months from January 2009 to September 2020. The increase rate was higher in the order of Yeosu, Pyeongtaek Dangjin, Gwangyang, Busan, Incheon and Ulsan. In the analysis of the rate of change, Yeosu showed an uptrend while other ports showed a modest downtrend. In the scatter analysis, the total ship departure shows a high degree of synchronization with other ports except Yeosu. As a result of the empirical analysis, the recent trend of ship departures is slowly falling below 0%, and the current movement is expected to continue for the time being. As the southern logistics of China and ASEAN and northern logistics of Eurasia become active, the role of major ports is expected to expand further. It is necessary to develop a differentiated logistics service for each port and find an efficient way to increase the volume of goods by deriving factors for improving logistics.

• SUVANNABHUMI
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• v.3 no.2
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• pp.79-123
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• 2011

문화정체성은 실로 구성적 성격을 지닌 개념으로, 문화정체성의 구성은 상황 (그리고 역사)과 상념 사이에서 발생하는 역동적인 상호작용의 결과에서 비롯된다. "다약인"이라는 개념의 형성 및 구성에 있어서도 서로 다른 다양한 힘이 작용해왔다. 식민 지배기에 탐험가들과 학자들은 서구적 방식으로 "다약인"의 구성을 구체화시켰고, 이것은 해방 이후 인도네시아 국가의 향방에 순차적으로 영향을 끼쳤다. 다약인 정체성의 구성과 그 동인에 관한 논의는 머리사냥, 긴 형태의 가옥들, 종교 등과 같이 다약인을 그려내는 특정한 이미지에 다만 집중하고, 다약을 그려내는 이러한 이미지들이 오늘날 다약인 정체성과 어떠한 연관성을 지니는가에 관한 논의이다. 과거 머리사냥 풍습에 관해서도 다약인에게 있어서 머리사냥의 의미와 관례를 충분히 설명할 수 있는 분석이 현재 전무하다. 다약인 사회의 또 다른 주요 특징은 독특한 주거양식에서 찾을 수 있다. 주거양식은 대부분의 문헌에서 추정해온 것처럼 독특한 것이 아니라 오늘날에 이르기까지 다약인은 껜야인처럼 종종 연립가옥(라민)을 그들의 중심문화로 여긴다. 깔리만딴 동부에 위치한 롱메카에서 문화와 청년축제가 개최되었는데 이 축제의 전체 진행은 자문화의 재건과 밀접하게 연관되어있다. 2006년에 끄라얀에서 개최된 이와 유사한 한 문화축제는 페뭉 에라우 펜제라니(Pemung Erau Pengerani)라고 불린다. 종교 역시 다약인의 인류학적 설명에 있어서 주요 특징으로, 다약인은 보르네오에 거주하는 비(非)무슬림교도들로 정의된다. 과거에는 거의 대부분의 사람들이 정령신앙을 숭배했으나, 다약인들 사이에서 기독교로의 대규모 개종이 일어나면서 다약인은 기독교도와 일반적으로 동일시되었다. 깔리만딴 지역의 무슬림은 다약인이 될 수 없다는 게 일반적인 생각이다. 실로 다약인이 된다는 것은 수많은 힘들의 집합체로부터 그 구성이 이루어진다는 것을 의미한다.

• Strategy21
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• s.37
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• pp.104-143
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• 2015

China's new grand strategy, the "One Belt, One Road Initiative" (also Belt Road Initiative, or BRI) has two primary components: Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the "Silk Road Economic Belt" in September 2013 during a visit to Kazakhstan, and the "21^st Century Maritime Silk Route Economic Belt" in a speech to the Indonesian parliament the following month. The BRI is intended to supply China with energy and new markets, and also to integrate the countries of Central Asia, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), and the Indian Ocean Region - though not Northeast Asia - into the "Chinese Dream". The project will be supported by the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), due to open in 2016 with 57 founding members from all around the world, and China has already promised US$ 50 billion in seed funding. China's vision includes networks of energy pipelines, railways, sea port facilities and logistics hubs; these will have obvious commercial benefits, but also huge geopolitical significance. China seems to have two distinct aims: externally, to restore its historical sphere of influence; and internally, to cope with income inequalities by creating middle-class jobs through enhanced trade and the broader development of its economy. In South Korea, opinion on the BRI is sharply polarized. Economic and industrial interests, including Korea Railroad Corporation (KORAIL), support South Korean involvement in the BRI and closer economic interactions with China. They see how the BRI fits nicely with President Park Geun-hye's Eurasia Initiative, and anticipate significant commercial benefits for South Korea from better connections to energy-rich Russia and the consumer markets of Europe and Central Asia. They welcome the prospect of reduced trade barriers between China and South Korea, and of improved transport infrastructure, and perceive the political risks as manageable. But some ardently pro-US pundits worry that the political risks of the BRI are too high. They cast doubt on the feasibility of implementing the BRI, and warn that although it has been portrayed primarily in economic terms, it actually reveals a crucial Chinese geopolitical strategy. They are fearful of China's growing regional dominance, and worried that the BRI is ultimately a means to supplant the prevailing US-led regional security structure and restore the Middle Kingdom order, with China as the only power that matters in the region. According to this view, once China has complete control of the regional logistics hubs and sea ports, this will severely limit the autonomy of China's neighbors, including South Korea, who will have to toe the Chinese line, both economically and politically, or risk their own peace and prosperity.

• The Southeast Asian review
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• v.28 no.1
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• pp.145-171
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• 2018

Laos' 2017 is a year of political "stagnation" and economic "change". In the political arena, despite the achievements such as the improvement of the corruption perception index (CPI), it is necessary to watch the progress of the reform. Diplomatically, the influence of China is expected to increase further. In particular, since November 2017, Xi Jinping's visit to Laos is expected to strengthen the framework of cooperation between the economic corridor and Lanchang-Mekong Cooperation Meeting. And Laos continued to have friendly relations with other neighboring countries, the ASEAN countries. However, the issue of the Laos-Cambodian border issue following the general election in Cambodia may recur. The economic sector maintained a high growth rate due to capital inflows from the construction of large infrastructures and the favorable tourism industry, but structural problems such as deficits in the fiscal and current account should be resolved. Korea and Laos discussed the comprehensive cooperation between the two countries through the Mekong Senior Officials' Meeting in March 2017 and the Ministerial Meeting of the Korean-Lao Foreign Minister in September 2017. Laos is Korea's eighth ODA aid (grant), and ODA will become an important diplomatic cooperation channel between the two countries in the future. In the economic relationship, the trade sector is on a declining trend, but investment and human exchanges are steadily increasing.