• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.20 no.5
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• pp.585-592
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• 2022

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation between executive excesss compensation and credit rating. According to the prior research which show the negative effects of excess compensation on a firm's future performance, this paper expects the negative effect of excess compensation on credit rating. Using a sample of Korean listed non-financial firms from 2014 to 2019, I perform the multivariate regressions analysis of excess compensation on credit rating. I find that excess compensation is negatively related to credit rating when executive compensation exceed expected executive compensation. Moreover, I find that the result is constant when a fim belongs to small-medium business. These results show that credit rating is affected by executive excess compensation and the relation could be different by the type of firm's size. Therefore, this study contributes to the literature by suggesting the possibility that capital market is aware of negative effect of executive excess compensation.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.37 no.2
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• pp.187-207
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• 2018

This study examines the negative relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation and examines whether their relationship increases as managerial incentive compensation intensity increases. For this purpose, a total of 2,755 company-years were selected for the analysis of the companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from December 2012 to 2016 as the final sample. The results of this study are as follows. First, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between accounting conservatism and manager overpayment. This implies that managers' incentives to distort future cash flow estimates by over booking assets or accounting profits in order to maximize their compensation when manager compensation is linked to firm performance. In this sense, accounting conservatism can reduce opportunistic behavior by restricting managerial accounting choices, which can be interpreted as a reduction in overpayment to managers. Second, we found that the relationship between accounting conservatism and excess executive compensation increases with the incentive compensation for accounting performance. The higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity of accounting performance is, the more likely it is that the manager has the incentive to make earnings adjustments. Therefore, the high level of incentive compensation for accounting performance means that the ex post settling up problem due to over-compensation can become serious. In this case, the higher the managerial incentive compensation intensity for accounting performance, the greater the role and utility of conservatism in manager compensation contracts. This study is based on the fact that it presents empirical evidence on the usefulness of accounting conservatism in managerial compensation contracts theoretically presented by Watts (2003) and the additional basis that conservatism can be used as a useful tool for investment decision.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.41 no.1
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• pp.67-90
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• 2016

This study examines whether there is any significant relation between executive compensation and future firm performance for the Korean export manufacturing small and medium-sized firms. We sorted the whole sample firms into the sub-groups of 10 deciles by firm size and the KSIC standard. We found the following empirical results. First, Korean export manufacturing small and medium-sized firms typically showed lower or even negative profitability in terms of return on equity and operating profit ratio to sales. Foreign equity ownership is very low with an average of 3.77%. Second, for the firms with higher ratio of excess executive compensation to asset had lower future firm performance. It implies that the typical owner-manager in Korean export manufacturing SMEs earns excess pay, but do not contribute much to firm performance. Third, as for future cumulative abnormal returns for future one- and three-year periods, firms with higher owner-executive pay had lower returns compared with firms with lower pay. So the stock market investors set a lower value on them. Fourth, there is a positive relation between excess executive pay and executive overconfidence, and it implies that owner-CEOs with higher pay may become overconfident, thereby lowering future firm performance somehow.

• 방재와보험
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• s.40
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• pp.52-53
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• 1989

• The Korean Journal of Financial Studies
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.177-198
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• 2005

본 연구는 기업의 자본비용을 반영한 초과이익(excessive earnings)의 우리나라 주식시장에서 투자지표로서의 유용성에 대해서 분석하였다. 이를 위해서 주당초과이익과 함께 전통적인 성과지표인 주당순이익을 비교분석하였으며, 주된 분석결과를 요약하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 분석기간 중 주당순이익을 기준으로 보면 대부분의 기업들이 양(+)의 값을 가지는 것으로 나타났으나, 주당초과이익의 경우에는 대다수의 기업들에서 음(-)의 값을 가지는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 기업들이 주주들에게 충분한 보상을 하지 못하고 있다는 것을 의미한다. 둘째, 주당초과이익(EES)은 전통적인 성과지표(EPS, ROE)보다 주식수익률과 상관관계가 높으며, 주당순이익에 비하여 주당초과이익을 기준으로 포트폴리오를 구성하는 경우에 보다 높은 초과수익률을 올릴 수 있는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 주당순이익 기준에 의한 하위집단의 누적평균초과수익률은 유의적으로 음의 값을 보이는 반면에 상위집단은 0과 차이를 보이지 않는다. 그러나 주당초과이익 상위집단의 수익률은 시장수익률보다 유의하게 높고 하위집단에서는 낮게 나타난다. 이는 주당순이익이 낮은 EPS 하위집단의 경우는 당기순손실이 주는 부정적 효과가 반영된 것으로 유추할 수 있으며, 투자지표로서는 EES가 유용한 것으로 판단된다. 결론적으로 기업의 진정한 부가가치 생산은 자본비용을 반영한 순이익이며, 제한적이지만 우리나라 주식시장에서 초과이익이 투자지표로서 활용될 수 있을 것으로 판단된다.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.34 no.1
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• pp.203-234
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• 2019

The concept of denied boarding is defined in Article 2(j) of Regulation 261/2004 thus: "denied boarding means a refusal to carry passengers on a flight, although they have presented themselves for boarding under the conditions laid down in Article 3(2), except where there are reasonable grounds to deny them boarding, such as reasons of health, safety or security, or inadequate travel documentation." So far as relevant to this case, to be entitled to compensation, if denied boarding, Article 3(2) provides a passenger must first come within the scope of the protection of the Regulation, which applies under the following conditions: "${\cdots}$.that passengers (a) have a confirmed reservation on the flight concerned and, except in the case of cancellation referred to in Article 5, present themselves for check-in, as stipulated and at the time indicated in advance and in writing (including by electronic means) by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, or, if no time is indicated, not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time." This paper reviews the EU Cases such as Rodríguez Cachafeiro v. Iberia [2012] Case C-321/11; Finnair Oyj v. Timy Lassooy [2012] Case C-22/11; Caldwell v. easyJet Airline Co. Ltd. [2015] ScotSC 64. ECJ and Sheriff court of Scotland held that the concept of denied boarding, within the meaning of Articles 2(j) and 4 of Regulation No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation No 295/91, must be interpreted as relating not only to cases where boarding is denied because of overbooking but also to those where boarding is denied on other grounds, such as operational reasons. Also, ECJ ruled that Articles 2(j) and 4(3) must be interpreted as meaning that the occurrence of extraordinary circumstances resulting in an air carrier rescheduling flights after those circumstances arose cannot give grounds for denying boarding on those later flights or for exempting that carrier from its obligation, under Article 4(3) of that regulation, to compensate a passenger to whom it denies boarding on such a flight.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.5434-5441
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• 2013

Using longitudinal data of 575 sample from 122 firms in large business conglomerates from 2001 to 2008, this study examines the impact of controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity on executive compensation. The empirical study finds that controlling shareholders' control-ownership disparity is negatively related to the level of executive compensation and moderate negatively the relation between firm performance and executive compensation. This finding suggests that controlling shareholders' control rights in excess of ownership rights lead to decreased executive compensation in order to relieve the concerns of stakeholder about the potential agency costs of controlling shareholder, and have, on the other hand, entrenchment effects on the decision of executive compensation by decreasing its sensitivity on firm performance.

• Proceedings of the KIPE Conference
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• 2017.11a
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• pp.3-4
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• 2017

컨버터 제어를 위한 피크 전류 모드는 기존의 전류 모드 제어 기법에 비해 빠른 응답과 간단한 구조로 인해 많은 컨버터 애플리케이션에서 사용된다. 그러나 듀티가 0.5를 초과하면, 서브 하모닉 발진이 전류에서 발생한다. 이러한 현상을 방지하기 위해 제어기를 안정적으로 동작 할 수 있도록 보상 기울기를 추가 한다. 그러나 기울기 보상의 방법은 구조를 복잡하게 만들고 출력 전압이 가변적 일 때 때때로 기울기를 변화시켜야 하는 문제가 있다. 따라서 본 논문에서는 기울기 보상 없이 새로운 하이브리드 모드 전류 제어 방법을 제안한다. 밸리 전류 모드에서 트레일 링 에지 변조를 사용하는 제안 된 방법에서, 서브 하모닉 발진 문제는 쉽게 해결 될 수 있다. 제안 된 제어기는 Psim 시뮬레이션에 의해 검증된다.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.2 no.1
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• pp.27-35
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• 1998

In this paper, we propose a novel spectral-chopping model of Class-II$(1+D)^2$ -PRS system which reveals improved spectral efficiency. We build up the model having spectrum chopped by the amount of Nyquist over-rate, and then compare its characteristics with the conventional model in both the time-domain and the frequency-domain. When the transmission system operates above the Nyquist rate, the new model has better performance than the conventional PRS using its inherent speed-tolerance. According to our investigations, Class-II PRS shows more excellent effect in the spectral-chopping method than Class- I and W types analyzed previously. We ascertain that the over-rate of 26.675 obtained by the inherent speed-tolerance could be improved upto 40% using spectrum-truncation. These effects come from the fact that the raised-cosine spectrum of Class-II PRS has smaller Boss of frequency component and energy than any other types for the same amount of truncation. In order to validate these theoretical results, we present their sidelobe-trends confirming cancellation effects at the sampling instants and some experimental results showing their patterns of eye-openings and spectra.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.1-20
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• 1990

In most of studies on market efficiency, the stability of risk measures and the normality of residuals unexplained by the pricing model are presumed. This paper re-examines stock splits, taking the possible violation of two assumptions into accounts. The results does not change the previous studies. But, the size of excess returns during the 2-week period before announcements decreases by 43%. The results also support that betas change around announcements and the serial autocorrelation of residuals is caused by events. Based on the results, the existing excess returns are most likely explained as a compensation to old shareholders for unwanted risk increases in their portfolio, or by uses of incorrect betas in testing models. In addition, the model suggested in the paper provides a measure for the speed of adjustment of the market to the new information arrival and the intensity of information contents.