• Iberoamérica
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• v.12 no.2
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• pp.1-25
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• 2010

This paper explains how the political elites limit peruvian politics after independence, through examining the historical origin of elites, the formation of the dominant elites and their politicization in Peru, 1824-1919. In detail, the first section of this paper examines theoretical concepts and the political economic conditions of elites. The next part explores the emergence of the dominant elite group and their politicization, which is focused on economic incentives and conditions in the Guano era. Finally, this paper suggests that peruvian elite group after independence is politically motivated by the direct control of economic resources and maximized privilege in distributions of economic benefits. Furthermore, these features provided the archetype of the Peruvian politics, such as the pre-modern oligarchy and the military intervention.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.7-43
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• 2023

This study examines and identified a series of strategies of Russia's political elites to maintain and strengthen their dominance by reviewing the case of revisions in the election laws of Russia in 2014. At that time, a mixed-member electoral system was newly introduced, and on the surface, it seemed that the new system was a step toward meeting the demands of the people for "enhanced democracy". However, in 2016 and 2021, the ruling party of Russia won the general elections by making the most of the factors that could distort the election results inherent in the mixed-member electoral system. Therefore, this study aimed to analyze whether the revision of election laws was a mere vehicle used by the ruling party, United Russia, to maintain its political power, or whether it was a leap forward to achieve democracy. The study result indicate that the revision of election laws in 2014 was part of the policy responses to the internal conflicts in the circle of Russia's political elites, which had been rising since 2008, as well as to the public resistance. In other words, it was confirmed that the revision of election laws was one of the measures taken to "minimize competition" and "reproduce political power on a stable basis".

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.44
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• pp.144-179
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• 2008

This paper explores the formation of global responsibility discourses in the elite US media used in promoting NATO's military interventions in the post-Cold War era. The case study of global responsibility discourses surrounding the Bosnian War (1992-1995) and the Kosovo Conflict (1998-1999) offers an account of the roles of the elite US media in foreign policy. The construction and articulation of global responsibility discourses in the elite US media were closely related to the US government's policy and were formed within the framework of US national interest and domestic responsibility. The cases of military intervention in the post-Cold War period imply that there were more fundamental structure and patterns by which the elite US media approached the 'humanitarian crises': 'benevolent domination' and the subsequent construction of a 'melodramatic national identity' in the war narratives. Presuming that the elite US media's discourse is a primary site for the public for experiencing and understanding distant suffering, this paper concludes that global responsibility discourses within the media may have dangerous ramifications for global democracy because the discourse of responsibility can potentially absorb the creative, progressive energies created by the public's awareness of responsibility on a global scale in order to reinforce the relations of domination.

• Analyses & Alternatives
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• v.8 no.1
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• pp.169-196
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• 2024

In the House of the Parliament of Kazakhstan, which members are re-elected several times, while others are only first-term? Existing studies on the Kazakhstan political elites have mainly discussed the effect of clans on the appointment or replacement of elites. These studies have contributed to explaining the characteristics of Kazakhstan's clientelistic political structure, but the analysis of the relationship between political background and elite appointment or replacement is very poor. The purpose of this study is to analyze what characteristics of members have continuity in the 4th to 8th House of the Parliament of Kazakhstan. As a result, members with activities in Communist Party of the Soviet Union had a higher average seniority than those who did not in the 4th, 6th, and 7th House of the Parliament. And Nur Otan members had a higher average seniority than those who did not in 4th and 5th House of the Parliament. On the other hand, there was no difference in average seniority by local political experience, and the difference by elite type was only partially found in the 6th House of the Parliament. These results reflect the president's strategy for parliamentary control in that the parliament is used as a means of solidifying Kazakhstan's political regime as an authoritarian state. The significance of this study is that for the first time it empirically proved who sustains political survival in the House of the Parliament of Kazakhstan.

• Journal of the Korean Geographical Society
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• v.38 no.2
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• pp.206-223
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• 2003

Bays and caps represent the physical characteristics of Naepo area in Korea. And reclamation of tidal land presents a clue toward the understanding of regional identities and landscape changes in this area. Reclamation of tidal land in the Garorim bay that is representative of the physical geographies of Naepo area had trended toward 'the diffusion of salt ponds' during Joseon dynasty. Hereafter the Japanese imperialism, the reclamation had tumed to 'the reclamation of arable lands' by drainage. But, at the same time the land use of salt pond that had been the most appropriate strategy of adaptation for the ecological environments of this area has showed a sort of the geographical long-term durability. And the great landlords that had emerged during Japanese imperialism were the Yeom-han(鹽漢, laborers who engaged in salt production) in former times. They as a new local elites have played a leading role in the reclamation of tidal land and the making of regional landscape.

• Journal of the Korean association of regional geographers
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• v.11 no.6
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• pp.640-656
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• 2005

A chronic depression in the Korean economy, which depends mostly on imported oil, has been attributed partly to rising crude oil prices recently. Against the backdrop of these realities in Korea, Azerbaijan in the Caspian region, with vast oil and gas deposits, has been greeted enviously by some Koreans. Many transition economies, especially on the Caspian region trumpeted by the oil boom, however, are rich in natural resources, but the benefits of those resources are appropriated by the local elite in collusion with foreign companies. Azerbaijan, in particular, is dominated by a series of internal and external patronage networks. Foreign capital nourishes those networks surrounding President Aliev. Thus, the case of Azerbaijan shows that resource rents in the transition economies sometimes do not help in improving the living conditions of ordinary people. Rather rich resource rents turn out to be a major impediment to the emerging development of the transition economy, lessening the incentives to reform in the country. The result was the possibility of the so-called Dutch Disease, in which disproportionate growth in a certain energy sector tends to crowd out investment in other sectors of the economy.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.129-153
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• 2010

The guiding research question of this paper is to discover 'why the UK could not develop a general structure in which transnational corporations were born during the end of the 19th ~ beginning of the 20th century like other countries'. In response to this question, although acknowledging its imperfections, the author would like to explore the causality in the context of 'Social Construction' which is reflected in the attributes of British society. As such, researchers are strongly recommended to take into account the actors' interests and the increased value effect of events which is driven by control power. This paper concludes that: firstly, not only was contempt for industrial capitalism prevalent in British society, the British government was unable to recognize the necessity of promoting policies for the development of transnational corporation. In addition, the increase in the clout of commercial-financial capitalists in the city of London along with the expansion of gentlemanly elites interfered with the transnationality of British companies. Secondly, the foundation of the political and economic structures in the UK experienced continuity and challenge simultaneously. Since the 1850's, the British social structure has been progressively characterized by the strengthening power of the commercial-financial elites in London, which resulted not in the transnationality of manufacturing but that of financial services. Finally, the configuration of the social network driven by the British elites consists of the actors' interests and control power in association with severance and connection. Unlike the complementarity of interests, in the initial stage, intended connection based on voluntary motivation between gentries and commercial-financial elites occurred in terms of control power. However, ultimately, the holding of power was transferred to the commercial-financial elites excluding the industrial capitalists and resulted in the reconfiguration of the social network.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.46 no.1
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• pp.318-345
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• 2013

This study was carried out with a focus on the factor on the periodical space organization of Daebodan (大報壇: the altar of great recompense) in Changdeok Palace, which is significant in terms of political history in the late Chosun Dynasty, and consider the factors in the formation of the structural system through historical records and drawings. Daebodan has the ideology of righteousness to the Ming Dynasty which the hierarchy of the Joseon Dynasty. who felt the crisis of the domination order, imposed as a solution after the Manchu war of 1636. In addition, Daebodan was built by complex factors that entailed the self-esteem of the 'Joseon Centralism Ideology (朝鮮中華)' and the desire of the sacrificial rituals for Heaven that were imminent to the kings of Joseon. Superficially, Daebodan has the spatial organization of the Sajik (社稷) Altar and the placement of an annex building, but had the applied placement due to limited topography and access to the backyard. Furthermore, the lateral structure of Daebodan multiply accepted various factors of the nine step's stairs, the hight of five cheok (尺), the circumstance of two floors that were showed in the altar and platform with small fences and an imperial order including the internal form of Hwangjangbang (黃帳房). Moreover, the name of the alter came from 'the Jiaote Sheng Book of Rites(禮記 郊特牲)' representing 'the suburban sacrifice ritual for Heaven (郊天)', and it was built by not only combining the system of the Sajik Altar in the Joseon Dynasty and China but also avoiding 'excessive etiquette (僭禮).' The point is a remarkable feature shown by the structural system of Daebodan. Thus, it is considered that the 'Notion of Confucian-Cultural Succession (中華繼承意識)' and the desire of the sacrificial rituals for Heaven were expressed by the structure and form of altar. This study examined the process of the creation, expansion, decline and disposal of Daebodan in a chronological order, and found that the ruling ideology of the governing elite by the political and cultural background of the era at each transitional point was reflected in the spatial formation of the altar. On the other hand, as a result of performing a field survey to find the location in accordance with Daebodan in drawing materials, there remains items such as worked stones from Daebodan, precast pavers and fragments of proof tile discovered in the surrounding of tora vine (Actinidia arguta) which is a natural monument of Changdeok Palace. As such, verification through future excavation and investigation is required.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.305-330
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• 2018

The purpose of this article is to examine whether Myanmar's experience in which dealing with the most exemplary change among rogue states or pariah state in the 21st century is feasible for North Korea's case. Recently, North Korea's willingness to dialogue, reform and open is similar to the precedent in which the Myanmar military junta dismantled its ruling system and turned over transition period through general elections in 2010 and 2015 each. The so-called 'Myanmar Model' refers to a country branded as a rogue state which has been under the international sanctions and pressure, and opening its political system and the market by choosing transformation. However, rapid changes in speed across the entire society after opening up are impossible because the political elite is only the leading role and implementation in the transition. In case of Myanmar, military culture has penetrated into society due to such a long-lasting military dictatorship, and even democratic bloc has become accustomed to authoritarian decision-making process. Furthermore, the "reserved area" of the old regime still exists in a deformed political structure that can not retrieve the interests of the military. Therefore there could not be achieved political development in term of qualification. North Korea also appears unlikely to achieve political and economic assessment in a short period of time, as civil society has not appeared due to its long dictatorship and very low economic development levels. Like Myanmar, North Korea is also likely to control the pace and direction of upcoming reforms and open, as the dictator or most powerful person chose to reform and open up. Therefore, if North Korea moves toward the 'Myanmar Model', there will be high expectations of new changes in the short term, but it could be delayed or stalled in the mid and long term.

• Korean Journal of Heritage: History & Science
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• v.53 no.4
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• pp.234-249
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• 2020

The dispute involving the construction of the Tomb of Queen Sindeok (hereinafter "Jeongreung"), King Taejo's wife in Seoul, and the moving of that tomb, represents the most clearly demonstrated case for the collision of new and old ideologies between political powers in the early period of Joseon. Jeongreung, the tomb of Queen Sindeok from the Kang Clan, was built inside the capital fortress, but in 1409, King Taejong forced the tomb to be moved outside the capital, and the stone relics remaining at the original location were used to build the stone bridge, Gwangtong-gyo. In an unofficial story, King Taejong moved the tomb outside the capital and used the stone items there to make the Cheonggyecheon Gwang-gyo so that the people would step upon the area in order to curse Lady Kang. In the final year of King Taejo, Lady Kang and King Taejong were in a politically conflictual relationship, but they were close to being political partners until King Taejo became the king. Sillok records pertaining to the establishment of Jeongreung or Gwangtong-gyo in fact state things more plainly, indicating that the moving of Jeongreung was a result of following the sangeon (a written statement to the king) of Uijeongbu (the highest administrative agency in Joseon), which stated that having the tomb of a king or queen in the capital was inappropriate, and since it was close to the official quarter of envoys, it had to be moved. The assertion that it was aimed at degrading Jeongreung in order to repair Gwangtong-gyo thus does not reflect the factual relationship. This article presents the possibility that the use of stone items from Jeongreung to repair Gwangtong-gyo reflected an emerging need for efficient material procurement that accompanied a drastic increase in demand for materials required in civil works both in- and outside the capital. The cause for constructing Jeongreung within the capital and the cause of moving the tomb outside the capital would therefore be attributable to the heterogeneity of the ideological backgrounds of King Taejo and King Taejong. King Taejo was the ruler of the Confucius state, as he reigned through the Yeokseong Revolution, but he constructed the tomb and Hongcheon-sa, the temple in the capital for his wife Queen Sindeok. In this respect, it is considered that, with the power of Buddhism, there was an attempt to rally supporters and gather the force needed to establish the authority of Queen Sindeok. Yi Seong-gye, who was raised in the Dorugachi clan of Yuan, lived as a military man in the border area, and so he would not have had a high level of understanding in Confucian scholarship. Rather, he was a man of the old system with its 'Buddhist" tendency. On the other hand, King Taejong Yi Bang-won was an elite Confucian student who passed the national examination at the end of the Goryeo era, and he is also known to have held a profound understanding of Neo-Confucianism. To state it differently, it would be reasonable to say that the understanding of symbolic implications for the capital would be more profound in a Confucian state. Since the national system that was ruled by laws had been established following the Three-Kingdom era, the principle of burial outside of the capital that would have seen a grave constructed on the outskirts of the capital was not upheld, without exception. Jeongreung was built inside the capital due to the strong individual desire of King Taejo, but since he was a Confucian scholar prior to becoming king, it would not have been accepted as desirable. After taking the throne, King Taejong took the initiative to begin overhauling the capital in order to reflect his intent to clearly realize Confucian ideology emphasizing 'Yechi' ("ruling with good manners") with the scenic view of the Capital's Hanyang river. It would be reasonable to conclude accordingly that the moving of Jeongreung was undertaken in the context of such a historic background.