Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.
Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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v.9
no.5
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pp.69-81
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2014
There is a growing interest in the technology transfer and commercialization both at home and abroad. Accordingly, this study looked at the concept of technology transfer and commercialization, identified the factors that should be taken into account in order to facilitate technology transfer and commercialization, and then performed a empirical analysis. As for the conventional technology transfer and commercialization, there was a tendency to limit its scope to the exploration, transfer and commercialization of technology itself. Here in this research, technology transfer and commercialization is defined the category to expand as various activities implemented in order to make sure that intellectual properties such as intangible technological developments, know-how, and knowledge are transferred between the relevant parties through a contract or negotiation, and the party to which the transfer is made can then further develop and exploit the technology into tangible products and other activities to obtain economic benefit out of that. In addition, the findings of the positive analysis of technology transfer and commercialization revealed that the focus of facilitating technology transfer has been on the technology itself, its management and securing efficiency of the systems and institutions involved in the technology transfer and commercialization. So there was lack of recognition as to the importance of financial support given to the phase of technology commercialization. This indicates that when it comes to the technology transfer and commercialization, quantitative performance has been the focus of interest such as patent application, registration, number of technology transfers, royalty, etc. So there was not enough understanding as to the issues of starting up a business, creating quality jobs through technology transfer and commercialization, which are directly related to the realization of the creative economy. In this regard, this research is expected to be used for the development for the future policies to boost technology transfer and commercialization as it suggests not only simply ensuring quantitative performance but also necessary to create the environment for the creation of the stable ecosystem for the parties involved in the technology transfer and commercialization and then to build circumstances in which creative economy can be realized.
This study speculates on responses to the nuclear threats of North Korea and mutual assistance and cooperation between South Korea, the U.S. and China for the unification of the Korean Peninsula. As for the North Koreas nuclear issue and unification of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea is the subject of national division, the U.S. is a responsible country in international issues and does not have diplomatic ties with North Korea. China is a traditional socialist nation and a supporter of North Korea. As North Korea's strategic weapons including nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles are international issues, to defend against Kim Jung-Eun's unexpected acts, the three countries should actively cooperate with each other and develop countermeasures. However, with respect to the road map of the North Koreas issue, there are subtle differences between the U.S. and China in recognition of and sanctions against North Korea as a resolution of the U..N. Security Council. The U.S. has continued a deterrence policy and sanctions against North Korea based on joint threats between South Korea and the U.S. while China has showed a negative position in the process of solving the North Korean nuclear issue because of the unstable security derived from the U.S. 's intervention in the Korean peninsula. North Korea should change its diplomatic policy in a more concrete way towards world peace although it has continued trade of strategic weapons with Middle Eastern countries to maintain its political system. For example, to restart the summit talks and open multilateral security channels. Although the issue of unification of the Korean peninsula should be resolved by South and North Korea themselves, it is strange that South and North Korea depend on the logic of powerful countries for the resolution of a national problem. As for North Koreas nuclear and the Unification issues, peaceful solutions presented by South Korea seem more persuasive than the solution presented by North Korea which did not secure any international support. However, South Korea, the U.S. and China need to develop uni-directional two-tract strategies for sanctions against North Korea and talks with North Korea for peace on the Korean peninsula, and should continue to support the economic independence of North Korea.
This paper analyze problems about scope of specific trade obligations(STOs), principle of dispute settlement procedure, and non-parties in context of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety(POB), which based on sub-paragraph 31(i) of DDA WTO Ministrial Declaration. The implications based on result of this study are as follows. First, to accept the wider scope of STOs under POB in Korea, importing country, won't be harmful to LMOs and Bioindustry. Instead, it will ensure a high level of biosafety concerning the import of LMOs. Exporters can take different kinds of trade measures to countervail adverse effect on the export of LMOs in this case. Therefore importer will endure the aftereffect. However, if korea were in exporter's place, to accept the wider scope STOs under POB will not have a good influence on the export of LMOs. Korea, therefore, should devise scheme for responding to debate about the STOs in MEAs, which have to be based on cost-benefit analysis and scenarios taking into account of speed and level in biotechology progress, status and trend of LMOs R&D and production, and condition of other industries. Second, it is not easy to agree with applying to what's rule between the POB and WTO for settlement dispute. Because there is the incompatibility between the POB characterized according to social rationality and WTO's rules for safety and environmental protection characterized according to scientific rationality. This issue have to be discussed for long period due to gap like that. Accordingly Korea, one of major LMOs importing countries, should suggest continuously that the effort is needed to ensure an adequate level of protection in transboundary movements of LMOs and scientific, environmental and socio-economic study. Third, in case of dispute between party and non-party of the POB, the duties under the WTO of non-party of the POB(if WTO member country) is valid. The country, therefore, will try to settle dispute based on WTO's rules. However, international society have to ensure for sound and safe use of LMOs in the field of transboundary movements. Accordingly Korea should devise scheme for preventing the possibility of dispute between party and non-party of the POB(if WTO member country), which is supported by policy options under the POB.
It is required to expand area of inter-Korean economic cooperation, being limited to non-military field, to military field and then, to positively promote arms control in order to establish foundation for peaceful reunification in Korean peninsula. Reasons why arms control has not been promoted between South and North Korea in the meantime were such original factors as follows; (1) limit of confidence building between the South and the North, (2) functional limit of arms control itself, (3) institutional structural limit between the South and the North, (4) environmental limit at home and abroad. It is necessary to get out from existing frame and to seek a new paradigm in order to overcome above factors and to realize arms control between the South and the North. First, it is required to have prior political dialog at the South-North high-level talks in order to promote arms control and to exercise 'strategic flexibility' during negotiation and promotion process. For this, 'flexible reciprocity' has to be adopted in compliance with situation and conditions. Second, it is necessary to get out from existing principle of 'confidence building in advance and arms reduction later' but to seek the 'simultaneous driving principle of confidence building and arms reduction' as an eclectic approach. Namely, based on reasonable sufficiency, it is required to promote military confidence building and limited arms reduction in parallel, which is a lower level of arms control. Third, as an advisory body of Prime Minister's Office, it is necessary to install an organization exclusively responsible for arms control and to positively handle arms control issue from the standpoint of national policy strategy. If the South-North high-level talks take place, it is necessary to organize and operate 'South-North Joint Arms Control Promotion Board (tentative name)'. Fourth, it is required to exercise more active diplomatic competence in order to create national consensus on necessity of arms control for peaceful reunification and to form more favorable international environment. Especially, it is necessary to think about how to solve nuclear issue of North Korea together in collaboration with international society and how to maintain balance between ROK-US alliance and Sino-Korean cooperation relations.
North Korea conducted a total of six nuclear tests from the 1st test of 2006 to September, 2017. North Korea developed an armed forces security strategy at the level of regime protection and defense to respond to U.S. hostile policy. However, it is certain that strategic goals of North Korea's nuclear test were to overcome a crisis in North Korea's regime through US-North Korea negotiation and complete nuclear armed forces for socialist unification on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's continuous nuclear test is a direct factor in threatening peace on the Korean Peninsula and an indirect factor in security dynamics of Northeast Asia. The U.N. Security Council has enforced sanctions against North Korea through six resolutions against North Korea's reckless nuclear test for the past 10 years. However, Kim Jong-Un's regime is in a position to stick to simultaneous pursuit of nuclear and economic development in spite of anti-North sanction of international society including U.N. and U.S.A. It is understood that North Korea was stimulated to conduct intense nuclear test as U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction was not effective on North Korea. Full-scale and local wars are expected as military options, one of anti-North sanctions of the Trump administration. The Trump administration has attempted diplomatic pressure strategy as a secondary boycott unlike previous administrations. Nevertheless, North Korea has stood against U.N. and U.S.A's anti-North sanction with brinkmanship tactics, announcing full-scale military confrontation against U.S. It is judged that North Korea will pursue simultaneous nuclear weapons and economic development in terms of regime survival. North Korea will have less strategic choices in that its regime may collapse because of realistic national strategy between U.S.A. and China.
Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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v.16
no.4
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pp.167-178
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2021
The purpose of this study is to analyze the direct investment decision factors in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Vietnam, and to contribute to the creation of domestic jobs and the revitalization of the inter-Korean economy. According to the analysis, most of the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Vietnamese investment companies are entering the complex for the purpose of utilizing cheap labor, cheap factory locations, sales/development of local markets, and bypass export production bases in third countries. This can be divided into production-efficient investors using differences in production price such as labor costs and market-oriented investors to sell and expand the local market, which seems to be consistent with global direct investment patterns such as Nike, Apple, and Amazon. However, even if the North Korea-U.S. denuclearization talks ease or lift sanctions, Vietnamese investors' willingness to invest in the North Korea has been most burdened by the possibility of closing special economic zones due to political risks. Last but not least, it is important to note that those willing to invest in North Korea are mostly smaller enterprises in textiles, sewing, footwear and leather industries-those that benefit from low-cost labor. Since their size is small, they need policy support in financing, especially in the early stages of their business. Even after they grow past the early stages, those without collateral would still need state guarantee letters to get financing. Thus, it is worth considering to use the Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund to compensate commercial banks for bad loan loss or for low-interest loans for smaller SMEs. The interviews with SMEs found that red-tape is one of the biggest difficulties they face. Thus, it is recommended that a one-stop service agency should be established to cover all processes and issues related to inter-Korean economic cooperation to eliminate redundancy and expediate government support for SMEs.
Journal of the Korean Institute of Landscape Architecture
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v.51
no.1
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pp.13-28
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2023
This study examines the process of project promotion in Busan, which introduced the private participation-type consultative body for the first time in the country in the promotion stage of the private-initiated park development project, and introduced flexible application of the system and differentiated policy elements in the implementation process, and examines the operational characteristics and we tried to analyze performance, etc. As a result of the analysis, first, the preferred bidder was selected by introducing a mixed method in the project method, which is an independent project method that cannot be seen in other local governments. Second, by specifying guidelines considering the characteristics of each park and detailed guidelines such as the location, area, and maximum height of non-park facilities, criteria for establishing a rational development plan utilizing regional identity and the basis of evaluation standards were laid. Third, in the project process, transparency was secured through the delegation-type roundtable, in which the private sector performs the functions and roles of key actors, thereby preventing disputes such as suspicion of preferential treatment. Fourth, in order to improve the quality of park facilities to be donated and to secure design adequacy, after approval of the implementation plan, a general planner was introduced and construction project management (design stage) services were performed to promote efficient implementation and specialization of luxury parks in the region. As a result, the city of Busan carried out the project efficiently by conserving 5 parks from sunset, a park area of 2.25km2, and reducing land compensation and park construction costs by KRW 740 billion. Reinforcement of the public nature of the private-initiated park development project was suggested. However, due to the application of these systems and verification procedures, the project period is prolonged, and park services are delayed along with the financial burden on private operators.
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