• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.36-44
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• 2023

The aim of this study is to predict the potential for bid-rigging among public construction bidders and develop preventive and responsive measures. By employing the Fraud Triangle Theory (FTT), which considers the factors of opportunity, pressure, and rationalization, we analyze and explore the bid-rigging potential among construction industry professionals. A survey is conducted among General and specialized construction firms to validate the FTT research model and predict individual bid-rigging tendencies. The results indicate that higher levels of pressure, greater opportunities, and stronger rationalization increase the likelihood of individual bid-rigging. Moreover, more opportunities and stronger rationalization also raise the potential for bid-rigging by others. Understanding these dynamics enhances our knowledge and contributes to the development of policies aimed at preventing bid-rigging.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.25 no.1
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• pp.23-31
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• 2024

This study highlights the importance of understanding the fair bidding behavior of bid practitioners in order to eliminate bid-rigging, which has a detrimental impact on the construction industry and the overall economy. The research collected survey data from bid practitioners in the Daegu and Gyeongbuk regions of South Korea and analyzed the causal relationships between attitudes towards bid-rigging, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, and the intention to engage in fair bidding using PLS-SEM analysis. The analysis results confirm that attitudes towards bid-rigging and perceived behavioral control are significant variables predicting the intention to engage in fair bidding among bid practitioners. This indicates that bid practitioners' perceptions of bid-rigging and personal behavioral control influence their willingness and actions towards fair bidding. The insights gained from this research provide valuable insights into bid practitioners' behavioral changes and can aid in the development of policies and measures to promote fair bidding and prevent bid-rigging.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.37 no.6
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• pp.1053-1061
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• 2017

The study is concerned with providing the improvement method on making a reasonable and scientific decision on the damages accrued from the bid rigging in the construction work. According to the review on the precedent studies and decision cases on the damages caused by bid rigging, the representative problems include the insufficiency of the classification system on the damage calculation method and the omission of the necessary stage in the damage determination process. First, the improved classification system on calculating the damages caused by bid rigging is presented with the application to the bid rigging in the construction work by adding the ratio factor in addition to the damage calculation parameters such as price and cost. Second, the standard procedures organized with six stages is presented as the process required for determining the damages if the indemnification for bid rigging is claimed. The study becomes the foundation for resolving the problem with the undue burden on a party and for preventing the opportunity loss by resolving a dispute early through the improvement classification system and standard procedures presented in the study.

• 월간 기계설비
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• s.59
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• pp.34-37
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• 1995

이 지침은 독점규제 및 공정거래에 관한 법률(이하 $\ulcorner$법$\lrcorner$또는 $\ulcorner$공정거래법$\lrcorner$이라 한다) 제19조에 의한 사업자간의 부당한 공동행위(이하 법 제26조 제1항에 의한 사업자단체의 금지행위를 포함한다)로서 입찰행위에 있어서의 부당한 공동행위(이하 $\ulcorner$담합$\lrcorner$이라 한다)에 적용되는 것으로 입찰담합과 관련하여 일반적으로 생각할 수 있는 유형과 처리지침을 예시적으로 열거한 것이다. 입찰담합으로 추정되는 사항으로 이 지침에 내용이 설명되어 있지 않은 활동에 대해서는 공정거래법 정신에 비추어 개별사안별로 판단되어질 것이다. 이 지침은 사업자 및 사업자 단체의 공적, 사적입찰과 관련된 활동에 포괄적으로 적용된다.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.12-20
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• 2020

To estimate collusion effects on bid award in Public Construction works, this paper uses Logit Model, which is a choice variable model. Price, design, competition, and other factors are included, with a special focus on collusion, as independent variables in the model. The empirical results are as follows. First, collusion has little effects on bid award, but great impacts on bidding behavior. Secondly, the score of design is the most important and significant factors among all variables. Thirdly, competition has also significant effects on bid award. Finally it is analyzed that institutional framework and characteristics of public work have some effects on bidding award.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.50-58
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• 2023

Bid-rigging is a common issue in public construction projects, and appropriate sanctions are required from the relevant authorities. This study analyzes the need for an optimal enforcement model to prevent bid-rigging by considering both civil and criminal aspects. Recently, there have been overlapping sanctions under the Fair Trade Act, such as fines imposed by the Fair Trade Commission and civil lawsuits filed by the client for damages. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effectiveness of penalty surcharges and compensation systems for preventing bid-rigging, and to consider the possibility of overlapping sanctions in public construction projects. It was found that overlapping sanctions under the Fair Trade Act can be helpful in improving the system. However, in cases where the state is the plaintiff for damages in a lawsuit, it is necessary to consider the penalty surcharge and sentence, reduce the penalty surcharge for joint acts, refund the surcharge after a final judgment, and consider the damage compensation system when imposing a surcharge. This study contributes to the development of an efficient enforcement model to suppress bid-rigging in public construction projects by analyzing the improvement effects of sanctions and compensation.

• KSCE Journal of Civil and Environmental Engineering Research
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• v.44 no.1
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• pp.75-83
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• 2024

This study examined the causes and remedies of bid-rigging in the construction industry through a survey of procurement practitioners. The study identified potential problems from the business, construction, and bidding environments, and proposed improvements to the procurement and bidding systems to address these problems. The study found that transparency, fairness, and diversity are important factors in reducing bid-rigging. These factors can be achieved through a variety of measures, such as expanding bidding systems, strengthening fairness standards, and increasing the diversity of participating companies. The study also found that unfair subcontracting regulations are a problem that needs to be addressed. There were differences in the perceptions of the causes of bid-rigging between the general and specialized construction groups. However, there was no difference in the perceptions of improvements to the procurement system between the two groups. This suggests that a consistent solution to bid-rigging can be found. The study's findings are expected to contribute to the resolution and prevention of bid-rigging in the construction industry.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.115
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• pp.30-43
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• 2005

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.121-160
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• 1993

본고(本稿) 1981~92년의 부당한 공동행위(共同行爲) 및 사업자단체금지행위(事業者團體禁止行爲) 심결례(審決例)들을 통해 우리나라 사업자들의 담합(談合)패턴과 특징(特徵)을 살펴보고 이를 바탕으로 담합규제법제(談合規制法制)와 그 운용상(運用上)의 문제(問題)들을 검토하여 담합규제(談合規制)의 실효성(實效性) 제고(提高)를 위한 경쟁정책적(競爭政策的) 대안(代案)들을 제시하고 있다. 우리의 담합규제법제(談合規制法制)와 법시행방법(法施行方法)은 은밀하고 지속적인 담합(談合)보다는 담합(談合)의 직접적 증거를 남길 가망이 많은 명시적(明示的) 공모행위(共謀行爲)의 적발(摘發)로 기울어져 있는 것으로 보인다. 사실, 담합사건(談合事件)들이 경쟁적(競爭的) 시장(市場)에 편재(偏在)되어 있고 사업자간(事業者間) 및 사업자단체(事業者團體) 공동행위(共同行爲)의 평균공모기간(平均共謀期間)이 각각 8개월과 10.7개월에 지나지 않는다는 것은 적발 시정조치된 행위(行爲)가 주로 담합(談合)의 시도(試圖)였음을 시사하는 것이다. 또한 가격고정공모(價格固定共謀)의 평균가격인상율(平均價格引上率)이 18%임을 감안할 때 담합실행기간(談合實行期間) 매출액(賣出額)의 1%라는 현재의 최고(最高) 과징금액(課徵金額)은 부당이득환수(不當利得還收)나 행정제재(行政制裁)의 어떤 측면에서도 그 실효성(實效性)이 극히 의심스러운 적은 금액이며, 거의 모든 위법행위(違法行爲)에 대하여 시정조치(是正措置)만이 취해지고 담합사업자(談合事業者)들에게 과징금(課徵金)이나 형사벌(刑事罰)이 부과되는 경우도 극히 드물어 담합억지효과(談合抑止效果)가 의문시되고 있다. 담합규제(談合規制)의 실효성(實效性) 제고(提高)를 위해서는 경쟁(競爭)의 실질적(實質的) 제한성(制限性)이 아니라 경쟁제한(競爭制限)의 부당성(不當性)을 위법성(違法性) 판단기준으로 하여 가격고정(價格固定), 입찰조작(入札操作), 시장분할(市場分割) 등 '적나라한' 담합(談合)에 대한 당연위법원칙(當然違法原則)을 확립하고, 과징금(課徵金)을 담합기간(談合期間) 매출액(賣出額)의 20% 정도로 상향조정(上向調整)하여 담합(談合)에 대한 핵심적 제재수단(制裁手段)으로 활용하여야 한다, 또한 담합(談合)의 적발(摘發) 입증노력(立證努力)에 경제적(經濟的) 분석(分析)과 증거(證據)를 이용하고, 특히 입찰조작(入札操作)의 감시(監視) 적발체제(摘發體制)를 확립하여 공공조달분야(公共調達分野)에 대한 경쟁정책(競爭政策)을 강화해야 하며, 묵시적(默示的) 담합(談合)을 가능케 하면서도 합의(合意)로 간주될 수 없는 담합촉진(談合促進) 기도행위(企圖行爲)를 금지할 법적(法的) 근거(根據)를 마련해야 할 것이다.

• Korean Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
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• v.19 no.3
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• pp.52-60
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• 2018

Korea's public construction projects are under construction through bidding, however, due to the nature of the bidding, collusion between participants can occur. The collusion of bids accordingly damages the client. So, it is necessary to calculate the appropriate fictitious competition price to compensate for this. In this regard, econometrics methods are generally used, but there are limitations and issues arising from the nature of construction, especially design-build bid. Therefore, this study proposes a method to estimate reasonable competitive bid-price in design-build bid. It derives the lowest bid-price from the design submitted by the proponent and estimates the competitive bid-price by examining the factors according to the penetration rate according to the technical level of the tester, the skill level of the competitor, and the type of tester. Based on the method proposed in this study, a reasonable price can be derived that reflects the characteristics of the design and construction bidding bidder selection method and also it can be used as a reference material in the actual bidding process as well as calculating the damage due to the answer.