• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
• /
• v.39
• /
• pp.69-97
• /
• 2021

'Déconstruction' is a system of thought that induces the emergent property that characterizes contemporary philosophy. The tradition of ancient Greek philosophy evolved over and over again, giving rise to the Renaissance and Enlightenment. It seemed to have reached its end under the historical perspective of modernity. However, contemporary philosophy wanted to see more possibilities through the deconstruction of modern philosophy. If modern philosophy dreams of a strange cohabitation between God and man with the humanistic completion of Plato's philosophy, modern philosophy rejects even that through deconstruction. Although Plato's classical metaphysics is a stable system centered around the absolute, it is ultimately based on God and religion. Under that system, human autonomy is only the autonomy bestowed by God. Contemporary philosophy is one of the results of efforts that try to begin philosophy from the original human voice through deconstruction. Instead of epistemology dependent on metaphysics, they wanted to establish epistemology from human existence and realize the best good that would set humans free through deconstruction. As such, it is no mistake to say that deconstruction is also an extension of the modern topic of human freedom. Deconstruction and human freedom act as one body in that the two cannot be separated from each other. Oddly enough, Daesoon Thought, which seems to have religious faith and traditional conservatism as main characteristics, has an emergent property that encompasses modern and contemporary times. The period of Korea, when Kang Jeungsan was active and founded Daesoon Thought, has an important meaning for those who have a keen view of history. Such individuals likely think that they have found a valuable treasure. This is because that period was a time when ideological activities were conducted due to an intense desire to discover the meaning of human freedom and envision a new world without copying the ways of the West. Instead they looked to face internal problems and raise people's awareness through subjectivity. In other words, the subtle ideas created by Korea's self-sustaining liberalism often take the form of what is commonly called new religions in modern times. Among these new religions, Daesoon Thought, as a Chamdonghak (true Eastern Learning), aims to spread a particular modern value beyond modern times through the concept of Haewon (the resolution of grievances) that was proclaimed by Jeungsan. The Haewon espoused in Daesoon Thought is in line with the disbandment of modern philosophy in that it contains modernity beyond modern times. First, Haewon means to resolve the fundamental resentment of human existence, which arose from Danju's grievance. Secondly, Haewon in Daesoon Thought encompasses the Haewon of the Three Realms of Heaven, Earth, and Humanity centers on a Haewon-esque style of existence called Injon (Human Nobility). Haewon in Daesoon Thought can be understood in the same context as Derrida's philosophy of Deconstruction. Modern deconstruction attempts to expose the invisible structures and bonds within human society and attempt to destroy them. In a similar way, Haewon endeavors to resolve the conflicts among the Three Realms by releasing the bonds of fundamental oppression that hinder the Three Realms of Heaven, Earth, and Humanity.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.144
• /
• pp.83-111
• /
• 2017

The purport of this essay is to examine the possible compatibility of liberalism and perfectionism. Liberalism is typically considered as anti-perfectionism. So communitarian critique of liberalism focused on the effects of its anti-perfectionism. But liberalism could be interpreted as compatible with perfectionism. Joseph Raz attempts to develop and defend "perfectionist" liberalism. He rejects anti-perfectionist "neutrality" and claims that the goal of political action is to encourage pursuit of what is truly good and discourage pursuit of what is morally unworthy. Despite this strong perfectionist claim, Raz's political philosophy gives pride of place to individual liberty, or autonomy, which he considers to be intrinsically valuable. One exercises autonomy in choosing among a plurality of human goods. Nonetheless, Raz forthrightly denies the value of autonomy used to choose what is morally bad and says that society has no reason to protect worthless, much less morally evil, options. Raz is more conventionally liberal, however, in espousing a version of J. S. Mill's "harm principle", arguing that a due regard for autonomy rules out government use of coercive means to discourage "victimless" immoralities. However, there are some serious questions about whether Raz's strong perfectionism can support his principled rejection of "morals legislation". I think that if his strong perfectionism could be a little "weakened" and his autonomy could be interpreted as having only formal value rather than having intrinsic value, then his perfectionism could be compatible with liberalism.

• The Science & Technology
• /
• v.29 no.2 s.321
• /
• pp.66-67
• /
• 1996

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• no.114
• /
• pp.177-212
• /
• 2016

Kants Begriff der Freiheit des Willens ist sehr kompliziert und verwirrend. Denn sowie es Ziel der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ ist, die reine praktische Vernunft zu beweisen, liegt der Fokus von Kants Begriff der Freiheit auf der Freiheit von Zwang, wobei Kant eine unbestimmte Haltung zur Freiheit von Notwendigkeit einnimmt und sie dann $schie{\ss}lich$ leugnet. Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit dagegen hebt die Freiheit von Notwendigkeit hervor, denn er sagt, dass der menschliche Wille nicht nur vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, sondern auch von Notwendigkeit frei sei. Die Struktur von Leibnizens Freiheitslehre unterscheidet sich zwar sehr von der Kants, aber die Charakterlehren beider Denker, in denen die $M{\ddot{o}}glichkeit$ der Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt werden, weisen viele Parallelen auf. Zudem ist Leibnizens Begriff der Freiheit sehr eindeutig. Daher ist ein Vergleich von Leibnizens und Kants Begriff der Freiheit nicht nur sinnvoll und $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ zu einem besserem $Verst{\ddot{a}}ndnis$ von Kants Freiheitsbegriff, durch die vergleichende Analyse stellt sich zudem auch heraus, dass auch bei Kant nicht nur Freiheit von Zwang, sondern auch Freiheit von Notwendigkeit $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ ist. Leibniz geht $f{\ddot{u}}r$ seine Freiheitslehre von dem Begriff der Freiheit vom Zwang der Leidenschaft, welcher von allen Rationalisten anerkannt wird, sowie von dem Begriff der Freiheit von der Notwendigkeit, welcher von Spinoza negiert wird, aus. Kant dagegen definiert Freiheit als $Unabh{\ddot{a}}ngigkeit$ von den Naturgesetzen, was diesen Begriff von Anfang an unklar macht. Kant war sich anfangs der Zweideutigkeit dieses Konzepts nicht $bewu{\ss}t$ und hat es undeutlich gebraucht, doch in der Neuauflage von ${\gg}$Die Religion innerhalb der $blo{\ss}en$ Vernunft${\ll}$ erkennt er den Unterschied in den zwei Begriffen der Willensfreiheit, weshalb er bei der Rechtslehre in der ${\gg}$Metaphysik der Sitten${\ll}$ dazu kommt, die Wahlfreiheit zu negieren. Aber in den Abschnitten, wo Kant in der ${\gg}$Kritik der reinen Vernunft${\ll}$ und der ${\gg}$Kritik der praktischen Vernunft${\ll}$ die Vereinbarkeit von Freiheit und Notwendigkeit behandelt, $f{\ddot{u}}hrt$ Kant aus, so wie auch Leibniz, dass der intelligible Charakter des Menschen sich durch wiederholte freie Wahl formt, womit sich $best{\ddot{a}}tigt$, dass auch Kant die Freiheit der Wahl anerkannt hat. Kant leugnet die Wahlfreiheit, weil er der Ansicht ist, dass der Begriff der Freiheit als ein einheitlicher Begriff definiert werden muss. Doch Freiheit muss nicht zwingend einheitlich definiert werden. Da Freiheit von Zwang und Freiheit von Notwendigkeit nicht $widerspr{\ddot{u}}chliche$ Begriffe sind, $k{\ddot{o}}nnen$ sie dem selben Willen gleichzeitig zugeteilt werden. Auch wird erst hierdurch Autonomie $m{\ddot{o}}glich$ gemacht.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.126
• /
• pp.377-401
• /
• 2013

일반적으로 성리학에서는 개인의 이익보다 도덕적 선택을 우선하라고 요구한다. 그러나 "주역"에서는 결코 이익을 죄악시 하지 않는다. 이 글은 성리학자이면서 역학자인 주자의 이익과 도덕에 대한 입장을 추적하는 연구이다. 주자가 소옹의 결정론적 세계관과 도덕적 자유의지를 강조하는 이천의 관점을 결합함으로써 완성하고자 한 것은 "주역"의 서(筮) 속에서 리(理)를 확인할 수 있다는 것이었다. 점서(占筮)의 결과가 그렇게 나오는 것은 그에 해당하는 이치가 있기 때문이라는 말이다. 그런데 "주역"의 리(理) 즉 역리(易理)란 오랜 경험과 관찰을 통해 확보된 사회적 존재로서 인간의 심리적 행위적 경향성의 총합이다. 그리고 그 구체적인 내용은 바로 상황적 합리성과 타자와의 조화로움이다. 이 리(理)는 우주와 사회의 정해진 질서로서 우리에게 주어진다. 개인은 이 주어진 질서에 따를 수 있는 자유와 함께 따르지 않을 수 있는 자유를 지닌다. 때문에 정해진 질서와 그 속에서의 개인의 자유의지는 양립가능한 것으로 받아들여지고, 그런 의미에서 주자는 약한 결정론자라고 할 수 있다. 성리학은 우주의 질서로부터 부여받은 당위의 법칙에 자발적으로 동의할 것을 요구한다. 그것이 가장 올바른 선택이면서 동시에 자신에게 가장 이로운 선택이기 때문이다. 주자는 상황적 합리성과 타자와의 조화로운 관계에서만이 자신의 진정한 이익을 추구할 수 있다고 생각한다. 타자와의 유기적 관계를 부정하고 유아적(唯我的) 이익만 추구하려는 자는, 사회적 존재로서 인간이 지니는 심리적 행위적 경향성을 무시한 어리석은 자이다. 이렇게 주자에게서 이익[리(利)]은 상황적 합리성[의(宜)]이 되고 또 그것은 바로 도덕[의(義)]이 된다. 참다운 의미에서의 합리적인 판단은 도덕적 선택을 불러온다.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2007.10a
• /
• pp.325-326
• /
• 2007

인간형 로봇(Humanoid)은 인간과 유사한 구조를 갖고 있는 로봇으로, 이족 보행이 가능하고 양 손이 자유롭기 때문에 인간 생활 환경에 적용이 가능하다. 인간형 로봇은 이족 보행 로봇의 형태를 지니며 보통 20 자유도(DOF : Degree of freedom) 이상의 높은 자유도와 직렬형 링크 구조로 인해 로봇의 안정도를 해석하고 움직임을 제어하기가 어렵다. 이러한 이유로 이족 보행 로봇 동작의 안정도를 증가시키기 위해 로봇의 최적화된 동작 패턴 생성과 자세 제어 등이 연구 되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 범용 근사자의 특징을 갖는 신경망을 이용하여 이족 보행 로봇의 동작 패턴 생성 방법에 대하여 제안하였다. 실제로 계획된 동작을 토대로 6가지의 동작 패턴을 생성하였으며 컴퓨터 모의실험과 상용 이족 보행 로봇을 이용하여 생성된 동작 패턴의 안정도를 확인해보고 제안된 방법에 타당성을 검증하였다.

• 건강소식
• /
• v.38 no.8
• /
• pp.22-23
• /
• 2014

르네상스시대의 위대한 천재 레오나르도 다빈치는 인간의 비행을 꿈꿨다. 새와 박쥐, 곤충 등 모든 생명체들의 비행역학을 관찰하고 자신의 모든 지식을 총동원해 날개를 설계했다. 수년간의 실험을 통해 그는 "인간이 새처럼 하늘을 날수 있다는 것은 불가능한 일이다."라는 결론에 도달했다. 그런 그가 지금의 한강변에서 패러세일링을 하는 사람들을 본다면 어떤 기분일까?

• Korean Journal of Health Education and Promotion
• /
• v.4 no.2
• /
• pp.1-8
• /
• 1987

학교는 교육과 연구의 기능을 가친 특수한 사회조직이다. 새로운 과학적인 지식을 습득하게 할 뿐만 아니라 집단생활 속에서 인간관계를 형성하고 상호협력 할 수 있는 경험을 터득하게 하는 장소이다. 그러나 학교는 사회집단으로서 지식제공에 의한 인간개발이나 인간관계에 의한 인격 및 정서발달을 개인 스스로의 체험과 책임으로 돌려 방치하는 자유방임적인 조직은 아니다. (중략)

• The Science & Technology
• /
• v.32 no.2 s.357
• /
• pp.26-27
• /
• 1999

과학기술의 발전은 인간을 그것에 예속시키고 퇴화시킨다. 편리함에 길들여지는만큼 불편과 불행감, 혹은 상대적 박탈감이 강하기 때문이다. 하지만 과학기술 그 자체는 선악의 가치와 자유의지를 갖고 있는 것이 아니기 때문에 단지 인간이 어떻게 운용하느냐에 따라 천사도 될 수 있고 악마도 될 수 있는 것이다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.129
• /
• pp.247-265
• /
• 2014

In this paper I will undertake three tasks: first, to identify the difference between John Rawls's liberal conception of liberty and Will Kymlicka's; second, to briefly examine the problems with liberal conception of liberty; finally, to propose a certain alternative that will be able to make liberal conception of liberty more meaningful In Kymlicka's view, Rawls seems to fail to make the best defence of freedom of choice because he wants to explain of individual freedom on the basis of Kant's moral theory about liberty. Kymlicka thinks that it is not a desirable way of defending liberal conception of liberty. According to his liberal theory, Rawls's defence of freedom of choice might make us think that we should have our freedom of choice for its own sake because freedom is the most valuable in the world. So Kymlicka wants to provide stronger argument to defend freedom of choice in liberalism. He insists that it is our projects and tasks that are most important things in our lives. Furthermore, he argues that we should conceive our freedom of choice as a precondition for pursuing those projects and practices that are valued for our good lives. Now I want to look at two concepts of liberty in liberalism with Rawls's theory and Kymlicaka's. In this paper, I shall look at criticisms of the liberal account of freedom of choice. These would give us a certain chance for understanding true freedom.