• The Korean Publising Journal, Monthly
• /
• s.313
• /
• pp.8-9
• /
• 2001

• Journal of Science of Art and Design
• /
• v.12
• /
• pp.145-191
• /
• 2007

21세기는 과학적 물질문명의 발달로 인하여, 과거에는 느껴보지 못했던 물질문명의 풍요를 이끌어 냈으며, 컴퓨터, 메스미디어의 발달로 인하여, 인간 문명의 관심은 지구계를 벗어나 우주론적으로 확장되어 마침내 우주시대를 열었다. 하지만 인간의 이성과 함께 영원하리라 믿었던 과학적 합리성은 20세기 초두에 제국주의적 전쟁을 일으키게 되었으며, 그로 말미암아 이성 파괴 현상이 드러나게 되었다. 급기야 20세기말에 이르러 다원주의라 칭하기도 하는 후기산업사회의 병적 증후군들, 국가간의 경제전쟁, 컴퓨터 및 각종 정보매체를 통한 신속한 정보교환의 이면에는 인간의 자기정체성의 혼돈을 아울러 초래하게 되었다. 과학기술의 발달로 생태계 및 환경은 오염되고 파괴되었다. 20세기말에는 산성비, 엘니뇨, 라니냐 현상으로 인하며, 환경의 재앙을 초래하면서 이제 인간은 문명에 대하여 여태껏 가져왔던 확고한 믿음에 회의를 갖게 된 것이다. 이와 같은 현상은 인간의 주체적 인식과 과학적 믿음의 지나친 숭배로 인하며 자연도 인간에 의하여 지배되고 인간을 위해서만 존재하는, 인간과 자연의 이원론적인 생각 즉, 인간의 이성에 의해서만 가능하다고 생각한 "근대적 주체"에 대한 맹신의 결과인 것이다. 이렇듯 20세기의 문제점은 21세기로 전가되어 여전히 계속되고 있으며, 세계내의 가장 큰 문제점은 전쟁, 기아 등 보다 이제는 오히려 환경. 생태문제로 귀결되어 지구의 생존권 자체가 위협을 받게 되었다. 미술도 서구문명의 근대주의적 영향에 의해서 모더니즘 등 이성위주의 미술인 "근대 주체적 미술"로 발전하였지만 포스터모더니즘에서 보여 지듯 이미 인간의 순수한 이성을 근간으로 한 미술에 있어서의 주체성 주장은 상당부분 무너졌으며, 이제는 장르의 해체와 다원화 현상으로 나아가게 되었다. 환경파괴에 직면하여 이제 주체는 자연이라는 타자를 새롭게 등장시킨다. 그리하여 생명중심주의, 전체론, 감각 중심주의 등 인간과 자연이 함께 공생하는 자연을 향한 생태적인 미술이 절실히 요구되는 것이다. 이에 본 연구논문은 무비판적 서구미술에 동요되지 않고, 지극히 자연적이고 동양적이기도 한 끊임없이 생명력을 창출해 내는 자연에 관심을 같게 되었으며, 환경의 중요성과 함께 생태학적 미술, 즉 생태미술에 본인의 작업을 관계시키고자 한다. 근대적 문명사에 의해 매장된 생태적 유기성의 흔적을 고고학적 탐사방법을 통하며 발굴해 내며, 환경윤리와 생태학, 심층 생태학, 북친의 '사회 생태학'을 수용하여 물질성의 생태적 복원과 함께 조형공간의 다원성에 대한 생태 미술의 일단을 규명코자 하였다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.120
• /
• pp.109-130
• /
• 2011

The main purpose of this paper is to examine Putnam's recent conception of ethics, and show that it gives rise to an ineluctable incoherence with his rationalism. This suggests that Putnam's philosophy has to be far more naturalized to make his new position cogent. Putnam recently has shown some explicit turn toward pragmatism a la James and Dewey under the name of "pragmatic pluralism." Putnam says that traditional ethics has presupposed some form of ontology in one way or another, which he sees is based on an unnecessary pursuit of a misleading conception of objectivity. Putnam tries to get rid of any notion of ontology in ethics, whereby we can talk about a third view which runs between traditional objectivism and nihilistic relativism. In this sense, he defines pragmatism as "fallibilism cum antiskepticism." Putnam's suggestion makes a good sense as far as it goes. However, his continuous transition toward pragmatism is critically impeded by his own adhesion to the normative conception of "reason." In this light, Putnam himself is wobbling between Kant and Dewey, just as he describes ethics is. Dewey's pragmatism does not have recourse to the very notion of reason to secure objectivity necessary to make sense of moral experience. Putnam needs to be far more naturalized to reach cogently where he espouses, and this can be done only by renouncing the normative conception of reason.

• Cross-Cultural Studies
• /
• v.45
• /
• pp.479-496
• /
• 2016

The aim of this essay was to investigate Marlow's desire for constructing enlightenment subject of knowledge and power sustained by the collusion of imperialism and patriarchy in Joseph Conrad's Heart of Darkness. Marlow's narrative, based on his journey up the river in Africa to retrieve Kurtz, attempts to conceptualize himself as the subject of the enlightenment reason and rationality. In the novella, collusive network of ideologies of empire and gender contributes to the making of a Western Enlightenment subject. Marlow eulogizes himself for realizing the harsh realities of imperialism, political domination and economic exploitation of the natives in Africa. However, Marlow is a colonial subject who has been ruled by the hierarchical system of thought in the Western logocentrism. He is not aware that his narrative has already been infiltrated by the ideological discourse of the totalitarian enlightenment. His narrative in effect is not a self-congratulatory testimony to truth and realities but a narcissistic and self-defeating document. Marlow unconsciously employs the totalitarian ideologies of empire and gender in order to relegate the African natives to the inhuman existence and to consign women to the sphere of illusion.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.116
• /
• pp.281-312
• /
• 2010

Der vorliegende Beitrag problematisiert die Zeichen einer Zeit, in der nach der 'Wende des Sprachparadigmas' alle Prozesse einer Posttranszendenz, die in der heutigen philosophischen Problemsituation versucht werden, $bel{\ddot{a}}chelt$ werden, der Relativismus, Partikularismus und Skeptizismus $verst{\ddot{a}}rkt$ wird, und als Resultat die Kritik, Ablehnung und das Desinteresse an der Ideologie der Vernunft und Wahrheit sich verbreitet. Ich werde daher umgekehrt gerade an diesem Punkt ansetzen und ${\ddot{u}}ber$ die Notwendigkeit und Dringlichkeit der Rehabilitierung der "$Realit{\ddot{a}}t$ einer moralischen Vernunft" nachdenken. Zweck dieses Beitrags ist es, in Zusammenhang mit der Rehabilitierung der $Realit{\ddot{a}}t$ einer moralischen Vernunft, aufzuzeigen, welche theoretische Erkenntnis bzw.moralische Erkenntnis wahr ist, d.h., dass ein 'bewiesenes', da 'objektiv gerechtfertigtes' Argument existiert. $Daf{\ddot{u}}r$ werde ich als erstes auf das Problem der Relativistischen und Skeptizistischen Anhaltspunkte philosophisch eingehen(2), zur ${\ddot{U}}berwindung$ dieser Anhaltspunkte eine Rechtfertigung der rationelen und moralischen $Begr{\ddot{u}}ndung$ versuchen(3). In Folge soll betrachtet werden, dass die Rechtfertigung der rational moralischen $Begr{\ddot{u}}ndung$ mit dem Problem der $Letztbegr{\ddot{u}}ndung$ in enger Verbindung steht(4), und nachdem darauf hingewiesen wird, dass dies durch eine Konfrontation mit der Fallibilismus These zu erkenntnistheoretisch objektiver $G{\ddot{u}}ltigkeit$ gelangt(5), werde ich den Beitrag $abschlie{\ss}en$(6).

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
• /
• v.148
• /
• pp.239-267
• /
• 2018

In the matter of ethical and moral practice, Thomas Aquinas's thought is called "intellectualism". It does not mean only that intelligence is more important than will in moral practice, but that it has epistemological, metaphysical, and psycho-psychological implications significance. The first means affirming "the first principles of knowing" as the problem of certainty of knowing. In Thomism, there are surely above suspicion notions in the domain of practice as well as in the domain of reason, which are obviously self-evident, and because of that certainty, they become the basis of certainty of all other knowings that follow. The principle to know these knowings is the first principle of knowing, reason and Synderesis(conscience). Therefore, the "intellectualism" of Tomism is the basis for providing the ground of metaphysics. In the case of reason, it is classified into superior reason and inferior reason according to whether it is object. The object of higher reason is "metaphysical object" which human natural reason can not deal with. This affirmation of superior reason provides a basis for human "autonomy" in the moral and religious domain. This is because even in areas beyond the object of natural reason, it is possible to derive certain knowledge through self-reasoning, and thus to be able to carry out the act through their own choosing. Likewise, for Thomas Aquinas, "Synderesi" as the first principle of good and evil judgment can be applied to both the superior reason and the inferior reason, and thus, except for the truth by the direct divine revelation, precedes any authority of the world, scrupulous Act always guarantees truth and good. This means "subjectivity" that virtually in the act of moral practice, it can become the master of one's act. Furthermore, "consciousness(conscientia)", which means the ability to comprehend everything in a holistic and simultaneous manner, is based on conscience(synderesis). So, at least in principle, correct behavior or moral behavior in Tomism is given firstly in correct knowledge. Therefore, it can be said that true awareness (conscious awareness) in Thomas Aquinas's thought coincide with practical practice, or at least knowledge can be said to be a decisive 'driver' for practice. This will be the best explanation of the definition of "intellectualism" by Thomism.

• Journal of Korean Society of Rural Planning
• /
• v.5 no.1 s.9
• /
• pp.76-86
• /
• 1999

본 연구는 미국의 실용주의 철학자인 존 듀이의 공생적 합리주의 모형에 대한 분석과 이 모형의 계획이론의 적용에 대한 사회규범적 논의에 관한 것이다. 다양한 사회과학분야의 문헌고찰과 듀이를 비롯한 실용주의학파들의 연구를 중심으로 이루어진 본 연구는, 최근 논의되고 있는 사회 규범적 차원에서 논의되고 있는 계획이론의 이론적 근거를 존 듀이의 공생적 합리주의에서 찾고자 하였다. 민주주의의 속성상 계획과정에서의 상충과 갈등이 피할수 없는 현실이라면, 이러한 갈등과 상충이 발전적 도구로 존재할 수 있다고 제시한 듀이의 공생주의는 합리성의 가능성에 바탕을 둔 고전적 합리주의 이론을 대체할 수 있는 하나의 이론으로 제시될 수 있을 것이다. 존 듀이의 공생주의 이론에 대한 연구는 기존의 계획이론분야에서는 제시된 적이 없는 최초의 연구로서, 향후 계획이론 분야의 발전에 있어서 이론적 분석의 한 축을 제시했다는데 본 논문의 기여가 있다고 하겠다.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
• /
• v.25 no.2
• /
• pp.3-10
• /
• 2022

Memorability is an indicator of how well a stimulus can be remembered. Studies on memorability have shown that stimulus memorability cannot be explained by the perceptual and semantic properties of a stimulus, suggesting that memorability is an intrinsic property of a stimulus. Though real-world scenes almost always contain multiple objects, previous studies on memorability have mainly tested memory performance using a single stimulus. In the current study, we investigated how multiple stimuli with different levels of memorability interact with each other. Participants were asked to remember a high or low memorability target presented with a high or low memorability distractor in the encoding block. Participants' memory accuracy was measured by a sensitivity index in the testing block. Results showed that a high memorability target was easier to remember. However, the distractor memorability level did not modulate this target memorability effect. The current results support previous studies that showed a highly memorable stimulus does not automatically induce bottom-up attentional shifts.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
• /
• v.7 no.1
• /
• pp.446-453
• /
• 2021

This paper deals with two methods regarding fact and value. One is the method of H. Putnam, which is to break the boundary between fact and value and to make a world where the two have an inherent connection. The other is the method of J. Habermas, which regards fact and value as the product of an intersubjective agreement based on argumentation. Putnam, through his position of internal realism, moves from realism to pragmatism, especially by combining the rationalist tradition of Kant and Dewey's pragmatic views. Habermas also stands in the tradition of rationalism and universalism in Kant, at the same time emphasizing the practicability of truth in Hegel's tradition of historical reason. The significance of the strategy of Putnam and Habermas is that they have attempted to revive the realm of value against the strict dichotomy of facts and values and the subsequent devaluation of rationality in the realm of value. The starting point of this attempt is that the practical foundation of rationality is laid on life and practice. This could provide the room for escaping from rationality, which prioritizes only truths that reveal facts, that is, instrument-reduced rationality, the room for the revival of practical rationality through reflection on what is the purpose of life, and, in turn, the room for resisting to pass the realm of values and norms to the logic of habitual routines or customs. However, despite such common goal, there are clear limitations to Putnam's approach due to the differences in the strategies taken on facts and values. Putnam's method can demolish the whole universal framework that is the foundation where pragmatic pluralism will be fostered, eliminating the difference between the specificity of values and the universality of norms and shaking up the status of universal ethics. Therefore, Habermas' ethical theory is proposed as an alternative to establish a basis for universal ethics by relying on communication rationality and to secure the coercion of norms and blossom cultural pluralism as a diverse lifestyle based on this coercion.

• Journal of architectural history
• /
• v.15 no.4
• /
• pp.23-36
• /
• 2006

Since he was a leading figure in nineteenth century architecture, Viollet-le-Duc's architectural theory is crucial to the foundation of modern architecture. He has been called a Gothic Revivalist, a Structural Rationalist and a Positivist. The first title was perhaps due to his vigorous restoration of Gothic works such as $N\hat{o}tre$ Dame, but he did not adore the Gothic style just for itself. Rather, he hoped to deduce some principles from the style. So how did he manage this? In his book "Entretiens sur l'Architecture (Lectures on Architecture), published between 1864 and 1872, he mentions using Descartes' four rules for reaching architectural certainty in contrast with the chaotic situation during that modernising period. Furthermore Viollet-le-Duc's theory can be seen as a serious attempt to translates Descartes' philosophical rules into systems of architectural speculation. Descartes' four rules of doubt are anchored in mathematical propositions, and without mathematical distinctions, none of these rules are valid. In other word, mathematics for Viollet is the yardstick of judgement between distinctness and indistinctness. Many architectural problems arise from this view. In this paper, the validities of applying Descartes' method of doubt to architectural discourse will be discussed in order to address the question:-Did Viollet-le-Duc clearly grasp Cartesian method by which memory was erased from the world?