

## Social Dimensions of Pragmatism and Planning Theory: An Application of John Dewey's Symbiotic Rationality

Lee, SeongWoo

Division of Agricultural Economics and Rural Development, Seoul National University

### 사회적 관점에서 조명한 실용주의와 계획이론: 존 듀이의 공생적 합리주의의 적용에 관한 연구

이성우

서울대학교 농업생명과학대학 농경제사회학부 전임강사

#### 초 록

본 연구는 미국의 실용주의 철학자인 존 듀이의 공생적 합리주의 모형에 대한 분석과 이 모형의 계획이론의 적용에 대한 사회규범적 논의에 관한 것이다. 다양한 사회과학분야의 문헌고찰과 듀이를 비롯한 실용주의학파들의 연구를 중심으로 이루어진 본 연구는, 최근 논의되고 있는 사회 규범적 차원에서 논의되고 있는 계획이론의 이론적 근거를 존 듀이의 공생적 합리주의에서 찾고자 하였다. 민주주의의 속성상 계획과정에서의 상충과 갈등이 피할수 없는 현실이라면, 이러한 갈등과 상충이 발전적 도구로 존재할 수 있다고 제시한 듀이의 공생주의는 합리성의 가능성에 바탕을 둔 고전적 합리주의 이론을 대체할 수 있는 하나의 이론으로 제시될 수 있을 것이다. 존 듀이의 공생주의 이론에 대한 연구는 기존의 계획이론분야에서는 제시된 적이 없는 최초의 연구로서, 향후 계획이론 분야의 발전에 있어서 이론적 분석의 한 축을 제시했다는데 본 논문의 기여가 있다고 하겠다.

#### I. Prologue

Pragmatism, a philosophical school of thought,<sup>1)</sup> has widely permeated the social science literature. Mitroff's (1983) development of the psychological logic of organization in the

field of management, an administrative point of view applying John Dewey's pragmatic philosophy from Stever (1993) in public administration, Smith's (1984) humanistic geography applying Robert Park's epistemological imperatives and Wescoat's (1992) study of the thought of Gilbert White and John Dewey applying on natural resources and hazards

\*본 논문은 1995년 11월 미국 미시간주 디트로이트에서 개최된 제36회 세계 계획학회 (The 36th Annual Meeting of the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning)에서 같은 제목으로 발표된 논문의 일부입니다. 본 논문의 저자는 논문의 수정에 많은 도움을 주신 본 학회지의 편집위원장이신 안동만 교수님과 익명의 두 심사위원에게 깊은 감사를 드립니다.

1) While a German philosopher Gunther Jacoby argues that pragmatism is a uniquely American philosophy describing it "not as a philosophy of the dollar but as a philosophy of life, of human creation, of possibilities" (Joas 1993: 5). However, most theorists have believed that pragmatism is not limited to North America. They argue that its development at Harvard and Chicago was influenced by the work of England's Schiller (cf. Stack 1982).

research, Emel's (1991) provocative pragmatism for environmental research, Banai's (1993) social systems theory applying to spatial theory in geography, alternative pragmatic perspectives against Habermas' critical theory drawn from Alexander (1985), Antonio (1989), Shalin (1992), and Bernstein (1992) in sociology, as well as recent diverse pragmatic inquiries from Hoch (1984a: 1984b: 1988), Harper and Stein (1992), and Verma (1993a: 1993b) in planning - all are heavily imbued with pragmatic maxim in their study.

The word pragmatism is widely known; however, the deeper contents of its thought have been assimilated fragmentarily and with some misinterpretations into intellectual society in general (Bernstein 1992; Joas 1993; Shalin 1992), and into planning in particular (Verma 1993b). In recent years, pragmatism has become increasingly visible in the planning literature. No doubt there are some specialists in the field of planning literature who are engaged in an academic study of pragmatism, but they are few in number. Thus, the movement in planning is not accompanied by a full-scale systematic study which might be necessary to bring it to everlasting fruition. Moreover, much of the discussion on pragmatism in planning has been seen supporting of technical rationality, rather than endorsing a normative dimension. Is this a fair interpretation of pragmatism? In this paper, I develop a response to the question by introducing new interpretation of pragmatism's contribution in 1) role of society, particularly as regards observation that we live in a pluralistic world and 2) role of science societal reality in human life. I argue that pragmatism provides a distinct position on the recent disputes over a new and relevant rationality for planning theory.<sup>2)</sup>

More specifically, I draw Dewey's aporia of symbiotic rationality from the sociological normative perspective to

recuperate the current lack of normative planning theory. This is neither a tacit dimension nor an archived curios, I shall show that this is just a unity in diversity inquiry, which exactly reflects the everyday life of individual and organizational activities where majority of planning practices is engaged. General misconceptions about the relationship between planning and pragmatism are well presented elsewhere (Hoch 1994: 9-12), so I will not reiterate these points here. The remaining parts of the paper are comprised as follows. Section II draws on the general ideology of pragmatism focusing on three aspects of scientific inquiry: science, society, pluralism and relativism. After investigating the normative dimension of pragmatism in Section III, section IV examines social realities in democratic politics and their congruence with Dewey's idea. Final section draws some concluding remarks.

## II . General Ideologies of Pragmatism

The reason for believing that American pragmatism is in good harmony with the ideology of planning is that the two are alike, in that they are both based on humanism, in the broad sense of the term. Planning, in one sense, places a faith in human dignity, and is a process of development which engages the spirit of humanity against a philosophical background which aspires toward the prosperity of mankind and the growth of individuals through a rational social life. Pragmatism can be described as a faith devoted to the discovery of the source of value in human experience and humanity, and hence it is akin to humanitarian aspect of planning. This commonness serves as ample basis for inferring that pragmatism will lead us to a view of life which affirms and promotes the progress of planning.

2) The perennial argument that has prevailed in planning theory is about "rationality" (Goldberg 1985; Friedmann 1987:1988; Alexander 1988). Much of the discussion on rationality comes from the synoptic tradition that is largely influenced by the "tool-and-craft" orientation of the natural sciences (Krieger 1986). However, the term "rationality" which has been the justification of social science - theoretical and applied (Weaver et al, 1985) - and which has been, and should be, regarded as the cornerstone of the planning context, now stands on the brink of "anomalies" (Alexander 1988) so "in need of renewal" (Hemmens 1980). Maybe rationality itself is impossible in the practical planning context (Weber 1983). Largely due to this dilemma, recently theorists have suggested many new variants of rationality such as, "a new rationality" (Weaver et al, 1985), "metarationality" (Goldberg 1985), or "contingency theories" such as, Hudson's SITAR (1979), Lim's synthetic framework (1986), Haynes and Stubbings' (1987) anthropological reaction, and Alexander's contingency framework

## II - 1. Respect for Science

As a branch of empirical philosophy, pragmatism holds science in high esteem, and the results of science in main part parallel to modernistic thought. Considering the chronological situatedness of the classical pragmatists, this is inevitable (however, see Verma' (1995b) s professional ethics). However, they respect not only the results of science, but scientific method and scientific modes of thinking as well. In other words, they respect science not just for its results but as an instrument or means for shaping human social life. The tremendous power inherent in science can become good or wrong according to the purpose for which it is utilized. So far science has not always been utilized for good purposes alone (cf. Sarason 1984). That science was utilized rather for evil purposes is quite apparent in the relationships between modern warfare and scientific technology, and between economic and social crises such as "homelessness" (cf. Lovelkin 1993).

The pragmatists emphasize the instrumentality of science and stress that it should be used for good purposes. Dewey is a pragmatist who most vehemently promotes social reform by the means of an agreement at margin through an intelligent dialogue (cf. Dewey 1993). The reason why he was optimistic for reform by the concept of an agreement is that he believed in the ability of science to display productivity to such an extent that it will enable all people to live in abundance (Antonio 1989: 743).

Asserting that science should be used not only for inquiry in the natural world but also for the solution of human social problems, pragmatists recommend we live in accordance with the reasonable modes of thinking which constitute the basis of science.

The Americans' pioneering progressive spirit which formed the social background for pragmatism accords with the spirit of scientists which pushes them constantly toward experimental challenges in search of new possibilities.

The most fundamental among scientific methods is the hypothesis driven method which is parallel to Popper's falsification theory in modern science. This calls for a humble

attitude of scientists to not recognize as the absolute and immutable truth any judgment as far as it concerns the objects of their experiment, but to regard it as a temporary hypothesis, subject to verification and revision in the future. The pragmatist ethic teaches that the application of this humble attitude to practical life is the correct course for the growth of individuals and the development of their society (cf. Stever 1993: 420-421). This conviction of pragmatists does not encourage hesitation and skepticism in human conduct so much as it recommends constant criticism of the present, and renews efforts to introduce change in a better direction.

## II - 2. Philosophy Considering Social Reality as its Main Theme

I believe that, in all societies, at all times, there are human complications and social problems which need to be addressed. In this sense, philosophy is the most inclusive attempt by human intelligence to resolve the problems that affect a society in its particular historical context. This seems unequivocally clear to the classical pragmatists. For instance, pragmatists assert that the philosopher's mission is to present a guiding principle for the solution of fundamental problems in human society arising from changes over time. Pragmatists' conceive the role of the scientist as being "an actor within the world rather than a spectator of it" (Susman 1978: 596). The biggest supporter of this is John Dewey, who conceived his ideas of pragmatism under the decisive influence of William James. Dewey believes that the most fundamental mission facing philosophers is to hold aloft the torch directing the course of history.

However, pragmatism neither gives us a panacea nor pursues a perfection. Pragmatism never suggests a particular remedy for every specific ill. It not only does not have a secret remedy, but it also does not promise to solve all the varied and complex problems facing society (Antonio 1989: 741). In this sense, pragmatism is not the name of a certain system consisting of conclusions having definite contents. Even when the same methodology is applied, pragmatism not only admits but encourages us to believe some difference in conclusion, according to the object for which the methodology is applied

and its particular point of emphasis. The contents, however, pragmatists strive to concern is only limited to instrumentalism is ill-founded (Singer 1992). More importantly, the pragmatic way of thinking is action oriented (Verma 1993b), by ways of tracing its practical consequences (James 1991: 23) and energizing a deeply moral concern which distinguishes it from mere instrumentalism.

Pragmatists are not the first to have believed that the philosopher's mission is to seek out principles of practice with which to cope with historical realities. The tradition linking philosophy directly to the reality of life dates back to the pre-Socratic era. However, the professionalization of sciences, which became more conspicuous in recent times, and the tendency among intellectuals to lose vigor and seek indulgence in ease, have encouraged philosophers to shun social reality and to engross themselves in philosophy for the sake of philosophy. That pragmatism sought to emphasize the historical and social missions of philosophy in the midst of such currents is a fact worth mentioning. Because the pragmatist's role is "not to solve the problems of philosophers but rather to deal with the problems of men" (Scheffler 1974: 187), thus regarding pragmatism as a philosophy of action that seeks to make room for the application of creative intelligence to the public realm.

### II - 3. Pluralistic Empiricism and the Relative Theory of Value

Another creed common to all pragmatists can be found in their rejection of all theories validating the notion of the Absolute, which attempts to solve all problems uniformly with the principle a priori. Recognizing special features unique to each discipline dealing with natural or social phenomena, they reject any attempt to explain both material and mental phenomena with one fundamental principle, as Spencer and Hegel do. For the pragmatists, the Absolute also remains, but only in the form of "an hypothesis" (James 1991: 73). They assert that a principle which can be applied to each case must be developed through experience. That is, the world is "what experience shows it to be" (Kaplan 1961: 21).

This pluralistic empiricism is, of course, not unique to

pragmatists. Almost all modern scientists influenced by Comte's positivistic ideology adhere to it. Along with these scientists, critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, logical empiricists, those belonging to the Cambridge analytical school and other scholars also support this view. However, these philosophers and theorists applied their pluralistic empiricism solely to theoretical problems; they did not attempt to propose practical solutions to practical problems arising from human society. The pragmatists on the other hand, faithful to their creed that science should penetrate social reality, enlarge their pluralistic empiricism to encompass social theories. Therefore, their view, unlike the case of empiricists belonging to other schools, shows aspects that are in close relation with planning.

Just as the pragmatists negate the absolute universal validity of a principle, they also do not recognize the absoluteness of any *ism* or *creed* in the domain of politics or economy, and at the same time refuse dictatorship of whatever nature. According to the pragmatist view, an *ism* or *creed* itself does not constitute a sacred purpose but it is only a means for life. Subsequently, its value is to be determined by the result its advocacy and practice bring about in life. As the results produced may differ according to the special features of countries or societies, the value of an *ism* or *creed* must be examined on an individual basis distinguishing one country or society from others to which it is applied (Rorty, 1992). Thus the question of what form of politics will bear what result is not a logical problem, but a problem of experience to be examined in the context of its own planning reality.

Pragmatists who assume the standpoint of empiricism mentioned above defend a relativistic view in regard to the essence of value. Most pragmatists side with the psychological theory of value. William James believes that individual subjective cognition is the basis of value and Dewey asserted that this cognitive value comes into existence where human problems are solved. But they are unanimous in reflecting realism, which holds that value exists of itself even in severance from relations with the subject, and in concluding that the horizon of value opens only when the human mind enters into relation with the object. The relativistic theory is especially important in that it can promote the progress of planning more

freely and positively. That is, a relativistic theory suggests a change in the content of morality in response to the demands of the special features of a society and its particular historical context. At the same time, it encourages a free but critical attitude towards old ethics or antiquated views of value. Planning, if it can be regarded as an overall reform movement in both spiritual and material life, necessarily requires the revision of our view of value as its most fundamental condition. A relativistic theory, which suggests the re-evaluation of the tradition from a completely free point of view provides a theoretical basis for the more positive achievement of the progress of planning than any realistic theory, which demands pious affection to traditional value. However, it should be emphasized that this theory by no means negates or slights the everlasting value contained in a tradition, recognizing the existence of things and events "prior to and independent of human awareness" (Fott 1991: 36-37) or "nature itself as that is uncovered and understood by our best contemporaneous knowledge could sustain and support our democratic hopes" (Dewey in Shusterman 1994: 394). There can be a universal aspect in human life in spite of changes in time and society, and human desire and feeling are peculiarly unchanging in that they reflect the universal conditions of life. Pragmatic relativist theory is never less enthusiastic than a realist theory in cherishing everlasting value. The only difference between the two is that whereas the former tries to discover the basis of everlasting value in the universal aspects of the human nature or human life [cf. "reason" (1984) or "reasonableness" (1994) in Habermas' critical theory], the latter argues that the everlasting value lies in its own essence as in pragmatism (cf. "endorsing relativism" in (Fox 1994), and pragmatic "community-wide paradigms" in Gregg (1994)).

It is inevitable that the relativist theories develop into ethical consequentialism, which places importance on the actual results of conduct. The question of which one among the results should be regarded as most precious should be determined not by the logical necessity dictated by relativist theory but by its relation with individual faith. This point might be the reason why pragmatism is accused of being naively utilitarian (Joas 1993). There are some pragmatists, however, who criticize

utilitarianism as being contrary to the principle of social justice and introduce a more reasonable ethical theory. Most representative among those who introduce a revised ethical theory is Dewey. This will be addressed more carefully in the following section.

### III. Social Norms in Pragmatism

Two views are generally common to their social theories. First, they all assert the establishment of a bright society where the rights and interests of the masses are protected by means of eliminating injustice and corruption deriving from the monopolistic capitalist economic system. Second, they assert a method of agreement through peaceful persuasion or "peaceful incremental change" which have always caused important structural changes in most democratic societies, namely, a democratic method for the elimination of the existing social dilemma. There is no single ethical theory that pragmatist methodology will inevitably arrive at, however. Pragmatism sides as well with conservatism--tender-minded, as it does with radicalism--tough-minded (James 1991: 8-9). It is, however, possible to find a certain general trend common among social theories actually developed by classical pragmatists.

Even though their proclivities toward the philosophic world view of cosmological evolution are somewhat different, in the main they are in concert with each other, in that they are critical of "reductive fallacy" (Kaplan 1961: 21) and of "reductivistic scientism" (Bernstein 1992: 814). Not only do these social theories reject the doctrines of mechanical determinism, but they also require that a proper understanding of the physical universe needs to acknowledge indeterminacy. Thus, Dewey (1946: 351) argued,

"Any view which holds that man is a part of nature, not outside it, will certainly hold that indeterminacy in human experience, once experience is taken in the objective sense of interacting behavior and not as a private conceit added on to something totally alien to it, is evidence of some corresponding indeterminateness in the process of nature within which man exists and out of which he arose."

In this sense, the insight of pragmatist ontology is "to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one" (James 1991: 25). Dewey expands on the implications of this position, arguing that "there is no prior fixed and ready-made determination of what may be predicated and of ways of predication" (1982: 138). In this respect, they never worry about Agamemnon's situation (cf. Nussbaum 1990: 63-64). Rather, just as a failure to properly prepare for an experience is just one more fact in planning reality, so dissent, chaos and mistakes are a kind of *raison d'être* or "a competing good" (Dewey 1957: 257), in pragmatism. Pragmatists also turn down Kant's notion of "categorical imperatives" except for God's territory (cf. Fuller 1992: Rockefeller 1989), and argue that in every situation, the adoption of some hypothetical imperative to this life world is unavoidable by incremental adaptation. In this regard, like the fact/value or knowledge/action kind of dichotomous logic structure favored by most analytic and synthetic traditions in planning is untenable to Dewey and the other classical pragmatists (cf. Kaplan 1961: 16; Marcell 1974: 208-209; Hacking 1990: 62; Putnam 1990: xi). While Kant raises this dualism to a guiding philosophical principle (Bedford 1993: 465), Dewey's epistemology, rather, focuses on the wholeness by way of a unity.

"We have the dualistic theory which simply takes the fact and generalizes it, simply says there is this duality of phenomena and there is a duality of principle.....which interprets the dualization as necessary but does not treat that as a matter of two separate factors or modes of being, but simply as a distinction of function, a distinction of modes of operation within a unity and for the sake of the unity" (1991: 331-332).

The pragmatic value of the world's unity is that these separate modes of operation are realized in a continuous process through which a world is operationalized to find "an account of the moral relations that obtain among things, which will weave them into the unity of a stable system" (James quoted in

Fuller 1992: 161) within shared attitudes and the attitude is sympathetic apprehension for others which does not require synthetic agreement or homogeneity.

Besides trampling such dichotomous paralogies under their feet, pragmatists reject the universalism which is common to Plato, Kant, Hegel's idea of immanent teleology - that "the real is the rational and the rational is the real" (Rorty 1992: 585) - and the conceptions of Cartesian thought. In this regard, pragmatists think of the pursuit of classical monocentric rationality as, at best, an experience of Isaiah Berlin's metaphor

- the scattered parts of a jigsaw puzzle (Berlin 1991). I suspect Kant's metaphor that "Out of the crooked timber of humanity no straight thing was ever made," may be a position close to the classical pragmatists' perspective. Thus dichotomous and universal logic is replaced in pragmatism by logic in use, also known as the logic of situation, which is parallel in many planning practices. Because there are no absolute truths for pragmatists, neither are there abstract problems. Conflicts only occur within the boundary of situations. Dewey (1982: 105-106) argues,

"It is the situation which has these traits of uncertainty and indeterminacy. We are doubtful because the situation is inherently doubtful.... It is a unique doubtfulness which makes that situation to be just and only the situation it is. It is this unique quality that not only evokes the particular quality engaged in but that exercises control over its special procedure."

Pragmatists regard situations in many accounts, conceiving them not as a residual phenomenon, but rather as central and permanent features of revolutionary life between human beings and context. But there is a question about what constitutes a situation, ontologically. Dewey explains it as a contextual whole defined by its constituents that cannot be expounded by isolating objects and events. These objects or events, however, are not the focus of inquiry, but only the perceptions of situation matter. I think it is best that we understand Dewey's pragmatic epistemology as one in which there are a plurality of possible interpretive contexts or situations. As the range of possible functions increase in the situation, the range of possible

interpretations expands. There are a plurality of possible worlds to the extent that there are a plurality of possible universes of experience. Sullivan (1995) notes this maxim as a pragmatic rhetoric of "comparison and exploration, seeking the more plausible rather than the certain." This surely cannot be the view of the postmodernistic perspective of skepticism. While the postmodernistic method adopts "a destabilizing method" as its principal strategy (Dear 1986:1988), throwing into unconditional doubt the authority claims of preceding traditions, the pragmatists epistemological instrumentalism, in terms of situations against the nihilistic cynicism, is overcome by their "transactions" (Alexander 1987: 108) which leads the world on a daily basis (implying some aspects of a way of life, of individuals, groups, or community, which are likely to share some standards of meaning and value, cf. Gregg 1994: 343-346: see also another defense from Verma 1993b). The examples given by Dewey, of course, are distinctively human situations in terms of "conscious and experiencing beings" (Alexander 1987: 106) and each situation is unique having "its own irreplaceable good" (Rockefeller 1989: 313).

However the most important thing Dewey establishes is his conception of symbiotic relationships among situations encouraging the kind of "variety-in-unity characteristic of rationality" (Rorty 1992) or "single-mindedness of purpose and diversity of inquiry" (Verma 1994b), which sustains homeostasis. In this, all situations are mediated or related, but human situations only find meaning, through their relations, and all human situations are characterized by what might be called interaction (Dewey 1929: 236). That is, they do not exist atomically, unrelated to other events, but interact as parts of a field or a community (cf. Dewey 1993). Among all the creatures that are involved in complex patterns of behavior with other creatures, human beings exhibit this behavior in the

most complex way and have transformed original biological instincts through cultural experience. Unavoidably, Dewey accepts conflict as an inevitable factor among different individuals and groups. In this reasoning, Dewey definitely rejects any kind of quest for perfection. Dewey argued (1991: 18-19),

"The first schools are generally termed hedonists. The other school, represented by Kant, and Green, may be termed perfectionists ... The good of man is the perfection of man. Does that mean that morality is found in man's devotion to this perfection? No...It is a self-perfection."

Thus the society envisioned by Dewey inevitably "rests upon persuasion, upon ability to convince and be convinced," upon "the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion and persuasion" (Dewey quoted in Shalin 1992: 246). In other words, the primary transactions of a democratic polity would consist of such activities as bargaining, negotiating, and persuasive argument rather than regulation or command. In this point, however, most Frankfurt School theorists and Positivists distort his aporia as neo-Hegelian or semi-positivist, characterizing it as a "utilitarian theory of truth or a crass version of the philosophy of life" (Joas 1993: 102). Dewey has long been treated as a proto-positivist who sought to reduce meaning to scientific procedure, like the so called Vienna or Cambridge circles (Alexander 1987, xiv). Instead of arguing that philosophy ought to concentrate on the cognitive value of experience, however, Dewey in fact maintains exactly the converse. He accentuates the limits of theoretically grounded consensus and highlights the productive properties of dissent. Dewey (1957: 275-276) argued,

---

3) Postmodernistic cynical consciousness is largely due to a response to an increasingly fragmented and hierarchical post-industrial society. In this kind of society, the best that can be hoped for is the politics of difference and multiculturalism (cf. Villa 1993). While pragmatism does not refute it, its stance is clearly opposed to foundationalism. The formalism of analytic theories of knowledge is itself hardly more than a "vestige of the foundationalist's account," asserting that purely formal accounts could be brought to approximate with increasing precision the necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. Pragmatism is bound to deny that questions in the theory of knowledge are autonomous or separable from an overview of man's biological and historical aptitudes and practice (Margolis 1986: 276).

"Conflict is the gadfly of thought. .... it instigates to invention. It shocks us out of sheep-like passivity, and sets us at noting and contriving. Not that it always effects this result: but that conflict is a sine qua non of reflection and ingenuity."

With his insistence upon increasing diversification and specification as the main traits of the universe, the world envisioned by Dewey happily allows dissent, warrants a wide margin of uncertainty, and gives caution toward policies based on purely theoretical calculations. An ideal democracy, Dewey holds, is to recognize the "infinite variety of human nature," and the "infinite plurality of purposes" (Singer 1992: 481) for which men associate themselves hyphenated together. At this juncture, Dewey's creative experience<sup>4)</sup> finally sublimates to this life world laying much emphasis on a higher tolerance for conflicts and dissents as an tolerable irrationality. Conflicts and dissents are not wrong because they are chaotic: their chaos is symbiotic with its profound irrationality. So Dewey's symbiotic rationality is "not a force to evoke against impulse and habit. It is the attainment of a working harmony among diverse desires.... The man who would intelligently cultivate intelligence will widen, not narrow, his life of strong impulses while aiming at their happy coincidence in operation" (1957: 196).

#### IV. Planning Practice in Democratic Society

Democracy has thrived on uncertainty (Dahl 1995): it relies on ad-hocing and muddling through as necessary mechanisms for handling a number of innumerably unformulated contingencies. In this juncture, democratic polities have promoted conflicting life-forms defined as pluralist power structure (Fay 1975), polyarchy (Lindblom 1977), pluralism (Dahl 1989) or interested group liberalism (Lowi 1969). All these ideologies guarantee conflicting life-forms and power structure, open up public discourse for an ever-widening range of participants, and maximizing the public's role in defining the terms in which indeterminacy can be legitimately terminated.

On the other hand, nondemocratic polities seek to expunge uncertainty by way of unviable consensus. They fear discord and value consensus and the more likely it is to favor a monopoly on the terminological means of production of social reality.

Democratic polities give room for honest differences of opinion, maximize every opportunity like Adam Smith's economy, and protect minorities from the aspersions the majority is apt to cast on their rationality. This is why Dewey does not argue for consensus (even satisficing consensus) for depicting his democracy, and unhesitatingly accepts dissent in the everyday situational conflicts of the life world. Instead, his reconciled democratic local communities functioning each as an indivisible part of the whole is concaved by the differences of opinion in the sense of differences of judgment based on the accreditation of the ignorance, bias and levity of the masses (Dewey 1993: 120-125).

Participatory democracy from the above public environment is inherently a major pole of the democratic systems (Dahl 1989; Lindblom 1979) and actively mediated planner's arbitration is a necessary tool for every planning practice in this political setting as we have experienced. How about the unity of symbiosis Dewey envisioned in this situation? He believes lifeworld is composed of a plurality of individuals with irreciprocal beliefs and desires, however, Dewey's symbiosis is not just an ideology, but a substantive one. It is the rationality that most scholars in the Chicago Sociological School have envisioned in their scientific inquiries (cf. Park 1928; Smith 1984). If planning does not simply mean to convince reasonable readers through argument, but to persuade general audiences through persuasion and characterization of written analytical language, Dewey's symbiosis may be an important prerequisite for the practical organization of democratic action in the conduct of public life in which most planners are engaged.

#### V. Epilogue

4) I use the term "creative experience" for "experience" is purely merged into the scientific circle by Dewey (Alexander 1987: xi-xiii). The maxim of "experience" is the following : all ideas are rooted in experience and then these ideas are transformed into an action via interaction and adaptation.



This is the first in a series of papers designed to reconstruct some works of pragmatists, particularly focused on John Dewey with his idea of symbiosis as a model of planning. I have tried to present a serious examination of some intellectual foundations of Dewey's theory of symbiosis for the application of planning. The motivation for doing so is to show how many parts of pragmatists' works are related and how together they outline a well articulated and philosophically sophisticated theory of planning.

In undertaking this descriptive analysis, I am only aware of

the need and relevance of historical research to provide the evidence necessary to link the discussion of pragmatic concepts with the development of planning theories. Although this paper is no substitute for such a rigorous exploration, I hope it will inspire greater interest in the development of planning theories in our planning society.

## Bibliography

- Alexander, E. R. 1988. "After Rationality." *Society* 26: 15-19.
- Alexander, J. 1985. "Review Essay: Habermas's New Critical Theory: Its Promise and Problems." *American Journal of Sociology* 91: 400-424.
- Alexander, T. M. 1987. *John Dewey's Theory of Art, Experience & Nature: The Horizons of Feeling*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Antonio, J. R. 1989. "The Normative Foundations of Emancipatory Theory: Evolutionary versus Pragmatic Perspectives." *American Journal of Sociology* 94: 721-748.
- Banai, R. 1993. "Social Systems Theory, Postmodernity, and the Region." *Area* 25: 386-399.
- Bedford, D. 1993. "John Dewey's Logical Project." *Journal of Pragmatics* 19: 453-468.
- Berlin, I. 1990. *The Crooked Timber of Humanity*. New York: Alfred A. Knoff.
- Bernstein, J. R. 1992. "The Resurgence of Pragmatism." *Social Research* 59: 813-840.
- Dahl, R. A. 1995. "Justifying Democracy." *Society* 32: 43-49.
- Dahl, R. A. 1989. *Democracy and its Critics*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Dear, M. 1986. "Postmodernism and Planning." *Environment and Planning D* 4: 367-384.
- Dear, M. 1988. "The Postmodern Challenge: Reconstructing Human Geography." *Transactions of Institute of British Geographers N.S.* 13: 262-274.
- Dewey, J. 1993. "The Public and Its Problems." in P. Green (ed.), *Democracy*. New Jersey: Humanities Press.
- Dewey, J. 1991. *Lectures on Ethics 1900-1901*. in D. F. Koch (ed.), *Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press*.
- Dewey, J. 1982. *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*. New York: Irvington Publishers.
- Dewey, J. 1957. *Human Nature and Conduct*. New York: The Modern Library.
- Dewey, J. 1946. *Problems of Men*. New York: Philosophical Library.
- Dewey, J. 1929. *The Quest for Certainty: A study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action*. New York: Minton, Balch & Company.
- Emel, J. 1991. "Ecological Crisis and Provocative Pragmatism." *Environment and Planning D* 9: 384-390.
- Fay, B. 1975. *Social Theory and Political Practice*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Culture and Society*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Fott, D. 1991. "John Dewey and the Philosophical Foundations of Democracy." *The Social Science Journal* 28: 29-44.
- Fox, J. F. 1994. "How Must Relativism be Construed to

- be Coherent?" *Philosophy of the Social Science* 24: 55-75.
- Friedmann, J. 1988. "Reviewing Two Centuries." *Society* 26: 7-15.
- Friedmann, J. 1987. *Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fuller, R. C. 1992. "American Pragmatism Reconsidered: William James' Ecological Ethics." *Environmental Ethics* 14: 159-176.
- Goldberg, M. A. 1985. "The Irrationality of Rational Planning: Exploring Broader Bases for Planning and Public Decisionmaking." in M. Breheny and A. Hooper (eds.), *Rationality in Planning: Critical Essays on the Role of Rationality in Urban and Regional Planning*. London: Pion Ltd.
- Gregg, B. 1994. "Possibility of Social Critique in an Indeterminate World." *Theory and Society* 23: 327-366.
- Habermas, J. 1994. "Three Normative Models of Democracy." *Constellations* 1: 1-10.
- Habermas, J. 1984. *The Theory of Communicative Action Vol. 1*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Hacking, I. 1990. *Representing and Intervening*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Harper, T.L., and S. M. Stein, 1992. "The Centrality of Normative Ethical Theory to Contemporary Planning Theory." *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 11: 105-116.
- Haynes, K. E., and R. G. Stubbings. 1987. "Planning and Philosophy: The Anthropology of Action." *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 6: 75-85.
- Hoch, J. C. 1988. "A Pragmatic Inquiry." *Society* 26: 27-35.
- Hoch, J. C. 1984a. "Doing Good and Being Right: The Pragmatic Connection in Planning Theory." *The Journal of American Planning Association* 48: 335-345.
- Hoch, J. C. 1984b. "Pragmatism, Planning, and Power." *Journal of Planning Education & Research* 4: 86-95.
- Hudson, B. M. 1979. "Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts and Contradictions." *Journal of the American Planning Association* 45: 387-398.
- James, W. 1991. *Pragmatism*. Buffalo, New York: Prometheus Books.
- Joas, H. 1993. *Pragmatism and Social Theory*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Kaplan, A. 1961. *The New World of Philosophy*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Krieger, M. H. 1986. "Research Policy and Review 11. New Tools for a Planner's Toolkit." *Environment and Planning A* 18: 1181-1187.
- Lim, G. C. 1986. "Toward a Synthesis of Contemporary Planning Theories." *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 5: 75-86.
- Lindblom, E. C. 1977. *Politics and Markets*. Basic Books.
- Lovekin, D. 1993. "Technology and Culture and the Problem of the Homeless." *The Philosophical Forum* 24: 363-375.
- Lowi, T. J. 1969. *The End of Liberalism*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. Inc.
- Mandelbaum, J. S. 1985. "The Institutional Focus of Planning Theory." *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 5: 3-9.
- Marcell, D. W. 1974. *Progress and Pragmatism*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Margolis, J. 1986. *Pragmatism without Foundations*. New York: Blackwell.
- Mitroff, I. I. 1983. *Stakeholders of the Organizational Mind*. San Francisco: Josey Bass.
- Nussbaum, M. C. 1990. *Love's Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Park, R. E. 1928. "Human Migration and the Marginal Man." *The American Journal of Sociology* 33: 881-893.
- Putnam, H. 1990. *Realism with a Human Face*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Rockefeller, S. D. 1989. "John Dewey, Spiritual Democracy, and the Human Future." *Cross Currents* : 581-596.
- Rorty, R. 1992. "A Pragmatist View of Rationality and Cultural Difference." *Philosophy East & West* 42: 581-596.
- Sarason, S. B. 1984. "If It can be Studied or Developed,

- Should It be?" *American Psychologist* 39: 477-485.
- Scheffler, I. 1974. *Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey*. New York: Humanities Press.
- Shalin, N. D. 1992. "Critical Theory and the Pragmatist Challenge." *American Journal of Sociology* 98: 237-279.
- Shusterman, R. 1994. "Pragmatism and Liberalism between Dewey and Rorty." *Political Theory* 22: 391-413.
- Singer, B. J. 1992. "Pragmatism and Pluralism." *The Monist* 75: 477-491.
- Smith, S. J. 1984. "Practicing Humanistic Geography." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 74: 353-374.
- Stack, G. J. 1982. "Nietzsche's influence on pragmatic humanism." *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 20: 369-406.
- Stever, J. A. 1993. "Technology, Organization, Freedom." *Administration & Society* 24: 419-443.
- Sullivan, W. M. 1995. "Can We Still Stand by Words? Or: Why Rhetoric Needs a Pragmatic Turn." *Argumentation* 9: 59-73.
- Susman, G. I. 1978. "An Assessment of the Scientific Merits of Action Research." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 23: 582-603.
- Verma, N. 1995. "The Systemic Nature of Professional Ethics." in S. L. Mandelbaum, Mazza, and R. Burchell, (eds.), *Planning Theory*. Rutgers: CURP press.
- Verma, N. 1994. "Organizations and Their Purposes: A Note on Churchmann's Philosophy of Management." *Interfaces* 24: 60-66.
- Verma, N. 1993a. "Metaphor and Analogy as Elements of a Theory of Similarity for Planning." *Journal of Planning Education and Research* 13: 13-25.
- Verma, N. 1993b. "Revisiting Rationality in Planning: Pragmatic Planning Theory." Paper presented at the 35th Annual Meeting of the Association of the Collegiate Schools of Planning.
- Villa, D. R. 1992. "Postmodernism and the Public Sphere." *American Political Science Review* 86: 712-721.
- Weaver, C. J., J. Jessop, and V. Das. 1985. "Rationality in the Public Interest: notes toward a new synthesis." in M J Breheny and A Hooper, (eds.), *Rationality in Planning*. London: Pion, pp. 145-165.
- Weber, M. M. 1983. "The Myth of Rationality: Development Planning Reconsidered." *Environment and Planning B* 10: 89-99.
- Wescoat, J. L., Jr. 1992. "Common Themes in the Work of Gilbert White and John Dewey: A pragmatic Appraisal." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 82: 587-607.
- Wrong, D. H. 1994. *The Problem of Order*. New York: The Free Press.