• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.233-253
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• 2014

The Pinocchio paradox that Eldridge-Smith suggested is a version of the semantic paradox. But it is unique in the sense that this paradox does not contain a semantic predicate. Tarski's solution which appeals to the hierarchy of language and Kripke's para-completeness which accepts the third truth value cannot solve the Pinocchio paradox. This paper argues that Eldridge-Smith's trial to criticize semantical dialetheism is not successful and that the paradox implies the rule of the truth predicate is inconsistent. That is, the proper diagnosis to this paradox is that the Pinocchio principle should be considered to be potentially inconsistent, which suggests that semantic paradoxes such as the liar paradox arise because the rule of the truth-predicate is inconsistent. The Pinocchio paradox teaches us that consistent view of truth cannot be successful to solve the semantic paradoxes and that we should accept the inconsistent view of truth.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.1
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• pp.65-93
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• 1997

거짓말쟁이 역설에 대한 전통적인 설명은 다음 두 가지로 주어진다. 역설을 일으키는 거짓말쟁이 문장이 자기지시적이기 때문에 역설이 발생하므로 자기지시적 문장을 금함으로써 그 역설을 피할 수 있다는 것이 첫 번째이고, 둘째는 모든 문장을 참이나 거짓이라고 주장하는 진리값에 대한 배중률(principle of bivalence)에 집착하기 때문에 그 역설이 발생한다고 생각하고 제3의 진리값을 갖는 문장이 있음을 인정해야 한다는 것이다. 이러한 전통적인 설명과 달리 진리 개념을 비일관적인 개념으로 보고 진리 술어와 그 외의 술어의 용법상의 차이를 설명함으로써 거짓말쟁이 역설에 대한 새로운 설명을 시도하고자 하는 것이 굽타의 "진리 수정론"이다. 굽타의 진리 수정론에 따르면, 진리 술어 외의 술어들은 그 외연이 고정적으로 산출되고 그 과정은 적용 규칙(rule of application)에 의해서 설명되지만 진리 술어는 순환적 정의처럼 고정된 외연을 만들어내지 못하고 단지 가설적 외연만 만들어 낼 뿐이다. 이렇게 진리술어의 가정적 외연을 산출해내는 과정은 수정규칙(rule of revision)에 의해서 설명된다. 요컨대 진리 수정론은 순환적 개념도 의미를 가질 수 있음을 보여주는 의미론적 구조틀이 있다는 것과 진리개념이 바로 그러한 의미구조틀에 의해서 의미를 갖는 순환적 개념이라는 것이다. 그리고 굽타는 그러한 의미구조 틀을 일정한 규칙을 갖는 함수로 설명하려고 시도한다. 즉 진리개념을 일관적인 것으로 보고 거짓말쟁이 역설을 해결해야 할 병리적 현상으로 보는 진리의 일관성론과 달리 굽타의 진리 수정론은 진리술어 자체가 비일관적이기 때문에 거짓말쟁이 역설은 그 술어의 속성상 자연스러운 것이지 피해야 만할 병리적 현상이 아니라고 주장한다. 필자는 의미론적 역설에 대한 여러 가지 설명 중에서 진리 수정론이 가장 설득력 있는 것으로 인정하고 그에 대한 가능한 반론을 검토하고 그에 대한 답변을 시도했다. 또한 진리 수정론을 통해서 거짓말쟁이 역설을 설명하고 -해결하려는 것이 아니라- 나아가서 진리 개념에 대한 이해를 제공해보려고 시도했다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.49-82
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• 2016

In this paper, I argue that it is Kripke's Tractarian notion of rule-following that prevents him from giving a non-skeptical (straight) solution to Wittgenstein's paradox. I characterize the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the 'determinate/infinistic' notion of rule-following. The later Wittgenstein, however, advocates an opposite notion of rule-following: the 'indeterminate/finistic' notion. Considering the later Wittgenstein's context-sensitive, pragmatics-oriented approach to meaning and rule-following, the later Wittgenstein could not have endorsed the determinate/infinistic notion of rule-following. To the contrary, a motive behind Wittgenstein's skeptical paradox was to blame the Tractarian notion of rule-following as the major culprit giving rise to the paradox. At the end, I argue that Kripke's adherence to the Tractarian-correspondence theory of truth also contributes to his failure to offer a non-skeptical solution to the paradox. If Kripke had noticed that the later Wittgenstein was a deflationist about truth, he could have avoided his skeptical conclusion.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.2
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• pp.189-231
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• 2013

The purpose of this paper is to show that Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox do not conclusively refute supervaluationism. I will achieve this purpose on the basis of local validity. In general, people regard supervaluational validity as global validity. And D-introduction, which is premise of Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox, is justified only if we assume global validity. But it cannot correctly grasp supervaluational semantics, especially semantic character of D-operator. So I will show that validity of supervaluationism is local and define global validity by local validity. Strategy of this paper is to protect supervaluationism against Williamson's counterexamples and Fara's paradox by minimal modification of supervaluationism and to prove that supervaluational logic is not revisionary and weak for solving the sorites paradox.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.381-406
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• 2013

This paper deals with the question whether the para-completeness theory of Kripkian style can avoid the revenge problem. According to the para-completeness theory, there are some sentences that are neither true nor false. And the liar sentence is the exemplar of such sentences. But the para-completeness theory has been criticised to give rise to the revenge problem, since Kripke suggested his theory. Maudlin argues that he can construct the para-completeness theory which avoids the problem by appealing to his foundationalist semantics. The aim of this paper shows that the para-completeness theory, including Maudlin's, cannot avoid the problem. Furthermore, it is argued that Maudlin's view is ad hoc suggestion just to avoid the problem.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.105-120
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• 2004

In this paper, we provide Routley-Meyer semantics for the many-valued logics ${\L}C$ and LC, and give completeness for each of them. This result shows the following two: 1) Routley-Meyer semantics is very powerful in the sense that it can be used as the semantics for several sorts of logics, i.e., many-valued logic, not merely relevance logic and substructural logic. Note that each implication of ${\L}C$ and LC does not (partially) result in "paradoxes of material implication" 2) This implies that Routley-Meyer semantics can be also used not merely for relevance systems but also for other logical systems such as ${\L}C$ and LC, each of which has its own implication by which we can overcome (partially) the problem of "paradoxes of material implication".

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.109-136
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• 2014

Every (semantic) antirealist accepts one or another form of verification principle. The principle has strong and weak forms, the strong form being highly counterintuitive but the weak one being more plausible. Understandably, antirealists have preferred the weak form of verification principle. Unfortunately, the socalled knowability paradox shows that those two forms are indeed equivalent. To solve this problem, Edgington suggests a yet new form of verification principle. Unfortunately, her new principle has its own difficulty. To overcome this difficulty, Edgington provides a new model of knowledge, according to which every true proposition is somehow associated with a known counterfactual conditional. In this paper, I shall argue that even this new model of knowledge confronts with an insurmountable problem. It is a well-known fact that, in the microscopic levels, some facts manage to occur despite very low physical chances. I will argue that the counterfactuals linked with those facts cannot be known due to the existence of epistemic defeaters. Hence, Edgington's knowledge model does not work in all cases.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.43-86
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• 2019

If 1st order ZFC is consistent(has a model($M_1$)) it has a transitive denumerable model($M_2$). This leads to a paradoxical situation called 'Skolem paradox'. This can be easily resolved by Skolem's typical resolution. but In the process, we must accept the model theoretic relativity for the concept of set. This relativity can generate a situation where the meaning of the set concept, for example, is given differently depending on the two models. The problem is next. because the sentence '¬denu(PN)' which indicate that PN is not denumerable is equally true in two models, A indistinguishability problem that the concept <¬denu> is not formally indistinguishable in ZFC arise. First, I will give a detail analysis of what the nature of this problem is. And I will provide three ways of responding to this problem from the standpoint of supporting ZFC. First, I will argue that <¬denu> concept, which can be relative to the different models, can be 'almost' distinguished in ZFC by using the formalization of model theory in ZFC. Second, I will show that <¬denu> can change its meaning intrinsically or naturally, by its contextual dependency from the semantic considerations about quantifier that plays a key role in the relativity of <¬denu>. Thus, I will show the model-relative meaning change of <¬denu> concept is a natural phenomenon external to the language, not a matter of responsible for ZFC.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.3
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• pp.373-399
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• 2014

This paper deals with the question whether the metaphysical dialetheism is a persuasive view or not. That is, the purpose of this paper is to criticize the metaphysical dialetheism by answering three questions, whether the dialetheism is compatible with the correspondence theory of truth, whether there is an observable contradiction, finally what the status of LNC is. In conclusion, it is argued that dialetheism is incompatible with the correspondence theory of truth, because it results in trivialism to suppose that two views are compatible. It is also claimed that LNC should be understood as the principle of exclusion which constrains the structure of the world and that the real world is consistent. Therefore, there is no observable contradiction in the world and the metaphysical dialetheism is not persuasive.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.14 no.8
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• pp.494-504
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• 2014

This is a study of Hick's self-described Christological 'Copernican revolution.' Since Hick as a former Christian theologian did not want to reject one of the core Christian doctrines(incarnation), he presented his copernican revolution in terms of Agape Christology, an inspiration Christology and myth Christology through his Christological reinterpretation. Thus Hick's Christologies that are developed gradually are discussed and evaluated chronologically. First, agape Christology understands that the incarnation is taking place all the time in different degrees everywhere. As a result agape Christology makes Jesus as a mere human being. Second, an paradox of grace or inspiration Christology views the incarnation as the Spirit of God enabling people to fulfill the will of God by their free responses. This Christology assumes that divine incarnation can occur anywhere and anytime in any person. Thus, according to this, Jesus is not literally God incarnate as Christian claims. Third, myth Christology views that the incarnation is not literal but mythological. Though he prefers to use metaphor in his later writings because it has a more positive connotation than myth, myth and metaphor have one thing in common: they are neither literal nor historical. Hick's mythological Christology implies the denial of Jesus Christ as God incarnate. Accordingly, the researcher must conclude that Hick's Christology as copernican revolution cannot said to be a perfect solution for today's religious situation, even though it was a sincere try to communicate with pluralistic world.