• KOREAN POULTRY JOURNAL
• /
• v.11 no.1 s.111
• /
• pp.108-113
• /
• 1979

미국 브로일러 산업은 지난 수십년 동안 소규모 분산, 비능률적생산체계로 부터 대규모 집약 능률적 산업으로 변모 발전해 왔다. 그 결과로 이제는 전체생산의 99$\%$가 여러 형태의 계열적 계약방식에 의하여 그리고 84$\%$가 10개 주에서 집중 생산되고있다. 이러한 생산체제의 변화는 생산비, 가격, 가공, 유통, 수요변화에 따른 각종 위험으로 부터 브로일러 산업을 보호하여, 능률적이며 안정적인 발전을 가능케 해주고 있다. 본고는 2회에 걸쳐 미국브로일러 산업의 현황과 그 발전동기를 만들어 준 계열화 생산 내용을 소개한다.

• Monthly Korean Chicken
• /
• v.1 no.2 s.2
• /
• pp.2-4
• /
• 1995

계열화자금 금리 $5{\%}$이하로 내려야 - 육류중 유해성물질 잔류시 유통금지 - 태국 냉동닭고기 수출줄어 - 호주, 닭고기 소비 증가추세 - 미국 가금류제품 'FRESH' 표기요건강화 - 말레이시아, 닭고기가격 상승예상 - ‘95한국양계박람회 개최 - 가공식품도 KS마크

• KOREAN POULTRY JOURNAL
• /
• v.50 no.9
• /
• pp.120-123
• /
• 2018

지난 7월 2일 (주)하림 대표이사에 박길연 전 한강씨엠 사장이 취임하였다. 박길연 대표이사는 사료 회사를 거쳐 계열업체까지 전 축종은 물론 생산부터 가공, 유통까지 두루 경험하면서 (주)하림의 CEO로 능력을 인정받아왔다. 본고는 그동안 계열화 사업의 선두주자로 자리매김해 온 (주)하림의 행보가 주목을 받고 있는 가운데 신임 대표인 박길연 대표이사를 만나 닭고기 산업의 현황과 (주)하림의 향후 계획을 들어보았다.

• KOREAN POULTRY JOURNAL
• /
• v.11 no.8 s.118
• /
• pp.91-101
• /
• 1979

많은 양계인이 일본에 다녀왔고 다녀온 후에는 시찰이나 연수기간 중에 보고 배운것을 잡지나 강습회를 통하여 많은 발표를 하여왔었읍니다. 그러나 이들 대부분이 생산기술 부문에 관한 것이었고 좀더 일본양계업계의 깊은 곳을 보고 오는 경우는 드물었읍니다. 지금 우리 양계업계는 생산 유통 소비구조 모두를 개선하지 않고는 더 발전할 수 없는 형편에까지 온것 같습니다. 이런 전환기를 맞이해서 최근 일본정부의 초청으로 9개월간의 일본양계 연수를 다녀오신 신촌부화장의 이찬모 상무와 일본의 양계 현황을 알아보기로 하겠읍니다.

• KOREAN POULTRY JOURNAL
• /
• v.49 no.12
• /
• pp.121-123
• /
• 2017

(주)체리부로는 원종계부터 유통 및 판매에 이르기까지 완벽한 육계 수직계열화를 완성한 기업으로 계열농가들과의 유대강화와 특화된 경영 및 사양관리로 직영 및 계약 농가들의 생산지수가 업계에서 최고의 성적을 나타낼 정도로 우수한 성적을 자랑하고 있다. 특히, 사료공장, 부화장, 도계장은 세계 최고 수준의 최첨단 시설과 기술력을 보유하고 있다. 본고는 12월 4일에 코스닥 상장이 이루어지는 (주)체리부로 김인식 회장을 만나 코스닥 상장의 의미와 향후 육계산업 전망을 들어보았다.

• KDI Journal of Economic Policy
• /
• v.14 no.2
• /
• pp.55-75
• /
• 1992

At the outset of import liberalization, most economists expected a significant drop in the prices of domestic goods that faced foreign competition. However, it is now generally acknowledge that a significant drop in prices of those goods has not occurred. A common claim is that the prices did not drop significantly because the major importers of many imported goods were also the domestic producers of competing goods. The objective of this paper is to analyze the welfare effect of importation by domestic firms that produce competing goods, to identify the factors that facilitate such business practices, and to formulate a policy that could improve the welfare. We proved that importation by competing domestic firms definitely raises the prices of both imported and domestic goods compared to the situation where foreign goods are imported by non-producers, ceteris paribus. The intuition behind this result is that since a producer-importer is essentially a cartel, its overall profit maximization requires reduced competition between the products that it sells. On the other hand, if a producer-importer is more efficient at distrinbution than a simple importer, the comparison between the two cases is a priori indeterminate. We also find that the industries in which domestic producers are actively involved in importing competing goods are the ones in which the distribution channels are tightly controlled by importer-producers. This finding suggests that exclusive dealing contracts, which work as an entry barrier, may be the source of importing by domestic producers. We argue that in a country such as Korea, where financial market is highly incomplete, tight control of the distribution channels by oligopolistic manufacturers is likely to be an effective entry barrier that leads to importing by domestic producers of similar goods. We further argue that seemingly superior distribution costs of importer-producers is likely to be a result of market foreclosure which would disappear once the entry barrier of exclusive dealing contracts is removed. Above findings suggest that market imperfections are the source of importation by domestic competitors, which in turn constitutes a market imperfection in itself and reduces consumer welfare. As potential remedies, we considered three alternatives; direct price control by the government over the imported goods sold by major domestic producers, regulation of trade itself between major producers, and regulation of exclusive dealing contracts. For reasons both theoretical and pratical, we find that the last alternative is the most attrative. Prohibiting exclusive contracts between manufacturers and dealers in industries where exclusive dealing contracts are a significant entry barrier is expected to break up the importer-producer cartel and improve the welfare.

• Review of Culture and Economy
• /
• v.21 no.1
• /
• pp.3-20
• /
• 2018

This study investigates a comprehensive context between the vertical integration and concentration of Korean film market. The concentration of distribution and screening markets are result of industrial strategy to defend demand uncertainty and to pursue economies of scale. Major distributors are increasingly inclined to defend industrial risk by concentrating resources on blockbusters and bargaining power of the multiplex is getting strengthened by distribution competition to secure as many screens as possible. Vertically integrated multiplexes operate discriminatory preferential treatment to their affiliates, however, there is a difference in degree of discrimination between vertically integrated groups. Furthermore, it is difficult to exclude each other from the distribution competition in which the largest screen number has to be secured. It is difficult for multiplex only to pursue the interests of affiliates and make negative choices in screening performance. As the number of screening screens increases, the seat occupancy also increases. As a result, the polarization of the distribution and screening markets, including the screen monopoly, is a phenomenon that occurs commercial films centered markets and the unfair behavior of the vertically affiliated multiplex has a limited effect on the movie market.

• Journal of Distribution Research
• /
• v.15 no.5
• /
• pp.103-126
• /
• 2010

The development of an industry including distribution sector is influenced by not only government policy but the related firms' behaviors. Recently the large-scale retailers have had more enormous channel power than any other distributors including monopolistic makers. Now is the time for government to prepare some policies against the unfair transaction behaviors by large-scale retailers. In this paper I tried to inquire into the distribution competition policy from a political correspondent point of view related with the transition of distribution system. For the purpose of this article I compared the case of Korea with Japan. According to the results so far inquired, there are some commons and differences in the cases of the two. Some suggestions are as follows. Considering the predominant position the concept of large-scale retailers is to be extended from a single store to numerous chain stores in the political level. Government needs to examine the standard propriety for large-scale retailer; the size of selling area and amount of sales a year. When a large-scale retailer store is to be established, it need to be taken a permit or a pre-inspection. The Fair Trade Commission have to secure the neutrality from Government's strategies. And government should find out the examples of unfair transaction behavior types and prepare some proper guidelines continually. For the last time statistical data by distributors are to be fitted out and the actual investigations for estimating the effects of government policies need to be enforced.

• Journal of Distribution Research
• /
• v.16 no.5
• /
• pp.1-18
• /
• 2011

Local assemblers of agricultural products perform important distribution functions such as providing sales outlets, labor forces, market information, and financing, forward contracting, farming, physical distribution, and etc. However, their business activities are not transparent and producers are not effectively protected from unfair practices done by local assemblers. In order to enhance transparency and to increase effectiveness of governmental policies, local assemblers, which are mostly private management, should be organized as corporations. In order to organize corporations, the government should emphasize the importance of education and should provide corporations with governmental funds for improvement of agricultural distribution. Corporations should be developed to marketing cooperatives in the long run, and are requested to form their federations. It is also necessary to have transparent forward contracting system by local assemblers. In order to have transparent system, producers and local assemblers are guided to use standard contract forms and to operate offices handling unfair trade practices by local assemblers. We also need a place to exchange forward contracts, which can be developed to a futures market in the long run. In summary, local assemblers of agricultural products, which are mostly private management, should be developed to corporations and be operated by a transparent manner in order to protect agricultural producers and increase efficiency of trading.

• KOREAN POULTRY JOURNAL
• /
• v.3 no.7 s.21
• /
• pp.58-63
• /
• 1971

국내에서 생산되는 배합사료의 품질을 비교하기 위하여 1969년부터 3년간 전국에서 323점의 배합사료 샘플을 수집하여 일반 조성분 및 칼슘인 함량을 분석해 본 결과 다음과 같은 결론을 얻었다. (1) 모든 성분에 있어서 같은 사료라도 제조하는 회사에 따라 그 함량의 변이가 심하며 산란사료의 경우에는 생산하는 종류의 계열화가 필요하다고 생각된다. (2) 수분 함량은 대개의 경우 13$\%$이하이나 일부 15$\%$ 이상으로 높은 것도 있었다. 조단백질 함량이 지나치게 높은것도 있었으나 다소 부족한 감이 있는 것도 상당수에 달했으며 대체로 조섬유 함량은 허용범위내에 들어갔으나 더러는 공정규격의 상한치를 넘는 것도 있었다. 산란계 사료에 있어서 조회분 함량과 Ca의 함량을 상관시켜 보면 공정규격 상한치의 제조정이 요청된다. (3) 초생추, 중추 및 대추 사료에 있어서는 Ca함량이 1.2$\%$이상인 것이 많았고 산란계 사료에 있어서는 2.75$\%$이하인 것이 상당수 있어서 앞으로 칼슘의 함량조절에 크게 주의를 해야 된 것 같다. 이런 점에서 보면 유통되는 패분의 선택에 신경을 써야 할것으로 본다.