• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.141-163
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• 2004

The limits in the use of force against a civil aircraft which intrudes into sovereign airspace have not been defined in the aspect of international law. Therefore, this paper intends to analyze international laws and practices about sovereign airspace intrusions by the civil aircraft, and to examine the legality in the use of force against the civil aircraft hijacked by means of political terrorism, in particular. In this paper, the sphere of study is restricted within the problems of interception against the civil aircraft which intrudes into sovereign airspace in times of peace, excluding the problems against a state aircraft, and the responsibilities for the civil or criminal affairs due to interceptions. Herein this paper analyzes the existing international laws and the cases of each nation's use of force against the civil aircraft which intrudes into sovereign airspace, and organizes the conditions in the use of force which have been accepted in international laws and practices, and then applies them to the special case of civil aircraft hijacked by political terrorism. Consequently, this paper suggests that the basic principles of necessity, ultimateness, and proportionality be taken into consideration in the use of force against civil aircraft which intrudes into sovereign airspace. This study finally suggests that the possibility in the use of force against civil aircraft hijacked by political terrorism might be higher than any type of civil aircraft intrusions into sovereign airspace due to the factor of necessity of national security concerned.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.18
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• pp.247-324
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• 2003

Considering Republic of Korea that is known as the worlds one of the most compact airspace, together with development of technology of aerospace and ever-strengthening weapon systems of aircraft, is, in its reality, in a dire need for more practical infrastructure against any intrusion, of course also being mindful of the situation with the North Korea, to its national airspace or other controlled airspace. Republic of Koreas current legislative regime is unable to effectively respond to such crisis on any legal ground, and responsible government members are relying heavily on relevant military laws and regulations. Naturally, there exists strong possibility of various problems when there occurs an actual intrusion to Koreas airspace and lawful and legal resolution of the aftereffect is demanded. This article categorizes Korean peninsula and its national airspace into various kinds of airspaces; KADIZ; FIR; airspace above EEZ; airspace above contiguous zone; airspace above the high sea, and attempted to research and study these respective categories, given the unique nature of airspace and the current responsive measure. Furthermore, this article will review some of the relevant legislative actions and their sense of direction as solution to the discussed problems.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.5
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• pp.403-407
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• 2023

This study started with the background that future South Korean military organizations should develop a complex system linking unmanned systems by analyzing and considering cases using "drone," which has recently become an essential means of war. In 2014 and 2022, South Korea is facing serious security threats from North Korean drones that have recently invaded South Korea's airspace in a row. If a North Korean drone was loaded with explosives and poisonous gas and invaded our airspace, the damage would be more serious. Furthermore, what the Azerbaijan-Armenian War of 2020 and the ongoing Ukraine-Russia war have in common is that battles using "combat drones" are underway. Watching this shift in the domestic and overseas war paradigm, drones have become essential for military operations. In the context of a "ceasefire" and the military environment on the Korean Peninsula, South Korea should actively develop "Combat drones" that take into account precise strikes and portability against targets linked to military drones.

• Journal of Aerospace System Engineering
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• v.18 no.3
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• pp.27-33
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• 2024

According to the success of the Nuri Space Launch Vehicle (KSLV-II) and the development goal of the next generation space launch vehicle (KSLV-III), it is expected that the domestic geostationary satellite capability will be increased from (1 to 3.7) ton. Also, it is predicted that substantial ability of about 1 ton can be provided for the space exploration of the Moon, Mars, asteroids, etc. The Goheung space launch site is optimized for sun-synchronous small satellites, and due to the essential precondition that the launch trajectory does not impinge another country's sovereign airspace, it is not satisfactory as a geostationary satellite launching site. Its latitude also requires more energy to shape the rotating orbital plane from the initial injection status. This results in a decreasing factor of economic feasibility, including the operating complexity. Therefore, in parallel with the development of a next generation space launch vehicle, the practical process for acquisition of oversea land or sea space launch site near the Earth's equator and research for the optimization of orbiting methods of geostationary satellite injection must be continued.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.26 no.2
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• pp.3-39
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• 2011

People may operate unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) thousands of miles from the drone's location. Drones were first used (like balloons) for surveillance. By 2001, the United States began arming drones with missiles and using them to strike targets during combat in Afghanistan. By mid-2010, over forty states and other entities possessed drones, many with the capability of launching missiles and dropping bombs. Each new development in military weapons technology invites assessment of the relevant international law. This Insight surveys the international law applicable to the recent innovation of weaponizing drones. In determining what international law rules govern drone use, the most salient feature is not the fact that drones are unmanned. The fact drones carry no human operator may be the most important new technological breakthrough, but the key feature for international law purposes is the type of weaponry drones carry. Whether law enforcement rules govern drone use depends on the situation and not necessarily who is operating the drone. Battlefield weapons may also be lawfully used before an armed conflict in the following situations: when initiating self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter; when authorized by the UN Security Council; when a government seeks to suppress internal armed conflict; and, perhaps, when a state is invited to assist a government in suppressing internal armed conflict. The rules governing resort to force in self-defense are found in Article 51 of the UN Charter and a number of decisions by international courts and tribunals. Commentators continue to debate whether drone technology represents the next revolution in military affairs. Regardless of the answer to that question, drones have not created a revolution in legal affairs. The current rules governing battlefield launch vehicles are adequate for regulating resort to drones. More research must be undertaken, however, to understand the psychological effects of deploying unmanned vehicles and the effects on drone operators of sustained, close visual contact with the aftermath of drone attacks.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.227-233
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• 2023

Along with the 4th Industrial Revolution, the impact of "unmanned" is affecting all fields around the world, and in particular, in the military sector, "unmanned" is so important that it occupies a part of the main combat system. Recently, the South Korean military is facing a crisis due to the North Korea's UAV incident that invaded our airspace and descended to Seoul. In response, the South Korea military declared its willingness and countermeasures to capture and destroy North Korea's UAV. However, as the technological development of UAV continues and the utilization plan is expanding, the countermeasures for UAV at the current level can be useless. Also, the threat from North Korea is not just UAV. North Korea has practically a nuclear power and is set to conduct its seventh nuclear test, and its missile technology is also being advanced, with 38 arounds of 67 missile tests conducted in 2022 alone. It is also developing five key strategic weapons that can pose a fatal threat to Korea, and North Korea's strong conventional forces are located around the NLL(Northern Limit Line), and the port of Long Range Artillery is facing the Seoul metropolitan area. It is important to respond to North Korea's UAV threats, which are now receiving much attention, but it will be necessary to comprehensively analyze and clearly prioritize North Korea's threats and use a limited budget to respond to them.