• Title/Summary/Keyword: 양면게임이론

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Analysis of China's Aid to North Korea: Focusing on The Two-level game theory (중국의 대북지원 결정요인에 관한 연구: 양면게임이론을 중심으로)

  • Kim, Hyun-Jung;Park, Sunhwa
    • Korea and Global Affairs
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    • v.2 no.1
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    • pp.113-136
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    • 2018
  • The purpose of this study is to start from the recognition of the problem of why the sanctions of the international community could not indicate a great effect. In order to find answers to this question, this study focuses on China's aid to North Korea and analyzes the determinants of support for North Korea. Despite a tough international community's sanctions against North Korea, China has taken a dual stance on sanctions and support for North Korea. As for this dual attitude of China, this study approaches the internal and external situation of the support to the North with the rationale for the Two-level game theory. China's sanction against North Korea could be divided into two categories: external factors and domestic factors. These factors include strengthening supremacy in China, checking the US, playing a responsible role in China, securing resources in North Korea, sustaining stable growth in China, maintaining the legitimacy of China's socialist political system, and spreading the Beijing consensus. Based on the analysis of these factors, it could be expected that China's aid for North Korea will be official, informal, or continuous, and it will be difficult for the North to stop supporting North Korea or deteriorating North Korea- China relations.

FTA Negotiation Strategy and Politics in the Viewpoint of the Three-Dimensional Game Theory: Korea-EU FTA and EU-Japan EPA in Comparison (삼차원게임이론의 관점에서 바라 본 유럽연합의 FTA 협상 전략 및 정치: 한-EU FTA와 EU-일본 EPA의 비교를 중심으로)

  • Kim, Hyun-Jung
    • Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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    • v.22 no.2
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    • pp.81-110
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    • 2018
  • In this paper, we examined the regional economic integration, the trade negotiation strategy and bargaining power of the European Union through the logical structure of the three - dimensional game theory. In the three - dimensional game theory, the negotiator emphasized that the negotiation strategy of the triple side existed while simultaneously operating the game standing on the boundary of each side game, constrained from each direction or occasionally using the constraint as an opportunity. The study of three-dimensional game theory is aimed at organizing the process of coordinating opinions and meditating interests at the international level, regional level and member level by the regional union as a subject of negotiation. This study would compare and analyze the recently concluded EU-Japan EPA (Economic Partnership Agreement) negotiation process with the case of the EU FTA, and summarize the logic of the three-dimensional game theory applicable to the FTA of the regional economic partnership. Furthermore, the study would illustrate the strategies of the regional economic cooperatives to respond to negotiations. The area of trade policy at the EU level has already been completed by the exclusive power of the Union on areas where it is difficult to politicize with technical features. Moreover, the fact that the policy process at the Union level has not been revealed as a political issue, and that the public opinion process is a double-step approach. In conclusion, the EU's trade policy process constitutes a complicated and sophisticated process with the allocation of authority by various central organizations. The mechanism of negotiation is paradoxically simplified because of the common policy decision process and the structural characteristics of the trade zone, and the bargaining power at the community level is enhanced. As a result, the European Commission would function as a very strong negotiator in bilateral trade negotiations at the international level.

Analysis of Network Neutrality in Two-sided Markets Using Game Theory (게임이론에 의한 양면시장에서의 망중립성 분석)

  • Oh, Hyung Sool;Lee, Jae Ha
    • Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering
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    • v.41 no.3
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    • pp.162-169
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    • 2018
  • Net neutrality, which has not been a problem, has recently become a problem for ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and their complaints have been paid by domestic platform companies, but overseas global IT companies such as Google and YouTube, generate huge revenues from domestic markets. In this situation, domestic IT companies claim that it is natural to impose more expensive charges or restrict speed on users who generate huge traffic. On the other side, however, the telecommunication network has become an essential public good that is essential to our everyday life, and because it has been given a monopoly position by a private company to efficiently respond to the explosive demand for telecommunication services, It is necessary to provide equal and universal service and fulfill public duty. In this paper, we deal with the network neutrality problem, focusing on the price elasticity between the CP (Contents Provider) and the ISP, rather than the user who is one side of the two-sided market for the already saturated satellites communication market. We present a game model that determines the optimal price for each platform by Nash equilibrium and analyze how the net neutrality affects CP according to the change of exogenous variables through the proposed game model.

A Study on the Negotiation on Management Normalization of GM Korea through the Two-Level Games (양면게임 이론으로 분석한 한국GM 경영정상화 협상연구)

  • Lee, Ji-Seok
    • Korea Trade Review
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    • v.44 no.1
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    • pp.31-44
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    • 2019
  • This study examines the normalization of Korean GM management between the Korean government and GM in terms of external negotiation game and internal negotiation game using Putnam's Two-Level Games. In addition, GM's Win-set change and negotiation strategy were analyzed. This analysis suggested implications for the optimal negotiation strategy for mutual cooperation between multinational corporations and local governments in the global business environment. First, the negotiation strategy for Korea's normalization of GM management in Korea can be shifted to both the concession theory and the opposition theory depending on the situation change and the government policy centered on the cautious theory. Second, GM will maximize its bargaining power through 'brink-end tactics' by utilizing the fact that the labor market is stabilized, which is the biggest weakness of the Korean government, while maintaining a typical Win-set reduction strategy. GM will be able to restructure at any time in terms of global management strategy, and if the financial support of the Korean government is provided, it will maintain the local factory but withdraw the local plant at the moment of stopping the support. In negotiations on the normalization of GM management in Korea, it is necessary to prepare a problem and countermeasures for various scenarios and to maintain a balance so that the policy does not deviate to any one side.