• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.41-72
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• 2003

The purposes of this paper are to build theoretical and empirically testable model to identify determining factors of ownership structure, and to analyze this model empirically using th Korea Stock Exchange panel data, and to test the impact of opening the stock market on the determinants of ownership structure. The determining factors of ownership structure identified in this paper include debt ratio, dividend, asset characteristics, profitability, growth business risk, size, institutional investors and chaebol-non chaebol dummy variable. Empirical panel estimation test reveals that this model can explain about $9\sim11%$ of the cross sectional variance in the equity ratio of large shareholders. The reasons that this model has too explanatory power are that some variables were measured with errors, and that there were some omitted variables in tested model. The regression results on the model variables ar generally in line with predictions. But the coefficient estimates on size is never significant. And it appears that the exogenous variable which explains opening the stock market has positive effect on the determinants of ownership structure.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.11 no.3
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• pp.23-31
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• 2013

In Korea, middle and small-sized company takes up an absolute majority of all businesses, and most of them are founded as a limited company. Yet, it is a type of business that fits a company of certain size, and its establishment process is complicated due to various reasons such as investor protection. It is also required to have strict organization structure based on the principle of separation of ownership and management. Accordingly, as the principles may undermine entrepreneur's will to start business, there has been dramatic change in legal system on business establishment and management since 2010. The changes include streamlined process at the foundation stage and digitalization of many regulations on business establishment and operation for more convenience in starting business. Also, new business types for small-sized companies were adopted, and freedom to select business name has been enhanced. The issue of non-par value stock has been allowed, and various types of stock have been adopted for more convenient financing, defense against hostile M&A, and easier business succession.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.20 no.2
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• pp.1-39
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• 2003

Using a comprehensive sample of convertible security offerings by Korean firms from 1981 to 1999, we examine the effect of convertible bond issues on firm value. We find that the announcement of convertible bond issues has a positive effect on firm value. However, the announcement of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant negative effect on their market values. This result is different from that in Japan, suggesting that the efficiency of the financing decision by Korean chaebol is different from that by Japanese keiretsu. In addition, we find that the announcement effect of private convertible bond issues by chaebol firms has a significant relation with the corporate governance variables such as ownership structure, bank relationship. These results indicate that convertible bond issues can be used as a mechanism for chaebol owner-manager to give rise agency problems at the expense of the wealth of minority shareholders.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.7
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• pp.3062-3071
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• 2011

This study proposed to compare the performance differences between a manufacturing company and a construction company in accordance with the mutual relations and ownership structures with the management performance based on the increase or decrease of the large shareholders' share-holding ratio (insider ownership, foreign share-holding, institutional investors' share-holding) of a KOSPI listed company in Korea during 10 years(1998-2007). To sum up the research work, first, the increase of foreign share-holding supported the results of previous studies which foreign share-holding has a positive effect on the long term performance by having a positive(+) effect on MTB, and the increase of an insider ownership supported the management entrenchment hypothesis of previous studies by having a negative(-) effect on MTB. However, relations between institutional investors's share-holding and MTB could not find out linkages in spite of the results of previous studies where dealt with the active monitoring hypothesis. Also, to examine the linkages of ROA and the ownership structure, though the increases of foreign share-holding and insider ownership had a positive(+) effect on ROA, the increases of institutional investors' share-holding had a negative(-) effect on it. It showed different analysis results from the active monitoring hypothesis of institutional investors. As a result of verifying whether there is "any difference in the management performances between the construction industry and the manufacturing industry according to the equity structure" which is the second hypothesis, nothing of the insider ownership and whether or not there is the construction industry, foreign share-holding and whether or not there is the construction, and the institutional ownership and whether or not there is the construction industry gave a statistical difference to MTB and ROA. Accordingly, it was possible to find out there is no difference in the management performance between the construction industry and the manufacturing industry based on the ownership structure in spite of different characteristics from the manufacturing industry such as the revenue recognition in ordering, production and accounting.

• Information Systems Review
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.1-19
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• 2013

Smart working sparked by iPhone3 opens a revolution in smart ways of working at any time, regardless of location and environment. Also, It provide real-time information processing and analysis, rapid decision-making and the productivity of businesses, including through the timely response and the opportunity to increase the efficiency. As a result, every company are developing mobile information systems. But company data is accessed from the outside, it has problems to solve like security, hacking and information leakage. Also, Mobile devices such as smart phones belonging to the privately-owned asset can't be always controlled to archive company security policy. In the meantime, public smart phones owned by company was always applied security policy. But it can't not apply to privately-owned smart phones. Thus, this paper is focused to archive company security policy, but also enable the individual's free to use of smart phones when we use mobile information systems. So, when we use smart phone as individual purpose, the normal operation of all smart phone functions. But, when we use smart phone as company purpose like mobile information systems, the smart phone functions are blocked like screen capture, Wi-Fi, camera to protect company data. In this study, we suggest the design and implementation of real time control and management of mobile device using MDM(Mobile Device Management) solution. As a result, we can archive company security policy and individual using of smart phone and it is the optimal solution in the BYOD(Bring Your Own Device) era.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.346-353
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• 2016

This research examines the effect of family member in board of directors. In Korea, the ownership and management of a firm is not thoroughly separated and most of firms are managed by controlling family. These family officers have same intent with family CEOs who identify themselves with the firm and want to hand over it to their descendants. Thus, family officers will influence positively on firm performance. Besides, the moderating effect of professional CEO on the above relation will be also positive. It is because professional CEO will be curbed by family officers in board of directors. Under this condition, the potential self-interest seeking behavior will be minimized and the specialty of professional CEO will be manifested. 2,456 firm-year panel data are gathered in manufacturing listed firms from 2004 to 2010 and the result suggests that hypotheses are supported.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.31-62
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• 2010

This paper analyzes empirically how analysts' forecasts affected by ownership structure. This study examine a sample of 1,037~1,629 the analysts' forecasts of firms registered in Korean Stock Exchange in the period from 2000 to 2006. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, from the analysis, companies which have higher major shareholder's holdings tend to increase earnings forecast errors and earnings forecast accuracy. Meanwhile, companies which have higher institution shareholder's holdings tend to decrease earnings forecast errors and earnings forecast accuracy. This result is in line with the view of previous works that companies with higher major shareholder's holdings look towards more of analysts' optimistic forecasts in order to maintain friendly relations with major shareholders. Because of analysts' private information use from major shareholders, earnings forecast accuracy is higher in high major shareholder's holdings firm than in high institution shareholder's holdings it. Second, this analysis is whether the minimal required selection condition of outside directors, audit committee adoption and audit quality affect the relation between ownership structure and analysts' forecasts. This result is that variables related corporate governance do not affect statically the relation between ownership structure and analysts' forecasts. The meanings of this paper is to suggest the positive relations between ownership structure and analysts' forecasts. After this, if analysts will notice forecasts of more many firms, capital market will be more efficient and this field works are plentiful. Also it will need monitoring systems not to distort market efficiency by analysts' dishonest forecasts.

• Industry Promotion Research
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• v.9 no.3
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• pp.1-11
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• 2024

At shareholders' meetings, minority shareholders are inferior in information to owners and majority shareholders, and they are often excluded from important decision-making. As a result, the rights and interests of minority shareholders are often damaged, which acts as a factor that hinders corporate value. The electronic voting system is expected to encourage minority shareholders to participate in management decision-making, which is expected to help increase corporate value. The results of the analysis in this study are summarized as follows. First, it was found that there was no difference between the earnings persistence of companies that introduced the electronic voting system and the earnings persistence of companies that did not. Second, we found no evidence that the introduction of the electronic voting system would increase the value of firms. Third, the effect of earnings persistence on corporate value of companies that adopted the electronic voting system was no different from that of firms that did not adopt it.

• Management & Information Systems Review
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• v.35 no.1
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• pp.287-305
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• 2016

This study confirms that there is a correlation between managers' incentive-compensation system(introduction of the compensation committee) and corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure, proportion of outside directors, debt ratio, competitive strength), and analyzes whether firm value is affected by corporate governance mechanisms. The purpose of this paper are empirically tested using 318 firm-year data listed on the KRX from 2001 to 2010 and 2SLS(two-stage least square method) were used for the analysis of the hypotheses. The results of empirical tests are as follows. Firstly, there is no correlation between introduction of the compensation committee and corporate governance mechanisms. In addition, the results show that there is a causal relationship between some variables. Secondly, results from the analysis of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm value, only introduction of the compensation committee and foreign investors ownership were analyzed as a positive impact on the firm value. This result means that most domestic firm don't actively used for managers' incentive-compensation system as a useful control device for improving corporate governance.

• Korean Business Review
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• v.22 no.1
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• pp.1-25
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• 2009

Typically, economic rationality is too apart from in a public enterprises system is started many cause troubles. The government in that upper management personnel of agencies and politicians who exploit the parachute and coalesce with the labor union as a hotbed of corruption due to inefficiency have bands. Most of peoples need to reform public enterprises and the idea became. The future direction of public enterprise reform is clear. As like Infrastructure industrial sector which is difficult to privatization of government owned and controlled public enterprises to improve efficiency and management systems to build. On the other hand, it is difficult to upset non-public enterprises, private sector efficiency in the transfer of management control to consider the idea of an active policy of privatization conversion is required.