• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.16 no.1
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• pp.117-142
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• 2014

China having largest market in the world, has been criticized by its trading partner countries due to its unfair trade practices, particularly in the field of anti-dumping regulation. The main reasons for such criticism seem to come from the incomplete anti-dumping law as instrument to protect the industry concerned. In 2001, though new anti-dumping law was established to replace the former one by revising it to meet the needs for economic development which should be secured for china to take part in the competition world as the new member of WTO. The provisions concerned have been evaluated not to be sufficient and efficient from the viewpoint of the safeguard mechanism, while are required to be modified to meet the real world of international trade law. I consider that as the biggest partner of chinese trade activity, we will need to maintain a well understanding of the Chinese anti-dumping regulations. So this report conducts the Chinese anti-dumping regulations, compares between the chinese regulations and the WTO agreement, and studies deeply in to the problems and the improvements of the Chinese anti-dumping regulations.

• International Area Studies Review
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• v.16 no.3
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• pp.269-291
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• 2012

Analyzing EU trade laws and institutional systems, the trade policy of EU has been founded, undoubtedly, on common interests for EU members. EU trade policy leaves room for 'Collective Protectionism' by permitting legal persona or interesting group to raise anti-dumping procedures. The anti-dumping policy of EU has shown a protectionism itself and has been affected by political motives. Investigation against anti-dumping can easily open and also there exists a wide range of political involvements. Furthermore, anti-dumping policy could be misused for protecting declining industries, which lost comparative advantage in global market. Economic theories show that anti-dumping measures divert import from outsider into insider members, which finally results in increasing intra-production of EU. This is exactly the reason why the anti-dumping policy has become attractive trade policy.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.8 no.2
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• pp.211-226
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• 2006

This paper discusses the definition of the term "domestic industry" in relation to the application of the safeguards provisions of the WTO through the judicial interpretation made by the WTO Appellate Body and panel. The requirements for the imposition of safeguards include a rapid increase in import quantity, the existence of serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic industry, and a causal relationship between the increase in imports and the industrial injury. The domestic industry refers to the producers that account for a considerable portion of the total national production, or the national producers who produce articles "like" or "directly competitive" with the specific imports. Chronically, there have been controversial disputes relating to the interpretation of the term "like" or "directly competitive". Reviewing the disputes relating to the term "domestic industry" in application of the safeguards provisions since the establishment of the WTO, the interpretation of the term "like" has been made imposing weight on the physical characteristics of the products. This interpretation is in contrast with that of the interpretation of the term "directly competitive" which has been interpreted with imposed weight on the commercial elasticity of substitution which can be measured by the final use or consumer's taste.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.307-325
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• 2007

Examining the standards of review adopted by the dispute settlement body of the WTO in its decision on safeguard measures, the Appellate Body offers no coherent guidance or theory as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures adopted by the domestic authorities. It faults the lack of reasoned and adequate explanation in the national authorities' decision to impose safeguard measures, yet its own explanation of the permissible role for safeguard measure could hardly be less instructive. The Appellate Body has consistently emphasized fidelity to text in its decision but that approach can not work properly when the text is fundamentally deficient from the viewpoints that neither Article XIX nor the safeguard Agreement establish a coherent foundation for safeguard measures due to their vague and abstract provision. Without any coherent theory on guidance as to the legitimation of the safeguard measures, it would be absurd to expect WTO members to produce a reasoned and adequate explanation as to how their safeguard measures are in compliance with the WTO roles. In the absence of a thorough renegotiation for the proper operation of the WTO safeguard system, which seems quite unlikely for the foreseeable future, perhaps the unique method out of the current predicament is for the Appellate Body to lead a movement in establishing a sensible common law of safeguards, drawing on extra-textual guidance including the standards of review about their proper role in the WTO safeguard mechanism.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.13 no.12
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• pp.702-714
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• 2013

South Korea, China and Japan is struggling for a new economic growth and facing new challenges and difficulties in foreign investment. In this paper, I Studied on the Legal System and Limits or Rules on the Investment Between Korea, China and Japan. First, FTA between Korea, Chin. The trade and economic relations and the investment flows between the three countries were examined. Based on the background of the three countries, it has been studied on the Legal System and Rules in the foreign investment Between Korea, China and Japan. Based on this, and the following were examined. What are the major limits in the foreign investment Between Korea, China and Japan? In the future, what should be included on the FTA investment chapter in FTA between Korea, China and Japan in order to facilitate more investment? FTA between Korea, China and Japan would be an effective means to strengthen the protection of investors and investment facilitation, and investment flows between the three countries will be activated. In the future, FTA between Korea, China and Japan is expected to further promote investment among the three countries. In this regard, in the future, the FTA investment chapter in FTA between Korea, China and Japan should include NT(National Treatment), MFN(Most-Favoured-Nation (Treatment)), Prohibition of the implementation of specific measures, the nationality requirements of management or the board of directors, movement of funds, safeguard measures, expropriation and compensation, compensation for loss, fair and equitable treatment, the settlement of disputes between foreign investors and investment promotion country(Investor-State Dispute Settlement), and other agreement between the three countries.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.43 no.5
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• pp.25-45
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• 2018

This paper estimates the export losses of the Korean domestic automobile industry due to US trade pressure and its economic ripple effects. Using the HS 6 digit tariff and export data from 2010 to 2017, this paper estimates the tariff elasticity of Korea's US automobile exports against a US tariff increase by applying the Poisson Pseudo maximum likelihood estimation method. After estimating Korea's export losses to the US in three trade pressure scenarios, we estimate its impact on Korean domestic production, value-added and job creation by applying the tariff impact accumulation model based on the industry input-output analysis. Empirical results show that the impact of 25% global tariff by the US on the Korean domestic economy is estimated to result in $30.8 billion in export losses for the five years from 2019 to 2023, about 300 thousand job losses, 88.0 trillion in production inducement losses, and 24.0 trillion in value-added inducement losses. The impacts of withdrawal of the automobile tariff concession are estimated at $4.27 billion export losses and 41.7 thousand job losses. A 15% tariff rate on automobile parts for 3 years is estimated to result in $1.93 billion export losses and 18.7 thousand job losses.

• International Commerce and Information Review
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• v.8 no.4
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• pp.209-227
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• 2006

This paper analyse current interpretation of the "causal link" that in particular, focuses principally on the so-called "non-attribution" requirement of Article 4.2(b) of the Safeguards Agreement. The safeguard measures are justified as a temporary economic adjustment to harm that is caused by an increase in imports. The problem with this justification is that there are other kinds of economic forces that may injure domestic industries, such as changes in consumer tastes, government spending or a lack thereof, and economic downturns. These problems do not justify government-imposed remedies. When factors therefore other than increased imports are causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not be attributed to increased imports. The Appellate Body stressed that a contribution of third-party imports to the existence of serious injury must be sufficiently clear as to establish the existence of the causal link required, it found that Article 4.2(b) does not suggest that increased imports be the sole cause of the serious injury, or that other factors causing injury must be excluded from the determination of serious injury. The interest in separation is to ensure that a measure is not applied to remedy harm not caused by imports, but this basic point assumes that the harm is distinguishable in the first place. It also assumes that the safeguard is designed to respond to harm caused by imports. In fact safeguards were never intended to respond to this kind of unfair trade, but rather to provide whatever emergency relief might assist an ailing domestic industry if imports happened to be a part of that injury. The Appellate Body's insistence in breaking cause and effect down to minutia in the non-attribution analysis seems to be so overly intricate that it conflicts with it's broader focus on evaluating factors that effect harm on the industry as a whole.