• Journal of Environmental Policy
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• v.6 no.3
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• pp.91-114
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• 2007

The cooperative cost sharing scheme for Dust and Sand Storm(DSS) in North East Asia, as suggested in Song and Nagaki(2007), may not be feasible due to possible defection(s) of participating countries. If non-cooperative strategies are more plausible, Nash equilibrium can suggest possible outcomes of the cost sharing game. The result from the continuous strategy model shows that there exists an infinite number of Nash equilibrium such that the summation of investment from each country is always equal to the required budget of the ADS pilot project. It is also discussed that the discrete strategy model points to only 3 Nash equilibria in continuous strategy game outcome and the cooperative game solution may be just one of the infinite equilibria.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.113
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• pp.15-31
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• 2005

최근 미국의 법원은 담합을 입증하려는 시도를 주로 경제적 증거에 입각하여 분석하는 추세를 보여 왔다. 하지만 담합의 존재를 입증하는데 있어서 경제분석의 역할에도 많은 이견이 날카롭게 표출되었다. 담합의 존재에 관한 경제적 증거를 분석하는 데에 있어 유일한 합리적 근거는 최신과점이론(Modern oligopoly theory)이다. 그런데 증인으로 나선 많은 경제학자들과 법원이 최신과점이론에 자신들의 분석을 뚜렷이 기초하지 않았기 때문에, 판례법의 현 상태가 불만족스럽다고 주장하는 것이 본 논문의 핵심적 내용이다. 셔먼법 제1조는 ''계약, 결합, 공모(contract, combination, or conspiracy)에 의해 초래되는 거래(즉 경쟁)의 불합리한 제한을 규제''하는데, 이러한 계약 결합, 공모의''용어들은 합의라는 하나의 개념으로 통합하여 이해''할 수 있다. 제 1조는 다수의 당사자가 ''단일한 목적, 공통된 의도와 의견의 일치, 혹은 의사의 합치(Meeting of minds)'', 즉 ''공통된 계획에 대한 의식적 참가(consious commitment to a common scheme)''를 합의한 모든 협약을 규제한다. 셔먼법 제 1조 위반을 입증하기 위해서는 일치된 행동이 합의 하에서 일어났음을 입증해야 한다. 미국 법원은 합의를 추론할 수 있는 증거력 있는 정황증거(admissible circumstantial evidence)의 원칙을 확립하였다. 독점가격에 가까운 수준의 과점가격 설정은 ''조정되었다(coordinated)''라고 칭해지는데, 이는 ''구두 합의''와 ''암묵적 합의''의 두 가지 형태로 나뉜다. 한편, 일회게임 과점 모형과 반복게임 모형은 과점이론의 핵심을 이룬다. 과점에 대한 Chamberlin의 견해는 본래 게임과 Stigler의 모형은 그와 같은 생각의 오류를 가르쳤다. 그러나 판례법은, Petroleum products antitrust litigation사건과 reserve supply사건에서 볼 수 있듯이 종종 그러한 교훈을 망각했다. 최신과정이론과 판례를 종합해 보면, 합의의 존재에 관해 경제학자가 이끌어내는 추론과 법원이 이끌어내는 추론을 포괄하는 다음의 네 가지 일반적 원칙이 도출된다. 1. 합의가 추론되기 위해서는 상호의존성을 넘는 무언가가 먼저 제시되어야 한다. 2. 합의의 존재는 일회게임 과점 모형에서의 비협조적 내쉬균형과 일치하는 행동으로부터는 추론될 수 없다. 3. 합의의 존재는, 비록 무한반복 과점게임에서의 비협조적 내쉬균형(혹은 Chamberlin-Fellner식의 과점)과 일치하더라도, 일회게임 과점 모형에서의 비협조적 내쉬균형과 일치하지 않는 행동으로부터 추론될 수 있다. 4. 증거는 구두합의의 존재를 뒷받침해야만 한다. 이러한 원칙에서 얻을 수 있는 가장 중요한 교훈은, 합의가 존재하지 않을 경우 과점상황으로부터는 독점가격이 예상될 수 없다는 사실을 법원이 인식하는 것만으로도 합의의 추론에서 범하기 쉬운 가장 큰 오류를 회피할 수 있다는 것이다.

• Proceedings of the Korea Water Resources Association Conference
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• 2012.05a
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• pp.822-822
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• 2012

본 연구는 상류의 개발행위와 더불어 현재 수질관리의 기준이 되는 오염총량관리제를 대상으로 '규모의 경제'의 논리를 따른다는 가정 하에, 지자체간에 협조를 통해 비용을 절감하여 서로 혜택을 볼 수 있도록 상 하류 지자체와 중앙정부 등 관련 당사자들 간의 비용배분 방안을 도출하는 것을 목적으로 하였다. 이를 위해서 광주광역시에 위치한 평동산업단지와 영본B, 영본C를 대상으로 광주, 전남, 중앙정부를 이해당사자로 하여 협조적 상황 하에서 대상 비용배분 문제를 정의하였고, 협조적 게임이론에 근거한 SCRB법 및 샤플리법을 적용하여 비용배분 결과를 제시하였다. 우선 광주와 전남이 각각 삭감해야 할 오염량을 산정하고, 해당 삭감량 만큼 처리하기 위한 하수처리시설의 규모를 설정하였다. 또한 하수처리시설의 건설비와 하수관거 공사비, 유지관리비를 산정하였으며, 하수처리시설의 내용연수인 20년간의 총비용을 2010년 현재가치 기준으로 산정하였다. 상 하류 지자체가 공동으로 대처할 경우 20년간 총비용은 416,311.8 백만원, 개별로 대처할 경우 464,439.6 백만원이며, 공동 대처가 42,359.3 백만원이 절감되므로 양 지자체 모두 협조적 게임에 응할 기본배경은 성립되었다. SCRB법에 의한 지자체별 비용배분율을 산정 결과, 광주 74.24%, 전남 25.76%로 산정되었으며, 2001～2010년 하수도 세입현황을 기준으로 중앙정부의 지원 비율은 10년간 최소 23.98%, 평균 29.22%, 최대 34.17%로, 각각의 비율별로 중앙정부, 광주, 전남의 비용분담액을 도출하였다. 본 논문에서는 개략적으로 비용을 산정하였으나 오염총량관리 사업은 막대한 예산을 필요로 하기 때문에 실제로 두 지자체가 협조하여 비용배분을 하게 된다면 하수처리시설의 수질개선효과, 하수처리시설 위치선정, 사업비용 등을 세밀하게 분석해야 할 것이다. 본 논문은 오염총량관리제에서 제시하는 목표수질을 대상으로 하였으나, 지자체의 정책에 따라 친수활동 증대와 생태 자연환경 개선 등과 같은 수질개선에 따른 간접적인 효과를 고려하여 오염 총량관리제의 목표수질보다 더 나은 수질을 원할 수도 있을 것이다. 협조적 게임의 상황을 복잡하게 하여 해결 가능성이 낮아질 수 있으나, 수질개선에 의한 다양한 효과를 편익으로 산정할 수 있다면 이를 협조적 게임에 적용하여 전반적인 수질개선에 대한 지자체의 적극적 활동을 유도할 수도 있을 것이다.

• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business Venturing and Entrepreneurship
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• v.19 no.2
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• pp.159-179
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• 2024

Based on the case of collaboration between large companies and startups, this study suggests the importance of establishing mutual cooperation and trust relationships for the success of open innovation strategy from the perspective of cooperative game theory. It also provides implications for how this can be implemented. Due to information asymmetry and differences in organizational culture and decision-making structures between large companies and startups, collaboration is likely to proceed in the form of non-cooperative games among players in general open innovation, leading to the paradox of open innovation, which lowers the degree of innovation. Accordingly, this study conducted a case study on collaboration between large company 'G' and startup 'S' based on the research question "How did we successfully promote open innovation through cooperative game-type collaboration?" The study found that successful open innovation requires (1) setting clear collaboration goals to solve the organizational problem between large companies and startups, (2) supporting human resources for qualitative growth of startups to solve reliability problems, (3) leading to strategic investment and joint promotion of new projects to solve the profit distribution problem. This study is significant in that it contributes to expanding the discussion of the success factors of open innovation to the importance of interaction and strategic judgment considering the organizational culture and decision-making structure among players, and empirically confirming the success conditions of open innovation from the perspective of cooperative game theory.

• Journal of Korea Port Economic Association
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• v.29 no.4
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• pp.73-95
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• 2013

This paper analyzes a competitive shipping market in East Asia in order to explore how container carriers make decisions on ship size, number of ships, service frequency, and service route. A sequential-move game based on non-cooperative game theory is applied to establish the models for the decision-makings involving the transportation volumes, freight rates, costs, and market shares of the service routes from Shanghai or Hong Kong to the ports in Busan, Gwangyang, and Incheon. According to the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium solutions proposed by these models, carriers' decisions in such a competitive environment vary depending on sailing distance, transport demand, and freight rates. Therefore, carriers are recommended to reflect the optimal equilibrium solutions and a variety of decision factors when formulating strategies for transportation networks and operating fleets. Furthermore, ports should establish management strategies for these factors to provide optimal equilibrium solutions for carriers' transportation networks.

• Journal of Korean Society of Forest Science
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• v.97 no.6
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• pp.669-679
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• 2008

Jirisan National Park was designated on December 29, 1967 as the first national park in Korea and that caused continuous conflicts between the violation of the right to hold property in this area due to several regulations following the designation and the nature preservation for the value of heritage for descendants. Thus, the objective of this study is to find a proposal for making decision based on the rationality that is able to solve these conflicts. To achieve the objective of this study, this study applies a game theory that supports a reasonable decision making process for solving these conflicts between interest groups around Jirisan National Park in which the component of this game consists of Jirisan National Park, residents, and interest groups. The Nash equilibrium obtained by the analysis of the strategy of interest groups for the use and preservation of forests and its rewards from the strategy as an nonecooperative game showed a behavior that chases their own benefits and causes lots of troubles. However, in the case of the results obtained from a cooperative game based on the strategy that includes some public interests accepted by interest groups and its rewards, it represented an aspect that solves conflicts through achieving a strategical set, which shows a win-win outcome even though the results of this cooperative game may present less rewards than that of the Nash equilibrium. Whereas, if there exists the public interests accepted by interest groups and truth for protecting such public interests, it is considered that it becomes a way that solves present structural troubles in the National Parks in Korea due to the fact that there exist uncertainties caused by the human rationality.

• Journal of Korea Water Resources Association
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• v.41 no.4
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• pp.353-363
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• 2008

This study aims to set up the appropriate strategies for the transboundary river between South and North Korea. We took the example of Bukhan River which penetrates both Koreas to illustrate this idea, and applied Game Theory to get the solutions. Previous studies have mainly dealt with counterplan in case of confliction. On the contrary, this study has the premise that there could be much more cooperations. The analysis shows that the best choice is to develop the basin together. For example, they can make up development plan for Imjin basin which ranges from North Korea and South. As the result, South Korea can get the stable water volume in the river and North Korea can have the chances for economic revitalization.

• Journal of Korea Game Society
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• v.14 no.5
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• pp.15-24
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• 2014

Semiotics studies the structures and systems of all signs related to human life, thus being capable of analyzing games. "Playing games" can be deemed as an act of reading or interpreting games semiotically, which makes game producers "senders," games "texts," gamers "receivers," and gamers playing games "contexts." Since most games are in the multi-variable narrative format, however, it is not a frequent case that gamers interpret games in the ways intended by producers. This study thus set out to analyze and interpret the console game (2001) remembered as the same evaluation by many gamers in the way intended by the producer. For analysis, the study defined its story program by analyzing the plot and sequence. For semantic analysis, the study applied the Actor Model and the Semiotic Square Model to interpret . The process identified such codes as confrontation, assistance, collaboration, and control and confirmed that Ico and Yorda, non-subject characters, were transforming into subject ones. That is, tells a story of the main characters that used to lead a non-subject life earning lives of their own.

• Journal of Gifted/Talented Education
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.59-80
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• 2017

In this study, we investigate social preference of gifted students by analyzing their behaviors in social dilemma situations. We conducted an experimental study using ultimatum games and public goods games with 132 academically gifted middle school students who attended the Ewha-Seodaemun Center for gifted education from 2012 to 2016. We also experimented the same games with 87 regular students for comparative analysis. The result of ultimatum game experiment shows that there is no statistical difference in the proposed share of both groups. Their proposed share ranges from 37% to 38% as expected in other similar studies. However, the rejection rate of the respondents to the proposals with small share are significantly higher among gifted students than among their regular counterparts. This result implies that the gifted students show stronger negative reciprocity, meaning that they tend to punish selfish behaviors even when it takes some costs. In finitely repeated public goods game experiments, the results show that both groups' contribution rates decrease toward the end of the experiments. However, the gifted students show strategic cooperation by attempting to increase the other members' contribution rate within an experimental group. This implies that gifted students tend to care more about how to increase their own expected rewards by reciprocating other students' behaviors.

• Transactions of the Korean Society of Mechanical Engineers A
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• v.37 no.11
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• pp.1429-1436
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• 2013

This study presents an approach for designing a vehicle rollover prevention controller using differential game theory and multi-level programming. The rollover prevention problem can be modeled as a non-cooperative zero-sum two-player differential game. A controller as an equilibrium solution of the differential game guarantees the worst-case performance against every possible steering input. To obtain an equilibrium solution to the differential game with a small amount of computational effort, a multi-level programming approach with a relaxation procedure is used. To cope with the loss of maneuverability caused by the active suspension, an electronic stability program (ESP) is adopted. Through simulations, the proposed method is shown to be effective in obtaining an equilibrium solution of the differential game.