• International Area Studies Review
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• v.13 no.2
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• pp.550-572
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• 2009

This paper investigates the textile negotiations between Korea and the U.S. which Korea, as a weaker party in the bilateral trade negotiation, was recognized as making a good performance by Odell(1985). Using the documents of Korean governments at the time - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry - telegrams and reports from various sources the paper picks a leveling factor during the negotiations. In the paper, we used a dynamic concept of power for describing the negotiating power, and showed Korea succeeded in making the negotiation symmetric using the Special Cooperative Relationship(SCR) as one of the most conspicuous leveling factors during the textile negotiations with the U.S. The paper contributes to finding the factors that can be used in the negotiations with power asymmetry as a leveling factor for weaker country. Also, based on the findings from the paper, future negotiators can get insights on which factors be used, and how to use those factors for leveling the negotiations with a stronger counterpart.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.24 no.2
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• pp.197-225
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• 2001

Bargaining theory with asymmetric information is widely accepted to explain labor disputes. Even though it secures theoretical consistency, it needs to be supplemented to explain disputes and negotiation more accurately. This paper shows that it may be assisted by bargaining theories based on the economics of psychology as well as theories on bargaining practices which are popular in other academic fields. The former suggests the occurrence of asymmetric information is related with the perception of the players of bargaining. The latter does they do not exchange offers as the typical theory of bargaining with asymmetric information assumes. When the latter is applied to explain the labor disputes of the public sector, it explains clearly their features and the differences from those of the private sector.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.1683-1689
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• 2013

Applying Markov Stochastic Process theory, this paper attempts to suggest a tentative model explaining how private information may cause bargaining delay. It is shown that the bargaining delay is critically dependent on the specification of information. It turns out that the delay tends to be longer in bargaining where information is imperfect. This means that bargaining models frequently can have an infinite delay under imperfect information while they have finite delay of bargaining before reaching the agreements if information is perfect. Other interesting result is that bargaining delay may depend on who makes the offer first. And it is also shown that bargaining tends to end earlier if both players (seller and buyer) can make offers in turn than the case where only one side make a offer.

• Journal of Labour Economics
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• v.27 no.3
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• pp.53-73
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• 2004

Korea has been suffering from increases in various disputes as well as militant behavior of resolving them. Industrial relations has become a typical case. However, research on the occurrence and resolution of a dispute has been rare. Especially, it has been difficult to find a study on barriers to dispute resolution. This paper investigates psychological barriers, information barriers and institutional barriers to reduce the efficiency of negotiation. It applies them to the typical cases of labor disputes and proposes implications to improve the way to resolve labor disputes.

• Journal of International Area Studies (JIAS)
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• v.14 no.1
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• pp.3-30
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• 2010

The focus of this paper is the determines of asymmetric cooperation between the European Union(and EC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea(DPRK). By analyzing the varying degree of cooperation and conflict by the EU and the DPRK, it argues that the outcomes of the asymmetric cooperation and conflict can be fully explained by the domestic and international variables.

• Journal of KIISE:Information Networking
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• v.37 no.4
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• pp.312-316
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• 2010

In this paper, we propose a game theoretic channel sharing model that allocates resources of a base station between MNO(Mobile Network Operator) and MVNO(Mobile Virtual Network Operator) in a fair and efficient manner. Considering the input traffic loads of MNO and MVNO, the proposed model uses the bargaining game theory to allocate channel resources between MNO and MNVO. When the input loads of the carriers are asymmetric, the proposed model increases the resource utilization by allocating more channel resources to the operator with high input load. In addition, the proposed model prevents the quality of service of an operator from degrading even if the input load of the other operators increases excessively.

• Health Policy and Management
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.91-113
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• 2002

We report and analyze the Korean physicians' recent general strike over the implementation of the Separation of Prescribing and Dispensing Practice (SPDP) in which more than 18,000 private clinics and 280 hospitals participated. Utilizing game-theoretic models of bargaining we explain why the Korean physicians were so successful in organizing intense collective action against the government and securing very favorable policy outcomes. In particular, we highlight the role of distributional conflict among social actors in shaping the details of institutional reform. The introduction of the SPDP was a necessary first step in the overall reform of health care system in Korea. However, the SPDP was perceived to be a serious threat to the economic viability of their profession by the vast majority of Korean physicians who had long been relied on the profits from selling medicines to compensate for the loss of income due to the low service fee under the previous health care system. The strong political coalition among heterogeneous physicians enabled them to organize an intense form of collective action, the general strike. Thus, physicians were successful not only in dragging the government to a bargaining table, but also winning in the bargaining and securing an outcome vastly favorable to them. On the other hand, the lack of an overall reform plan in the health care policy area, especially the finance of the National Health Insurance and the need for maintaining an image as a successful reform initiator, motivated the government to reach a quick resolution with the striking physicians.

• The Journal of The Korea Institute of Intelligent Transport Systems
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.66-71
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• 2012

In this paper, using the bargaining game theory, we propose a bandwidth management scheme that allocates bandwidth in an efficient and proportionally fair manner between the service classes with different service requirements. Since the traffic input rates of the classes are asymmetric in most of the time, the proposed scheme allocates bandwidth in proportion to the traffic input rates to increase the bandwidth utilization while protecting the quality of service of a class against the excessive traffic input of the other classes. In addition, the proposed method considers the weights of classes so that the bandwidth is allocated differentially among the classes.

• Korea Trade Review
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• v.44 no.3
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• pp.105-121
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• 2019

This study applies diverse game theories to the US-China Trade War. The US-China Trade War can be analyzed as a game situation because the strategic decision-making process to maximize one's profit while considering the reaction of the other party is a game situation. However, related research suffered from some mistakes in applying the US-China Trade War as it is to classic game theory, because while the prisoners dilemma is based on the situation of No Communication, No Trust, No Cooperation, the US-China Trade War has a precondition different from that of prisoners dilemma, since it mutually communicates information and negotiation is repeated several times in a cooperative situation. The result of the trade negotiation will likely end as 'cooperate-cooperate'. Further, considering trade volume, trade interdependence, bargaining power based on economy, and the scale of damage caused by the Trade War, the US-China Trade War is progressing with the bargaining power of the US being higher than that of China. Since the current US-China Trade War is in an asymmetrical situation under the dominant bargaining power of the US, it is likely to reach 'US defect-China cooperative' in the long run.

• Korean journal of communication and information
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• v.74
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• pp.177-196
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• 2015

This paper aims to plan a new research program on the parallel relationship between Korean press and political power, by providing concepts on the mode of existence of professional journalists in Korea. In the midst of the economic crisis of Korean journalism, relative deteriorisation in the political democracy and the liberty of press, and changes in news ecosystem due to the revolution of digital news, the status of professional journalists is at stake. In these circumstances, this paper argues that many existing researches on journalistic professionalism need to be reconstructed in the perspective of professional project. It enables, first of all, an evaluation on actual issues of professional journalists from the actor perspective, i.e. economic interests, social closure, regulative bargain with the authority. Secondly, concerning decoupling phenomenon of journalism and democracy which became salient in the contemporary society, this study raises a necessity to create new logical relations around concepts of journalist professionalism. And we will find, in this situation, a beginning of new evaluation on the mode of existence of professional journalists, that has been possibly developped within the old, assymetric relationship between State-press. And finally, this study proposes to consider a category of professional journalists as a vehicle that helps to conceptualize the old, parallel relationship between Korean press and political power.