• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.2
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• pp.251-272
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• 2012

Recently Professor Lee has suggested the analysis of the indicative conditional based on Sellars-Brandom's inferentialism. In this paper, I raise three questions. First, Professor Lee seems to misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that he considers only the analytically valid arguments as materially valid inferences. Second, Professor Lee seems to misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that whereas Sellars-Brandom talks about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, Professor Lee takes it as the analysis of the indicative conditional only. Third, either Professor Lee's analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or his analysis is too general.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.1-14
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• 2004

현재의 언어철학에서 거의 지배적인 위상을 갖고 있는 의미 전체론이 직면하는 중요한 문제 중의 하나는 '의미 불안정성 문제'이다. 의미 전체론에 의하면, 한 진술의 동일성 조건이 그 진술이 속한 이론에 상대적이기 때문에 전체 이론이 조금만 바뀌어도 그 진술의 의미가 바뀌게 되는 의미 불안정성의 문제가 발생한다. 필자는 이 논문에서 이 문제에 관한 기존의 해결 방식의 일부를 소개한 후 브랜덤이 그의 책 Making It Explicit (1994)에서 제시한 새로운 해결책을 소개하고 이를 옹호한다. 브랜덤은 이 문제를 해결하기 위해, 커뮤니케이션은 어떤 공통적인 것을 공유하는 것이라는 커뮤니케이션에 관한 기존 모델을 거부하고, "실천 속에서의 일종의 협동"으로서의 새로운 커뮤니케이션 모델을 제시한다. 필자는 이 논문에서 브랜덤이 제시하는 새로운 커뮤니케이션의 모델을 적극 옹호한다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.15 no.3
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• pp.347-375
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• 2012

In my article published in 2008, I offered an inferentialist account of indicative conditionals. In her recent paper, Professor Seawha Kim raises three objections. First, I misunderstand Sellars-Brandom in that I take only concept-constitutive inferences as materially valid inferences. Second, Sellars and Brandom talk about the common features of all kinds of conditionals including counterfactual conditionals, but I construe their view as the analysis of the indicative conditionals only. Third, either my analysis is incompatible with Sellars-Brandom inferentialism or my analysis is too general. In this paper I argue that Seawha Kim's objections are all based on insufficient understandings of Sellars's and Brandom's views. First, it is Sellars's view that materially valid inferences are restricted within concept-constitutive inferences. Second, neither Sellars nor Brandom proposes a specific theory about the indicative conditional. Instead, they argue for the expressive role of the conditional. What I accept from their views is this expressive role of the conditional. The detailed proposals about the indicative conditional in my aforementioned article are my own. Third, the differences among conditionals have no direct bearing on Sellars-Brandom inferentialism. In addition, the meaning and role of the conditional expression 'if-then' do not require more than what I have argued for it.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.18 no.2
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• pp.217-241
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• 2015

Brandom upholds the anaphoric theory of reference. On this theory, reference is a relation of anaphoric dependence between linguistic items rather than a substantial relation between linguistic items and non-linguistic objects. In addition, 'refers' is a pronoun-forming operator, which is used to form anaphorically indirect descriptions such as 'the one referred to as "Leibniz"'. Recently, Arbid $B{\aa}ve$ raises three objections against this theory. First, the anaphoric theory distinguishes between ordinary descriptions and anaphorically indirect descriptions in terms of iterability. But this condition is not an adequate ground for asserting that anaphorically indirect descriptions form a distinctive semantic category. Second, sentences containing a pronoun such as 'he' and sentences containing an anaphorically indirect description such as 'the one referred to as "Leibniz"' have different modal statuses. Consequently, indirect descriptions are semantically different from paradigmatic anaphors. Third, on the anaphoric theory, expressions of the form 'a' and the corresponding indirect descriptions of the form 'the one referred to as "a"' are intersubstitutable. But we can make an equivalent claim by using the more general semantic concepts such as equivalence and intersubstitutability, instead of using notions such as 'anaphor' and 'antecedent'. So the anaphoric theory is explanatorily idle. In this paper I argue that these objections do not pose a serious problem for the anaphoric theory of reference. I argue thereby that the anaphoric theory of reference is a promising theory which provides us with the right understanding of the expression 'refers'.