• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
• /
• v.11 no.2
• /
• pp.247-255
• /
• 2000

Usually, partailly balanced incomplete block design have been used a parametric design that make blocks of complete diallel cross. For that we use triangular PBIBD as parametric design, we have to find triangular PBIBD with corresponding parameters. Using the theorem that dual design of balanced incomplete block design with special parameters becomes triangular PBIBD, we can design block complete diallel cross without finding new triangular PBIBD. In this paper, we provided the plan and design satisfying such block complete diallel crosses.

• Journal of Labour Economics
• /
• v.38 no.4
• /
• pp.83-107
• /
• 2015

Free Agent(FA) system allows a professional player to make a salary contract with the other clubs as well as the incumbent one after the player has played in one club for a fixed periods. Sometimes compared with the salary FA players performs very poorly, which leads to a debate about FA busts. We extend the model of Yang and Wang(2013) to the one with incomplete information about the productivity of the player to explain the possibility of FA busts. FA busts do not arise in the separating equilibrium where the private information is fully revealed. The FA busts do occur in the pooling equilibrium We show that the separating equilibrium does not exist. We also show that under some conditions, in particular with strong compensation rule, the unique pooling equilibrium exists.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
• /
• v.26 no.2
• /
• pp.347-354
• /
• 2015

This paper deals with a method for intrablock anlaysis of balanced incomplete block designs on the basis of projections under the assumption of mixed effects model. It shows how to construct a model at each step by the stepwise procedure and discusses how to use projection for the analysis of intrablock. Projections are obtained in vector subspaces orthogonal to each other. So the estimates of the treatment effects are not affected by the block effects. The estimability of a parameter or a function of parameters is discussed and eigenvectors are dealt for the construction of estimable functions.

• The Korean Journal of Applied Statistics
• /
• v.28 no.2
• /
• pp.151-158
• /
• 2015

This paper discusses how to use projections for the analysis of data from balanced incomplete block designs. A model is suggested as a matrix form for the interblock analysis. A second set of treatment effects can be found by projections from the suggested interblock model. The variance and covariance matrix of two estimated vectors of treatment effects is derived. The uncorrelation of two estimated vectors can be verified from their covaraince structure. The fitting constants method is employed for the calculation of block sum of squares adjusted for treatment effects.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2005.07a
• /
• pp.778-780
• /
• 2005

Electric power industry throughout the world is restructured. The electric power industry has a characteristics of an oligopoly with an imperfect competition. In Korea rules, all information is not available. So the strategy under such incomplete information market differ firm those under complete information system in game theory. This paper presents a analysis technique if Korea ma rket model with incomplete information.

• Journal of the Korean Data and Information Science Society
• /
• v.13 no.2
• /
• pp.175-184
• /
• 2002

In this paper, diallel crosses block designs for control versus test comparisons among the lines are proposed. These block designs are constructed by using partially balanced incomplete block designs with C-properties. Also, the efficiencies of the diallel crosses block designs obtained through this method are tabulated for number of lines 22 or less.

• The Korean Journal of Applied Statistics
• /
• v.5 no.2
• /
• pp.229-242
• /
• 1992

Bradley and Stewart(1991) considered a large class of experimental designs as multidimensional block designs(MBD's). The simplest MBD could be considered to be a row-column design(RCD). They presented the intrablock analysis of variance for a general row-column design. In this article, a generalized least squares solution for Bradley & Stewart's example is considered. In this case, the assumption is that row and column effects are random. This is an application of revised Paik(1990a,1990b)'s method. The Appendix is devoted to that revised method.

• The Transactions of The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers
• /
• v.56 no.5
• /
• pp.848-853
• /
• 2007

This paper presents a methodology of estimating incomplete information in electricity markets for analyzing the gaming behavior of Generating Companies (GENCOs). Each GENCO needs to model its opponents' unknown information of strategic biddings and cost functions. In electricity markets with complete information, each GENCO knows its rivals' payoff functions and tries to maximize its own profit at Nash equilibriurnl Nli) by acknowledging the rivals' cost function. On the other hand, in the incomplete information markets, each GENCO lacks information about its rivals. Load patterns can change continuously due to many factors such as weather, price, contingency, etc. In this paper, we propose the method of the estimation of the opponents' cost function using market price, transaction quantities. and customer load patterns. A numerical example with two GENCOs is illustrated to show the basic idea and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

• Proceedings of the KIEE Conference
• /
• 2006.07a
• /
• pp.361-362
• /
• 2006

This paper presents the result of survey and analysis on a theoretical approach to the application of incomplete information game in deregulated Power Pools. The deregulation power market arc modeled by the incomplete information game. The case where participants have incomplete information about the operation costs of other participants are highlighted. Pool participants define transactions to maximize their benefit in non-cooperative situation, the ISO defines transactions among participants by looking for minimum price that satisfies the demand in the Pool. The incomplete information game determines Nash equilibrium satisfied Pool participants and the ISO.

• The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A
• /
• v.55 no.5
• /
• pp.214-219
• /
• 2006

Oligopoly differs from perfect competition and monopoly in that a firm must consider rival firms' behavior to determine its own best policy. This interrelationship among firms is the issue examined in this paper. In the oligopoly market, the complete information market means that each producer has full information about itself, the market, and its rivals. That is, each producer knows the market demand function, its own cost function and the cost functions of rivals. On the other hand, the incomplete information market means that in general each producer lacks full information about the market or its rivals. Here, we assume that each firm doesn't know the cost functions and the strategic biddings of its rivals. The main purpose of this paper is to analyze firm' strategic behaviors and equilibrium in an electricity market with incomplete information. In the case study, the complete information market and the incomplete market are compared at the Nash Equilibrium from the viewpoints of market price, transaction quantities, consumer benefits, and Social Welfare.