• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.11 no.1
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• pp.57-79
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• 2002

동 연구는 미국 캘리포니아주 San Joaquin Valley의 고정오염원들로부터 발생되는 ROG(Reactive Organic Gases) 배출량을 저감하기 위하여 명령통제방식(CAC)과 경제적 유인제도를 적용할 경우의 비용효과성을 비교 분석하였다. 경제적 유인제도로서는 UMPS(uniform marketable permit system)와 LMPS(localized marketable permit system) 배출권거래제도를 적용하였다. 분석결과 배출권거래제도(UMPS, LMPS)를 이용한 ROG 배출량 저감이 명령통제방식보다 비용이 적게 드는 것으로 나타났다. 한편, one-to-one permits trading이 허용되는 UMPS의 경우에는 일부 특정 지역에 대한 환경질이 악화되는 결과를 초래하는 경우가 발생하여, 궁극적으로 San Joaquin Valley의 ROG 배출량 저감을 위해서는 UMPS 방식의 배출권거래제도 도입이 보다 바람직한 것으로 나타났다.

• Bulletin of Korea Environmental Preservation Association
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• s.403
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• pp.19-21
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• 2013

국내 배출권거래제는 2015년 1월부터 도입된다. 정부는 그 동안 시행령을 마련하였고, 앞으로 기본계획과 할당계획을 확정할 예정이다. 기본계획과 할당계획은 구체적인 최종 세부 운영규칙과 관련된 사항이다. 각 운영요소의 대안별 선택 및 대안간 평가에 관한 실증적 검토, 운영요소 간 상호 연계 효과 등에 관한 최종적 점검이 필요하다.

• JOURNAL OF ELECTRICAL WORLD
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• s.456
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• pp.33-40
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• 2014

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.31 no.2
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• pp.261-290
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• 2022

Although market stabilization measures have been triggered in the K-ETS, carbon price is still under uncertainty. Considering Korea's 2030 enhanced reduction target announced in October 2021, it is crucial to have practical stabilization measures to appropriately deal with price uncertainty. This study examines the quantitative effects of a price collar, which is considered as a means of alleviating price uncertainty, on expected cumulative emissions and abatement costs. There are three main scenarios: carbon tax, emissions trading system, and emissions trading system with a price collar. Monte Carlo simulation was conducted to reflect uncertainty in emission. There are several results as follows: 1) In a price collar, domestic emission target is likely to be achieved with a lower expected abatement cost than other scenarios. In addition, there is a small amount of excess emissions in this research and it would be not critical(0.1% excess than target); 2) Prohibiting banking increases the expected abatement cost. This is because firms can not intertemporally reallocate allowances to match the firm's optimal emissions path; 3) With the adoption of a price collar, government's net revenue can be positive even if the government's purchase volume of emissions allowances is more than sales volume. This is because the government sells them at price ceiling and purchases them at price floor.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.21 no.3
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• pp.519-542
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• 2012

In this paper, we empirically analyzed whether carbon leakage really happened in EU by comparing before and after the period of EU ETS. We regarded foreign direct investment outflows as indicator of carbon leakage and analyzed panel regression between production cost including environment cost and this FDI variable. Also we consider foreign market potential to analyze market oriented FDI. According to this analysis, carbon leakage was observed in some models for manufacturing industry. However carbon leakage did not prove consistently in a variety of models and it is hard to speak carbon leakage was happened in EU ETS. Notwithstanding relatively short time series of data, in the view of the fact that carbon leakage was tested in some models, Korea also should keep in mind the possibility of carbon leakage and design emission trading scheme.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.14 no.2
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• pp.493-518
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• 2005

It has been taken for 10 years since Climate Change Convention could it be made. And Kyoto Protocol will come into force as an international law as from 16. Feb 2005. As based on it, Annex I countries will implement their mitigation projects on GHG reductions and press developing countries on GHG reduction target. Korea has not duty target on it yet. But it will be held a COP(Conference of Party) on negotiation for reduction target of second commitment period. If Korea has a real duty, Industry sector should reduce GHG emissions. Then Market mechanism will be need to introduce for this. This study started having a question "Is it possible to introduce emissions trading in Korea?". To solve the problem, this study analysed GHG emissions, marginal abatement cost, market price with 11 companies of industry (about 36% of Korea emissions). minus target is impossible to implement reduction target ver base year (2002). And emissions trading scheme also can't make the market without additional policy and measures. This study suggest that it is need to import credits and give a subsidy of government to encourage it. The imported credit can reduce the demand curve within the marginal abatement cost curves. But the effectiveness of credit is not the same as continually growth. As a result, Allowing 40% credit into emissions trading market is the best to reduce costs. However, a subsidy is the little bit difference. A subsidy make marginal abatement cost curves down for itself. Giving 30% for subsidy, it is the best. Considering both of importing credits and subsidy, it is the best effects in the reducing cost for company. especially 30% is the best effects respectively. This Study show that government wants to consider designing emissions trading, encourage participants competitiveness, and encourage the early action, government has to allow credit trading and give a subsidy to participants.

• Korea Petroleum Association Journal
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• s.300
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• pp.8-11
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• 2016

• NICE (News & Information for Chemical Engineers)
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• v.36 no.2
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• pp.191-195
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• 2018

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.21 no.4
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• pp.809-850
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• 2012

A linkage of emissions trading schemes among Korea, China and Japan demonstrates overall increase in gross domestic product (GDP). However, it also demonstrates reductions in household consumption, and the impact of integration could be very unbalanced between the countries. In particular, the reductions in domestic marginal costs are high in both Korea and Japan. Therefore, household consumptions in the two countries decrease despite increases in GDP because Korea and Japan will be purchasers of emissions rights. China, on the other hand, will experience the opposite. The unbalanced impacts on real household consumptions are intensified when emission credits are allocated via paid auctions instead of free allocation. This was demonstrated to be the case because the circumstances of three countries are intensified when using a paid emissions credit allocation scheme, and their differences could potentially hinder the cooperation between the three countries. Under the free allocation scheme, the emission trading schemes' unbalanced impacts on consumption could be mitigated, but unavoidable negative impacts of free allocation schemes are also serious. Based on the analysis results, Korea, China, and Japan will individually face complicated impacts if their carbon markets are integrated. Although the GDP of three countries will increase as a result of carbon market integration, the benefits of integration will surely be unbalanced, and the three countries will experience negative impacts in terms of actual consumption or employment. In particular, increases in income and consumption, reductions in employment, and energy dependence by credit purchasers (Japan and Korea) and production reduction and possibility of offshoring faced by revenue producing countries (China) could serve as a barrier to carbon market integration. To maximize the positive influences of carbon market integration while reducing the risks of negative side effects, the development and application of complimentary policy tools, such as import duties or discounts for emissions credits, are required.

• Environmental and Resource Economics Review
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• v.25 no.3
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• pp.403-419
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• 2016

Cap-and-trade policies that allow firms to trade emission allowances are designed to reduce emissions at least cost and are shown to be efficient when there is no uncertainty over emissions. This paper examines how uncertainty in emissions affects firms' decisions about permit purchase and abatement. The results show that whether firms abate more under uncertainty compared to a case with no uncertainty depends on the expected penalty cost and marginal abatement cost. If the expected marginal penalty cost is greater than the marginal abatement cost, the firm will choose to reduce emissions and abate more under uncertainty. When the expected marginal penalty is greater than the marginal cost of abatement, increases in uncertainty result in reduced emissions. This paper also examines whether the order of abatement and permit trading and the realization of uncertainty affect firms' decisions. The results show that total expected emissions are the same regardless of the order of moves.