• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.465-484
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• 2010

In diesem Aufsatz werden die Si Dan(四端) in dem Mengtzu durch die Bedeutung des Abbruchs der Selbstliebe in der Kriktik der praktischen Vernunft projiziert und gelesen. Fuer Kant ist die Befriedigung der Neigungen die subjektiven Bestimmungsgruenden seiner Willkuer. Nach ihnen macht sich selbst das allgemeine Prinzip der Selbstliebe die eigene Glueckseligkeit "zum objektiven Bestimmungsgrund." Das moralische Gesetz schlaegt jenes subjektive Prinzip der Selbstliebe nieder, und das bedeutet die Si Dan(四端) in dem Mentzu. Die Si Dan sind die Bestimmungsgruende der menschlichen Wesen. Das Subjekt des moralischen Gesetzes bricht deswegen seine Selbstliebe ab und richtet sich an sozialen Gemeinschaft, weil die Selbstlibe fuer den Individualismus.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.29
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• pp.125-152
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• 2010

The main purpose of this dissertation is a introductive proposal to reconstruct confucian moral principles. The most classical question in moral principles is : what is the good. In order to reconstruct confucian moral principles, this dissertation begin with question of what is the good in confucian moral principles. Confucianism believe in reality of the human good mind and good nature. Confucian the human good mind and good nature is comprised of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom(四德) is the origin of morality. Confucian's moral principles of human relationship is none other than conscientiousness and altruism. Conscientiousness is a principle of self-cultivation and self-revelation. As to altruism, confucious said, "the man of perfect virtue, wishing to be established himself", or "do not impose on others what you do not desire others to impose upon you." Altruism is rectified as a principle of reciprocity methodology of the making of whole kingdom peaceful in The Great Learning. Confucian golden rule(conscientiousness and altruism is equal to Kantian categorical imperative in The Fundamental principles of Metaphysics of Ethics. : Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law ... etc. Kant's three principles of moral philosophy(Categorical Imperatives) imply that the idea of universality, freedom, and the kingdom of ends. We contrast confucian moral principles with Kant's three principles of Categorical Imperatives. In conclusion, confucian moral principles implicate Kant's principle of universalizability and impartiality.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.35
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• pp.297-327
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• 2009

Kant proposed three principles of moral philosophy(Categorical Imperative) and Supreme moral principle in The Fundamental principles of Metaphysics of Ethics : Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law ${\cdots}$ etc. Kant's three principles of moral philosophy(Categorical Imperatives) imply that the idea of universality, freedom, and the kingdom of ends. We contrast Chu Hsi's Moral Philosophy with Kant's three principles of Categorical Imperatives. In conclusion Chu Hsi's moral rules be equal to kantian categorical imperative. These rules implicate principle of universalization, impartiality, and the kingdom of ends. But Chu Hsi believe in reality of the human mind and it's nature. Human mind and it's nature is comprised of benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom. Benevolence, righteousness, propriety and wisdom(四德) is the origin of morality. Chu Hsi's philosophy of LI(理) is metaphysics of Tao-Te(道德) or ontological-metaphysical Ethics. Everyone has created with LI. LI is potentiality of Human beings and the good. Chu Hsi's moral philosophy is distinguished from the traditional theory of the substance and modern scientism(phenomenalism)

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.142
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• pp.1-25
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• 2017

Kant's doctrine of virtue shows how an actor should behave morally in an individual situation with moral law defines the limits of human action. There is latitude for action in the course of formulating the maxims of action by an actor. And moral judgement, as Aristotle's Pronesis, is very important in the latitude for action. In the doctrine of virtue, Kant suggests two kinds of duty of virtue: one's own perfeciton as an obligatory end, and the happiness to others as an obligatory end-and raises the question of casuistics for each. However, this was the practice and training for the human moral life by application of the moral law. In particular, Kant saw that ethics does not give laws for action, but only give laws for the maxims of action, and further intended to realize the practice in a proper way of seeking truth through casuistical questions. Thus, Kant points out that the casuistic is related only to ethics in a fragmentary way and is added to ethics only as a comment on the system. According to Kant, virtue and judgment are inevitable to apply categorical imperative in the empirical and realistic world. In other words, virtue and judgment are necessary to enable people who are likely to act in accordance to inclination to live a moral life in accordance with the command of reason. Thus Kant saw that in order to take wide duty into narrow ones, human beings must not only have to cultivate virtues as a strong power of will, but also to exercise judgment. In addition, the distinction between duty of law(narrow obligation) and duty of virtue(wide obligation) is dependent on whether there is a latitude for action in the application of both duties. So the role of virtue and training of judgement is very important in the latitude for action that occurs in the process of formalizing actor's maxims. In detail, as the duty is wider, so man's obligation to action is more imperfect, but the closer to narrow duty(Law) he brings the maxim of observing this duty(in his attitude of will), so much the more perfect is his virtuous action. Thus, it was an effort to show how Kant's best moral principles, that is categorical imperative could be applied to the real world at the time of criticism. Of course, even if it is difficult to assess Kant's efforts as successful, criticizing Kant's ethics as 'formal', 'abstract', or 'monologous' is not persuasive because of critics did not understand his ethics as a whole.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.126
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• pp.377-401
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• 2013

일반적으로 성리학에서는 개인의 이익보다 도덕적 선택을 우선하라고 요구한다. 그러나 "주역"에서는 결코 이익을 죄악시 하지 않는다. 이 글은 성리학자이면서 역학자인 주자의 이익과 도덕에 대한 입장을 추적하는 연구이다. 주자가 소옹의 결정론적 세계관과 도덕적 자유의지를 강조하는 이천의 관점을 결합함으로써 완성하고자 한 것은 "주역"의 서(筮) 속에서 리(理)를 확인할 수 있다는 것이었다. 점서(占筮)의 결과가 그렇게 나오는 것은 그에 해당하는 이치가 있기 때문이라는 말이다. 그런데 "주역"의 리(理) 즉 역리(易理)란 오랜 경험과 관찰을 통해 확보된 사회적 존재로서 인간의 심리적 행위적 경향성의 총합이다. 그리고 그 구체적인 내용은 바로 상황적 합리성과 타자와의 조화로움이다. 이 리(理)는 우주와 사회의 정해진 질서로서 우리에게 주어진다. 개인은 이 주어진 질서에 따를 수 있는 자유와 함께 따르지 않을 수 있는 자유를 지닌다. 때문에 정해진 질서와 그 속에서의 개인의 자유의지는 양립가능한 것으로 받아들여지고, 그런 의미에서 주자는 약한 결정론자라고 할 수 있다. 성리학은 우주의 질서로부터 부여받은 당위의 법칙에 자발적으로 동의할 것을 요구한다. 그것이 가장 올바른 선택이면서 동시에 자신에게 가장 이로운 선택이기 때문이다. 주자는 상황적 합리성과 타자와의 조화로운 관계에서만이 자신의 진정한 이익을 추구할 수 있다고 생각한다. 타자와의 유기적 관계를 부정하고 유아적(唯我的) 이익만 추구하려는 자는, 사회적 존재로서 인간이 지니는 심리적 행위적 경향성을 무시한 어리석은 자이다. 이렇게 주자에게서 이익[리(利)]은 상황적 합리성[의(宜)]이 되고 또 그것은 바로 도덕[의(義)]이 된다. 참다운 의미에서의 합리적인 판단은 도덕적 선택을 불러온다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.148
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• pp.357-377
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• 2018

In order to concludes that human being is in the making, not a being already perfectly made, this paper goes through four steps. The first step raises a question that human being is only a being of reason. The Kant's assertion that human being has a moral capacity of 'good will' seems to be distorted portrait of human being. The second step calls into a question that human being can obey universal moral laws. Any universal moral law can't be obeyed by moral agent, because he can't exclude his external situations which are ceaselessly changing. Nevertheless imperatives of reason which require to obey the universal moral laws seems to be a 'unfortunate legacy' to human being. The third step demonstrates that imperatives of reason are originated from dualism which have dichotomize "mind vs. body" as "internal capacity vs. external situation". According to dualism, imperatives of reason require internal capacity to exclude emotions or desires which are sensitive to external influences. The fourth step discusses that interacting of inner and outer is to be necessary for human being. Then, reason is to be really in one glove with emotions which are beginning form externals, otherwise reason can't stop being powerless to any external situation. Concludingly any human being is to be processing to a new being, not situating any extreme antagonism of "reason vs. emotion". Because of emotional human animal, not a perfect god, humans being is in the ceaseless process into the making a new self.

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.68
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• pp.283-317
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• 2017

Issues over morality and profit usually address relations between moral principles and material gains. In the history of traditional Oriental philosophy, discussions about them were called "Yi-Li zhi bian." The ideas of Confucius and Mencius also contain various discussions about Yi-Li. Both Confucius and Mencius defined Yi as a value concept to represent "natural," "appropriate" or "just" and regarded Yi as an external moral principle on the one hand and an internal moral emotion on the other hand. They had, at the same time, differences, as well. While Confucius placed importance on the external and acquired nature of Yi as a goal of morality, Mencius argued for the internal and innate nature of Yi as the nature of morality partially while recognizing its externality overall. Such Yi is a general term for subjective moral emotions and objective moral principles. Li was a concept of fact to represent "gain," "profit" or "profit-making." Both of them were against private interest and emphasized public interest. As for their differences, Confucius was positive about Li to some degree by saying "One should think of Yi when making profit," whereas Mencius was almost negative about Li and perceived it to be for Yi by saying "One should give up even his own life for Yi." He meant Li's dependence on Yi and also Yi's absoluteness for Ri. Both of them found a mix of opposite features in Yi such as internality and externality, subjectivity and objectivity, specificity and generality, and uniqueness and universality and also in Li such as individuality and specialty and public and private interest. Those features have both disadvantages including theoretical irrationality and logical contradiction and advantages including ideological diversity and conceptual polysemy. If efforts are made to avoid their disadvantages and highlight their advantages, they will provide some elements to consult in the creation of new global ethics required today when East and West are becoming one. In the modern society, the Yi-Li issues can be divided into the issues of morality and economy, personal and social profit, and moral ideal and material gain. If these modern Yi-Li issues are combined with the traditional Yi-Li issues, two paths will emerge over the order of Yi-Li. Of the many perceptions of Yi-Li issues of Confucius and Mencius, the idea of "Yi First, Li Later" can be very useful for creating a new ethics theory to represent "humanism" that we all need today when everyone considers their own pursuit of profit and satisfaction of needs as the best values. Sound Yi-Li relations will be possible only through Yi's orientation toward externality based on internality and Li's pursuit of private interest on the premise of public interest according to the spirit of "Yi First, Li Later."

• (The)Study of the Eastern Classic
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• no.33
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• pp.7-29
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• 2008

Jang, Hyeon-Guang is one of the representative natural philosophers of Joseon Korea. This article aims to investigate the meaning of the factors of Xiangshuxue(象數學) contained in his cosmology. Xiangshuxue applies Image(Xiang), Numeral(Shu) and In-Yang to present the distinctions, inter-relations and time-series orders of things. Jang's cosmology, combined with Xiangshuxue, insisted that Li(Principle) is infinite in time and space, the cosmos is finite on the other side. This assures that the moral principle is absolute and eternal. Jang emphasized the book I-ching as the criterion and the model in understanding the nature. This restrained the objectivizm of Shaoyong and made his concept 'natural law' difficult to change itself as the experience and the knowledge expand. None the less, his cosmology is appraised in that it strengthened natural philosophical basis of neo-confucianism and preceded the cosmological investigations since mid-Joseon dynasty.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.23
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• pp.193-239
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• 2014

본 논문은 대순사상의 선화(善化)사상을 살펴보고 그 주체성을 밝히는데 목적이 있다. 『전경』에서는 어떻게 선을 드러내고 행하며 더 나아가 선으로 중생을 교육하고 천하를 교화하는가 하는 선화의 문제를 다루고 있는데, 이는 곧 대순진리회의 핵심 사상으로 볼 수 있다. '선화'사상은 세 가지 내용으로 설명할 수 있다. 첫째, 도덕적 의미에서 만물을 도와서 교화시키거나 만물을 크게 이롭게 하는 속성을 가지고 있다. 둘째, 상선(上善)의 덕 외에도 상선의 법이 필요한데, 이는 '선을 행하는 목적'에 부합하고 또한 선을 행하는 법칙을 지키는 실천방법과 절차를 말한다. 셋째, 가장 높은 차원에서의 '선'은 윤리도덕의 단계를 초월한다. 이에 대순진리회의 '선화'사상을 살펴보면 첫째, 대순진리회의 목적인 무자기, 포덕천하, 광제창생, 보국안민, 지상천국건설에 나타난 문자의 표면적 의미와 내재적 의미는 모두 '선화'의 내용에 포함된다. 둘째, 대순진리회 목적의 실현은 그 종지와 신조에 의거하는데, '합덕·조화·해원'과 사강령(四綱領)과 삼요체(三要諦)에도 '선화'의 의미가 포함되어 있다. 셋째, 대순진리회의 목적은 도인들의 구체적 행위를 통해 실현되는데, 수도와 공부의 필요성과 규범 속 그리고 상제와 도주 조정산(趙鼎山)의 창교(創敎)나 선교(宣敎) 등 구체적인 실례에서도 '선화'의 원칙이 분명하게 드러나 있다. 대순진리회의 '선화'사상은 전형적이고 신성한 종교 도덕적 특징과 일상생활의 의미가 담긴 사회 윤리적 특징이 있으며, 또한 윤리를 초월하고 진선(盡善)을 추구하는 궁극적 목적의식과 이론적 깊이가 있다. 대순진리회 '선화'사상의 주체성과 이론구조를 분석하면 다음과 같다. 첫째, 대순진리회의 '선화'사상에서는 무엇보다 윤리 도덕적 측면에서의 선의 배양과 실천을 중시한다. 둘째, 대순진리회의 '선화'사상은 윤리도덕의 선을 실천하는 법문(法門)을 제시하였다. 셋째, 대순진리회의 '선화'사상은 수도의 최종 목적인 대선(大善)·지선(至善)·진선(盡善) 등을 추구하고 실현할 것을 강조하였다. 선화사상이 나타내는 핵심인 '선덕'과 이로부터 발전된 '선행선법(善行善法)'이 결국 윤리도덕의 차원을 초월하였음을 알 수 있다.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.131
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• pp.165-197
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• 2014

In this paper, I investigate on the human nature in philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism from a Kantian point of view. The core argument of the philosophy of Wang Yang-Ming, Buddhism and Kant is that all human beings have the pure abilities a priori to overcome themselves, to realize their own potentialities. This is called immanent transcendence. At this time human beings can be free. Kant, Wang Yang-Ming and Buddhism claim that all human beings themselves will overcome their desires from their mind and body through the immanent transcendence, reflection and contemplation on their own. When we give up the external knowledges, throw away obsessions with the selfish desires and go back to our inside, we can see our original nature. To have an insight into this inner nature, to respect the moral law a priori, this is to overcome the ourselves, and to be a Grate Man(聖人) and a Buddha. This way is the only way to be a Grate Man and a Buddha. The main proposition of Wang Yang-Ming's philosophy is expressed 'There are no things without mind.'(心外無物) The core of Kant's transcendental philosophy is called the Copernican Revolution by himself. Copernican Revolution means the transition from the object-centered epistemology to the subject-centered epistemology. 'Innate Knowing'(良知) and 'Perform Innate Knowing'(致良知), 'All human beings have the mind of Buddha'(一切衆生悉有佛性) contain the apriority, immanence of Moral Law. In this respect, the theory of Innate Knowing in Wang Yang-Ming and mind of Buddha in Buddhism, pure Moral Law in Kant has the same structure grounded in subjectivity. Even if we have the mind of Buddha, innate Knowing, moral law a priori, the reason why we don't know our original nature is that we fall into the obsessions with selfish desires, and that we have inclination to external interests. So the moment you see our original nature, ordinary people themselves turn into a Buddha. These changes and transitions are immanent transcendence. All human beings have the ability to do this changes and transitions. Buddha does not exist outside of us, but it exists with our reflections on our human nature. Buddha can not existed without our insight into the our innate Ego. Where there is our original nature, there is a Buddha. So Buddha is called the another name of the original figure of human beings.