• Korean Journal of Social Welfare
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• v.66 no.1
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• pp.139-162
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• 2014

This paper critically examines the existing discourses about 'relationship', a key element of social work practice and questingly examines Lao-tzu's work of Tao Te Ching, the book of way and virtue, as an alternative theoretical framework for social work relationship. Compared to current discourses of relationship beleaguered by either modernism or postmodernism, both of which are in the deadlock of binary perspective, the insights and vision in Tao Te Ching are successfully able to overcome the limits of them and provide new and profound way of thinking about human, society and their relationship. Especially core cannons crystallized by natural humanistic concepts for cosmos coupled with innate critical power against artificial manipulations of world can extend the horizon of understanding concerning the relationship between client and social workers and therefore provide a new and attractive roles in professional relationship. Moreover, opposed to usual images of Lao-tzu's ideas such as nihilism and passivity, alternative relationship of social work can play an important role of caring the disordered reality where Dao disappered and criticise the selfish desires of individuals and comport the broken-hearted minds in modern society. In addition, results of this paper implies that more extended study articulating ideas of Tao Te Ching with the social work practice would have lots of potentials to promote later researches in quest of 'Korean' social work practice.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.27
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• pp.327-361
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• 2009

So far there has been a strong tendency to study The Great Learning in terms of quite" limited ethical and moral understandings." Yet The Great Learning was originally a political text to educate the ruler. So the ethical and moral understanding discussed in the book should be interpreted as something more comprehensive and practical, which includes the political ability. This paper thus focuses on this new line of understanding of The Great Learning. Among the three principles of the book, 'Myeongmyeongdeok( 明明德)' means the virtue of a politician, that is to 'cultivate (Myeong)' the 'properties for a statesman (Myeongdeok).' 'Sinmin (新民)' means 'to innovate or reform the people as a result of substantive administration of a politician'. 'Jieojiseon (止於至善)' means 'to reach and to maintain the highest degree of goodness as a result of Myeongmyeongdeok and Sinmin'. These three principles would divide into eight practicums. Myeongmyeongdeok would divide into five steps of 'Sugi(修己: Cultivating the self)' practicum, which are 'Gyeokmul (格物) → Chiji(致知) → Seongeui(誠意)→ Jeongsim (正心)→ Susin (修身)'. Sinmin would divide into three steps of 'Chiin (治人: rule the people)' practicum which are 'Jega(齊家) → Chiguk(治國) → Pyeongcheonha(平天下).' And the point where the two practicums are harmonized, i.e. that of Sugichiin (修己治人), is the place of Jieojiseon. Not every ethical people become a politician but every politician must be ethical. That is the assertion of the Great Learning.

• Science of Emotion and Sensibility
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• v.14 no.4
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• pp.555-570
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• 2011

In order to do morally right behavior that we cognitively know, prosocial moral motivation is necessary. Previous studies revealed emotion is important for prosocial moral motivation. This was supported by cognitive neuroscience studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging(fMRI) in which the activity of ventral striatum(VS) was observed when people made moral decision. VS was originally known as the core area of reward process but recently VS was found to respond also to social reward and even feeling of prosocial emotion itself. However it is not clear why VS was activated when people experience prosocial moral sentiments. The aims of this review article were to find situations in which people are prosocially and morally motivated and to understand more about the role of emotion as a moral motivator by examining evidence regarding the neural network, including VS, of prosocial moral motivation and moral decision-making.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.148
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• pp.239-267
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• 2018

In the matter of ethical and moral practice, Thomas Aquinas's thought is called "intellectualism". It does not mean only that intelligence is more important than will in moral practice, but that it has epistemological, metaphysical, and psycho-psychological implications significance. The first means affirming "the first principles of knowing" as the problem of certainty of knowing. In Thomism, there are surely above suspicion notions in the domain of practice as well as in the domain of reason, which are obviously self-evident, and because of that certainty, they become the basis of certainty of all other knowings that follow. The principle to know these knowings is the first principle of knowing, reason and Synderesis(conscience). Therefore, the "intellectualism" of Tomism is the basis for providing the ground of metaphysics. In the case of reason, it is classified into superior reason and inferior reason according to whether it is object. The object of higher reason is "metaphysical object" which human natural reason can not deal with. This affirmation of superior reason provides a basis for human "autonomy" in the moral and religious domain. This is because even in areas beyond the object of natural reason, it is possible to derive certain knowledge through self-reasoning, and thus to be able to carry out the act through their own choosing. Likewise, for Thomas Aquinas, "Synderesi" as the first principle of good and evil judgment can be applied to both the superior reason and the inferior reason, and thus, except for the truth by the direct divine revelation, precedes any authority of the world, scrupulous Act always guarantees truth and good. This means "subjectivity" that virtually in the act of moral practice, it can become the master of one's act. Furthermore, "consciousness(conscientia)", which means the ability to comprehend everything in a holistic and simultaneous manner, is based on conscience(synderesis). So, at least in principle, correct behavior or moral behavior in Tomism is given firstly in correct knowledge. Therefore, it can be said that true awareness (conscious awareness) in Thomas Aquinas's thought coincide with practical practice, or at least knowledge can be said to be a decisive 'driver' for practice. This will be the best explanation of the definition of "intellectualism" by Thomism.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.116
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• pp.465-484
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• 2010

In diesem Aufsatz werden die Si Dan(四端) in dem Mengtzu durch die Bedeutung des Abbruchs der Selbstliebe in der Kriktik der praktischen Vernunft projiziert und gelesen. Fuer Kant ist die Befriedigung der Neigungen die subjektiven Bestimmungsgruenden seiner Willkuer. Nach ihnen macht sich selbst das allgemeine Prinzip der Selbstliebe die eigene Glueckseligkeit "zum objektiven Bestimmungsgrund." Das moralische Gesetz schlaegt jenes subjektive Prinzip der Selbstliebe nieder, und das bedeutet die Si Dan(四端) in dem Mentzu. Die Si Dan sind die Bestimmungsgruende der menschlichen Wesen. Das Subjekt des moralischen Gesetzes bricht deswegen seine Selbstliebe ab und richtet sich an sozialen Gemeinschaft, weil die Selbstlibe fuer den Individualismus.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.129
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• pp.141-166
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• 2014

Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory of Mencius combined xìng(性) that means physical characteristic of human together $sh{\grave{a}}n$(善) that means moral value or moral behavior. Therefore in other to verify the meaning of xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) we need to analysis human nature in Psychology and moral norm in Ethics simultaneously. And that necessity justified Moral Psychological approach to xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). Mencius combined a priori morality and a priori moral norm and asserted xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善). And than he presented an example for a basis or a clue of mora norm and explained grounds of moral behavior. But various theory Moral Psychology considered morality as an attachment or derivation of human nature. So another new Moral Psychology is needed to investigate Mencius Xìng $sh{\grave{a}}n$(性善) theory in a viewpoint of Moral Psychology. And than that must managed morality and moral norm as essential problems firstly. That because Mencius considered human as a moral subjectivity and seek the clue or basis morality and moral norm in human nature. And secondly that must managed moral intelligence as a emotional intelligence, because of $li{\acute{a}}ng$ $n{\acute{e}}ng$(良能) $li{\acute{a}}ng$ zhī(良知) of Mencius meaned moral intelligence which was derived from blood tied and moral emotion.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.28
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• pp.103-131
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• 2017

As the establishment of self-identity is based on 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence,' the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is the only road to the security and confirmation of self-existence. But given that our ordinary life almost entirely consists of actions objectifying others, the formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' is by no means easy. The formation of 'Relationships of Mutual Beneficence' should be based on morality, controlling self-desire, and not objectifying others. Philosophy based on a priori reasoning describes self-control over selfdesire as the domination of the body through a priori reasoning. But this practical philosophy cannot present a self-evidential internal motivation behind moral actions. Due to this, the application of moral order given by a priori reasoning in response to reality is likely to be reinterpreted on basis of self-interest. With regards to this, the 'propensity towards sympathy' is given as new moral norm. The 'propensity towards sympathy' as emotion is direct and consistent given that feeling occurs prior to thinking. The 'propensity towards sympathy' is intuitive in the sense that it is an instinctual response preceeding a reasoned judgment. The 'propensity towards sympathy,' as a natural moral emotion, is self-validating given that all human beings know it and practice it. But previous studies on the 'propensity towards sympathy' have an obvious limitation because they adopt phenomenological approaches to the 'propensity towards sympathy' which eschew the investigation of morality. Though they present the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural emotion based on body rather than reason, they do not philosophically explain the 'propensity towards sympathy.' Thus the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a natural moral emotion is likely to be interpreted as a subjective and relative moral norm. This paper philosophically explains that the 'propensity towards sympathy' is a universal moral norm on the basis of Merleau-Ponty's 'flesh.' 'Flesh' is formed as the entanglement between oneself and others and presents the 'propensity towards sympathy' as its philosophical basis. In other words, 'flesh' formed as the mixture or entanglement between oneself and others is the material foundation upon which one can activate the 'propensity towards sympathy.' This paper's approach to the 'propensity of sympathy' can be desribed as a phenomenological approach to the 'propensity towards sympathy' as a universal moral norm.

• Journal of the Daesoon Academy of Sciences
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• v.50
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• pp.139-176
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• 2024

This article examines the theory of mutual resonance (感應論) of Dasan (茶山), Jeong Yak-yong (丁若鏞), and Jeungsan (甑山), Kang Il-sun (姜一淳), who lived during the transition to modernity in Joseon. By examining the philosophical thought of Dasan and Jeungsan, which centered on the problem of realizing morality through the resonance (感應) between human beings and Sangje, this article aims to reveal that their religious discussion of resonance, which is differentiated from the rational theory, ultimately strengthens the practice of morality. Dasan and Jeungsan argue that it is difficult to overcome human selfish desires through the mind alone, which aims for moral autonomy, so the recognition of a transcendent being, Sangje, becomes necessary. Since Sangje, the Supreme Being, is always watching over human life, one can examine one's deficiencies with reverence and correct them. In particular, Dasan and Jeungsan reveal that humans and Sangje do not exist independently, but are in touch with each other through the heart, so that moral practice can be actualized in reality. Dasan and Jeungsan do not position humans and the Supreme Being as independent entities, but rather allow them to organically resonate with each other through the mind, enabling individuals to engage in moments of contemplation and reflection at every juncture of choice, unbound by time and space. From this perspective, the resonance theory of Dasan and Jeungsan can be seen to have practical implications for integrating moral practice into everyday life. The thought systems of Dasan and Jeungsan should be understood as embodying the anguish and sincerity of two figures who sought to convey to future generations the path of moral practice that humans must walk, based on a reverent mindset towards the Supreme Being, amidst tumultuous domestic and international circumstances.

• The Journal of Korean Philosophical History
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• no.43
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• pp.107-139
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• 2014

Tasan Chong Yak-yong has criticized Zhu Xi's metaphysical viewpoints of human being. Therefore he revealed his viewpoint of human being and the theory of moral practice through his thoughts about the Lord of Heaven and human nature with spiritual inclination toward goodness. He has drawn the Lord of Heaven into Confucianism again. Heaven as the Lord endows human being with a nature that enjoys virtues and detests vices. It watches human being's good and evil. Here we can say Heaven is a outer efficient cause of moral behavior. According to Tasan, human being has its own 'self directed weight'自主之權 so that he can make a judgment and decision about what to do. Therefore we have to do manifest this moral inclination which is a inner efficient cause of moral behavior. That is to say, we must follow the order of daoxin道心 inside our mind. If we did go against it, our mind would be uncomfortable. Now through the method of so-called shu恕 we need to put filial piety孝 fraternal respect弟 compassion慈 into practice. These three moral practices represent the spirit of reciprocity in Confucianism. These lead us to make an achievement of ren仁, representative virtue in the theory of moral practice. Our moral practice means the fulfillment of humanity. This is the way to serve Heaven. Tasan insists that theses are the core thoughts of Confucius and Mencius.

• Journal of Korean Philosophical Society
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• v.139
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• pp.133-167
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• 2016

Happiness is no more than a pleasant mental state that we can feel everyday. How to seek happiness is the key subject of positive psychology, for which we also need a clear neural system so that our emotional life can be accomplished. This is an issue in people with neural problems (such as psychopathy or hypochondria) as they can not achieve such emotional clarity. In this sense neuroscience is thought of as a new approach that can replace the traditional rational insight which has been aimed at completing a virtual life. But there is also a limit: we can not reach a virtual life with only a confirmation of our transitive state. A practice of virtue which our moral ethos aims at, has been a problem of rational insight. Here is a gap between our emotional life and our rational insight in which an anguish of psychology results. So a task we should combine organically is band between neuroscientific fact and ethical practice; a new addition to psychology. But unfortunately psychology can not solve this problem by itself, for it is a meta-question arising beyond psychology. Thus an explication of this meta-question is, I believe, a new theory of moral philosophy; one that can only be explored using an interdisciplinary approach.