• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.25 no.7B
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• pp.1204-1214
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• 2000

본 연구에서는 국내외 이동전화 단말기의 판매·가격보조금에 대한 실태를 조사하고 외국 사례와의 비교를 통해 이동전화 사업자가 취할 수 있는 실현 가능하고 건전한 정책을 제시하였다. 또한 이동전화 대리점과 단말기 유통구조에 관한 이해가 필요하여 조사되었으며, 각 회사별 가입자수와 매출액 및 단말기 보조금 규모는 중요한 자료이므로, 이의 분석을 통하여 바람직한 단말기 가격보조정책을 제시하였다. 이동전화 사업자간 과당경쟁이 과도한 단말기 판매보조금의 원인이며, 누적 판매보조금은 사업자에게 적자 요인이 되었다. 따라서 본 연구의 목적과 중요성을 적정보조금을 산출하는 것이다. 국내외 주요 이동전화 사업자들에 대한 가입자당 월평균수익(ARPU) 및 단말기 보조금 규모의 파악과 함께 단말기 보조금 회수에 걸리는 기간의 산촐을 통해 적정한 단말기 보조금 액수를 제시하였다.

• The Journal of Korean Institute of Communications and Information Sciences
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• v.30 no.10B
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• pp.669-675
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• 2005

In the mobile telecommunication industry, the effects of handset subsidies are revealed as two aspects. There are the activation of service and handset market and the acceleration of related technology development in the desirable aspect. On the other hand, the rise in service rates and the squandering of the related resources in the undesirable one. There have been a lot of researches that disclose the desirable or undesirable factors through the qualitative methods. However, the quantitative studies are rare. In this study, we consider the positive, from the increase of demand, and negative, from the increase of service rates, effects on consumers' benefit attendant handset subsidies. Then, we quantitatively compared between the positive and negative effects and analyze the direct effects of consumers' benefit of handset subsidies, and figured out that the direct effect is not expected to be positive.

• Journal of Korea Fair Competition Federation
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• no.118
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• pp.7-17
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• 2005

전기통신사업법상 이동전화사업자의 단말기보조금 지급금지 그 자체는 경쟁원리에 부합하지 않는다. 단말기 보조금의 금지를 정당화하는 유일한 근거는 그것이 갖는 비대칭적 성격이나, 그로 인하여 유효경쟁이 촉진될지는 확실치 않다. 이동전화시장에서 사업자 전환에는 요금이나 통화품질보다 이용자의 전환비용이 매우 큰 영향을 미치며, 따라서 전환비용을 낮추는 것에 초점을 맞출 필요가 있다. 그렇다면 번호이동성을 통하여 충분히 제거되지 않는 고착효과 및 전환비용을 가능한 해소하기 위해서는 지금과 같이 엄격하고도 일률적인 단말기보조금 금지는 재고할 필요가 있다. 여기서 유의할 것은 경쟁적인 보조금 지급이 후발사업자의 존속을 위태롭게 할 수 있다는 점에서 통신시장에서 어느 정도 유효경쟁체제가 자리잡은 이후에야 보조금 지급을 완전히 허용할 수 있다는 점이다. 다만, 비대칭규제의 취지는 어디까지나 이미 쏠림현상으로 고착화된 독점적 시장구조를 유효경쟁체제로 전화하는 데에 있다는 점에서 볼 때, 어느 시점에서 단말기 보조금을 허용할 것인지는 현재 또는 향후의 시장 상황에 대한 면밀한 분석을 요한다.

• Informatization Policy
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• v.17 no.2
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• pp.86-103
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• 2010

This paper computes the economic impact of handset subsidies using the recent Input-Output Tables and compares the results with other alternatives which telecommunications companies can choose. The first scenario is that telecommunications companies give handset subsidies to consumers and sales agents. The second is that the companies do not give the subsidies to them, but instead spend the same amount of subsidy on facility investment. The third is that the companies lower the prices of their mobile communications services and consumers spend the saved expenses on other goods and services. The result is that the production, value added, import, job, employment inducement coefficients of the first scenario is larger than those of the second and third scenarios. The reason is as follows. The handset subsidy results in the incentive to consumers for handset purchase or the incentive for sales agents to sell the telecommunication services of the companies. The former has larger production and import inducement effect, and the latter also has larger value-added, job, and employment inducement effect than those of other scenarios.

• Proceedings of the Korean Institute of Information and Commucation Sciences Conference
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• 2014.10a
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• pp.933-936
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• 2014

The government has the duty to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. In order to promote competition we have to address the asymmetry in the information as possible and to ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it virtually distort the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by avoiding their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy could be transferred to down the price of cell phone and charges and it would be a benefit to consumers. Separate notice of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a developed policy but it was too late. It, the market price close to that from perfect competition structure, is plausible, ultimately.

• Journal of the Korea Institute of Information and Communication Engineering
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• v.19 no.8
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• pp.1893-1900
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• 2015

The government has the responsibility to prevent abuses of monopoly and promote competition in order to maximize consumer welfare. The government should address the asymmetry in the information as much as possible and ensure consumer choice. The subsidy seems to reduce the burden on the consumer service charges and handset prices but it actually distorts the market through price discrimination. The government caused the principal-agent problem by neglecting their appropriate role to prevent distortion of the mobile telecom market. The money used as subsidy is part of excess profit and could be transferred to down the price of mobile phone and charges and it would become a benefit to consumers. Separate announcement of subsidies by Mobile Communications Terminal Distribution Structure Improvement Act is a little developed policy but it was not actually realized. The market price close to that from perfect competition structure is plausible, ultimately.

• The Journal of the Korea Contents Association
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• v.14 no.11
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• pp.389-397
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• 2014

Studies on switching intention have been one of the most interesting topics. In this paper we investigate empirically the factors influencing the mobile communication service switching intention. Our research model includes the relationship between 'switching intention' and 'habit', 'alternative attractiveness', 'present service satisfaction'. In addition, we try to find the effects that 'habit' and 'alternative attractiveness' give to 'switching intention' through 'present service satisfaction'. Finally, the moderating effects of 'handset subsidy' are examined. We analyze the model by Multiple Group Structural Equation Model. This proves that 'habit', 'present service satisfaction', and 'alternative attractiveness' give direct effects to 'switching intention'. And 'habit' and 'alternative attractiveness' give the indirect effects to 'switching intention' through 'present service satisfaction'. In addition, 'handset subsidy' has the moderating effects between 'switching intention' and 'habit'.

• Journal of Digital Convergence
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• v.12 no.7
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• pp.11-20
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• 2014

This paper finds that the ultimate source of problems facing Korean mobile telecommunications such as excessive subsidies of handsets, waste of resources, and a vicious circle of expensive handsets and high prices for services, is bundling of handset and subscription. The analysis suggests that bundling causes consumers to confuse about prices of handsets and services, and firms focus on handset subsidy competition rather than on upgrading service qualities and lowering prices due to anti-competitive effects of bundling. Because most of the cost of bundling is passed on to consumers, the welfare of consumers decline. In particular, equality among consumers worsens due to price discriminations. To resolve these problems, unbundling of handset and subscription is a necessity. Mixed bundling allowing separate selling of handsets under bundling does not seem to work as a cure because bundling tends to be a dominant strategy. The best regulatory policy is a complete separation of handset and subscription.

• Journal of Distribution Research
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• v.11 no.4
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• pp.31-48
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• 2006

This study was motivated by a recent channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset between a service provider and a handset manufacturer in the mobile communication market. In this study, we have developed a two-person non-zero sum game for the channel conflict on subsidies for mobile handset, and derived its optimal strategic game solution. As a result, we have found that, between the service operator and the handset manufacturer, one who has high level of market leadership in his own market has a power to affect the optimal strategic game solution. We have also found that, when the service operator and the handset manufacturer have relatively high level of market leadership in their own market, there exist both of potential channel conflict and cooperation. The result of this study may provide an effective reference for a solution of similar channel conflicts.

• Digital Contents
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• no.10 s.149
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• pp.20-22
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• 2005

국회는과기정위·법사·정무·재경·건교등14개상임위별로지난달22일부터까지국정감사를벌였다.이번 국감에서는 휴대전화 도·감청 문제, 단말기보조금 허용 여부, KT 민영화에 대한 평가 등 디지털콘텐츠관련내용들이중점적으로부각됐다.