• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.7
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• pp.155-231
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• 2009

Xu-Jing(徐競) an official of the Song(宋), a medieval Kingdom of China, wrote a book titled $\ll$Koryo Tu Jing(高麗圖經)$\gg$ which explains his travel to the Koryo as a member of diplomatic mission in 1123. $\ll$Koryo Tu Jing$\gg$ is the record of his personal experience in Koryo with many explanatory illustrations and especially contains 5 months' voyage record of his diplomatic fleet. His fleet set sail at a port located in the Ding Hai Xian(定海縣), Ming Zhou(明州) via a few islands of Koryo [Hyup Kye San(俠界山) , the Kun San Do(群山島) , the Ja Yon Do(紫燕島) , the Keup Su Mun(急水門) in Kang Hwa Gun(江華郡) and the Hap Gul(蛤窟) ] and finally arrived the Port Ye Song Hang(禮成港) . According to the Xu-Jing's record his fleet sailed the sea with the help of the favorable seaward winds and tides as the usual way of ancient sailing. The Xu- Jing's Fleet sailed the sea between the Mei Cen(梅岑), Ming Zhou(明州) of China and the Hyup Kye San(俠界山) of Koryo from about 5:00 a.m., May 24th(of the lunar calendar) to about 5:00 p.m., June 2nd. At this section, the average speed of the seaward winds was 19.45km/h and the average speed of the fleet which sailed only by the power of the winds was 6.29km/h. This means that 32.3% of the favorable seaward winds' speed was equal to the speed of the ancient fleet which sailed only by the power of the favorable seaward winds. The fleet sailed the sea between the Ja Yon Do(紫燕島) and the Keup Su Mun(急水門) from about 9:00 a.m., June 10th to about 1:00 p.m., the same day. At this section the fleet sailed by the power of tides in addition to the favorable seaward winds without oaring. The average speed of the winds was not different from that of former section and the average speed of the tides was 1.937km/h. And at this section the average speed of the fleet increased by 0.41km/h than that of the former section. This means that 21.1% of the speed of the tides was equal to the increased speed of the ancient fleet by virtue of the tides. The fleet sailed the sea between Keup Su Mun(急水門) and the Hap Gul(蛤窟) from about 1:00 p.m., June 10th to about 3:00 p.m., the same day. At this section, there were no seaward winds and the fleet sailed only by the powers of tides and oaring. And at this section, the tide increased the average speed of the fleet by 0.3114km/h and the fleet could sail at the speed of 4.3km/h. So we can conclude that the average speed of ancient fleet without any influences of the seaward winds and tides was 3.98 km/h. We can make use of the various sailing speeds of ancient fleets when judging their maritime activities. If we make use of the various sailing speeds of the ancient fleets as calculated in this article, we will be able to get various important informations about the certain ancient fleet's maritime maneuver. For example, we can infer the sailing routs of a certain fleet and the time when the fleet passed a certain spot by making use of the various sailing speeds of the ancient fleet. In this article I did not take account of the shapes of ships that consist of the ancient fleets and the sizes of the various ships and fleets. It was because that such factors would not change the foresaid conclusions seriously.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.137-658
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• 2016

1. Movement of the leaders of the Silla army The leaders of the Silla army traveled from Gyeongju(경주) to Icheon (이천), Deokjeokdo(덕적도) Island, and Hwangsanwon(황산원) during the period of the Against Baekje(백제) War that began in 660. Movement route between Gyeongju and Icheon : Gyeongju(경주)-Daegu(대구)-Gumi(구미)-Gimcheon(김천)-Chupungryeong(추풍령)-Geumdol Fortress(금돌성)-Boeun(보은)-Jincheon(진천)-Juksan(죽산)-Bubal-eup(부발읍) Movement route between Bubal-eup and Deokjeokdo Island : Bubal-eup(부발읍)-Ipo(이포) Ferry-Haengju(행주) Ferry-Palmido (팔미도) Island-Seonjaedo(선재도) Island-Yeongheungdo(영흥도) Island-Pido(피도) Island-Soyado(소야도) Island-Deokjeokdo(덕적도) Island Movement route between Deokjeokdo Island and Hwangsan: Deokjeokdo(덕적도) Island-Danghangpo(당항포)-Jincheon(진천)-Boeun (보은)-Okcheon(옥천)-Geumsan(금산)-Tanhyeon(탄현)-Hwangsan (황산)-Ganggyeong(강경)-Buyeo(부여) 2. Movement of the combat units of the Silla army Jincheon area : 4,325 persons of the Geupdang unit(急幢) and 611 persons of the Kaegeumdang unit(罽衿幢) were deployed. These units moved from Jincheon to Cheongju, Yeongi, and Gongju, and contained Ungjin Fortress(熊津城) (6,650 Baekje troops). Boeun area : 4,763 persons of the Daedang(大唐) unit, 3,548 persons of the Hajujeong unit(下州停), 3,017 persons of the Namcheonjeong unit(南川停), and 4,500 persons of the Saseoldang unit(四設幢) were deployed. These units moved from Boeun(보은) to Okcheon(옥천), Geumsan(금산), Tanhyeon,(탄현) and Hwangsan(황산). Geumdol Fortress area : 3,753 persons of the Sangjujeong unit(上州停), 5,762 persons of the Seodang unit(誓幢), 3,753 persons of the Guidang unit(貴幢), and 5,562 persons of the Nangdang uni(郎幢)t were deployed. These units moved from Geumdol Fortress to Hwanggan(황간), Yeongdong(영동), Geumsan(금산), Tanhyeon(탄현), and Hwangsan(황산). Jirye area: 3,017 persons of the Eumrihwajeong unit(音里火停) and 3,017 persons of the Ehwahyejeong unit(伊火兮停) were deployed. These units moved from Jirye(지례) to Juchiryeong(走峙嶺), Mupung (무풍), Muju-eup(무주읍), and Bunam-myeon(부남면) in Muju-gun. Goryeong area: 3,017 persons of the Samryanghwajeong unit(三良火停) and 3,017 persons of the Sosamjeong unit(召參停) were deployed. These units moved from Goryeong(고령) to Geochang(거창), Hamyang(함양), Namwon(남원), Sunchang(순창), and Jeongeup(정읍). 3. Movement of the Tang army Dangjin area(당진 방면) : 1,000 persons were deployed. These units moved from Dangjin(당진) to Myeoncheon(면천), Yesan(예산), and Imjon Fortress(임존성). Garijeo area(가리저 방면) : 1,000 persons were deployed in the Garijeo(加里渚) area. These units moved from Garijeo(가리저) to Myeoncheon(면천), Yesan(예산), and Imjon Fortress(임존성). Geumganggu area(금강구 방면) : 000 persons were deployed. These units moved from Geumganggu(금강구) to Ganggyeong(강경) and Sabi Fortress(사비성). 4. Baekje military deployment Total troops of the Baekje army : There were 60 thousand Baekje troops according to the Old Book of Tang(舊唐書). Troop deployment by the Baekje army: 62,230 persons were deployed in 15 regions: 1,000 in Dangjin(당진), 1,000 in Garijeo(가리저), 6,120 in Imjon Fortress(임존성), 1,120 in Namjam Fortress(남잠성), 1,350 in Dooryangyun Fortress(두량윤성), 870 in Wangheungsajam Fortress(왕흥사잠성), 6,650 in Ungjin Fortress(웅진성), 1,120 in Jinhyeon Fortress(진현성), 1,000 in Dooshiwonak(두시원악), 1,000 in Irye Fortress(이례성), 5,000 in Gosaburi Fortress(고사부리성), 5,000 in Gujiha Fortress(구지하성), 3,000 plus 3,000 in Gibeolpo and Yangan(기벌포 양안), 5,000 in Deukan Fortress(득안성), and 20,000 in Sabi Fortress(사비성).

• Maritime Security
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.31-60
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• 2023

This study proposes a new convergence weapon system that combines the covert placement and detection abilities of a self-propelled mobile mine with the rapid tracking and attack abilities of supercavitating rocket torpedoes. This innovative system has been designed to counter North Korea's new underwater weapon, 'Haeil'. The concept behind this convergence weapon system is to maximize the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of each weapon type. Self-propelled mobile mines, typically placed discreetly on the seabed or in the water, are designed to explode when a vessel or submarine passes near them. They are generally used to defend or control specific areas, like traditional sea mines, and can effectively limit enemy movement and guide them in a desired direction. The advantage that self-propelled mines have over traditional sea mines is their ability to move independently, ensuring the survivability of the platform responsible for placing the sea mines. This allows the mines to be discreetly placed even deeper into enemy lines, significantly reducing the time and cost of mine placement while ensuring the safety of the deployed platforms. However, to cause substantial damage to a target, the mine needs to detonate when the target is very close - typically within a few yards. This makes the timing of the explosion crucial. On the other hand, supercavitating rocket torpedoes are capable of traveling at groundbreaking speeds, many times faster than conventional torpedoes. This rapid movement leaves little room for the target to evade, a significant advantage. However, this comes with notable drawbacks - short range, high noise levels, and guidance issues. The high noise levels and short range is a serious disadvantage that can expose the platform that launched the torpedo. This research proposes the use of a convergence weapon system that leverages the strengths of both weapons while compensating for their weaknesses. This strategy can overcome the limitations of traditional underwater kill-chains, offering swift and precise responses. By adapting the weapon acquisition criteria from the Defense force development Service Order, the effectiveness of the proposed system was independently analyzed and proven in terms of underwater defense sustainability, survivability, and cost-efficiency. Furthermore, the utility of this system was demonstrated through simulated scenarios, revealing its potential to play a critical role in future underwater kill-chain scenarios. However, realizing this system presents significant technical challenges and requires further research.

• Journal of National Security and Military Science
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• s.13
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• pp.687-738
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• 2016

To prepare for the complicated international relationship regarding Korean Peninsula after reunification, this thesis started off with the awareness that Unified Korea should build its international posture and national security at an early stage by determining its appropriate military strength for independent defense and military strategies that Unified Korea should aim. The main theme of this thesis is 'The research on appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military'. To derive appropriate military strength of Unified Korea, this research focuses on conflict scenario and relative balance strategy based on potential threats posed by neighboring countries, and this is the part that differentiates this research from other researches. First of all, the main objective of the research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to secure defense sufficiency. For this, this research will decide efficient military strategy that Unified Korea should aim. Than by presuming the most possible military conflict scenario, this research will judge the most appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to overcome the dispute. Second, after deciding appropriate military strength, this research will suggest how to operate presumed military strength in each armed force. The result of this thesis is as in the following. First, Unified Korea should aim 'relative balance strategy'. 'Relative balance strategy' is a military strategy which Unified Korea can independently secure defense sufficiency by maintaining relative balance when conflicts occur between neighboring countries. This strategy deters conflicts in advance by relative balance of power in certain time and place. Even if conflict occurs inevitably, this strategy secures initiative. Second, when analyzing neighboring countries interest and strategic environment after unification, the possibility of all-out war will be low in the Korean Peninsula because no other nation wants the Korean Peninsula to be subordinated to one single country. Therefore appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military would be enough when Unified Korea can achieve relative balance in regional war or limited war. Third, Northeast Asia is a region where economic power and military strength is concentrated. Despite increasing mutual cooperation in the region, conflicts and competition to expand each countries influence is inherent. Japan is constantly enhancing their military strength as they aim for normal statehood. China is modernizing their military strength as they aspire to become global central nation. Russia is also enhancing their military strength in order to hold on to their past glory of Soviet Union as a world power. As a result, both in quality and quantity, the gap between military strength of Unified Korea and each neighboring countries is enlarged at an alarming rate. Especially in the field of air-sea power, arms race is occurring between each nation. Therefore Unified Korea should be equipped with appropriate military strength in order to achieve relative balance with each threats posed by neighboring countries. Fourth, the most possible conflicts between Unified Korea and neighboring countries could be summarized into four, which are Dokdo territorial dispute with Japan, Leodo jurisdictional dispute with China, territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korea Peninsula with China and disputes regarding marine resources and sea routes with Russia. Based on those conflict scenarios, appropriate military strength for Unified Korea is as in the following. When conflict occurs with Japan regarding Dokdo, Japan is expected to put JMSDF Escort Flotilla 3, one out of four of its Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force Escort Fleet, which is based in Maizuru and JMSDF Maizuru District. To counterbalance this military strength, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of jurisdictional conflict with China concerning Leodo, China is expected to dispatch its North Sea fleet, one out of three of its naval fleet, which is in charge of the Yellow Sea. To response to this military action, Unified Korea needs one task fleet, comprised with three task flotilla. In case of territorial dispute concerning northern part of the Korean Peninsula with China, it is estimated that out of seven Military Region troops, China will dispatch two Military Region troops, including three Army Groups from Shenyang Military Region, where it faces boarder with the Korean Peninsula. To handle with this military strength, Unified Korea needs six corps size ground force strength, including three corps of ground forces, two operational reserve corps(maneuver corps), and one strategic reserve corps(maneuver corps). When conflict occurs with Russia regarding marine resources and sea routes, Russia is expected to send a warfare group of a size that includes two destroyers, which is part of the Pacific Fleet. In order to balance this strength, Unified Korea naval power requires one warfare group including two destroyers. Fifth, management direction for the Unified Korean military is as in the following. Regarding the ground force management, it would be most efficient to deploy troops in the border area with china for regional and counter-amphibious defense. For the defense except the border line with china, the most efficient form of force management would be maintaining strategic reserve corps. The naval force should achieve relative balance with neighboring countries when there is maritime dispute and build 'task fleet' which can independently handle long-range maritime mission. Of the three 'task fleet', one task fleet should be deployed at Jeju base to prepare for Dokdo territorial dispute and Leodo jurisdictional dispute. Also in case of regional conflict with china, one task fleet should be positioned at Yellow Sea and for regional conflict with Japan and Russia, one task fleet should be deployed at East Sea. Realistically, Unified Korea cannot possess an air force equal to neither Japan nor China in quantity. Therefore, although Unified Korea's air force might be inferior in quantity, they should possess the systematic level which Japan or China has. For this Unified Korea should build air base in island areas like Jeju Island or Ullenong Island to increase combat radius. Also to block off infiltration of enemy attack plane, air force needs to build and manage air bases near coastal areas. For landing operation forces, Marine Corps should be managed in the size of two divisions. For island defense force, which is in charge of Jeju Island, Ulleung Island, Dokdo Island and five northwestern boarder island defenses, it should be in the size of one brigade. Also for standing international peace keeping operation, it requires one brigade. Therefore Marine Corps should be organized into three divisions. The result of the research yields a few policy implications when building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea. First, Unified Korea requires lower number of ground troops compared to that of current ROK(Republic of Korea) force. Second, air-sea forces should be drastically reinforced. Third, appropriate military strength of the Unified Korean military should be based on current ROK military system. Forth, building appropriate military strength for Unified Korea should start from today, not after reunification. Because of this, South Korea should build a military power that can simultaneously prepare for current North Korea's provocations and future threats from neighboring countries after reunification. The core of this research is to decide appropriate military strength for Unified Korea to realize relative balance that will ensure defense sufficiency from neighboring countries threats. In other words, this research should precisely be aware of threats posed by neighboring countries and decide minimum level of military strength that could realize relative balance in conflict situation. Moreover this research will show the path for building appropriate military strength in each armed force.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.32 no.2
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• pp.189-217
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• 2017

Declaration of Air Defense and Identification Zones started with the United States in 1950, which was followed by declaration of KADIZ by the Republic of Korea in 1951. Initial ADIZ were solely linked with air defense missions, but their roles have changed as nations around the globe manifested a tendency to expand their influence over maritime resources and rights. In particular, China declared ADIZ over the East China Sea in October 2013 and forced all passing aircraft to submit flight plan to ATC or military authority, saying failure of submission will be followed by armed engagement. China announced it would declare another zone over the South China Sea despite the ongoing conflict in the area, clearly showing ADIZ's direct connection with territorial claim and EEZ and that it serves as a zone within which a nation can execute its rights. The expanded KADIZ, which was expanded in Dec 15, 2013 in response to Chinese actions, overlaps with the Chinese ADIZ over the East China Sea and the Japanese ADIZ. The overlapping zone is an airspace over waters where not only the Republic of Korea but also of China and Japan argue to be covering their continental shelf and EEZ. Military conventions were signed to prevent contingencies among the neighboring nations while conducting identifications in KADIZ, including the overlapping zone. If such military conventions and practice of air defense identification continue to be respected among states, it is under the process of turning into a regional customary law, although ADIZ is not yet recognized by international law or customary law. Moreover, identification within ADIZ is carried out by military authorities of states, and misguided customary procedures may cause serious negative consequences for national security since it may negatively impact neighboring countries in marking the maritime border, which calls for formulation of operation rules that account for other state activities and military talks among regional stake holders. Legal frameworks need to be in place to guarantee freedom of flights over international seas which UN Maritime Law protects, and laws regarding military aircraft operation need to be supplemented to not make it a requirement to submit flight plan if the aircraft does not invade sovereign airspace. Organizational instructions that require approval of Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for entrance and exit of ADIZ for military aircraft need to be amended to change the authority to Minister of National Defense or be promoted to a law to be applicable for commercial aircraft. Moreover, in regards to operation and management of ADIZ, transfer of authority should be prohibited to account for its evolution into a regional customary law in South East Asia. In particular, since ADIZ is set over EEZ, military conventions that yield authority related to national security should never be condoned. Among Korea, China, Japan and Russia, there are military conventions that discuss operation and management of ADIZ in place or under negotiation, meaning that ADIZ is becoming a regional customary law in North East Asia region.

• Korea and Global Affairs
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• v.1 no.2
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• pp.171-208
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• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.30 no.1
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• pp.273-302
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• 2015

The term "peaceful uses of outer space" in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty appears in official government statements and multilateral outer space related treaties. However, the examination of the state practice leads to the conclusion that this term is still without an authoritative definition. As far as the meaning of 'peaceful use' in international law is concerned the same phrases in the UN Charter, the 1963 Treaty of Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere in Outer Space and Under Water, the 1956 Statute of IAEA, the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 1972 United Nations Conference of the Human Environment were analysed As far as the meaning of 'peaceful uses of outer space' is concerned the same phrases the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the 1979 Moon Treaty and the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques(ENMOD) were studied. According to Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space treaty, states shall not place in orbit around the earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kind of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner. The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies repeats in Article III much of the Outer Space Treaty. This article prohibits the threat or use of force or any other hostile act on the moon and the use of the moon to commit such an act in relation to the earth or to space objects. This adds IN principle nothing to the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty relating to military space activities. The 1977 ENMOD refers to peaceful purposes in the preamble and in Article III. As far as the UN Resolutions are concerned, the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exp1oration and Use of Outer Space, the 1992 Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space(NPS) were studied. And as far the Soft Laws are concerned the 2008 Draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapon in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects(PPWT), the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Prolifiration(HCoC) and 2012 Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities(ICoC) were studied.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
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• v.27 no.2
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• pp.211-241
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• 2012

The Draft International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities officially proposed by the European Union on the occasion of the 55th Session of the United Nations Peaceful Uses of the Outer Space last June 2012 in Vienna, Austria is to fill the lacunae of the relevant norms to be applied to the human activities in the outer space and thus has the merit our attention. The missing elements of the norms span from the prohibition of an arms race, safety and security of the space objects including the measures to reduce the space debris to the exchange of information of space activities among space-faring nations. The EU's initiatives, when implemented, cover or will eventually prepare for the forum to deal with such issues of interests of the international community. The EU's initiatives begun at the end of 2008 included the unofficial contacts with major space powers including in particular the USA of which position is believed to have been reflected in the Draft with the aim to have it adopted in 2013. Although the Code is made up of soft law rather than hard law for the subscribing countries, the USA seems to be afraid of the eventuality whereby its strategic advantages in the outer space will be affected by the prohibiting norms, possibly to be pursued by the Code from its current non-binding character, of placing weapons in the outer space. It is with this trepidation that the USA has been opposing to the adoption of the United Nations Assembly Resolutions on the prevention of an arms race in the outer space (PAROS) and in the same context to the setting-up of a working group on the arms race in the outer space in the frame of the Conference on Disarmament. China and Russia who together put forward a draft Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT) in 2008 would not feel comfortable either because the EU initiatives will steal the lime light. Consequently their reactions are understandably passive towards the Draft Code while the reaction of the USA to the PPWT was a clear cut "No". With the above background, the future of the EU Code is uncertain. Nevertheless, the purpose of the Code to reduce the space debris, to allow exchange of the information on the space activities, and to protect the space objects through safety and security, all to maximize the principle of the peaceful use and exploration of the outer space is the laudable efforts on the part of EU. When the detailed negotiations will be held, some problems including the cost to be incurred by setting up an office for the clerical works could be discussed for both efficient and economic mechanism. For example, the new clerical works envisaged in the Draft Code could be discharged by the current UN OOSA (Office for Outer Space Affairs) with minimal additional resources. The EU's initiatives are another meaningful contribution following one due to it in adopting the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 to the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on the Climate Change) and deserve the praise from the thoughtful international community.

• Atmosphere
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• v.22 no.4
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• pp.489-497
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• 2012

Recently released a top secret document explicitly shows that the early development plan for an earth observation satellite in the USA has a hidden and more important purpose for a concept of 'free space' than the scientific purpose. At that time, the hidden and secret concept imbedded within the early space development plan prevail other national policies of the USA government for purpose of the national security. Under these circumstances, it is quite reasonable to accept a possibility that the meteorological satellites which play a key role in the every area of meteorology and climatology was also born for the hidden purposes. Even it is so, it is quite amazing that the first meteorological satellite is launched in the USA despite of the facts that the major users of the meteorological satellites were not very enthusiastic with the meteorological satellite and the program was not started as a formal meteorological satellite project. This was only possible because of the external socio-political impact caused by the successful launch of the Russian Sputnik satellite and a few key policy developers who favored the meteorological satellite program. It is also interesting to note that the beginning of the first Korean meteorological satellite program was initiated by a similar socio-political influence occurred by the launch of a North Korean satellite.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.215-240
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• 2020

In 2017, the U.S. DARPA coined 'mosaic warfare' as a new way of warfighting. According to the Timothy Grayson, director of DARPA's Strategic Technologies Office, mosaic warfare is a "system of system" approach to warfghting designed around compatible "tiles" of capabilities, rather than uniquely shaped "puzzle pieces" that must be fitted into a specific slot in a battle plan in order for it to work. Prior to cover mosaic warfare theory and recent development, it deals analyze its background and several premises for better understanding. The U.S. DoD officials might acknowledge the current its forces vulnerability to the China's A2/AD assets. Furthermore, the U.S. seeks to complete military superiority even in other nation's territorial domains including sea and air. Given its rapid combat restoration capability and less manpower casualty, the U.S. would be able to ready to endure war of attrition that requires massive resources. The core concept of mosaic warfare is a "decision centric warfare". To embody this idea, it create adaptability for U.S. forces and complexity or uncertainty for the enemy through the rapid composition and recomposition of a more disag g reg ated U.S. military force using human command and machine control. This allows providing more options to friendly forces and collapse adversary's OODA loop eventually. Adaptable kill web, composable force packages, A.I., and context-centric C3 architecture are crucial elements to implement and carry out mosaic warfare. Recently, CSBA showed an compelling assessment of mosaic warfare simulation. In this wargame, there was a significant differences between traditional and mosaic teams. Mosaic team was able to mount more simultaneous actions, creating additional complexity to adversaries and overwhelming their decision-making with less friendly force's human casualty. It increase the speed of the U.S. force's decision-making, enabling commanders to better employ tempo. Consequently, this article finds out and suggests implications for Korea armed forces. First of all, it needs to examine and develop 'mosaic warfare' in terms of our security circumstance. In response to future warfare, reviewing overall force structure and architecture is required which is able to compose force element regardless domain. In regards to insufficient defense resources and budget, "choice" and "concentration" are also essential. It needs to have eyes on the neighboring countries' development of future war concept carefully.