• Korea Trade Review
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• v.42 no.4
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• pp.139-157
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• 2017

Whether an investor can invoke a dispute settlement procedure stipulated in other BIT based on the MFN clause in the original BIT is an important issue. There is a difference in the interpretation of MFN clause in which the scope of the treatment stipulates the slightly different contents for each investment treaty. Therefore, this study considered ICSID arbitration cases related to the applicability of MFN clause for investment dispute settlement provisions. There are two different approaches for the applicability of MFN clause by arbitral tribunals. At first, the expanded interpretation of the MFN clause can be applied to procedural regulations, in that the purpose of the investment treaty is to protect foreign investors and to ensure their status. So, foreign investors can invoke a BIT of a third country that is advantageous to them. Second, the limited interpretation of the MFN clause can not be applied to procedural regulations. Without explicit regulation, the term treatment can not be considered to include dispute resolution provisions. And the BIT that the host state has concluded with third country is a treaty that applies only to the contracting party, so it can not be used by foreign investors of other nationality. Therefore, this study suggests concretely stipulating the scope of MFN clause under the investment treaty, highlighting that certain restrictions should be applied to the MFN clause. Furthermore, it is required continually investigating and analyzing the database of the scope of MFN clause.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.71
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• pp.195-216
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• 2016

In determining the content of the FET standard, the tribunals stated protection of investor's legitimate expectations, due process and denial of justice, transparency, discrimination and arbitrariness, good faith, etc. The most major elements of the FET standard is the protection of the investor's legitimate and reasonable expectations. It is necessary to consider whether it is possible to what the expectations of investors are protected as legitimate and it is formed under any circumstances. If host state frustrate investor's legitimate expectations, it found a breach of the FET. The host state's specific assurance may reinforce investor's expectations, but such explicit statement is not always necessary. The host state must preserve a stable environment for investments. However, It must not be understood as the inalterability of the host state's legal framework. It implies that the host state's subsequent changes should be made consistently and predictably. The host state is entitled to exercise a reasonable regulatory authority to respond to changing circumstances in the public purpose. Therefore, whether the violation FET shall be determined through a balanced against the investor's legitimate expectations and the host state's reasonable regulatory exercise in the public interest. And investor should keep in mind that the principle of proportionality is applied unless host state provides stabilization clause or similar commitments to investor. Also host state should establish the basis of an argument about reasonable regulatory authority for public interest.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.121-145
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• 2009

South Korea has investment agreements such as FTAs, BITs with several countries. Up to now, no single case has been registered against the Korean government on breach of investment agreements, but it is likely that the number of such cases would increase. Therefore, an investor-state dispute settlement system, an arbitral procedure by which a foreign investor may seek compensation of damage against the host country, is gaining its importance. The provision of the ISDS has been one of the hottest issues in Korea while the Kor-US FTA was being signed. In this respect, with the growing number of regional agreements such as BITs and FTAs, a careful scrutiny on the ISDS is necessary for Korea. I have therefore studied theoretically subjects including the National Treatment(NT), the Most-Favored Nation(MFN), Fair and Equitable Treatment and Expropriation - those that have been the objects of protection on investors. And I have analyzed ICSID arbitral awards and provided implications. In the ICSID arbitral awards, the Fair and Equitable Treatment turned out to be the most recognized violation on investors by the host State in terms of investor protection. On the other hand, Indirect Expropriation - a matter of which public anxiety was shown led by civic groups - was not generally recognized in arbitral awards. This study is written for sake of governments, local autonomous entities and public enterprises that are in charge of FTAs and BITs.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.31 no.1
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• pp.3-22
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• 2021

This article examines the Challenge through Annulment of ICSID Arbitral Awards. Either party may request annulment of the award by applying in writing addressed to the ICSID Secretary-General on one or more of the grounds under Article 52 of the ICSID Convention. The annulment proceedings must focus on the award itself. Because committees have no inherent supremacy over the arbitral tribunal, they should not review the tribunal's findings on evidence, damage, interest, and cost findings. Otherwise, the parties would have, in effect, two opportunities, and that will almost certainly weaken the reliability of the entire ICSID system. In short, because of the limited scope of review under ICSID annulment and because annulment is not an opportunity for the parties to re-try the case, committees should not allow new arguments or new evidence. Since an annulment committee is not a court of appeals, it cannot create a new res judicata. Committees can only decide not to annul an award, thus confirming the existing res judicata or annul the award, in which case the affected decision ceases to be res judicata. An obvious annulment decision stipulating which particular findings of the award remain res judicata should prevent any uncertainty in resubmission proceedings.

• Journal of Arbitration Studies
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• v.25 no.2
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• pp.71-96
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• 2015

This paper deals with the annulment of the ICSID(International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) arbitral award. The annulment of the ICSID is characterized by the fact that it can be made possible through the special committee of ICSID only. The annulment of the ICSID was constructed on the premise that it is not an appeal procedure. However in the initial period, it was strongly criticized as it allowed new trials or duplicated many of the functions of an appeal and it broke down the boundary between the two systems. Although the trend seemed to be corrected through its 2nd and 3rd generations, it was still criticized for functioning as a new trial. It is approaching its 4th generation. On the other hand, with the activation of investment agreement arbitration based on ICSID and FTA, a certain degree of consistency is required for the ICSID arbitralaward. Also, with the emphasis on the public features of the arbitration for the investment agreement, the necessity of an appeal system is presented. The ICSID Secretariat published the "Opinion on the Appeal Procedure" in 2004 but as the system was criticized as too early due to the cost allocation problem and others, its adoption of an appeal procedure has been delayed. This paper focuses on how the currently incomplete ICSID arbitration judgment annulment system shall be used. Although it is still hardto expect the quality and consistent arbitral award annulment in the ICSID, this paper suggests that the "annulment without the actual new trial" using the restricted authority of a special commission in a creative way shall be pursued rather than just the actual new trial with or without annulment, thus going back to the original concept of the ICSID arbitral award annulment.