• Korean Journal of Legislative Studies
• /
• v.25 no.3
• /
• pp.69-96
• /
• 2019

This paper is written to suggest several recommendations for South Korea to deter and defend North Korean nuclear threat, when North Korea does not seem to give up its nuclear weapons and the US's extended deterrence including the nuclear umbrella could remain uncertain. For this purpose, it explains key options regarding nuclear deterrence and defense by non-nuclear weapon state. It evaluates the current status of South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat and provides some recommendations to improve the preparedness. As a result, this paper concluded that South Korean non-nuclear preparedness against North Korean nuclear threat was not that reliable. The preparedness has weakened since the South Korean effort to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations in 2018. In this sense, South Korea could have serious problems in protecting its people from North Korean nuclear threat if the US promise of extended deterrence is not implemented. South Korea should focus on its decapitation operation to North Korean highest leaders in case of North Korean nuclear attack based on a minimal deterrence concept. It should be prepared to conduct preventive strikes instead of preemptive strikes due to North Korea's development of solid fuel ballistic missiles. It should integrate its Ballistic Missile Defense with that of the US forces in Korea. South Korea should make a sincere effort for nuclear civil defense including construction of nuclear shelters.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.37
• /
• pp.325-354
• /
• 2013

The concept of national security and the fundamental system for crisis management have departed from traditional methods and the importance of a national critical infrastructure crisis management has been emphasized. A national critical infrastructure crisis means a situation where human resource, material and functional system that may have a material effect on the critical functions of the government, the vitality and integrity of society, national economy and the safety of the public becomes disabled due to causes such as terrorism or major disasters. Although North Korea had been subject to numerous rounds of negotiations and sanctions as it continually developed nuclear weapons since the 1960s, it has also showed off its nuclear armaments through successful nuclear testings and missile launches. As the development and threat of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction becomes more noticeable and the range of its risk expands, this study focuses on the potential for an absence of leadership for national crisis management where the country's leadership, which should serve the critical role and function of handling national crises, becomes completely destroyed by the unexpected initial attacks by North Korea. As a result, the purpose of this study is to propose safety measures for the country's leadership in preparation for North Korea's threat of nuclear weapons by examining the concept and degree of risk of weapons of mass destruction with a focus on nuclear weapons, analyzing the substance of the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and evaluating such threat. In conclusion, first, to ensure the normal functioning of a national crisis management system in the event of a national crisis, we must seek safety measures that conform to the scope and succession order of the leadership of the national crisis management for an Enduring Constitutional Government (ECG) and the Continuity Of Operations (COOP). Second, in the event of a national ceremony, the gathering of the country's leadership all together in an open place should be avoided. In unavoidable circumstances, the next in rank that will act on behalf of the current leader should be designated and relevant safety measures should be taken. Third, during time of peace, in preparation for national crises, the scope of protection for the country's leadership should be prescribed and specific security and safety measures should be implemented. Fourth, the succession order for acting president in the case of the death of the president pursuant to Articles 71 and 26(1) of the National Government Organization Act should reconsidered to see whether it is a reasonable provision that takes into consideration a national crisis management that corresponds to the threat of North Korean nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Pursuant to the Basic Guidelines for National Crisis Management set out under Presidential Directive No. 229, the Korean government is currently operating a case-by-case "crisis management standard manual" and its sub-manuals and has also prepared the Presidential Security Service's security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president. Therefore, the Korean government should actualize the above points in the case-by-case crisis management standard manual and security and safety measure regulations regarding the acting president to implement and legislate them.

• The Korean Journal of Air & Space Law and Policy
• /
• v.30 no.1
• /
• pp.303-325
• /
• 2015

The latest slogan put forth by the international space community is the safety, security, and sustainability of outer space activities. The security of outer space activities, in particular, would be defined as the secure state from space-based threats. The latter comprises passive threats (such as collision with other satellites and space debris) and aggressive threats (such as electromagnetic interference, arms race on the earth or in outer space, and military attacks). Has outer space been used for military purposes in practice? If so, does international law regulate the military space activities it? The use of outer space for military purposes is referred to as space militarization and space weaponisation. Satellites has been used in Gulf War, Kosovo War, and Afghan War, recently, and research and development on space weapons are under way. Since only the placement of weapons of mass destruction on orbit around the earth is prohibited in accordance with 1967 Outer Space Treaty, it may be asked whether other weapons may be placed on orbit. It will be necessary to analyze the stance of on the above question, by studying UN space-related treaties including UN Charter. New international space norms represented by PPWT, ICoC, and UN GGE Report are at the center of progressive development of international law. In conclusion, the author will signpost the various points on international norms to be codified on the use of outer space for military purposes.

• Korea and Global Affairs
• /
• v.1 no.2
• /
• pp.171-208
• /
• 2017

This paper is to analyze the type characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy. To this end, the paper is composed of 5 chapters titled introduction; the concept and type of nuclear strategy; the nuclear capabilities of North Korea and the declarative nuclear strategy; the operational characteristics and prospects of the North Korean nuclear strategy; and conclusion. Recently, the deployment of nuclear weapons and the enhancement of nuclear capabilities in North Korea have raised serious problems in our security and military preparedness. Nuclear strategy means military strategy related to the organization, deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. The study of North Korea's nuclear strategy begins with a very realistic assumption that the nuclear arsenal of North Korea has been substantiated. It is a measure based on North Korea's nuclear arsenal that our defense authorities present the concepts of preemptive attack, missile defense, and mass retaliation as countermeasures against the North Korean nuclear issue and are in the process of introducing and deploying them. The declared nuclear declaration strategy of the DPRK is summarized as: (1)Nuclear deterrence and retaliation strategy under the (North Korea's) Nuclear Weapons Act, (2)Nuclear preemptive aggression, (3)The principle of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons in the 7th Congress. And the intentions and operational characteristics of the North Korean nuclear strategy are as follows: (1)Avoiding blame through imitation of existing nuclear state practices, (2)Favoring of nuclear strategy through declarative nuclear strategy, (3)Non-settlement of nuclear strategy due to gap between nuclear capability and nuclear posture. North Korea has declared itself a nuclear-weapon state through the revised Constitution(2012.7), the Line of 'Construction of the Nuclear Armed Forces and the Economy'(2013.3), and the Nuclear Weapons Act(2013.4). However, the status of "nuclear nations" can only be granted by the NPT, which is already a closed system. Realistically, a robust ROK-US alliance and close US-ROK cooperation are crucial to curbing and overcoming the North Korean nuclear threat we face. On this basis, it is essential not only to deter North Korea's nuclear attacks, but also to establish and implement our own short-term, middle-term and long-term political and military countermeasures for North Korea's denuclearization and disarmament.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.39
• /
• pp.185-215
• /
• 2014

Since North Korea has used terror crime as a means of unification under communism against South Korea, South Korea has been much damaged until now. And the occurrence possibility of terror crime by North Korean authority is now higher than any other time. The North Korean terror crimes of Kim Il Sung era had been committed by the dictator's instruction with the object of securing governing fund. However, looking at the terror crimes committed for decades during Kim Jung Il authority, it is revealed that these terror crimes are expressed as a criminal behavior because of the conflict to accomplish the power and economic advantage non powerful groups target. This study focused on the power conflict in various causes of terror crimes by applying George B. Vold(1958)'s theory which explained power conflict between groups became a factor of crime, and found the aspect by ages of terror crime behavior by North Korean authority and responding plan to future North Korean terror crime. North Korean authority high-ranking officials were the Labor Party focusing on Juche Idea for decades in Kim Il Sung time. Afterwards, high-ranking officials were formed focusing on military authorities following Military First Policy at the beginning of Kim Jung Il authority, rapid power change has been done for recent 10 years. To arrange the aspect by times of terror crime following this power change, alienated party executives following the support of positive military first authority by Kim Jung Il after 1995 could not object to forcible terror crime behavior of military authority, and 1st, 2nd Yeongpyeong maritime war which happened this time was propelled by military first authority to show the power of military authority. After 2006, conservative party union enforced censorship and inspection on the trade business and foreign currency-earning of military authority while executing drastic purge. The shooting on Keumkangsan tourists that happened this time was a forcible terror crime by military authority following the pressure of conservative party. After October, 2008, first military reign union executed the launch of Gwanmyungsung No.2 long-range missile, second nuclear test, Daechung marine war, and Cheonanham attacking terror in order to highlight the importance and role of military authority. After September 2010, new reign union went through severe competition between new military authority and new mainstream and new military authority at this time executed highly professionalized terror crime such as cyber/electronic terror unlike past military authority. After July 2012, ICBM test launch, third nuclear test, cyber terror on Cheongwadae homepage of new mainstream association was the intention of Km Jung Eun to display his ability and check and adjust the power of party/military/cabinet/ public security organ, and he can attempt the unexpected terror crime in the future. North Korean terror crime has continued since 1980s when Kim Jung Il's power succession was carried out, and the power aspect by times has rapidly changed since 1994 when Kim Il Sung died and the terror crime became intense following the power combat between high-ranking officials and power conflict for right robbery. Now South Korea should install the specialized department which synthesizes and analyzes the information on North Korean high-ranking officials and reinforce the comprehensive information-collecting system through the protection and management of North Korean defectors and secret agents in order to determine the cause of North Korean terror crime and respond to it. And South Korea should participate positively in the international collaboration related to North Korean terror and make direct efforts to attract the international agreement to build the international cooperation for the response to North Korean terror crime. Also, we should try more to arrange the realistic countermeasure against North Korean cyber/electronic terror which was more diversified with the expertise terror escaping from existing forcible terror through enactment/revision of law related to cyber terror crime, organizing relevant institute and budget, training professional manpower, and technical development.

• Korean Security Journal
• /
• no.41
• /
• pp.37-66
• /
• 2014

In recent years, with the development of computers and electronics, electronics and communication technology in a growing and each part is dependent on the cross-referencing makes all electronic equipment is obsolete due to direct or indirect damage EMP. Korea and the impending standoff North Korea has a considerable level of technologies related to the EMP, EMP weapons you already have or in a few years, the development of EMP weapons will complete. North Korea launched a long-range missile and conducted a nuclear test on several occasions immediately after, when I saw the high-altitude nuclear blackmail has been strengthening the outright offensive nuclear EMP attacks at any time and practical significance for the EMP will need offensive skills would improve. At this point you can predict the damage situation of Korea's security reality that satisfy the need, more than anything else to build a protective system of the EMP. The scale of the damage that unforeseen but significant military damage and socio-economic damage and fatalities when I looked into the situation which started out as a satellite communications systems and equipment to attack military and security systems and transportation, finance, national emergency system, such as the damage elsewhere. In General, there is no direct casualties reported, but EMP medical devices that rely on lethal damage to people who can show up. In addition, the State power system failure due to a power supply interruption would not have thought the damage would bring State highly dependent on domestic power generation of nuclear plants is a serious nuclear power plant accident in the event of a blackout phenomenon can lead to the plant's internal problems should see a forecast. First of all, a special expert Committee of the EMP, the demand for protective facilities and equipment and conduct an investigation, he takes fits into your budget is under strict criteria by configuring the contractors should be sifting through. He then created the Agency for verification of performance EMP protection after you have verified the performance of maintenance, maintenance, safety and security management, design and construction company organized and systematic process Guard facilities or secret communications equipment and perfect for the EMP, such as protective equipment maneuver system should take.