• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.23 no.2
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• pp.117-159
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• 2020

In the early Wittgenstein's Tractatus, both philosophy of logic and that of mathematics belong to the most crucial subjects of it. What is the philosophical view of the early Wittgenstein in the Tractatus? Did he, for example, accept Frege and Russell's logicism or reject it? How did he stipulate the relation between logic and mathematics? How should we, for example, interpretate "Mathematics is a method of logic."(6.234) and "The Logic of the world which the proposition of logic show in the tautologies, mathematics shows in equations."(6.22)? Furthermore, How did he grasp the relation between mathematical equations and tautologies? In this paper, I will endeavor to answer these questions.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.71-104
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• 2004

비트겐슈타인이 왜 "논고"를 포기했느냐 하는 주제는 비트겐슈타인의 철학을 조명하는 데 매우 중요한 문제이다. 그러나 이 글의 일차적인 관심은 비트겐슈타인이라는 한 개인의 실제 철학적 사유 과정보다는, 오히려 "논고"가 포기될 수 있는 모든 가능성들과 경로를 생각하고 추적하는 데 있다. 이를 위하여 우리는 "논고"의 여러 근본 전제들을 크게 두 가지로 나눌 수 있다. 한 부류는 직접적 논박 가능성이 희박한 것으로서, 여기에는 "논고"에서 정의에 해당되는 것, 모호한 개념인 "완전한 분석"과 관련된 것, 그리고 유아론과 관련된 것 등이 있다. 다른한 부류는 전자에 비해 어떤 직접적인 논박 가능성의 여지가 있는 근본 전제로서, 가장 중요한 것으로 요소 명제들의 상호 독립성을 들 수 있다. "논고"는 소위 "색깔배제 문제"부터 후자에 속하는 근본전제가 직접적인 타격을 입으면서 와해되기 시작했으며, "논고"와는 완전히 다른 패러다임에 서게 됨으로써 비로소 포기되었다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.3
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• pp.417-446
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• 2019

The operation theory of the Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is the essential basis of the philosophy of mathematics of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein presents the definition of cardinal numbers on the basis of operation theory, and suggests the proof of "$2{\times}2=4$" by using the theory of operations in 6.241. Therefore, in order to explicate correctly the philosophy of mathematics, it is required to understand rigorously the theory of operations in the Tractatus. Accordingly in this paper, I will endeavor to explicate operation theory of the Tractatus as a preliminary study for explicating the philosophy of mathematics of the Tractatus. In this process, we can ascertain Frascolla's important contributions and fallacies in his reconstruction of 6.241. In particular, we can understand the background that in 6.241 Wittgenstein made mistakes and that there he dealt with the addition operation of the theory of operations, and on the basis of this, we can reconstruct correctly 6.241.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.19 no.1
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• pp.1-49
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• 2016

In the Tractatus, 'logical space' raises the several puzzles as follows. What are logical space, logical coordinates and logical place? What is the point of such analogies and what do they refer to exactly in the Tractatus? And what do occupy logical space? Can facts, proposition, propositional sign, situation and contradiction occupy it respectively? Or is it impossible to reconcile the remarks concerning logical place in the Tractatus? Futhermore, why did Wittgenstein need the concept of logical space? What is the problem that he tried to solve through this concept? In this paper, I will endeavor to answer to these problems. Logical space in the Tractatus is the system of propositions with senses. And it is the concept which Wittgenstein contrived by making model of Hertz's configuration space. Wittgenstein's fundamental coordinates are in some ways similar to geometrical ones. On the other hand logical coordinates are completely different from geometrical ones. Hence attempts to understand logical space by a kind of geometrical spaces cannot be right at all.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.1
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• pp.1-37
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• 2018

As is well known, Wittgenstein criticizes Russell's theory of types explicitly in the Tractatus. What, then, is the point of Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types? In order to answer this question I will consider the theory of types on its philosophical aspect and its logical aspect. Roughly speaking, in the Tractatus Wittgenstein's logical syntax is the alternative of Russell's theory of types. Logical syntax is the sign rules, in particular, formation rules of notation of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein's distinction of saying-showing is the most fundamental ground of logical syntax. Wittgenstein makes a step forward with his criticism of Russell's theory of types to the view that logical grammar is arbitrary and a priori. His criticism of Russell's theory of types is after all the challenge against Frege-Russell's conception of logic. Logic is not concerned with general truth or features of the world. Tautologies which consist of logic say nothing.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.41-65
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• 2004

이 글은 박병철과 이승종의 저술에 대한 박정일의 서평을 중심으로 비트겐슈타인 철학의 몇몇 문제점을 고찰하면서 다음과 같은 것을 주장한다. 첫째 비트겐슈타인 철학의 현상학적 양상을 추적하고 있는 박병철의 현상학의 개념이 명백하지 않다. 둘째 "논리철학논고"의 유아론은 경험적 유아론이 아니라 선험적 유아론이다. 셋째 "논리철학논고"의 대상은 감각자료가 아니다. 넷째 우리에게 주어진 소여는 논리적인 것이다. 다섯째 박병철은 이 논리적인 것을 경험에 근거지우는 실책을 범하고 있다. 여섯째 모순의 형식적 개념에 대한 이승종의 비판은 성공적이지 않다. 일곱째 이것은 박정일이 지적한 것처럼 허수아비 공격의 오류를 범했기 때문인 것처럼 보인다. 여덟째 모순된 규칙에 대한 이승종의 이해는 박정일이 지적하듯이 잘못되었다.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.253-290
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• 2019

Wittgenstein presents so-called picture theory in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. What is, then, the point of the picture theory? What are the philosophical problems which the picture theory tries to solve? In this paper, I will endeavor to show that the object of a picture is different from the sense of a picture, that the representing relation is different from the projective relation, that picture theory is applied to composite propositions as well as elementary propositions and that on the one hand the basic problems that picture theory tries to solve are problem of theory of meaning and that of theory of truth, but on the other hand the more important problem is what Wittgenstein calls "the mystery of negation." From these discussions, we can see that it is not correct at all to interpret that the picture theory in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is nothing but an analogy which does not have a significant content.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.17 no.1
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• pp.1-32
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• 2014

Both 5.52 and 5.521 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus raise several questions. In this paper I will explicate Wittgenstein's concept of generality by answering such questions. These questions and problems are closely intertwined. I will try to show what follows. It is ${\xi}$-conditions that are most decisive on the concept of generality of the Tractatus. Except Ramsey, commentators such as Anscombe, Glock, Kenny etc. failed in accurately grasping the Wittgenstein's thoughts concerning ${\xi}$-condition and their claims are not fair at all. Futhermore, from a view point of history of logic, 5.52 has very important significances. That is to say, it anticipates for the first time a possibility of infinitary logic and the concept of universe of discourse in model theory.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.21 no.2
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• pp.231-268
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• 2018

Wittgenstein asserts in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 5.542 that "A believes that p" is of the form "'p' says p" and "here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a co-ordination of facts by means of a co-ordination of their objects." What does, then, it mean exactly that 'p' says p? What are "facts" and "a co-ordination" in the expression "a co-ordination of facts"? Are propositional attitude statements significant propositions or not? Furthermore, what is the point of Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of judgement? In this paper, I will answer these questions on the basis of Wittgenstein's explication of the concept of thought and Ramsey's relevant remark on propositional attitude. Meanwhile propositional attitude statements are bound up with solipsism of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and some of them have senses. Hence both of assertions that all the propositional attitude statements are significant and all of them are nonsense in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus are not correct.

• Korean Journal of Logic
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.47-70
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• 2004

필자는 이 글에서 박병철의 저서 Phenomenological Aspects of Wittgenstein's Philosophy (Kluwer 1998)에 대한 박정일 박사의 서평과 김영건 박사의 비판에 대한 반론을 제시하고 있다. 먼저 현상학과 현상론의 구분이 불분명하다는 비판에 대한 반론에서 시작하여, 유아론에 대한 비판을 반박하고 있으며, "논리-철학 논고"에서의 대상의 본성에 대한 견해도 밝히고 있다. 필자는 무엇보다도 자신의 시도가 여전히 불투명한 비트겐슈타인의 철학을 놓고 벌어지는 다양한 해석의 스펙트럼의 한 부분을 이룰 수 있을 것이라고 주장한다.