Reserved forces of ROKA are in charge of replacement of TOE in the wartime and mission of rear area operation. But there is institutional inertia in the law and organization oriented to fill human resources rather than take mission. We need to prepare for the investment and arrangement of reserved forces as military power that would be replaced standing forces. In this portion, to reinforce reserve forces elite, First, efficient mobilization regulations and systems are suggested. I covered a maintenance of relevant mobilization ordinances which need to legislated and approved by national assembly for wartime and development of mobilization system which might lose the appropriate time for mobilization due to complicated declaration procedures and measures to overcome the panic at the initial stage of the war and organization and employment of nationwide transportation system and mobilization center. To ensure efficient resource management and mobilization of reserve forces with a number of approximately 3 million, there's a necessity of organization for integration and conciliation. To make it real, I suggested establishing and employing the mobilization center, on first phase, employ the mobilization center focusing on homeland divisions, on second phase, it is advisable to convert to national level mobilization system and develop to central mobilization center focusing on national emergency planning committee. During peacetime, in conjunction with Mobilization Cell, mobilization center can conduct resource survey and integrate and manage mobilization resources and take charge of mobilization training of subordinate units, and during wartime, in conjunction with mobilization coordination team and Cell, can ensure the execution of mobilization. Second, Future oriented reserve forces management system such as service system of reserve forces and support system of homeland defense operations. Current service and trainings of reserve forces by the year have very low connection, as it is very complex to manage the resources and trainings, and service and training lack the equity, re-establishment of service system is required. Also in an aspect of CSS and cultivation support for reserve forces, as the scope and limitation of responsibility between the armed forces and autonomous organization is obscure, conditions to conduct actual-fighting exercises are limited. Concentrated budgetting is extremely difficult because reserve forces training fields are scattered nationwide, and facilities and equipments are rapidly getting older. To improve all these, I suggest the organization of homeland defense battalion with a unit of "City-Gun-District" and supporting the local reserve forces. Conduct unit replacement or personal replacement for those who have finished their 1 or 2 years and homeland defense operation duty for those with 3-5 years for consistency and simplification. Third, I suggest Future oriented Reserved Training(FRT) and Training Center oriented training management to establish a reliable reserve training. Reserves carry out expansion of unit, conventional combat mission, homeland defense and logistics support during wartime, and actual-fighting exercise, and disaster relief, peace keeping activities. Despite diverse activities and roles, their training condition still stays definitely poor. For these reasons, Modernization of weapons and facilities through gradual replacement and procurement is essential to enhance mobilization support system.

Reserved force's training(RFT) is undoubtedly the critical component to increase the national capability in case of emergency. It is because RFT plays an important role in maintaining the peace for the Korean peninsula as the key deterrence force power for more than 40 years. Considering the reserved force reform linked with the goal and the plan of Korean Defense Reform 2020', we can expect the utility of the reserved force as the potential combat power to make national defense resources more efficient and useful. In that sense, this study suggests some solutions to promote the reserved force's competency to demonstrate the ROK Armed Force's combat power as the equivalent partner with the active force as well as the future deterrence power. This study also analyzes the present training system including law and regulation, identifies some implications through the literature review, and designs the future ROK reserved force's training system by extracting new variables forecasting the future environment for national defense. In addition, this study includes its concerned systems generally without limiting the scope into the reserved force. Therefore we try to seek to prepare for mobilization readiness and to promote regional hometown defense capability in order to cope with the enemy's threat in case of emergency.

ROK and the United States finally reached accord on the controversial transition of Wartime Operational Control on February, 2007, and ROK Government needs to strengthen the role of supporting for the comprehensive threats of futuristic warfare. The crucial point of the supporting for Military Operation depends on the nation's mobilization capabilities. For the effective mobilization the following facets can be improved further. First of all, the organizational integrity of the mobilization network within the government can be bolstered along the vertical command chain. The process of mobilization must be improved and it is import to utilize the information system. On the other side the government plan to distribute timely the mobilized resources must be made up for the weak points and developed continuously. We can expect these points to be improved steadily with the execution of the National Defence Reform 2020.

Government duties in the cases of crisis are aimed at supporting efficient military operations in the fields of non-military affairs and resource mobilization, maintenance of government functions, and search for the public security of living during the war. In crisis, the government must change its functions into the total-war system with all resources available for the efficient performance of military operations, war economy, public safety and security as well as government continuance. The main contents of "Chung-Mu Plan" include the alternative measures to control the circulation of life necessities, emergency electricity, water and gas; recover public facilities from the disaster; and accommodate the wounded and refugees. Governments have practiced Ul-chi and ChungMoo exercises to improve government's management capabilities and master standard operating procedures including systematic distribution plans in the national and local level. However, such plans have not yet sufficient enough for the maintenance of public security of living. In addition to the conceptual ambiguity, major problems are the inappropriate system of the war economy, legal institutions, and administrative SOPs for the efficient maintenance of it. Thus, for the betterment of national crisis management system, the government should have the manual stated from every step and level dealing with crisis to the legal institutions. It is important to empower the National Emergency Planning Commission for the policy consistency and efficient/effective implementation. The comprehensive plans must have an integrated cooperative system of the central/local governments, military and civil society with actual practices and exercises for the maintenance of the public security of living.

After successful nuclear tests Pakistan launched a more severe surprise attack toward India than before. It is highly possible that North Korea will adopt this Pakistan military strategy if it is armed with nuclear weapons. The North Korean forces armed, with nuclear bombs could make double its war capability through strengthening aggressive force structure and come into effect on blocking reinforcement of the US forces at the initial phase of war time. Therefore we may regard that Pyongyang's nuclear arming is a major one of various factors which increase possibility of waging a conventional warfare or a nuclear war. North Korea's high self-confidence after nuclear arming will heighten tension on the Korean Peninsula via aggressive military threat or terror toward South Korea, and endeavor to accomplish its political purpose via low-intensity conflicts. For instance, nuclear arming of the Pyongyang regime enforces the North Korean forces to invade the Northern Limit Line(NLL), provoke naval battles at the West Sea, and occupy one or two among the Five Islands at the West Sea. In that case, the South Korean forces will be faced with a serious dilemma. In order to recapture the islands, Seoul should be ready for escalating a war. However it is hard to imagine that South Korea fights with North Korea armed with nuclear weapons. This paper concludes that the Pyongyang regime after nuclear arming strongly tends to occupy superiority of military strategy and wage military provocations on the Korean Peninsula.

The current problems with the changing nature of the battlefield of the future point up the serious need for more and better research on the nature of effective military leadership. The purpose of this study was to examine effective leadership traits and behaviors of junior officers in combat situation. During times of peace, leader study battles and imagine themselves in all sorts of combat situations while at the same time, they must cope with numerous challenges and fill a variety of roles that they perceive are not battle related. This illustrates one of the fundamental paradoxes of the peacetime environment. Early studies, showing that combat leadership and noncombat leadership needed different talents, produced some clusters of traits which good combat leader were said to possess. Good combat leaders, for example, were described as possessing courage(e.g., bravery, fearlessness, daring, prowess, gallantry, guts, intrepidity, undaunted courage, fighting spirit, aggressive action), personal integrity(e.g., sincerity, flair, calmness, modesty), adaptability(e.g., flexibility, rapidity in action, speedy decision-making, clarity of thought) and so on. Behaviors found to be important in both combat and noncombat situations bore some relation to role requirements common to both situations. Behaviors important in one situation but not the other could be explained in terms of situational differences in role requirements for effective leadership. In order to achieve this purpose, a number of literature reviews were analysed. These results, though obtained in a somewhat rough and ready fashion, were useful not because they pointed to different leaders in war and in peace, but because they showed leaders the different things that were expected of them in different situations. It was also worth knowing how develop combat leadership. While these findings clearly suggest combat and noncombat differences, they do not necessarily confirm the complete study on effective leadership in combat situation. In conclusion, this study would be useful basis for further improvement on effective combat leadership and some further researches were recommended.

This study examines the relationship of the industry-specific factors that effect innovation of manufacturing technology and the market share within the defense industry. Since the establishment of the basic defense industry framework in 1973, there were numerous interactions of the industry-specific factors of the defense industry structure with the technological innovation and market organization of the defense industry. During last three decades, the domestic defense industry has achieved the considerable level but the framework of the basic system has not developed much in areas of the military science and the defense manufacturing technology. Industry-specific factors were formed in the process and appeared in a variety of behavioral characteristics as subsystems. Currently, there IS a growing trend where the management of defense industry is gradually deteriorating due to limitation of the domestic industry-specific factor (e.g. defense technologies, amount of demand, etc.). If there is a prominent imbalance of the industry-specific factors. it can trigger the potential problem of conflict, lack of cooperation and control, slowing the growth of the manufacturing technology thereby diminishing the market and deteriorating the defense supply/demand relationship. In a research conducted by Joe S. Bain, Bain analyzed the relationship of the traditional industrial organization where industry-specific factor(S) not only impacts the conductor(C). And, conductor(C) influences the shaping of the performance(P) of relationship of the traditional industrial organization. Consequently, the researcher has identified the demand monopoly, barriers to entry, and market competition with comparison of defense industry issues. These defense issues were three industry-specific factors identified, which are 1) The demand monopoly and The entry barriers to new market competition, 2) the industrial technical factor to a production technical competitiveness and a market sharing competitiveness, 3) the probability factor to revolution for military affairs(RMA) and a R&D production. According to baseline with these factors, the following research model is established from the special companies group(Group A), the systematization companies group(Group B), and the general companies group(Group 0. The hypothesis is that if there are more industry-specific factors, then there will be more relationships of defense industry relation statutes. This research is an empirical study on the relationship that the industry specific factors effects the innovation of manufacturing technology and the shaping of the market in the defense industry. Moreover, the existing models to evaluate the industry specific factors of the defense industry IS much to be desired with the controlled statistical analysis of the result. It is vital to study on current situation with suggesting alternative strategy to the efficient strategy. The descriptive analysis approach analysis is conducted with SPSSWIN to conduct reliability test, factor analysis, correlation analysis, cross-tabulation analysis, one-way ANOVA, and multiple regression analysis. However, there were some limitations of the survey such as the rigidity of concept about the technical factors and various market management factors. The wishes is that the decision-maker could be utilized these defence industrial factors to formulate efficient defence policy and strategy in the future.

The purpose of this study is to survey the circumstances of sniping warfare and to prove the importance of usage of snipers. The research method was referred to the history of foreign warfares and autobiographies, articles, and testimonies of snipers. Also, various news reports were also studied to collect information. The content of this study investigates the circumstances of sniping combat scenes from its first appearance in the world's major warfares to contemporary ones. Also, the research contains the history of weapons, ammunition, rifles, and the principle of rifle shooting including ballistics. We hope this study provides ROK Army and government agencies the foundation of sniping and thereby improving the effectiveness of correspondence to international conflicts and terrorism.

Combat Development is process of studying and developing concept, doctrine, weapon systems, organization and training for the improvement of combat capability to be ready present and future warfare. The combat development domain consists of 6 fields Doctrine, Organization, Material, Training, Personnel, and Facilities. The cornerstones of combat development are "How to prepare" and "How to fight" in the future warfare. ROK- TRADOC(Republic of Korea Army Training and Doctrine Command) has implemented combat development that applies CBRS (Concept-Based Requirements System) and "Vision - Capstone concept - operating and functional concept - FOC(Future Operational Capabilities) Requirements". To prepare for the possibility or new types or wars in the future, the creation of new concept and system is essential. Though verification with various instruments, combat power can be secured and exhibited. Combat development by empirical mind estimation means that is no longer relevant.To prepare combat development based on scientific analysis, there is a need for powerful engineering analysis and verification, in order to prepare for uncertain and diverse future battlefield environments. In this thesis, warfighting experiment is essential ways and means to pursue the scientific combat development ; investigated tendency of combat development environment, and analyzed diversification aspects of possible future warfare. In conclusion, concept of campaign experiment and role is the conerstone of scientific combat development; and lays out the roadmap of all affecting components to its development.

In order to restore the Hwangsanbeol Combat at present, it is necessary to make a close examination on the name of the military cops, the number of units, and the numerical strength, an unit organization, and a combat formation. Based on Samguksagi, Samgukyusa, other historical documents and military history information, I tried to restore the Hwansanbeol Combat as follow. The Shilla, at the 7 year of Mooyeol Dynasty, AD. 660, maintained 35 military units. The Shilla committed18 military units from among 35 units to battle against Baekje at the 7 Year of Mooyeol Danasty. The names ofmilitary units are as follow: 1) Daedang, 2) Sangjoojeong, 3) Hajoojeong, 4) Seodang, 5) Nangdang, 6) Eumlihwajeong, 7) Samryanghwajeong, 8) Sosarnjeong, 9) Namcheonjeong, 10) Leehwahaejeong, 11) Kaegeumdang, 12) Geupdang, 13) Nodang, 14) Woonjaednag, 15) Chungdang, 16) Suktoodang, 17) Gwidang, and 18) Soogun. The numerical strength, which the Shilla maintained at the year of A.D. 660, was total 106,353 persons from 35 military units. Shilla committed 57,433 military personnel to combats against the Great Baekche. Ground Forces from the 57,433 personnel were 58,343 persons, and the naval forces were 9,100 persons. Finally, 2,602 persons from among the 9,100 naval forces were only combating forces, and non-combat forces were 6498 persons.