초록
We investigate whether the association between management overconfident tone and the level of audit effort measured by audit fees and hours differs depending on the level of earnings management. Prior studies suggest that firms led by overconfident managers are likely to initiate risky investments, report low quality financial statements, and have material weaknesses in internal control system. These characteristics, combined together, result in higher audit risk. At the same time, auditors assess audit risk based on the quality of financial reporting, measured by level of earnings management. As a result, the assess audit risk is likely to reflect the combined effect of management overconfidence and the level of earnings management. In this paper, we investigate whether auditors differentiate the effects of real earnings management (REM) and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) when they assess the audit risk related management overconfident. Using the CEO's letter published in 2018, we measure the CEO's tone representing the degree of overconfidence (i.e., activity). Based on this measure, we find that the positive association between managerial overconfident tone and audit effort is more pronounced as the level of REM is higher. However, we find that the baseline association does not vary depending on the level of AEM. These results suggest that auditors consider the managerial overconfident severer when such characteristic accompany the higher level of REM, which can be outcome of aggressive business decisions possibly leading to the higher audit risks. We further find that these results are stronger for Big 4 auditors and continuing auditors. This paper contributes to the literature and practice as follows. First, we provide contextual evidence on how auditors reflect managerial characteristics in the audit process by documenting that auditors actively increase their audit efforts only when overconfident managerial characteristics are highly likely to lead to audit risk. This result suggests that auditors conduct external auditing considering both the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit process. Second, we suggest that auditors use information obtained from a wide range of sources to identify audit risks. Our results provide evidence of how the auditing standards, which do not provide detailed guidelines for audit risk assessment, are being applied in practice. Finally, our results also enhance the understanding of how audit fees are determined. Combined with the studies related to audit pricing, we provide the important reference for discussion between the auditor and the auditee about the audit fee that has created acute tension after the enforcement of the new External Audit Act.