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The Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society (한국산학기술학회)
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The Impact of Industry-level Competition on the Excess Stock Returns due to Changes in Cash Holdings

산업 내 경쟁정도가 보유현금의 변화에 따른 초과수익률에 미치는 영향

  • Cho, Jung Eun (College of Business Administration, Pukyong National University)
  • Received : 2019.02.22
  • Accepted : 2019.05.03
  • Published : 2019.05.31
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Abstract

This study examined whether industry-level competition affects excess stock returns because of changes in cash holdings. Competitive inter-company threats increase the possibility of the manager's replacement, and function to induce management to make their best efforts, resulting in the amount and quality of the information provided by the enterprise increasing. Therefore, as competition intensifies, agency problems are reduced and stock returns increase because the company's cash holdings are expected to increase. However, there is a view that firms in industries with severe competition tend to have high information asymmetry because competitors may compete in more favorable positions by using detailed information disclosed by the competing firms. Accordingly, as market competition intensifies, the excess stock returns resulting from increased cash holdings are expected to decline. These results show that excess stock returns because of increases in cash holdings increase as the degree of competition in the industry intensifies, thus supporting the positive effect of market competition. Overall, the results of this study provide an understanding that market competition plays an effective external governance mechanism and that investors positively evaluate the cash held by companies with severe industry competition.

본 연구는 산업 내 경쟁정도가 기업의 보유현금의 변화에 따른 초과수익률에 미치는 영향에 관해 검증하였다. 경쟁기업 간 위협은 기업의 성과가 좋지 않을 경우 경영자가 교체될 가능성을 높여 경영자가 최선의 노력을 다하여 경영을 하도록 규율하는 기능을 하고, 기업이 공시하는 정보의 양과 질을 향상시킨다. 즉 경쟁이 치열해질수록 대리인 문제가 감소하여 해당 기업의 보유현금의 증가에 대한 초과수익률은 증가할 것으로 예상된다. 반면 경쟁이 심한 산업에 속한 기업은 자세한 정보가 공시되면 경쟁 기업들이 해당 정보를 역이용하여 보다 유리한 위치에서 경쟁할 수 있기 때문에 정보비대칭이 오히려 증가한다는 의견도 존재한다. 이러한 경우 외부 이해관계자들은 기업의 상황을 정확히 파악하지 못하게 되어 경영자가 사적이익을 얻을 목적으로 기회주의적으로 현금을 운용하여도 이를 감독하거나 통제하지 못하게 된다. 이에 따라 시장경쟁이 심해질수록 보유현금의 증가에 대한 초과수익률은 감소할 것으로 예측된다. 분석 결과, 산업 내 경쟁정도가 증가할수록 보유현금의 증가에 대한 초과수익률은 높아지는 것으로 나타나 경쟁의 긍정적 효과를 지지하는 결과를 발견하였다. 본 연구는 시장경쟁이 효과적인 외부 기업지배구조로 작용하여 투자자들이 기업의 현금이 효율적으로 운용된다고 인식함에 따라 해당 기업의 보유현금의 증가에 대해 긍정적으로 평가한다는 실증적인 근거를 제시하였다는 측면에서 공헌점을 찾을 수 있다.

Keywords

Table 1. Descriptive statistics

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Table 2. Correlation matrix

SHGSCZ_2019_v20n5_163_t0002.png 이미지

Table 2. Correlation matrix - continued

SHGSCZ_2019_v20n5_163_t0003.png 이미지

Table 3. The effect of industry competition on the excess stock returns due to changes in cash holdings

SHGSCZ_2019_v20n5_163_t0004.png 이미지

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