• Asia-Pacific Journal of Business
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• v.10 no.4
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• pp.205-221
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• 2019

The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of cash holdings on firm value in export companies. To investigate this effect, we analyzed 5,386 samples drawn from export companies listed in the KOSDAQ from 2011 to 2018. During this period, the International Financial reporting Standards have been employed. The research results are as follows. First, the results of a T-test showed that the level of the firm value of export companies with high levels of cash holdings is significantly higher than that of those with low levels of cash holdings. In addition, the level of the firm value of export companies with higher levels of cash holdings than in the previous year is higher than the level might otherwise be. Furthermore, the effects of cash holdings on firm value are similar to those on return on asset. These results suggested that export companies have little used a way of increasing their debt levels in order to increase cash holdings. Second, the results of a multivariate regression analysis presented that the cash holdings of export companies in listed the KOSDAQ significantly influence their firm value. Moreover, a higher level of cash holdings than in the previous year significantly affect firm value. These results proposed that making higher cash holdings than in the previous year might be useful in enhancing firm value. We found that export companies efforts to increase cash holdings positively influence changes in firm value. We also found that Korean export companies maintain their financial stability by obtaining sufficient liquidity specifically in a high uncertainty era like the recent time. We finally firmed an effort to maintain cash holdings as a reasonable choice for export companies.

• Journal of the Korea Academia-Industrial cooperation Society
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• v.12 no.4
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• pp.1654-1662
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• 2011

This paper investigates how does cash holdings have effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity in korea firms over the period 1981-2009. According to $\"{O}$.Arslan et al.(2006), I expect that financially constrained firms have more cash holdings. and financially constrained cash-rich firms are likely to have less investment-cash flow sensitivity especially in the financial crisis period. Using financial constraint classification variables(firm size, dividend, cash holdings), we divide whole sample firms into financially constrained firms and financially unconstrained firms, and then I compare investment-cash flow sensitivity in pre-financial crisis(1981-1996), financial crisis(1997-1998) and after-financial crisis(1999-2009) period. This paper's findings are as follows: First, under no financial constraint classification conditions, cash-poor firms exhibit greater investment-cash flow sensitivity than cash-rich firms do during 1981-2009 period except financial crisis period. These findings support the hypothesis that firms have more cash holdings less investment-cash flow sensitivity except in financial crisis period. In financial crisis period, cash holdings have no effect on investment-cash flow sensitivity. Second, this paper findings are somewhat different as $\"{O}$.Arslan et al.(2006)'s. Under the financial constraint classification conditions, financially unconstrained firms have more investment-cash flow sensitivity rather than constrained firms have. The reason is that both dividend and firm size are not a complete classification criteria variables. And there exists other possible determinants of investment-cash flow sensitivity. Finally, this paper find that there are common determinants of corporate cash holdings in all periods. This paper suggests that cash flow and market to book ratio are positive determinants of corporate cash holdings but short-term debt, investment and firm size are negative determinants of corporate cash holdings.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.14 no.12
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• pp.129-139
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• 2016

Purpose - This paper examines the explanatory power of the agency theory in the determination of cash holdings for Korean retail firms. If the agency theory holds, a firm with strong corporate governance structure tends to have low cash holdings. A strong governance structure makes the CEO of this firm to behave in the interests of shareholders and thus the CEO has low incentive to stockpile cash holdings, which can be easily diverted for the CEO's own managerial purposes. We investigate this relationship between corporate governance structure and cash holdings, by using corporate governance scores as a proxy variable that captures the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanism. Research design, data, and methodology - We adopt the sample of publicly listed retail firms in KOSPI market from 2005 to 2013. Financial and accounting statements are gathered from the WISEfn database. We also use the corporate governance scores published by Korean Corporate Governance Service. The relationship between the corporate governance scores and cash holdings is cross-sectionally estimated based on the ordinary least square method. This estimation method is widely accepted in the existing literature. The sample of large conglomerates, Chebol, and the remainder firms are separately examined as well, to account for the distinctive internal financing environment in these large conglomerates. Results - We mainly contribute to the extant literature by providing empirical evidence against the agency theory of cash policy. Unlike the prediction of agency theory, we confirm statistically insignificant or even positive correlations between the set of corporate governance scores and cash-asset ratios. Almost all the major corporate governance attributes including total score, shareholder rights, board structure, and the quality of information disclosure do not show negative correlations with cash holdings, which poses a strong challenge to the validity of the agency theory in the determination of retail firms' cash holdings. Conclusions - This study presents interesting empirical results with respect to the cash policy in Korean retail firms. Consistent to prior studies, I verify that the agency theory only limitedly explains the level of cash holdings. Future studies may obtain more robust results by examining a longer sample period.

• Journal of Distribution Science
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• v.20 no.3
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• pp.53-58
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• 2022

Purpose: Controlling and minority shareholders sometimes have conflicting interests. Controlling shareholders who do not have adequate monitoring can exhibit a strong tendency to maximize their personal wealth. In this case, cash holdings can be the easiest means for them to pursue their personal interests. This study examined whether the largest shareholder's ownership proportion affected the speed at which firms adjust their cash holdings to target levels in Korean distribution and service companies. Research design, data, and methodology: The study uses regression analysis to examine 834 firm-year samples listed on the KOSPI between 2013 and 2018 in the distribution and service sectors. Results: The largest shareholder's ownership is positively related to a firm's cash holdings adjustment speed. That is, the larger the largest shareholder's ownership, the faster the firm adjusts its cash holdings to achieve the target level. Conclusions: This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that the cash holdings adjustment speed in Korean service and distribution companies is affected by the largest shareholder's ownership. As the agency problem between controlling and minority shareholders in Korea is a major issue, minority owners' sensitivity to agency costs may help restrict controlling owners' ability to maximize their personal wealth.

• The Journal of the Convergence on Culture Technology
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• v.9 no.2
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• pp.319-325
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• 2023

This study investigates the impact of over-investment on the market value of cash holdings. In addition, this paper examines whether the effect of over-investment on the value of cash holdings differs depending on firms' ownership structure. The results show that increase in over-investment reduces the market value of cash holdings. This suggests that investors perceive that over-investment deteriorates future business performance and generates excessive burdens on future cash flows. As a result, they provide negative evaluation on the market value of cash holdings. In addition, the negative impact of over-investment on the market value of cash holdings is more significant for owner manager firms where managers hold a high level of equity. Such empirical results imply that owner manager firms are more likely to use their cash holdings for private interest, therefore, over-investment reduces the cash value to a greater extent. This study provides empirical evidence that the effect of over-investment on the market value of cash holdings varies depending on the characteristics of firms' ownership structure.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.7 no.2
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• pp.9-20
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• 2020

The study investigates a recent surge of cash literature by using a sample of hospitality firms to gain a new understanding of corporate cash holdings. Past literature states that there is a substantial variation of liquidity across industry groups. Existing literature predominantly refers to US-listed firms and focus on either hotels or restaurants and not the hospitality industry as a whole. Therefore, we provide a comparative study of cash holdings behaviour between hospitality and non-hospitality firms from an emerging market context. Using a sample of public listed hospitality firms from 2002 to 2013, dynamic panel regression techniques are used to study the relationships between firm characteristics and cash levels. Also, the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was carried out to examine the time and sectoral differences in cash holdings. In addition, the panel regression techniques are used to investigate the relationships between firm characteristics and level of corporate cash holdings. The results reveal that firm characteristics do matter in hospitality firms. We find that firm size, capital expenditures, and liquid assets substitutes are negatively related to cash level. The results support trade-off theory and the pecking order theory. This study incrementally explains the cash holdings behaviour of hospitality firms in emerging market.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.8 no.7
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• pp.323-331
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• 2021

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structure and level cash holdings in an emerging country, namely, Saudi Arabia, by constructing a corporate governance mechanism (foreign ownership, family ownership, institutional and managerial ownership). This paper uses data from 100 listed firms at Saudi Stock Exchange (TADAWUL) from 2011 to 2019. The firm's decision to hold cash has come to the fore in the last two or three years as a result of the recent global financial crisis, and the impact that this has had on the firms' ability to raise funds from external sources. Using the random-effect generalized least square (GLS) regression model, the findings reveal that foreign and family ownership negatively influences cash holdings, while managerial ownership has a positive association with cash holdings. Further, institutional ownership did not have a direct effect on cash holdings in Saudi Arabia. Our results suggest that ownership structure include foreign ownership, family and managerial ownership is an essential vehicle to promote the performance of cash holding of all the 100 public-listed non-financial firms in Saudi Arabia. We recommend that sound policies should be targeted toward foreign ownership, family, and managerial ownership since they are essential to improve cash holding in Saudi Arabian firms.

• The Korean Journal of Financial Management
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• v.27 no.1
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• pp.89-120
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• 2010

In this paper, we analyse empirically the relations between ownership structure and cash holdings of firms listed on Korea Securities Market and Kosdaq Market of Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Cash holdings increase as large shareholder's equity holdings increase. Cash holdings increase as the difference between first largest shareholder's and second largest shareholder's equity holdings increase, and cash holdings increase as the ownership concentration increase. Managerial ownership exert a non-linear effects on cash holdings. So to speak, at lower level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders, but at higher level of managerial ownership, the interests of managers and shareholders are aligned, and also at highest level of managerial ownership, managers hold more cash to pursue their own interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Cash holdings increase larger in owner-controlled firm than in management-controlled firm. These results support the expropriation of minority shareholders hypothesis that large shareholders can extract private benefits from corporate resources under their control at the expense of minority shareholders. This paper contributes to defining information value of large shareholder's equity holdings on cash holdings for a firms' other stakeholders such as investors and creditors, and to strengthening a legal and institutional safeguard for external minority shareholders. Ownership concentration might have negatively affected the evolution of the legal and institutional frameworks for corporate governance and the manner in which economic activity is conducted. It could be a formidable barrier to future policy reform.

• The Journal of Asian Finance, Economics and Business
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• v.9 no.3
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• pp.135-147
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• 2022

This study was conducted to determine whether there is a significant relationship between board structure and board committee qualities and corporate cash holdings in Pakistan. For this objective, 168 listed enterprises on the PSX for the period 2016 to 2020 were chosen as a sample from a population of 436 non-financial firms. Multiple regression analysis was used in the study to discover a relationship between board structure and board committee features and cash holdings. The study's findings revealed that board size, executive directors, and board independence have no significant impact on the firm's cash holding because they play no important part in the firm's cash holding. Auditors, audit committee size, audit committee meetings, and the compensation committee, on the other hand, have no major impact on the firm's cash holdings because they are not relevant indicators to compare with cash holdings. While board meeting frequency and leadership structure both have a negative influence on cash holding, board meeting frequency increases firm costs, whereas leadership structure causes agency problems. Results were supported by the pecking order theory, cash flow theory, and agency theory.

• The Journal of Industrial Distribution & Business
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• v.11 no.5
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• pp.7-16
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• 2020

Purpose: Prior studies empirically examine how financial flexibility is related to required returns by using realized returns and considering cash holdings as net debts, but they fail to find consistent results. Conjecturing that inappropriate proxy of required returns and aggregation of cash and debts caused the inconsistent results, this study revisits this topic by using a refined proxy of required returns and separating cash holdings from debts. Research design, data and methodology: This study uses a multivariate regression model to investigate the relationship between required returns on cash holdings and financial leverage. The required returns are estimated using the return decomposition method by vector autoregression model. Empirical tests use US stock market data from1968 to 2011. Results: Empirical results reveal that both cash holdings and leverage are positively related to required returns. The positive relation is stronger in economic downturns than in economic upturns. Conclusions: Three major findings are drawn. First, risky firms prefer large cash balance. Second, information shocks in the realized returns caused failure of prior studies to find consistent positive relationship between leverage and realized returns. Third, cash and leverage are related to required returns in the same direction; therefore, cash cannot be considered as negative debts.