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Response of the International Community to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

  • Received : 2019.02.14
  • Accepted : 2019.03.11
  • Published : 2019.03.31

Abstract

This paper attempts to analyze the role of Nigeria's current President Major (Rtd) Mahammudu Buhari and the immediate past President Goodluck Jonathan in dealing with the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria. Nigeria has not been without its fair share of conflict. In fact, no decade of post-Independent Nigeria has been conflict free. With several coups, general strikes and a civil war, Nigerians have had to experience some of the most sordid tragedies arising from difference of opinions and distrust. It is interesting to mention that the conflict in Nigeria has not received the needed attention as it were. The leadership of Goodluck Jonathan did not receive the same effort and cooperation as compared to Muhammadu Buhari who came into office in May 2015. This paper argues the important roles played by the two Nigerian leaders which either aided or prevented collaboration. Goodluck Jonathan was perceived as a weak and indecisive leader whose leadership failed to effectively handle the Boko Haram insurgency. Muhammadu Buhari assumed office with a lot of high hopes and expectations from the Nigerian population and the international community to tackle the Boko Haram insurgency.

본 논문은 나이지리아 보코하람 소요사태를 다루는 과정에서 나이지리아 현 대통령 소령(rtd) 마하무두 부하리(mahamudu buhari)와 직계전 대통령 굿럭 조나단(jonathan)의 역할을 분석하고자 한다. 나이지리아는 공정한 분쟁 분담이 없는 적이 없었다. 사실, 독립 후 10년 동안 어떤 나이지리아도 분쟁이 없었던 적이 없었다. 몇몇 쿠데타와 총파업 그리고 내전으로 나이지리아 사람들은 의견과 불신의 차이에서 비롯되는 가장 비참한 비극들 중 일부를 경험해야 했다. 나이지리아에서의 갈등이 지금처럼 필요한 관심을 받지 못했다는 얘기가 흥미롭다. 굿럭 조나단 지도부는 2015년 5월 취임한 무함마두 부하리 전 총리와 비교할 때 같은 노력과 협조를 받지 못했다. 본 논문은 두 나이지리아 지도자가 협력하는 것을 돕거나 방해하는 중요한 역할을 한다고 주장한다. 굿럭 조나단은 약하고 우유부단한 지도자로 인식되어 보코하람의 폭동을 효과적으로 다루지 못했다. 무하마두 부하리는 나이지리아 국민과 국제 사회가 보코하람 반란을 타개할 큰 희망과 기대를 안고 취임했다.

Keywords

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