Conflict of Interests and Analysts' Forecast

이해상충과 애널리스트 예측

The paper investigates the possible relationship between earnings prediction by security analysts and special ownership ties that link security companies those analysts belong to and firms under analysis. "Security analysts" are known best for their role as information producers in stock markets where imperfect information is prevalent and transaction costs are high. In such a market, changes in the fundamental value of a company are not spontaneously reflected in the stock price, and the security analysts actively produce and distribute the relevant information crucial for the price mechanism to operate efficiently. Therefore, securing the fairness and accuracy of information they provide is very important for efficiencyof resource allocation as well as protection of investors who are excluded from the special relationship. Evidence of systematic distortion of information by the special tie naturally calls for regulatory intervention, if found. However, one cannot presuppose the existence of distorted information based on the common ownership between the appraiser and the appraisee. Reputation effect is especially cherished by security firms and among analysts as indispensable intangible asset in the industry, and the incentive to maintain good reputation by providing accurate earnings prediction may overweigh the incentive to offer favorable rating or stock recommendation for the firms that are affiliated by common ownership. This study shares the theme of existing literature concerning the effect of conflict of interests on the accuracy of analyst's predictions. This study, however, focuses on the potential conflict of interest situation that may originate from the Korea-specific ownership structure of large conglomerates. Utilizing an extensive database of analysts' reports provided by WiseFn(R) in Korea, we perform empirical analysis of potential relationship between earnings prediction and common ownership. We first analyzed the prediction bias index which tells how optimistic or friendly the analyst's prediction is compared to the realized earnings. It is shown that there exists no statistically significant relationship between the prediction bias and common ownership. This is a rather surprising result since it is observed that the frequency of positive prediction bias is higher with such ownership tie. Next, we analyzed the prediction accuracy index which shows how accurate the analyst's prediction is compared to the realized earnings regardless of its sign. It is also concluded that there is no significant association between the accuracy ofearnings prediction and special relationship. We interpret the results implying that market discipline based on reputation effect is working in Korean stock market in the sense that security companies do not seem to be influenced by an incentive to offer distorted information on affiliated firms. While many of the existing studies confirm the relationship between the ability of the analystand the accuracy of the analyst's prediction, these factors cannot be controlled in the above analysis due to the lack of relevant data. As an indirect way to examine the possibility that such relationship might have distorted the result, we perform an additional but identical analysis based on a sub-sample consisting only of reports by best analysts. The result also confirms the earlier conclusion that the common ownership structure does not affect the accuracy and bias of earnings prediction by the analyst.

본 연구에서는 주식시장에서 정보 생산자로서 중요한 기능을 수행하는 '애널리스트'의 이익 예측치 편의와 정확도가 증권사와 평가 대상 기업의 동일인 소유 여부에 의하여 영향을 받는지를 점검하였다. 소유구조에 기반한 증권사와 평가 대상 기업 간의 특수관계에 의하여 평가자의 행태가 달라지고 그로 인하여 불특정 다수의 투자자에게 부정적 영향이 초래되는 경우 적절한 규제조치가 필요할 것이라는 측면에서 제기된 문제의 실천적 의미를 찾을 수 있다. 물론 평판효과(reputation effect)가 중요한 역할을 하는 증권업과 애널리스트 시장에서 시장규율(market discipline)이 원활히 작동한다면 특수관계로 인해 왜곡된 정보를 제공할 유인이 사라질 것이며 별도의 규제가 필요하지는 않을 것이다. 분석 결과에 의하면, 특수관계가 존재할 경우 양의 예측편의가 발생하는 빈도가 높은 것은 사실이나, 예측편의의 크기를 포함한 종합적 상관관계를 고려할 경우 증권사와 평가 대상 기업 간의 특수관계가 유의한 예측편의를 발생시키는 것으로 보기는 어려우며, 정확도 또한 의미있는 차이를 보이는 것으로 결론짓기는 어려운 것으로 나타났다. 이는 적어도 현재까지는 증권사가 소유구조로 인하여 왜곡된 정보를 생산하려는 유인보다 정확한 정보를 제공한다는 평판을 지키려는 유인이 더욱 크게 작용한 결과 관측되는 현상으로 해석될 수 있다.