유배당보험상품에 대한 재무론적 분석

The Risk Implication of Ownership Structure: Focused on Korean Life Insurance Companies

본 논문은 생명보험회사들이 판매하는 유배당상품에 대해 재무이론적 고찰을 시도하였다. 계약자와 주주의 현금흐름과 이익배당에 대한 분석을 행하고, 또한 배당억제를 통해 적립된 준비금의 의미를 분석하여 그 시사점을 모색해 보았다. 본 연구의 분석에 의하면, 유배당보험의 경우 그 판매자가 주식회사이든 상호회사이든 보험계약자 상호간에는 동일한 계약상의 권리가 존재하지만, 이것이 곧 주식회사인 보험회사의 유배당보험 계약자가 주주와 동일한 권리와 의무를 가진다는 것을 의미하지는 않는다. 즉 주식회사인 보험회사의 경우 주주와 유배당 보험계약자가 보험금지급요건 발생과 경영성과라는 동일한 위험요인에 노출되지만 양자간에 자산가치의 배분순위에 차이가 존재하기 때문에 노출된 위험의 크기에 차이가 존재한다. 본고의 분석에 의하면 보험수요자가 주식회사와 유배당보험 계약을 체결하는 것은 자신의 일, 이차적 권리에 내재된 리스크를 주주에게 전가하기 위한 것이며, 상호회사가 아님에도 불구하고 보험계약자가 주주와 보험이익을 공유하는 것은 이러한 리스크 전가에 대한 보상인 것으로 해석되었다. 또한 이익배당의 억제를 통해 적립된 준비금은 사후적으로 결손이 발생하지 않는 경우에 보험회사의 부채로 인식되어야 하기 때문에 우발채무로 해석하는 것이 타당한 것으로 나타났다.

Our article investigates the risk implication of ownership structure in life insurance companies. We set up a model to identify the priority structure of policyholder's and shareholder's cashflow claims, and to derive its implications. Current literature on this issue has focused on the agency paradigm or the risk-sharing efficiency. Fama and Jensen(1983a, 1983b) and Mayers and Smith(1981, 1986, 1988, 1990, 1994) argue that the survival of both the corporate and the mutual form of organization is due in part to the relative efficiencies in controlling agency problems. With regard to insurance business, agency problems arise because of the three functions inherent in the organizations:manager, risk-bearer(owner), and policyholder. Stock insurers are characterized by the potentially complete separation of all three functions while mutual insurers merger the policyholder with the ownership function. Doherty and Dionne(1993) and Doherty(1991) concentrate their analysis on differences in the efficiency of risk sharing between participating and non-participating policies. They argue that when the undiversifiable risk has higher portion in business risk, combining policy and equity claims into a single package is a more efficient risk-sharing contract than a simple prepaid risk-transfer. Among various methods for assembling the policy/equity package, Doherty and Dionne(1993) and Doherty(1991) suggest that policy/equity package offered by the mutual is the most efficient risk-sharing arrangement. There has been a controversy on the property of participating policies sold by life insurance corporations in Korea. Some scholars argue that participating policyholders of Korean life insurance companies have shared the cashflow risk with shareholders. They emphasize that insurance firms have used dividend reserves to supplement for equity deficits. Thus, they argue that the economic entities of Korean life insurance companies are mutual companies though their legal entities are corporations. Our article explicitly sets up each stakeholder's cashflow claim in stock and mutual insurers, and thus identify risk differences in shareholder and policyholder. Using our model, we could derive direct implications on the controversy. Our model shows that life insurance companies would sell participating policies since policyholders would have the incentive to share the risk inherent in their primary claims with equityholders. And there exists a fundamental difference in shareholder's risk and equityholder's.