자원ㆍ환경경제연구 (Environmental and Resource Economics Review)
- 제15권2호
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- Pages.201-245
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- 2006
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- 1229-9146(pISSN)
기후변화협약 하의 배출권 거래 대상에 따른 일반균형효과와 효율성 비교
The Efficiency and General Equilibrium Effect by the Emission Trading Structure under the Climate Change Convention
초록
본 연구는 일반균형모형을 이용하여 배출권 거래로 인한 일반균형효과와 온실가스 저감비용의 효율성에 대해 알아보았다. 모든 국가가 교토의정서를 비준하고 연합을 형성한 국가끼리 배출권 거래를 한다는 가정 하에서 분할함수형태의 온실가스저감게임을 구성하였고, 전지구를 미국과 미국 이외의 OECD 국가군, 구소련연방, 개도국으로 나누어 연합구조별로 각 국가군에 미치는 영향을 일반균형모형으로 분석한 결과 대연합 하에서 기후변화협약은 연합을 형성하지 않은
We applied general equilibrium model to analysis the economic impact of international emission trading by sector and the efficiency of the Convention to study whether Climate Change Convention satisfy the efficiency. We divided the world as 4 groups : USA, OECD members w/o USA (OEC), Former Soviet Union (FSU) and Developing countries (DEV). Compared to no trading, global trading would accomplish the same environmental effect with less cost as much as 97.8 billion$, which is the surplus of trading. However, half of it is taken by USA and 20% by OEC. FSU and DEV have only 18% and 10%. This result suggest the two things. First, the emission trading is effective as far as the participation of developing countries are guaranteed. If they do not take part in the coalition and emit the leakage, it may threaten the stability of the international trading coalition. Second, we found the logical ground of the side payment for developing countries. The permit buying countries take more share of the surplus under the emission trading, while the energy sector of developing countries shrinks to sell permits, which may adversely affect to economic growth of the countries. Therefore, the Annex-I countries need to provide side payment to lead the participation of the developing countries.