Enhanced Certificate with User's Privacy Protection Methods

프라이버시 보호 기능이 추가된 인증서 프로화일에 관한 연구

  • 양형규 (강남대학교 컴퓨터미디어공학부)
  • Published : 2005.04.01

Abstract

When a Certification Authority (CA) issues X.509 public-key certificate to bind a public key to a user, the user is specified through one or more subject name in the 'subject' field and the 'subjectAltName' extension field of a certificate. The 'subject' field or the 'subjectAltName' extension field may contain a hierarchically structured distinguished name, an electronic mail address, If address, or other name forms that correspond to the subject. In this paper, we present the requirements for certificate holder's privacy protection and propose the methods to protect the user's privacy information contained in the 'subject' field or the 'subjectAltName' extension field of a public-key certificat

CA가 공개키를 포함하는 X.509 인증서를 사용자에게 발급할 때, 사용자는 하나 이상의 subject name을 "subject" 필드와 "subjectAltName" 확장 필드에 명시해야 한다. "subject" 필드 또는 "subjectAltName" 확장 필드는 DN, 전자메일 주소, IP 어드레스 등의 계층적인 구조를 포함할 수 있다. 본 논문에서 우리는 인증서 소유자의 프라이버시 보호를 위한 요구 조건들을 제시하였고, 그리고 공개키 인증서내의 "subject" 필드와 "subjectAltName" 확장 필드에 포함돼 있는 사용자의 프라이버시를 보호하는 즉, 제시한 요구조건들을 만족하는 방법을 제안하였다.

Keywords

References

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