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Enhanced Certificate with User's Privacy Protection Methods  

Yang Hyung kyu (강남대학교 컴퓨터미디어공학부)
Abstract
When a Certification Authority (CA) issues X.509 public-key certificate to bind a public key to a user, the user is specified through one or more subject name in the 'subject' field and the 'subjectAltName' extension field of a certificate. The 'subject' field or the 'subjectAltName' extension field may contain a hierarchically structured distinguished name, an electronic mail address, If address, or other name forms that correspond to the subject. In this paper, we present the requirements for certificate holder's privacy protection and propose the methods to protect the user's privacy information contained in the 'subject' field or the 'subjectAltName' extension field of a public-key certificat
Keywords
PKI; Public-key certificate; Privacy; zero-knowledge;
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