대한전기학회논문지:전력기술부문A (The Transactions of the Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers A)

대한전기학회 (The Korean Institute of Electrical Engineers)
권호 표지

전력시장 해석을 위한 Bi-matrix 게임의 이산화 알고리즘

A Discretization Algorithm for Bi-Matrix Game Approach to Power Market Analysis

  • 이광호 (단국대 전기전자컴퓨터공학과)
  • 발행 : 2003.01.01
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⟨ 이전 논문 다음 논문 ⟩

초록

An important aspect of the study of power system markets involves the assessment of strategic behavior of participants for maximizing their profits. In models of imperfect competition of a deregulated electricity system, the key task is to find the Nash equilibrium. In this paper, the bimatrix approach for finding Nash equilibria in electricity markets is investigated. This approach determines pure and mixed equilibria using the complementarity pivot algorithim. The mixed equilibrium in the matrix approach has the equal number of non-zero property. This property makes it difficult to reproduce a smooth continuous distribution for the mixed equilibrium. This paper proposes an algorithm for adjusting the quantization value of discretization to reconstruct a continuous distribution from a discrete one.

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참고문헌

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