• Journal of Information Technology and Architecture
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• v.9 no.4
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• pp.391-400
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• 2012

This work describes a derivation of functional architecture of Cooperative Engagement (CE) for a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD). The TBMD is composed of multi-layered defense systems as system of systems which includes network-based sensors, shooters and battle management. The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a typical real-time battle management system, and the key function of the CEC is CE. The CE is a warfighting concept designed to defeat threats through the synergistic integration of distributed resources among two or more units. In this point of view, this paper proposed functional architecture through analyzing the CE concept, and was conducted as a pre-study to develop a CE based combat system of TBMD.

• Strategy21
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• s.33
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• pp.65-112
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• 2014

Recent trends show that the PRC has stepped aside its "army-centered approach" and placed greater emphasis on its Navy and Air Force for a wider range of operations, thereby reducing its ground force and harnessing its economic power and military technology into naval development. A quantitative growth of the PLA Navy itself is no surprise as this is not a recent phenomenon. Now is the time to pay closer attention to the level of PRC naval force's performance and the extent of its warfighting capacity in the maritime domain. It is also worth asking what China can do with its widening naval power foundation. In short, it is time to delve into several possible scenarios I which the PRC poses a real threat. With this in mind, in Section Two the paper seeks to observe the construction progress of PRC's naval power and its future prospects up to the year 2020, and categorize time frame according to its major force improvement trends. By analyzing qualitative improvements made over time, such as the scale of investment and the number of ships compared to increase in displacement (tonnage), this paper attempts to identify salient features in the construction of naval power. Chapter Three sets out performance evaluation on each type of PRC naval ships as well as capabilities of the Navy, Air Force, the Second Artillery (i.e., strategic missile forces) and satellites that could support maritime warfare. Finall, the concluding chapter estimates the PRC's maritime warfighting capability as anticipated in respective conflict scenarios, and considers its impact on the Korean Peninsula and proposes the directions ROK should steer in response. First of all, since the 1980s the PRC navy has undergone transitions as the focus of its military strategic outlook shifted from ground warfare to maritime warfare, and within 30 years of its effort to construct naval power while greatly reducing the size of its ground forces, the PRC has succeeded in building its naval power next to the U.S.'s in the world in terms of number, with acquisition of an aircraft carrier, Chinese-version of the Aegis, submarines and so on. The PRC also enjoys great potentials to qualitatively develop its forces such as indigenous aircraft carriers, next-generation strategic submarines, next-generation destroyers and so forth, which is possible because the PRC has accumulated its independent production capabilities in the process of its 30-year-long efforts. Secondly, one could argue that ROK still has its chances of coping with the PRC in naval power since, despite its continuous efforts, many estimate that the PRC naval force is roughly ten or more years behind that of superpowers such as the U.S., on areas including radar detection capability, EW capability, C4I and data-link systems, doctrines on force employment as well as tactics, and such gap cannot be easily overcome. The most probable scenarios involving the PRC in sea areas surrounding the Korean Peninsula are: first, upon the outbreak of war in the peninsula, the PRC may pursue military intervention through sea, thereby undermining efforts of the ROK-U.S. combined operations; second, ROK-PRC or PRC-Japan conflicts over maritime jurisdiction or ownership over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands could inflict damage to ROK territorial sovereignty or economic gains. The PRC would likely attempt to resolve the conflict employing blitzkrieg tactics before U.S. forces arrive on the scene, while at the same time delaying and denying access of the incoming U.S. forces. If this proves unattainable, the PRC could take a course of action adopting "long-term attrition warfare," thus weakening its enemy's sustainability. All in all, thiss paper makes three proposals on how the ROK should respond. First, modern warfare as well as the emergent future warfare demonstrates that the center stage of battle is no longer the domestic territory, but rather further away into the sea and space. In this respect, the ROKN should take advantage of the distinct feature of battle space on the peninsula, which is surrounded by the seas, and obtain capabilities to intercept more than 50 percent of the enemy's ballistic missiles, including those of North Korea. In tandem with this capacity, employment of a large scale of UAV/F Carrier for Kill Chain operations should enhance effectiveness. This is because conditions are more favorable to defend from sea, on matters concerning accuracy rates against enemy targets, minimized threat of friendly damage, and cost effectiveness. Second, to maintain readiness for a North Korean crisis where timely deployment of US forces is not possible, the ROKN ought to obtain capabilities to hold the enemy attack at bay while deterring PRC naval intervention. It is also argued that ROKN should strengthen its power so as to protect national interests in the seas surrounding the peninsula without support from the USN, should ROK-PRC or ROK-Japan conflict arise concerning maritime jurisprudence. Third, the ROK should fortify infrastructures for independent construction of naval power and expand its R&D efforts, and for this purpose, the ROK should make the most of the advantages stemming from the ROK-U.S. alliance inducing active support from the United States. The rationale behind this argument is that while it is strategically effective to rely on alliance or jump on the bandwagon, the ultimate goal is always to acquire an independent response capability as much as possible.

• Strategy21
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• s.41
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• pp.52-84
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• 2017

After finishing Cold War, the U.S. Navy's ability to Sea control has been gradually eroded last 15-20 years. The global security environment demands that the surface Navy rededicate itself to sea control, as a new group of potential adversaries is working to deny U.S. navy command of the sea. China has been increasing their sea denial capability, such as extended anti-surface cruise missile and anti-surface ballistic missile. To cope with this situation, the U.S. Naval Surface Forces Command has announced Surface Forces Strategy: Return to Sea Control. It is a new operating and organizing concept for the U.S. surface fleet called 'distributed lethality'. Under distributed lethality, offensive weapons such as new ASCMs are to be distributed more widely across all types of Navy surface ships, and new operational concept for Navy surface fleet's capability for attacking enemy ships and make it less possible for an enemy to cripple the U.S. fleet by concentrating its attack on a few very high-value Navy surface ships. By increasing the lethality of the surface ships and distributing them across wide areas, the Navy forces potential adversaries to not only consider the threat from our carrier-based aircraft and submarines, but they now consider the threat form all of those surface ships. This idea of using the distributed lethality template to generate surface action groups and adaptive force package and to start thinking about to increase the lethal efficacy of these ships. The U.S. Navy believes distributed lethality increases the Navy's sea control capability and expands U.S. conventional deterrence. Funding new weapons and renovated operating concept to field a more lethal and distributed force will enable us to establish sea control, even in contested area. The U.S. Navy's Surface Forces Strategy provides some useful implications for The ROK Navy. First the ROK Navy need to reconsider sea control mission. securing sea control and exploiting sea control are in a close connection. However, recently the ROK Navy only focuses on exploiting sea control, for instance land attack mission. the ROK Navy is required to reinvigorate sea control mission, such as anti-surface warfare and anti-air warfare. Second, the ROK Navy must seek the way to improve its warfighting capability. It can be achieved by developing high-edge weapons and designing renewed operating concept and embraced new weapon's extended capabilities.

• Convergence Security Journal
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• v.22 no.2
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• pp.131-141
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• 2022

Future battlefield domains are expanding to ground, sea, air, space, and cyber, so future military operations are expected to be carried out simultaneously and complexly in various battlefield domains. In addition, the application of convergence technologies that create innovations in all fields of economy, society, and defense, such as artificial intelligence, IoT, and big data, is being promoted. However, since the current Korean military C4I system manages warfighting function DBs in one DB server, the efficiency of combat performance is reduced utilization and distribution speed of data and operation response time. To solve this problem, research is needed on how to apply the 4th industrial revolution technologies such as AI, IoT, 5G, big data, and cloud to the Korean military C4I system, but research on this is insufficient. Therefore, this paper analyzes the problems of the current Korean military C4I system and proposes to apply the 4th industrial revolution technology in terms of operational mission, network and data link, computing environment, cyber operation, interoperability and interlocking capabilities.

• Journal of The Korean Institute of Defense Technology
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• v.5 no.3
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• pp.8-17
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• 2023

The current weapon system is operated as a complex weapon system with various standards and protocols applied, so there is a risk of failure in smooth information exchange during combined and joint operations on the battlefield. The interoperability of weapon systems to carry out precise strikes on key targets through rapid situational judgment between weapon systems is a key element in the conduct of war. Since the Korean military went into service, there has been a need to change the configuration and improve performance of a large number of software and hardware, but there is no verification system for the impact on interoperability, and there are no related test tools and facilities. In addition, during combined and joint training, errors frequently occur during use after arbitrarily changing the detailed operation method and software of the weapon/power support system. Therefore, periodic verification of interoperability between weapon systems is necessary. To solve this problem, rather than having people schedule an evaluation period and conduct the evaluation once, AI should continuously evaluate the interoperability between weapons and power support systems 24 hours a day to advance warfighting capabilities. To solve these problems, To this end, preliminary research was conducted to improve defense interoperability capabilities by applying natural language processing techniques (①Word2Vec model, ②FastText model, ③Swivel model) (using published algorithms and source code). Based on the results of this experiment, we would like to present a methodology (automated evaluation of interoperability requirements evaluation / level measurement through natural language processing model) to implement an automated defense interoperability evaluation tool without relying on humans.

• Maritime Security
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• v.1 no.1
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• pp.215-240
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• 2020

In 2017, the U.S. DARPA coined 'mosaic warfare' as a new way of warfighting. According to the Timothy Grayson, director of DARPA's Strategic Technologies Office, mosaic warfare is a "system of system" approach to warfghting designed around compatible "tiles" of capabilities, rather than uniquely shaped "puzzle pieces" that must be fitted into a specific slot in a battle plan in order for it to work. Prior to cover mosaic warfare theory and recent development, it deals analyze its background and several premises for better understanding. The U.S. DoD officials might acknowledge the current its forces vulnerability to the China's A2/AD assets. Furthermore, the U.S. seeks to complete military superiority even in other nation's territorial domains including sea and air. Given its rapid combat restoration capability and less manpower casualty, the U.S. would be able to ready to endure war of attrition that requires massive resources. The core concept of mosaic warfare is a "decision centric warfare". To embody this idea, it create adaptability for U.S. forces and complexity or uncertainty for the enemy through the rapid composition and recomposition of a more disag g reg ated U.S. military force using human command and machine control. This allows providing more options to friendly forces and collapse adversary's OODA loop eventually. Adaptable kill web, composable force packages, A.I., and context-centric C3 architecture are crucial elements to implement and carry out mosaic warfare. Recently, CSBA showed an compelling assessment of mosaic warfare simulation. In this wargame, there was a significant differences between traditional and mosaic teams. Mosaic team was able to mount more simultaneous actions, creating additional complexity to adversaries and overwhelming their decision-making with less friendly force's human casualty. It increase the speed of the U.S. force's decision-making, enabling commanders to better employ tempo. Consequently, this article finds out and suggests implications for Korea armed forces. First of all, it needs to examine and develop 'mosaic warfare' in terms of our security circumstance. In response to future warfare, reviewing overall force structure and architecture is required which is able to compose force element regardless domain. In regards to insufficient defense resources and budget, "choice" and "concentration" are also essential. It needs to have eyes on the neighboring countries' development of future war concept carefully.

• Maritime Security
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• v.5 no.1
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• pp.1-53
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• 2022

One manifestation of the contemporary era of renewed great power competition has been the deepening relationship between China and Russia. Their strengthening military ties, notwithstanding their lack of a formal defense alliance, have been especially striking. Since China and Russia deploy two of the world's most powerful navies, their growing maritime cooperation has been one of the most significant international security developments of recent years. The Sino-Russian naval exercises, involving varying platforms and locations, have built on years of high-level personnel exchanges, large Russian weapons sales to China, the Sino-Russia Treaty of Friendship, and other forms of cooperation. Though the joint Sino-Russian naval drills began soon after Beijing and Moscow ended their Cold War confrontation, these exercises have become much more important during the last decade, essentially becoming a core pillar of their expanding defense partnership. China and Russia now conduct more naval exercises in more places and with more types of weapons systems than ever before. In the future, Chinese and Russian maritime drills will likely encompass new locations, capabilities, and partners-including possibly the Arctic, hypersonic delivery systems, and novel African, Asian, and Middle East partners-as well as continue such recent innovations as conducting joint naval patrols and combined arms maritime drills. China and Russia pursue several objectives through their bilateral naval cooperation. The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation lacks a mutual defense clause, but does provide for consultations about common threats. The naval exercises, which rehearse non-traditional along with traditional missions (e.g., counter-piracy and humanitarian relief as well as with high-end warfighting), provide a means to enhance their response to such mutual challenges through coordinated military activities. Though the exercises may not realize substantial interoperability gains regarding combat capabilities, the drills do highlight to foreign audiences the Sino-Russian capacity to project coordinated naval power globally. This messaging is important given the reliance of China and Russia on the world's oceans for trade and the two countries' maritime territorial disputes with other countries. The exercises can also improve their national military capabilities as well as help them learn more about the tactics, techniques, and procedures of each other. The rising Chinese Navy especially benefits from working with the Russian armed forces, which have more experience conducting maritime missions, particularly in combat operations involving multiple combat arms, than the People's Liberation Army (PLA). On the negative side, these exercises, by enhancing their combat capabilities, may make Chinese and Russian policymakers more willing to employ military force or run escalatory risks in confrontations with other states. All these impacts are amplified in Northeast Asia, where the Chinese and Russian navies conduct most of their joint exercises. Northeast Asia has become an area of intensifying maritime confrontations involving China and Russia against the United States and Japan, with South Korea situated uneasily between them. The growing ties between the Chinese and Russian navies have complicated South Korean-U.S. military planning, diverted resources from concentrating against North Korea, and worsened the regional security environment. Naval planners in the United States, South Korea, and Japan will increasingly need to consider scenarios involving both the Chinese and Russian navies. For example, South Korean and U.S. policymakers need to prepare for situations in which coordinated Chinese and Russian military aggression overtaxes the Pentagon, obligating the South Korean Navy to rapidly backfill for any U.S.-allied security gaps that arise on the Korean Peninsula. Potentially reinforcing Chinese and Russian naval support to North Korea in a maritime confrontation with South Korea and its allies would present another serious challenge. Building on the commitment of Japan and South Korea to strengthen security ties, future exercises involving Japan, South Korea, and the United States should expand to consider these potential contingencies.