• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.13
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• pp.365-387
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• 2000

One of the central and primary doctrine of the law of marine insurance is that the contract of indemnity entered into by assured and insurer is a contract of the utmost good faith. The notion of utmost good faith is a well established doctrine derived from the celebrated case of Carter v. Boehm(1766), decided long before the inception of the Marine Insurance Act(MIA). With the codification of the law, the principle found expression in sections $17{\sim}20$ of the MIA 1906. In section 17 is presented the general duty to observe the utmost good faith, with the following sections introducing particular aspects of the doctrine, namely, the duty of the assured and brokers to disclose material circumstances, and to avoid making misrepresentations. It is somewhat surprising that section 17, being a long founded doctrine, has not attracted the attention of the courts until very recently. Given that the most significant manifestations of uberrimae fidei are non-disclosure and misrepresentations, fulfillment of the obligation of utmost good faith was, not unreasonably, for a long time perceived in terms of the duty to disclose and not to misrepresent. However, Black King Shipping Corporation v. Massie, 'Litsion Pride'(1985) has clarified that the duty of disclosure stems from the duty of utmost good faith, and not vice versa. The duty of utmost good faith is an independent and overriding duty, with the ensuring sections on disclosure and representations providing mere illustrations of that duty. It is now clear that there are important questions with regard to the general doctrine and as to the nature and scope of any duty of good faith continuing after the contract of insurance is made which require separate and fuller discussion. The purpose of this paper is to review the nature and scope of the duty of utmost good faith.

• Journal of the Korean Institute of Navigation
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• v.7 no.1
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• pp.83-103
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• 1983

The duty of disclosure it is a preliminary requirement to effect marine insurance contract between the assured and the underwriter. The contract of Marine Insurance is called a uberrimae fidei contract, the assured, therefore, in the law of marine insurance, shall communicate a material circumstances to the latter before the policy to be effected. As growing the maritime industries in Korea, there is forming a larger marine insurance market, accordingly, and having a wide relation with the practice of the marine insurance in England. It means that the most of the legal theories of the marine insurance would be adopted by the English Marine Insurance Case Law and M.I.A., 1906. From the viewpoint of the said this author has tried out to study what is the duty of disclosure of the marine insurance based upon the English Marine Case Law.

• Journal of Korea Trade
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• v.24 no.6
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• pp.19-36
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• 2020

Purpose - This paper analyzes how to interpret the legal view of the precedents to the UK Insurance Act 2015, comparing it to the UK Marine Insurance Act (MIA) 1906 with a focus on the relationship between the duty of uberrimae fidei and the duty of disclosure. Furthermore, this study focuses on the judgment of the Korean Supreme Court in a case, that examined whether the legal nature of the duty of disclosure or duty of uberrimae fidei in insurance law can be considered as a matter related to the insurer's liability when the applicable terms of English law are incorporated under the insurance contract. Design/methodology - This paper belongs to the field of explanatory legal study, which aims to explain and test whether the choice of law is linked to the conditions that occur in the reality of judicial practice. The approach that is used toward this problem is the legal analytical normative approach. The juridical approach involves studying and examining theories, concepts, legal doctrines and legislation that are related to the problem. Findings - Regarding the requirements and effects of breach of the duty of disclosure, if English law and the Korean Commercial Act are handled differently from each other and Korean law is recognized as the applicable law outside of the insurer's liability, it may be whether the insurer's immunity under English law is contrary to s.633 of the Korean Commercial Act. In considering the breach of the duty of disclosure as a matter of the insurer's liability, even if English law is applied as a governing law, the question of how to interpret the agreement of the governing law in this case may also be raised in the interpretation of Korean International Private Law in relation to the applicable law that applies to the rest of the matter, excluding the matters of liability. Originality/value - According to the Korean Supreme Court judgement under the governing law of the MIA 1906, the basis for recognizing the assured's pre-and post-contractual duty of disclosure is separate, and the only important matters to be notified by the assured after the conclusion of the insurance contract are those that are "relevant" and "material circumstances" that are "relevant" to the matter in question after the conclusion of the insurance contract.

• THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & LAW REVIEW
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• v.33
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• pp.191-219
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• 2007

Section 39(5) of Marine Insurance Act 1906 concerns the case where with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an unseaworthy state. The underwriters argue that the assured had"blind-eye knowledge" of the particular respect in which the ship was unseaworthy. Blind-eye knowledge requires a conscious reason for blinding the eye. There must be at least a suspicion of a truth about which one do not want to know and which one refuse to investigate. What has caused greater difficulty is the broad provision in s.17 which appears to be unlimited in its scope. The expression "utmost good faith" appears to derive from the idea of uberrimae fidei, words which indeed appear in the sidenote. The concept of uberrima fides does not appear to have derived from civil law and it has been regarded as unnecessary in civilian systems. S.17 raises many questions. But only two of them are critical to the decision of the present appeal-the fraudulent claim question and the litigation question. It is however necessary to discuss them in the context of a consideration of the problematic character of s.17. In the Star Sea Case, for the defendants to succeed in their defence under this part of the case the defendants have to show that claim was made fraudulently. They have failed to obtain a finding of fraud. It is not enough that until part of the way through the trial the owners failed to disclose to the defendants would have wished to see in order to provide them with some, albeit inadequate, evidential support for their alleged defence under s.39(5). The defence under s.17 fails. The Purpose of this work is to analyze the Star Sea Case, and to explore problems of the MIA relating to the judgement of this case.